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The thesis explores the concept of grand strategy and applies it to the development of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy between 1949 and 2008, from Presidents Chiang Kai-shek, 
Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui to Chen Shui-bian. The thesis first examines the 
debates between the ‘classical’ war-centred and ‘neo-classical’ peace-centred 
perspectives in the realm of strategic studies and argues that these need not be 
mutually exclusive, but can in fact supplement one another. The thesis then adopts a 
stance of theoretical pluralism, whereby grand strategy is regarded as a process of 
power practice across periods of war and peace; it defines grand strategy as a 
cognitive state agent taking action to create and manipulate power in furthering its 
desired ends in a dynamic international society. This convergent perspective of grand 
strategy is designed to embrace these two schools of thought, since it is equally 
important for those who seek a better understanding of grand strategy in general and 
the evolution of Taiwan’s grand strategy in particular to focus both on how best to 
wage war and how best to preserve peace.  
 
To make sense of and to apply the concept of grand strategy, as an operational term, 
this thesis proposes four strategic analytical dimensions, namely, capability, choice, 
environment and posture, which are informed by the duality of four analytical pairs: 
ideational and material factors, ends and means, agency and structure, and defence 
and offence. Building upon this strategic analytical framework, the thesis moves to 
explore the perspective of leadership in Taipei against the backdrop of the political-
military confrontation between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC. The thesis 
investigates how and how far Taiwan’s grand strategy had been conditioned and 
developed by the influence of the Taipei-Beijing competition for sovereignty, changes 
in the international context, the unique strategic perspective of the successive 
presidents, domestic political developments and the asymmetry of national power 
between Taiwan and China. Through its investigation, the thesis argues that Taiwan’s 
grand strategy over the past six decades has been fundamentally driven by one prime 
factor: to secure the perspective of the ROC’s sovereign status as understood by 
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In this thesis, I have principally used the Pinyin Romanisation system to transliterate 
the Chinese names and terms, both in the text and in the footnotes. However, in some 
cases I have also used the Wade-Giles Romanisation system, where individual names 
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This thesis aims to explore the development of Taiwan’s grand strategy from 
President Chiang Kai-shek through Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui to 
Chen Shui-bian.1 It does so against the background of the political-military 
confrontation, which has long existed between the Republic of China (ROC) and 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), together with the changes in the 
international balance of power, as well as the domestic political developments in 
Taiwan. It is guided by three central questions: first, what has lain at the core of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy?2 Second, in what ways has Taiwan’s grand strategy 
been practised and, third, why has the substance of Taiwan’s grand strategy 
changed over time during these different administrations? To answer the above 
questions, the thesis examines above all the perspective of Taiwan’s top political 
leaders on the ROC’s sovereign status (zhuquan dingwei) and their responses to 
the cross-Strait crises which they encountered.    
  
These questions are important because they will go some way to providing an 
understanding of the perspective of the leadership in the ROC in managing over 
time the question of state sovereignty (quojia zhuquan) contested with the PRC. 
Clearly Taipei’s leaders have regarded Beijing as a constant and serious threat to 
the ROC’s sovereignty. Notably, only a limited number of works have so far 
been published that systematically investigate how, in the period from 1949 to 
the present, Taiwan’s grand strategy has evolved, or which focus on its 
underlying assumptions and practical effects. In this regard, this thesis seeks to 
                                                
1 This thesis in its concluding chapter will briefly examine the grand strategy of the current 
president, Ma Ying-jeou, since Ma’s administration is just beginning its second four-year spell 
under his presidency. 
2 The term ‘Taiwan’ here refers to the Republic of China (ROC) or the Republic of China on 
Taiwan (ROCOT), all three of which are interchangeable. 
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fill a gap in the academic literature concerning Taiwan’s grand strategy. It also 
contributes to the literature some important implications for the study of grand 
strategy, in particular in relation to debates about the way in which Taiwan’s 
grand strategy has continued to develop. 
 
 
C.1.1 Why This Topic? 
 
Taiwan’s grand strategy is worth exploring for its regional and wider 
international significance and its profound implications for regional and 
strategic studies. Because of Taiwan’s unique geopolitical position, the rising 
PRC places Taiwan at the very core of its national interests. From Beijing’s 
perspective, the Taiwan issue concerns not only China’s sovereignty and its 
territorial integrity, but also the distinctive geostrategic importance of this island 
for China’s future development. 3  There is a widespread belief that the 
cross-Strait conflict is ‘the only issue in the world today that could realistically 
lead to war between the two major powers [the PRC and the United States]’.4 
As some have described it, the Taiwan Strait is ‘the most dangerous place on the 
planet’ and ‘a tinderbox for war between US and China’ 5  because the 
cross-Strait conflict represents one of the most intractable political antagonisms 
in the world. Essentially, the cross-Strait confrontation is a consequence of the 
unfinished Chinese civil war in which the PRC has controlled Mainland China 
while the ROC has commanded the islands of Taiwan. More than six decades 
from its inception, the conflict remains unresolved because Beijing and Taipei 
                                                
3 Allan M. Wachman (2007) Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial 
Integrity (Stanford: Stanford University Press), Chapter 7; You Ji (1999) The Armed Forces of 
China (London: I.B.Tauris), pp.212-213.; Martin L. Lasater (1993) U.S. Interests in the New 
Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press), Chapter 7.  
4 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ‘Dangerous Strait: An Introduction’, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed.) 
(2005) Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University 
Press); Michael S. Chase, ‘US-Taiwan Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial 
Relationship’, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed.) (2005) Dangerous Strait, p.161; Swaine, M. D. 
and J. C. Mulvenon, et al. (2001). Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and 
Determinants. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), p.1; Wachman, Allan M. (2007) Why Taiwan? p.2. 
5 Edward Friedman, ‘China’s Dilemma on Using Military Forces’, in Edward Friedman (ed.) 
(2006) China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace (London: Routledge), p.205. 
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have failed to agree on mutually acceptable terms for a settlement of the 
contested sovereign statehood across the Strait. Ever since Deng Xiaoping 
proposed ‘one country, two systems’ in the early 1980s, Beijing seems 
increasingly over the years to have sought to compromise over political 
differences across the Strait, but still firmly declines to accept the claim of 
sovereign statehood by the ROC on Taiwan. On the other side, Taipei has so far 
preferred the status quo, neither unification nor formal independence across the 
Strait, which has also been well described as a ‘deadlock’ across the Strait 
which is unlikely to break. 6  However, due to the ROC’s reluctance to 
compromise its state sovereignty, Taipei has every now and again had to deal 
with major instances of a peaceful united-front strategy, coercive diplomacy and 
military intimidation instigated by Beijing, which have had a profound impact 
on regional stability and security in East Asia.7 
 
To understand the evolution of Taiwan’s grand strategy, not only the questions 
of what has been Taiwan’s grand strategy, but also the vital question of how and 
why it has changed should be considered. The main argument of this thesis is 
that it is the perspective of Taipei leaders on the ROC’s sovereign status that has 
been decisive in shaping Taiwan’s grand strategy. Moreover, this grand strategy 
has been designed and redesigned ever since 1949, to secure the leaders’ 
different perspectives of the ROC sovereign status in the sense of the state’s 
political independence and jurisdictional rights.8 According to F. H. Hinsley, 
the core meaning of sovereignty is ‘that there is a final and absolute political 
                                                
6 Taipei’s preference as the status quo power mainly began in Lee Teng-hui’s administration 
when Lee unilaterally announced the end of the civil war between the ROC and the PRC. But 
Lee, even later than Chen Shui-bian’s administration, did not rule out the option of unification in 
terms of Taiwan’s future. For discussions about the deadlock in the relations of Taiwan’s 
democratization, cross-Strait sovereign disputes and Beijing’s Taiwan policy, see Christopher R. 
Hughes (1999) ‘Democratization and Beijing’s Taiwan Policy’, in Steve Tsang and Hung-mao 
Tien (eds.) (1999) Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China (London: Macmillan), pp. 
143-144      
7 Beijing’s ‘united front’ strategy, see Christopher R. Hughes (2001) ‘Living with “One Country, 
Two Systems”? The Future of Beijing’s Taiwan’s Policy’, in Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, Vol.14 (2) (April 2001), pp. 130-135. 
8 For a discussion of sovereignty in these terms, see Alan James (1999) ‘The Practice of 
Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, Political Studies, Vol.47(3), 
(Specially Issue, 1999), pp. 457-473.  
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authority in the political community … and no final and absolute authority 
exists elsewhere.’ 9  Although meanings of sovereignty have varied across 
different theories and practices, the term sovereignty in the present thesis, thus, 
is embedded in this classic institutional perspective referring to an independent 
state’s supreme political authority within an exclusive territory.10 Nevertheless, 
the ROC’s sovereignty issue has proven to be a much more difficult and 
complex situation, because the ROC and the PRC have not been able to reach a 
mutually satisfactory institutional arrangement such as was reached in Germany 
and Korea, for example, in the context of the divided China.11 In fact, the 
ROC’s claim as a sovereign state is constantly under threat from Beijing, while 
the ROC’s international legal sovereignty has been seriously undermined as a 
consequence of Taipei’s losing its UN seat and diplomatic recognition by most 
major countries in international society since the early 1970s. At present the 
ROC has formal diplomatic relations with only 23 countries, although its 
international isolation has been mitigated to some degree by the initiation of 
Chiang Chingh-kuo’s pragmatic ‘total diplomacy’ (quan fangwei waijiao), by 
means of association with some counties, notably the United States, which has 
made comprehensive alternative arrangements to provide the functional 
equivalent of recognition under the Taiwan Relation Acts (TRA).12 Moreover, 
as Christopher R. Hughes points out, the practice of the ROC’s sovereignty by 
the population of Taiwan, in particular since Taiwan’s democratization in the 
                                                
9 F. H. Hinsley (1986) Sovereignty (2nd Ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.26.  
10 See Robert Jackson (1999) ‘Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and 
Historical Landscape’, Political Studies, Vol.47 (3), (Special Issue, 1999), pp. 431-456. Further 
discussions of different theories and practices of sovereignty include Robert Jackson (1999) 
‘Introduction: Sovereignty at the Millennium’, Political Studies, Vol.47(3), (Special Issue, 1999), 
pp. 423-430. Classifying the term “sovereignty” in four different ways: ‘domestic sovereignty’, 
‘interdependence sovereignty’, ‘international legal sovereignty’ and ‘Westphalian sovereignty’, 
Stephen D. Krasner applies the concepts of “authority” and “control” in these four usages of 
sovereignty to conclude that “authority” refers to a mutual recognised right among states and 
“control” refers to the use of a unilateral power without the mutual recognition of authority. See 
Stephen D. Krasner (2009) Power, the State, and Sovereignty (London: Routledge), pp. 179-253.  
11 On issues of the divided nations and states, see Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow and 
John G. Stoessinger (eds.) (1974) Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David Mckay 
Company). 
12 The ROC Yearbook 2011, p.74, at 
http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/docs/ch05.pdf (accessed on 23 August 
2012). Taiwan’s unique international sovereign status, see Krasner (2009) Power, the State, and 
Sovereignty, p.210 and pp. 229-230. Discussions of Chiang Ching-kuo’s ‘total diplomacy’ 
strategy, see  Chapter 5.3 of this thesis. 
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early 1990s, has presented Taipei’s leader as not merely China’s ‘provincial 
leader’ and has posed serious challenges for Beijing’s cross-Strait unification 
policy, which is fundamentally embedded in Beijing’s position of there being in 
principle only ‘one China’.13 Taking account of competing sovereignty claims 
between the ROC and the PRC, this thesis defines the meaning of the ROC’s 
sovereign status in two major aspects: on the one hand, the ROC’s jurisdictional 
sovereignty is to continue as an independent sovereign state in terms of its 
effective control on Taiwan; on the other hand, the ROC’s political sovereignty 
is dynamically to proceed with reference to varying domestic and international 
perceptions of what the ROC is in terms of its relations with Mainland China. 
Accordingly, as this thesis will argue, it is this jurisdictional and political 
sovereign concern to secure what the ROC is, that lies at the heart of the making 
of Taiwan’s grand strategy from Chiang Kai-shek’s formula of ‘the ROC as 
China’, through Chiang Ching-kuo’s notion whereby ‘the ROC as the free 
China’ and Lee Teng-hui’s argument that ‘the ROC on Taiwan’ to Chen 
Shui-bian’s dictum that ‘the ROC as Taiwan’. In short, the much contested 
sovereignty issue matters fundamentally for the ROC, in that it represents the 
core value for the state’s very survival. 
 
Accordingly, Taiwan’s national grand strategy has served either to recover 
Mainland China or to deter an invasion or forced unification by Beijing. 
Significantly, Taiwan’s grand strategy has been adapted over and over again to 
fit new circumstances and developments, both international and domestic, as 
well as those in Mainland China. For instance, in the period immediately after 
the retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the defeated forces of the Kuomintang (KMT) had 
to fight to survive against the prevailing Chinese Communist forces and they did 
so without external assistance. This unfavourable strategic situation dramatically 
changed with the outbreak of the Korean War during which the ROC began to 
emerge as a key military ally of the United States, which could be relied upon to 
want to see all Communist expansion contained. The ensuing defence alliance 
                                                
13 Hughes (1999) ‘Democratization and Beijing’s Taiwan Policy’, pp. 143-144.  
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was nonetheless dissolved during the Cold War period, when Washington 
decided to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979. Ever since, 
Taipei’s decision-makers have been obliged to design and reconsider their grand 
strategy in the face of new strategic developments at the global and regional 
level. But equally, Taipei has had to respond in the post-Cold War era to a more 
aggressive tone in Beijing’s rhetoric vis-à-vis the island.  
 
While the cross-Strait confrontation has involved two polities, the ROC on 
Taiwan has long been overshadowed by the PRC not only in international 
society but also in the academic community. This is because Taiwan is generally 
regarded as in the category of Chinese issues. Nevertheless, as long as 
unification with Taiwan represents the core of the PRC’s national interests, 
Taipei’s grand strategy will have a decisive impact on Beijing’s strategic 
behaviour.14 However, unlike the number of studies of China’s security and 
strategy, 15  the literature on Taiwan’s grand strategy is still very limited. 
Although some works have dealt with Taiwan’s security policy, these have not 
yet given enough attention to explicitly and systematically engaging with the 
strategic literature to trace the evolution of Taiwan’s grand strategy.16 Rather, 
these works have either mostly involved truncated or merely descriptive 
accounts of Taiwan’s military posture and defence capabilities or been guided 
by the framework of foreign policy analysis, including studies of the 
US-China-Taiwan “strategic triangle”.17 Bernard D. Cole’s work, for instance, 
                                                
14 The studies of China’s rise include Rex Li (2009) A Rising China and Security in East Asia: 
Identity Construction and Security Discourse (New York: Routledge); and Avery Goldstein 
(2005) Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press). 
15 An excellent literature review of the discourse of China’s security and strategy is offered by 
Rex Li (2009) A Rising China and Security in East Asia, chapter 1, pp.1-46.  
16 For authors focusing on Taiwan’s security policy, see Bernard D. Cole (2006). Taiwan’s 
Security: History and Prospects. (London: Routledge); Michael S. Chase (2008) Taiwan’s 
Security Policy: External Threats and Domestic Politics (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers); M. 
D. Swaine and J. C. Mulvenon, et al. (2001). Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies: Features 
and Determinants. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). 
17 For important works related to Taiwan’s national security and strategy, see Michael D. 
Swaine, Andrew N. D. Yang, Evan S. Medeiros and Oriana Skylar Mastro (ed.) (2007) 
Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan's Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment). Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds.) (2003) Defending Taiwan: The 
Future Vision of Taiwan’s Defence Policy and Military Strategy (London: Routledge Curzon); 
Michael D. Swaine (1999) Taiwan’s National Security, Defense Policy and Weapons 
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focuses on the military aspects of Taiwan’s security posture as adopted by the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its President Chen Shui-bian. In Cole’s 
view, Taiwan requires greater military capabilities and a stronger popular will as 
necessary elements of a deterrent against the threat of an invasion by Mainland 
China, considering that Beijing commands a military advantage against which 
Taipei cannot prevail alone for long.18 Michael S. Chase criticizes Taiwan’s 
current security policy as a “puzzled response” to Chinese military 
modernization because of (1) Taipei’s apparent belief in “free-riding” on its 
security ties with Washington; (2) its mistaken perceptions and analysis of both 
China’s military capabilities and the CCP’s will to consider and possibly opt for 
waging war against Taiwan; and (3) the island’s problematic domestic politics, 
in so far as there is a lack of consensus in relation to its security policy.19  
 
Western scholars of International Relations (IR) working on this topic have 
analysed the cross-Strait confrontation in both theoretical and empirical terms. 
Dennis van Vranken Hickey applies the idea of international system and argues 
that the transformation of the global system in the Post-Cold War era and the 
conjunction of long-term trends, such as US-PRC competitive relations, augurs 
well for Taiwan’s security as long as Taiwan resists moves for de jure separation 
from China and maintains sufficient military capabilities to deter the PRC.20 
While describing Taiwan one of ‘the two most dangerous flashpoints’ in the 
security context of East Asia, William T. Tow observes that Taipei’s policy 
makers have pursued a multi-dimensional strategy which incorporates both a 
realist and a liberal perspective. 21  Regarding the Taiwan issue as ‘an 
                                                                                                                                       
Procurement Process (Santa Monica: RAND); Dennis Van Vranken Hickey (1994) United 
States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger); Lin Cheng-yi (1989) A Triangle Lesson of Taiwan’s Security: The Influence of the 
Communist China and the United States (Chinese edition) (Taipei: Laureate Publishers); Bau, 
Tzong-ho and Wu Yu-shan (eds.) (1999) Contending Approaches to Cross-Strait Relations 
(Taipei: Wu-Nan Publishers).  
18 Cole (2006), Taiwan’s Security, pp.169-170. 
19 Chase (2008) Taiwan’s Security Policy, pp. 4-9. 
20 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey (1997) Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp.197-98. Hickey’s systematic approach also see Dennis 
Van Vranken Hickey (2007) Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principles to Pragmatism 
(London: Routledge).   
21  William T. Tow (2001) Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security 
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internationalized territorial dispute’, rather than simply a Chinese domestic 
conflict, Alan M. Wachman opts for a geostrategic approach to explain why 
Taiwan is worth fighting for, since from Beijing’s point of view foreign powers, 
mainly the U.S. and Japan, might seek to draw Taiwan into their own strategic 
realm and use Taiwan as a “bridgehead” to undermine China’s national 
interests.22 Within the Cold War context, John W. Garver empirically analyses 
the ROC-US alliance, which was a central feature of their national strategy 
during the 1950s and 1960s.23 Regarding the American roles in the ROC-PRC 
confrontation, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues that ‘strategic ambiguity’ remains 
‘safer, smarter and more realistic’ than ‘strategic clarity’24, while Richard Bush 
sees Washington’s ‘dual deterrence’ policy as being designed to constrain both 
Taipei and Beijing from escalating their bilateral confrontation into a full-scale 
conflict.25 While these valuable studies in IR provide insights about Taiwan, 
there still remains a lack of comprehensive case studies to account for the 
overall development of Taiwan’s grand strategy. The vast majority of case 
studies related to Taiwan in the field of security and strategy analysis have 
mainly focused on either the PRC or the United States. 
 
Moreover, it is also worth noting that those in the mainstream of Taiwan’s 
academics on this subject have primarily applied realist approaches, neorealism 
in particular, with a concomitant focus on the importance of material structures 
in the context of great powers’ politics. This academic preference can be 
understood by considering the distinct feature of the power asymmetry across 
the Strait: that Taipei has evidentially continued to pursue external powers to 
compensate for its weaknesses compared to Beijing. Wu Yu-shan, for example, 
one of the leading Taiwanese scholars working on international and cross-Strait 
                                                                                                                                       
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.106-108. 
22 Wachman (2007) Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity, 
chapter 8, pp.153-164. 
23 Garver, John W. (1997) The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold 
War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe). 
24 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (2005) ‘Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity’, in Tucker (ed.) 
(2005) Dangerous Strait, pp. 186-211. 
25 Richard Bush (2006) ‘The US Policy of Dual Deterrence’, in Steve Tsang (2006) If China 
Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics (New York: Routledge), pp 35-53. 
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relations, in order to rationalise Taipei’s mainland policy, applies theories of 
‘balancing and bandwagoning’ with reference to the US-China-Taiwan 
“strategic triangle”, but fails to identify the origins of the cross-Strait 
confrontation which plays a decisive role in fundamentally shaping Taiwan’s 
grand strategy.26  Similarly applying the “strategic triangle” approach, Lin 
Cheng-yi argues that a strategy of alliances is indispensable for a small state’s 
security against its much stronger foes.27 In a research report from Taiwan’s 
government, Chan Man-jung, Lin Wen-chen and Lin Bih-jaw adopt the 
neo-functionalist approach, which relies on supranational institutions for a 
collective security mechanism to deal with the cross-Strait confrontation.28 The 
consequence of this structural focus is that it pays insufficient attention to the 
evolution of strategic thinking by strategic agents, namely Taipei’s leaders, and 
too much to an analysis which seems exclusively preoccupied with the 
international system and its effects on foreign policy.  
 
With regard to the implications of democratization for Taiwan’s security and 
strategy in the cross-Strait sovereign confrontation, Bernice Lee observes that 
‘Taiwan’s democratization’ stands as ‘the most important’ factor lying behind 
the dispute between Taiwan and China. 29  Concerning Beijing’s possible 
                                                
26 Wu Yu-shan’s structural perspective is mainly derived from Kenneth N. Waltz (1959) Man, 
the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press) and Stephen M. Walt (1987) The 
Origin of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), see Wu Yu-shan (1999) ‘Taiwan’s 
Mainland Policy: Structure and Rationality’, in Bau Tzong-ho and Wu Yu-shan (eds.) (1999) 
Contending Approaches to Cross-Strait Relations (Taipei: Wu-Nan Publishers), pp. 155-210. 
27 Lin Cheng-yi (1995), “Taiwan’s Security Strategies in the Post-Cold War Era”, Issues and 
Studies (Taipei), Vol.31, No,4 (April 1995), pp.78-97. 
28  Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (1996) A Construction of the 
Asia-Pacific Collective Security System and the Role of Our State (Taipei: Research, 
Development and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan). On collective security, see David 
B. Dewitt (1994) ‘Concept of Security for the Asia-Pacific Region’, in Bunn Nagara and K.S. 
Balakrishnan (eds.) (1994) The Making of Security Community in the Asia-Pacific (Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International Studies), pp.9-43. On the origins and 
ideas of neo-functionalism see, for instance, Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter (1964) 
‘Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about the Unity in 
Latin America’, in International Organization, Vol.18, No.4 (Autumn, 1964), pp.705-737; Ernst 
B. Haas (1968) ‘Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe’, in Joseph S. Nye Jr, 
International Regionalism: Readings (Boston, MA: Little, Brown), pp.149-176; Norman D. 
Palmer (1991) The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific (Lexington, Massachusetts: 
Lexington Books).  
29 Bernice Lee (1999) The Security Implication of the New Taiwan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press/IISS, Adelphi Paper 331), pp.9-11. 
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misperception of the evolution of Taiwan’s national identity movements as steps 
toward separatism, Cal Clark argues that democracy in Taiwan can go for a 
“clear and present danger” to its national security if democratisation becomes 
inflamed and polarises ethnic tensions within the society and cross-Strait 
relations with Beijing.30 Analysing the impact of democratisation on Taiwan’s 
national identity and national security, Chia-Lung Lin argues that Taiwan’s 
democratisation involves a mechanism for forging domestic consensus and 
enables Taipei to redefine its roles and relations with the region’s major actors 
(the US, China, Japan and the ASEAN) as a way of building Taiwan as a nation 
and state.31     
  
The main weakness of the above works and other relevant publications is that 
they have resulted in studies with what is arguably a limited focus and a 
truncated understanding of the context and in particular the development of 
Taiwan’s security and strategy. Indeed, a major oversight of the literature on the 
cross-strait conflict is that it lacks works which examine the evolution of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy in theoretical and historical terms. Even where the 
literature discusses strategy, it largely fails to acknowledge that Taiwan’s grand 
strategy is the product of a dialectical interplay of material and ideational factors 
and that the formulation of this strategy can itself be grasped only by way of an 
understanding of the decision-makers as agents situated in the dynamic of 
strategic contexts.32 Equally, this strategic literature does not consider in much 
                                                
30 Cal Clark (2001) ‘Successful Democratisation in the ROC: Creating a Security Challenge’, in 
Alexander C. Tan, Steve Chan, Calvin Jillson (2001) Taiwan’s National Security: Dilemmas and 
Opportunities (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 18-59. For the interaction between democratisation and 
national identity, Christopher R. Hughes rightly observes that, for greater access to the mainland 
and more recognition in international society, Taipei has moved to ‘a more sophisticated attempt 
to articulate the meaning of one China than opting for either independence or unification.’ see 
Christopher R. Hughes (1997) Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism – National Identity and Status in 
International Society (London: Routledge), p.94.   
31 Chia-lung Lin (2001) ‘National Identity and Taiwan Security’, in Alexander C. Tan, Steve 
Chan, Calvin Jillson (eds.) (2001) Taiwan’s National Security, pp. 60-83.  
32 This shortage mainly stems from the reliance on neorealist analysis, such as the ‘balancing 
and bandwagoning’ analysis adopted by Wu Yu-shan. For Wu’s structural realist perspective on 
the ‘strategic triangle’ model analysis, see Yu-shan Wu (2003) ‘Does Chen’s Election Make 
Any Difference? Domestic and International Constrains on Taipei, Washington and Beijing’, in 
Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) (2003) Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization and 
Cross-Strait Relations in the 21st Century (Taiwan in the Modern World) (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe Paperback), pp. 155-192.   
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detail the complex and interdependent relationship of means and ends or dwell 
for long on the notions of offence and defence, as seen from Taipei’s viewpoint. 
The existing literature is also virtually oblivious to changes in Taiwan’s grand 
strategy over time and pays only limited attention to the impacts of cross-Strait 
crises. As a result, it is worthwhile to explore and display a bigger picture in the 
evolution of Taiwan’s grand strategy, which might enrich regional and strategic 
studies dealing the conflict across the Taiwan Strait.  
 
 
C.1.2 The Concept of Grand Strategy 
 
 
The term grand strategy has generally been applied when studying national 
powers, constituted by military, economic, social and political means, by which 
a state aims at producing its intended effects.33 This usage points to the core of 
grand strategy: the pursuit of a combination of military and non-military 
instruments to promote and preserve national interests. Instead of considering 
the military dimension of strategy in isolation, this thesis will understand by 
grand strategy an overarching policy design which takes into consideration 
different factors to fulfil proposed national goals as defined by national policy 
through the interpretation and implementation of the prime strategic actors, e.g. 
political leaders. As such, it adds to the existing literature of grand strategy 
which has mainly focused on historical or policy analysis as necessary, but has 
not necessarily dwelt much on the general concept or theorized about its 
                                                
33 Lawrence Freedman (2006) The Transformation of Strategic Affairs. (Abingdon, New York: 
Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 379), pp.8-9. For 
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Kennedy (1991) ‘Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition’, in Paul 
Kennedy (ed.) (1991) Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press); 
John M. Collins (1973) Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press); Barry R. Posen (1984) The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and 
Germany between the World Ears (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Richard Rosecrance and 
Arthur A. Stein (eds.) (1993) The Domestic Basis of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press); Thomas J. Christensen (1996) Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic 
Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press); 
James C. Gaston (ed.) (1992) Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process (Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University Press). 
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meaning and significance, as Avery Goldstein observes.34 
   
Accordingly, the analytical framework adopted in the present thesis is based on 
a particular formulation of grand strategy (which will be the subject of Chapter 
2): one which does not simply regard the concept as relating to conventional 
strategic analytical dimensions, namely the ‘diplomatic, economic, military and 
informational’ perspectives and their hierarchy of importance for national 
security.35 The main weakness of this conventional framework is arguably the 
limitation as regards identifying, exploring and conceptualising the core value of 
national strategy, given its focus on the operational convenience for conducting 
the strategic analysis. To make sense of grand strategy, this thesis examines four 
strategic analytical dimensions, namely, choice, capability, environment and 
posture, which are informed by the duality of four analytical pairs: 
ideational-material factors, ends-means, agency-structure and defence-offence.36 
Also, I believe that the concept of grand strategy highlights a process of power 
practice.37 This implies that the focus of analysis should rest principally on the 
state as a political entity which is dedicated to its own survival and prosperity. 
Notably, grand strategy is a form of agency pursued by decision-makers. 
Consequently, by applying the four strategic dimensions, I define grand strategy 
for the purpose of this thesis as a process in which a cognitive state agent takes 
actions to create and manipulate power to achieve its perceived ends in a 
dynamic international society. Obviously, this is not a traditional definition 
often encountered in the analysis of grand strategy although the concepts of 
                                                
34 Goldstein (2005) Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security, 
pp.17-18. Goldstein highlights the role of diplomacy in the concept of grand strategy, which 
refers to ‘the central logic that informs and links those [foreign] policies, the regime’s vision 
about it can most sensibly serve the national interests (goals) in light of the country’s capabilities 
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Goldstein (2005) Rising to the Challenge, p.19.  
35 U.S. Department of Defense (1995) Dictionary of Military Terms (London: Greenhill Books), 
pp. 257-258.  
36 For details of the analytical framework of grand strategy adopted in this thesis, see Chapter 2.  
37 The idea that the concept of strategy should be regarded as a process draws upon Williamson 
Murray and Mark Grimsley (1994) ‘Introduction: On Strategy’, in Williamson Murray, 
MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (eds.) The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.1-23. 
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process and power are not new in relation to strategic analysis. 38  The 
conceptual framework of grand strategy as a process of power practice echoes 
André Beaufre’s idea that ‘[the nature of] strategy cannot be a single defined 
doctrine; it is a method of thought.’39    
 
Traditionally, the idea of grand strategy is part of a conceptual hierarchy which 
in the context of war ranges the subordinate concepts according to their degree 
of specialisation, from tactics and operations to strategy.40 In Michael Howard’s 
definition, ‘grand strategy in the first half of the twentieth century consisted 
basically in the mobilization and deployment of national resources of wealth, 
manpower and industrial capacity, together with the enlistment of those of allied 
and, when feasible, of neutral powers, for the purpose of achieving the goals of 
national policy in wartime.’41 Edward Mead Earl likewise pointed out that state 
and society have become so interwoven in the era of modern war that ‘strategy 
must be considered as the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a 
nation … The highest type of strategy – sometimes called grand strategy – is 
that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort 
to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum 
chance of victory.’42 By such a definition, Earle, along with others, not only 
regards war as a political instrument reflecting Clausewitz’s dictum whereby 
‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’, but also extends the realm of 
grand strategy from wartime to peacetime. These classical concepts of grand 
strategy present the notion of strategy as action, which is focused in the main on 
                                                
38 For the application of the concept of power in strategic studies here, I draw on Lawrence 
Freedman (1992) ‘Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power’, in Lawrence Freedman, Paul 
Hayes and Robert O’neill (eds.) (1992) War, Strategy and International Politics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
39 André Beaufre (1965) An Introduction to Strategy (tr. R.H. Barry) (London: Faber & Faber), 
PP.11-13. 
40 Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka (2005) ‘Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: 
The Social Root of Nordic Defence’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.40 (1) (March 2005), p.12. 
41 Michael Howard (1972) (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series) 
Grand Strategy Vol. IV: August 1942- September 1943 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office), p.1. 
42 Edward Mead Earle (1943) ‘Introduction’, in Edward Mead Earle (ed..) (1943) Makers of 
Modern Strategy: Military Though from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press), p. viii. 
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preparations for war and then the putting into effect of those war preparations in 
order to secure and promote their proposed national interests.43 Building on this 
classical concept of strategy, strategic analysis focuses on the way in which 
states and their leaders coordinate and direct all the available resources of the 
nation for the pursuit of its political ends. This is a convincing aspect that the 
classical analysis proposes, taking in on the way a major selection of national 
resources, but centring on the war effort for strategic analysis. Nevertheless, the 
war-centred kind of traditional strategic analysis, a “classical” school, which 
stresses the application of military force as an indispensable and effective 
political instrument in the context of strategy, does not dwell on the importance 
of the element of flexibility pervading strategic considerations, whereby military 
fighting power is just one of grand strategy’s possible instruments. Adopting a 
broader vision of strategy allows the analyst to take account of other available 
dimensions, including the non-military one, to enrich the analysis.  
 
The traditional war-centred strategist has always regarded victory as the ultimate 
value in the context of strategy. To rethink the war-centred strategic analytical 
framework, a peace-centred strategic perspective, in a “neo-classical” school, 
emerges to further scrutinise the very meaning of victory. Liddell Hart opted for 
this rethinking, as follows: ‘The object of war is to obtain a better peace … 
Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace and of one’s people, is 
better after the war than before. Victory in this sense is only possible if a quick 
result can be gained or if a long effort can be economically proportioned to the 
national resources. The end must be adjusted to the means.’ 44  This 
peace-centred argument led to the conclusion, in Paul Kennedy’s phrase, that ‘a 
true grand strategy was now concerned with peace as much as (perhaps even 
more than) with war.’45 This was in line with the fact that the advent of nuclear 
weapons had encouraged mainstream strategic studies to focus on theories of 
deterrence, in so far as it laid a new emphasis on the use made by military forces 
                                                
43 Hew Strachan (2008) ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. 
Maiolo (eds.) Strategic Studies: A Reader (London: Routledge), pp.428, 432. 
44 Liddell Hart, B. H. (1991) Strategy (2nd ed’n.) (London: Meridian), p.357. 
45 Paul Kennedy (1991) ‘Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition’, p.4. 
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mainly of the threat of war.46 Thomas Schelling, in Arms and Influence, thus 
regards military strategy as ‘the diplomacy of violence’, that is, the art of 
coercion, intimidation and deterrence, which deals with the exploitation of 
potential force rather than the efficient application of force for military victory.47 
As a result, a new approach in strategic studies has taken the peace-centred 
strategic perspective, by drawing on all national resources to preserve peace and 
avoid war instead of engaging in war for the pursuit of national interests. 
However, Hew Strachan blames the non-military dimension of strategic studies 
for ‘losing the meaning of strategy’ because in his view ‘the control and 
direction of war’ are at the core of strategy, which, as he put it, is designed ‘to 
make war useable by the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfil its 
political objectives.’48  
 
While researchers may debate the relative insights and limitations of 
war-centred and peace-centred perspectives in analysis, these need not be 
mutually exclusive but can instead supplement one another. It is obvious that, 
analysts who draw on either of them exclusively are unlikely to have a full 
understanding of a state’s grand strategy. For example, in the context of the 
cross-Strait confrontation, a war-centred notion of strategy fails to explain how 
Taiwan as a small state, when compared to China, can have survived as an 
independent political entity by focusing only on military preparation against its 
much stronger foe. By comparison, those concentrating on what I would call 
strategy’s peace-centred aspects cannot fully explain why Taipei has rejected 
any international intervention in the pursuit of a peace settlement across the 
Strait from the 1950s to the 1970s. In this thesis, therefore, I intentionally adopt 
a posture of theoretical pluralism, whereby I regard grand strategy as a process 
of power practice which embraces both these schools of thought, since it is 
equally important to focus on how best to wage war and how best to preserve 
peace. I believe that viewing things from a perspective of power practice is a 
                                                
46 Hew Strachan (2008) ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, p.428. 
47 Thomas C. Schelling (1966) Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press), 
pp.26-34. 
48 Hew Strachan (2008) ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, p.432. 
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better way to avoid distortion in favour of any partisan perspective and hence to 
gain a better understanding of strategic analysis in general and the evolution of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy in particular. 
 
 
C.1.3 Strategy-making and the Presidential Role  
 
As this thesis is explicitly concerned with Taiwan’s grand strategy under 
particular administrations during the period from Chiang Kai-shek to Chen 
Shui-bian and to some extent with making comparisons between administrations 
where possible, it is worth explaining in advance why a presidency-centred 
perspective has been adopted for the analysis of the strategic decision-making 
processes under discussion. This actor-specific orientation speaks to both 
theoretical and empirical concerns of the analysis of strategy. 
 
First, strategies are fundamentally made and practised by people. As Colin S. 
Gray observes, ‘strategists have personalities that are the product of their 
biology and life experience’. 49  While demonstrating other necessary 
components to make sense of strategy, Gray argues that ‘the human dimension 
of strategy is so basic and obvious that it often escapes notice by scholars with a 
theoretical bent. At all relevant levels of analysis strategy is done by 
individuals.’50 Gray’s approach of decoding strategy thus stresses the vital role 
in the analysis of strategy of the behaviour of particular individuals. It also 
offers explanations for some phenomena of the existing strategic literature, 
showing why many national strategic doctrines have been initiated and made by 
certain individual leaders, which has given rise to labels such as the Eisenhower 
Doctrine.51To be sure, adopting such a leader-oriented perspective does not 
                                                
49 Colin S. Gray and Jeannie L. Johnson (2010) ‘The Practice of Strategy’, in Baylis, John, 
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mean that the ROC President alone can make decisions without interacting with 
other key factors within the structure and process of national security policy- 
making in Taiwan. This is because, in the context of a given strategic 
environment, there is an interrelated ‘strategic-relation’ between ‘strategic 
actors’ and the ‘strategically selective context’, as Colin Hay argues. In other 
words, this thesis holds that strategic actors purposively engage comprehensive 
external structural factors to achieve their perceived goals.52 In fact, rather than 
focusing exclusively on external structural factors, as the neorealist approach 
does, the adopted presidency-centred perspective can be regarded as a 
domestic-orientation of strategic analysis by other means. Moreover, the 
human-actor-specific perspective makes it more useful, sensible and accessible 
to understand how and explain why ideational factors, e.g. perception and belief, 
can play a decisive role in making national strategy.53 With their desired goals 
in mind, the strategic actors, in fact, are versatile enough to pursue all available 
means and respond to external structural constraints on purpose to map out their 
strategies. National grand strategy is the product, and the outcome, of the 
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dynamic process, which is centred on prime strategic actors’ perspectives with 
regard to national choices, capabilities, situation and pose.54 As a result, in the 
analysis of strategy, the actor-specific perspective is designed mainly to 
understand the strategic actors’ goals and motivations and, accordingly, to 
explain their actions on the nation’s behalf that may enable the much-neglected 
human element to be brought back to centre stage in making national grand 
strategy. 
 
The analytical framework of national grand strategy is also a policy-relevant 
element of theory which policymakers may find useful in making strategy. At 
the heart of national grand strategy is an overarching national security policy, a 
setting of interdependent choices, ‘in the pursuit of viable solutions’, according 
to Bernard Brodie.55 As it partakes of policy in its nature, the concept of 
national grand strategy can be substantialized only by the action of a strategic 
actor in a dynamic strategic environment. ‘The crux of grand strategy lies in 
policy’, as Paul Kennedy rightly argues, ‘that is, in the capacity of the nation’s 
leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for 
the preservation and enhancement of the national’s long term best interests.’56 
Accordingly, the prime strategic actors, their policies and the actor-policy 
relations stand as the principal objects for strategic analysis.  
 
In the analysis to identify what major factors affect state behaviour in 
international politics, there is a level-of-analysis debate among IR scholars. 
While Kenneth Waltz famously framed three distinct ‘images’- human nature, 
the nature of states, and the nature of the international system - to explain the 
sources and causes of war. David Singer, in response, introduced the 
‘level-of-analysis’ concept to International Relations and focused mainly on two 
levels: the international system and the national state.57 Although the concept of 
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levels of analysis has offered many insights for the development of theoretical 
thinking in IR, challenges to the level-of-analysis approach remain, in particular 
in terms of how to integrate the different levels of analysis for a comprehensive 
understanding of national policy.58  In the analysis of grand strategy, the 
proposed ‘strategic-relational’ approach enables the analysis to cut across the 
levels of individual agency and the structure of international relations in a 
systematic manner. As a result, as regards explaining state strategy or behaviour, 
the selected level of analysis (which may focus our attention, for example, on 
individual leaders, bureaucracy, the state, the region or global relations) does not 
necessarily lead to the kind of ‘reductionist’ or ‘holistic’ perspective that Waltz 
identified. Instead, the approach looks at causal factors (explanans) or sources of 
explanation. And the objects of analysis all depend on the criteria by which the 
objects’ principal units are defined and the question(s) being asked of the 
research subject. In short, coined as foreign policy analysis, while focusing on 
the selected prime strategic actors, the policy-centred analysis of grand strategy 
claims a position in multi-causal explanations and interdisciplinarity.59     
 
Secondly, addressing the empirical question of specifying the prime strategic 
actors in the studies of the governmental decision-making processes, Melvyn D. 
Read proposes a ‘central and marginal’ policy network theory to classify and 
identify the important figures in various agencies, both public and private, in 
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terms of their influence, involvement and commitment to policy formulation.60 
The question of who is the prime actor in the strategic decision-making process, 
therefore, is about the question of political power: how to identify who is really 
in charge. With regard to the nature and scope of policy-centred national grand 
strategy, it is typical for the study of national strategy to put its analytical lens 
on the most powerful strategic actor, the leader of a state.61 The crucial role of 
leaders explains why in the study of American grand strategy, for example, the 
President has always remained in central focus. As Robert J. Art rightly points 
out, the vital relations between grand strategy and national leaders, ‘grand 
strategy is a broad subject: a grand strategy tells a nation’s leaders what goals 
they should aim for and how best they can use their country’s military power to 
attain these goals.’62 In the context of who is making Taiwan’s grand strategy, 
despite the variety of agencies and individuals involved in the governmental 
decision-making process, the President has consistently played the role of the 
prime strategic actor who possesses exclusive and decisive power to dictate 
national grand strategy.63 In fact, if anything extended over the course of the 
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authoritarian period under Presidents Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo, 
the scope of presidential power and the prerogatives of the presidency have also 
been jealously guarded by subsequent leaders of the executive, regardless of 
party affiliation and the intervening domestic political changes which have 
brought about significant democratization. Presidential power in mapping out 
Taiwan’s grand strategy is particularly identifiable, as are the finer details of the 
country’s national policy, which continue to rest on executive privilege. During 
Chiang’s authoritarian period (1949-1988), imposing their hard-line cross-Strait 
policy against Beijing, the so-called “Communist bandit” (gong fei) in the period 
of martial law, the roles and responsibilities as commander in chief, chief 
executive and head of state gave the presidents exclusive and distinctive power 
to control government policy, the military forces and intelligence-gathering 
instruments in an overall unchallenged status. Despite Taiwan’s democratization 
associated with the political and organizational developments after the 
authoritarian period, the President still enjoys exclusive power and 
responsibility in making national security strategy, in relation to foreign and 
defence policy in particular, as well as cross-Strait issues. The dominant power 
in Taiwan currently is guarded by and derived from the French-style presidential 
constitutional framework.64 Consequently, the president has generally been 
regarded as the prime strategic actor, who plays a leading and representative role 
in the making of the country’s foreign and national security policies.  
 
Nevertheless, too little attention for its full meaning and significance, some 
exceptions notwithstanding, is still paid to the role of the President in foreign 
policy making in general and in particular as regards comparisons of the styles 
of different presidents in the analysis of Taiwan’s grand strategy. Chin-Pu Chen, 
in his research on Taiwan’s defence policy-making process, has concluded that 
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the President is at the very core of Taiwan’s policy network and as such the 
major decision-maker who leads, commands and controls Taiwan’s defence and 
also security policy.65 In related research on the formulation of Taiwan’s 
national security policy and Taipei’s policy on weapons procurement, Michael 
D. Swaine likewise points out that the President exercises “supreme authority” 
over national grand strategy, together with the broad contours of foreign and 
defence policy.66 Nevertheless, Swaine also finds that, during President Lee 
Teng-Hui’s series of administrations in the 1990s, despite his supreme power, 
‘no formal, institutionalised and regularized interagency process’ was observed 
in the government for making national security policy; indeed, the President 
relied on his few senior civilian and military officials for professional 
suggestions. 67  This lack of a formal mechanism for coordinating the 
decision-making processes regarding national security policy under Lee 
Teng-Hui’s administration can be regarded as the legacy of former authoritarian 
regimes. Before the 1990s, Taipei’s leaders were political and military strong 
men, who exclusively shaped the boundaries of their responsibilities, determined 
policy directions and identified the critical issues and points under which to map 
out Taiwan’s grand strategy. The greatest challenge to the exercise of the 
President’s power in determining the decision-making process with regard to 
grand strategy emerged in 2000 when, for the first time in Taiwan’s history, not 
only did the President’s party lose its majority in Parliament (Legislative Yuan) 
but Taiwan’s military institutions in consequence had to deal with a non-KMT 
government.68 As the head of state and supreme commander of the armed 
forces, President Chen Shui-bian could continue to rely on the framework of the 
Constitution and the National Defence Law to bear the primary role and 
responsibilities in the formulation of Taiwan’s grand strategy but, as the leader 
of a minority government, the President inevitably had his authority undermined 
                                                
65 Chen Ching-Pu (2006) ‘Defense Policy-Making and Civilian Roles’, in Martin Edmonds and 
Michael M. Tsai (eds.) (2006) Taiwan’s Defense Reform (Oxon: Routledge), pp.93-94. 
66  Michael D. Swaine (1999) Taiwan’s National Security, Defense Policy and Weapons 
Procurement Process (Santa Monica: RAND), pp.6-7 
67 Ibid, p. ix. 
68 The civil-military relations in Taiwan at the time are explored by Bernard D. Cole (2006). 
Taiwan’s Security, Chapter 9. 
 32 
and hindered, so that he could not enjoy as much power as his predecessors from 
the KMT had.69 As the structure and decision-making process in relation to the 
making of Taiwan’s national security strategy has changed dramatically since 
the end of the martial law era, democratization has surely complicated the 
national strategy-making process in Taiwan. In addition to the president, new 
main participants in the decision-making process now include the prime minister 
(xingzhengyuan yuanzhang), the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry 
of National Defense and General Staff Headquarters, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the National Security Bureau, the Legislative Yuan, the Mainland 
Affairs Council, political parties and the president’s private advisors. For 
instance, the NSC was established in 1967 as an advisory body to the president 
and its role has increased significantly since Lee Teng-hui’s era. In a private 
interview with the author, a former member and later Deputy General of the 
NSC told him that ‘the NSC has been consulted by the president on a regular 
basis and does play a vital role in providing policy advices for national security 
strategy, although the NSC does not get involved in the practical 
implementation because that is the authority belonging to the president and the 
Executive Yuan.’70 However, he stressed that ‘the role of the NSC all depends 
on the president’s instructions and trust.’71 
 
In conclusion, the making of Taiwan’s grand strategy is certainly not a one-man 
mission, but the main argument here is that the role of the President, as the 
prime strategic actor in making national policy, is not sufficiently emphasised 
and should be more systematically examined in a comparative way. As Hudson 
argues, in writing on foreign policy, ‘[t]he ground of the human decision-makers 
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lead us toward an emphasis on agent-oriented theory’.72 While affirming that 
the President acts as the prime strategic actor at the core of Taiwan’s 
decision-making processes with reference to the formulation of national security 
policy, this thesis aims to identify and explore the principal elements of the 
respective national grand strategy of successive administrations, which is 
sometimes also encapsulated in the term “doctrine”.73 For instance, this thesis 
distinguishes between the “outward-looking” doctrine of Chiang Kai-shek, the 
“inward-looking” doctrine of Chiang Ching-kuo, the “existing” doctrine of Lee 
Teng-hui, and the “third-way” doctrine of Chen Shui-bian. In response to the 
cross-Strait challenges centred on the sovereignty question, the President’s 
perspective of the ROC’s sovereignty status continues to have a critical bearing 
on the formulation and conduct of Taiwan’s grand strategy. Thus, I find it 
essential, in seeking to capture the essence and evolution of Taiwan’s grand 
strategy at any point and to effectively relate particular security strategy 
proposals to basic policy, not only to clarify the thinking and implementation of 
the main ideas by the country’s particular administrations, but also to do so by 
comparing the background of some analysis of the way in which preceding 
administrations shaped policy development in dealing with the selected crucial 





The use of particular methodologies and sources in strategic studies is the 
subject of considerable debate. 74  Such debate reflects differences and 
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preferences regarding particular approaches to the social sciences and the related 
conceptual and theoretical approaches. The research focus also influences one’s 
choice of methodology. This thesis employs a case study with qualitative 
methodology, in line with the proposed convergent analytical framework 
derived from the strategic studies literature, to explain the evolution of Taiwan’s 
grand strategy with a focus on the role played by the president, the prime 
strategic actor making national strategy. The qualitative case study, rooted in a 
historical context, is especially vital for strategic analysis because Taiwan’s 
grand strategy is policy-oriented in nature. As Alexander L. George suggests, 
the qualitative case study enables us to proceed to theory testing and apply 
established theories to explain specific cases.75 Stephen Van Evera and Robert 
K. Yin have also suggested that the case study approach is often regarded as the 
most effective method for studying how and why types of question.76 When 
opting for a qualitative methodology, the researcher is usually guided by the 
principle that reality is subject to perceptive interpretation. While quantitative 
research is rooted in the positivist position, presupposing an objective reality 
and requiring the pursuit of this reality through a ‘scientific’ approach, 
qualitative methodology, deriving from the philosophical thinking of 
interpretivism, is considered a better approach for ‘culturally derived and 
historically situated interpretations of the social life-world’.77 Indeed, with 
regard to concepts of ‘meaning, process and context’ within analysis, qualitative 
methods are ‘most appropriately employed where the aim of research is to 
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explore people’s subjective experiences and the meaning they attach to those 
experiences’.78 The advantage of qualitative methodology, as Fiona Devine 
points out, goes ‘to the study of mass political behaviour by seeking to 
understand political actors as conscious social beings who shape the world of 
politics as well as being shaped by it.’79 As a result, drawing particular attention 
to the method of structured, focused comparison80, the qualitative case study is 
considered appropriate in the context of the research questions posed herein. 
 
This thesis adopts a convergent approach, building on diverse but 
complementary strategic analytical perspectives. It is both war-centred and 
peace-centred. The convergent framework focuses on eight analytical concepts 
combined in four pairings (ideational-material factors, ends-means, 
agent-structure and defence-offence), which are operationally presented in 
relation to four strategic dimensions (capability, choice, the environment and 
posture) to establish the analytical structure. For the selected cases, the thesis 
investigates the development of Taiwan’s grand strategy in relation to four 
administrations, those of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui 
and Chen Shui-bian. The analysis of the case studies thus covers the period from 
1949 to 2008. As change in the formulation of Taiwan’s grand strategy 
generally tends to be incremental while being punctuated by crisis situations, the 
thesis also examines, in relation to five key events, the island’s post-1949 
politico-military history and the implications of these events for Taiwan’s grand 
strategy. These five events are: (1) the first two military crises in the Taiwan 
Strait of 1954-55 and 1958; (2) the Nixon shocks (Nixon’s visit to China in 
1972 and the beginning of Taiwan’s international isolation); (3) the end of 
Taipei-Washington formal diplomatic relations in l979; (4) the third Taiwan 
Strait crisis of 1995-96; and (5) the seizure of power by the self-determination 
Democratic Progress Party in 2000. Because of the unique context of each crisis, 
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it is worth noting in advance that the research will incorporate the unique 
features of these crises for explaining Taiwan’s grand strategy. For example, 
cross-Strait economic relations were not an issue among the strategic concerns 
of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, as there were simply no such 
cross-Strait economic connections as exist today. The contemporary agreements 
on economic exchanges were in fact forbidden under both these Presidents. 
Another important factor that this thesis takes into account is the changing 
domestic political situation. Other dynamic domestic factors, e.g. the 
democratisation process, have also left their own mark on the formulation of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy mainly after Chiang Ching-kuo took power and adopted 
an inward-looking strategic doctrine from the early 1970s.  
 
The historical experiences of Taipei in managing the cross-Strait confrontation 
since 1949 reveal that the dynamics underpinning Taiwan’s grand strategy are 
by no means straightforward. To incorporate the three central research questions 
proposed at the beginning of this thesis, these complexities and contradictions of 
historical experiences invite three crucial questions: (1) What are the main 
factors which have resulted in the long-lasting cross-Strait confrontation 
according to the crisis? (2) Why has the conflict between Beijing and Taipei and 
the key political and military crises which have arisen at various times not 
escalated into a major war across the Strait? (3) What is the nature of the 
contingent advantages during the crisis which have so far have allowed the 
relatively small state of the ROC on Taiwan to sustain and continue conflict 
with that great power, the PRC? By focusing on these three questions, this thesis 
is able to standardise comparisons of the implications of the way in which 
Taipei’s policy-makers have perceived and engaged in these crucial cross-Strait 
crises to formulate and reconstruct Taiwan’s grand strategy. 
 
Furthermore, to explore in more detail how these crises and developments 
influenced Taiwan’s grand strategy, the analysis of these key events attempts to 
explicate the following questions: 1) In what ways have the above crises and 
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events led Taipei’s decision-makers to re-evaluate the island’s grand strategy? 
In particular, how has Taipei’s top leadership interpreted China’s strategy 
toward the island? 2) In what ways have re-evaluations of cross-Strait relations 
also led to the formulation of actual changes to Taiwan’s grand strategy? 3) To 
what extent has the nature of the threat posed by Beijing been re-interpreted as a 
consequence of the various cross-Strait crises or important developments in the 
strategic relations between the major powers? Did these events undermine 
Taiwan’s longstanding geostrategic position? 4) To what extent has Taiwan’s 
grand strategy depended on US deterrence? To what extent has the grand 
strategy nevertheless built on an autonomous military capability for Taiwan? 5) 
To what extent have Taiwan’s decision-makers sought to win an even greater 
commitment on the part of the United States to defend Taiwan? 6) What has 
been the importance of developments in military technology in Taiwan’s 
reassessment of the island’s grand strategy? What significance has been 
attributed to China’s arms acquisitions and upgrades? 7) To what extent has 
Taiwan’s grand strategy been the function of the political purposes of the ruling 
party? 8) To what extent has Taiwan’s grand strategy been the subject of 
domestic political dispute? At the end of each of the empirical chapters of the 
thesis I also highlight and assess the following: first, key elements of Taiwan’s 
grand strategy in the intervening period between two key events; second, 
whether Taiwan’s grand strategy led at the time to an improvement or 
deterioration in cross-Strait relations?; and third, whether it has been Taiwan’s 
grand strategy or other factors that have shielded Taiwan from forced unification 
with China?       
 
To address these issues, this thesis draws mainly on published primary and 
secondary materials with extensive use of primary sources in the Chinese 
language. The evidence employed includes official reports and documents 
issued by Taipei, Beijing and Washington; official speeches and statistics; and 
both newspaper articles and scholarly studies. As the thesis adopted a 
perspective which focuses heavily on the role of the president; particular 
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emphasis is placed on publications highlighting the Presidents’ thoughts and 
reasoning: i.e., his speeches, diaries, as well as relevant articles, interviews and 
official autobiographies, such as the forty-volume collection of Chiang Kai-shek 
organised by Qin Xiaoyi from the Kuomintang (KMT) Historical Committee, 
‘Complete Collection of President Chiang’s Ideas and Speeches’ (Xian zongtong 
jianggong sixiang yanlun zongji); the twenty-four-volume collection of Chiang 
Ching-kuo from the ROC Government Information Office, ‘Collected Speeches 
of Chiang Ching-Kuo’ (Jiang jingguo xiangsheng quanji); Lee Teng-hui’s ‘The 
Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity’ and the four-volume 
comprehensive interview with him organized by Zhang Yan-xian from 
Academia Historica, ‘An Interview and Narration of Lee Teng-hui’ (Li denghui 
zongtong fangtan lu); as well as Chen Shui-bian’s own books ‘The Son of 
Taiwan’, ‘The Maiden Voyage into the New Century’ (Shiji shouhang) and 
‘Believe Taiwan’ (Xiangxin taiwan).81 Additional important official sources 
include the bi-annual national defence reports from the ROC Ministry of 
Defense (MND) since 1992, press releases from the ROC MND, the Mainland 
Affairs Council (MAC) and the Presidential Office, and other official documents 
such as the Taiwan National Security Council’s first and only National Security 
Report, published in 2006. For secondary sources, while Lee Teng-hui and Chen 
Shui-bian have many of their own books and firsthand interviews to show their 
thoughts about how they managed Taiwan, Jay Taylor’s books, ‘The 
Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and The Struggle for Modern China’ and  
‘The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and 
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Taiwan’, provide valuable updated information and comprehensive analysis for 
the study of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, two traditional 
political-military strong men who did not express themselves in such an explicit 
fashion as Lee and Chen did, about their ways of handling national strategy. In 
addition to international scholars’ works, this thesis also draws on Taiwan’s 
leading academic journals (e.g. Issues and Studies), MND military periodicals 
(e.g. National Defense Journal and Air Force Science Monthly), monographs 
and policy papers published by Taiwan’s major think tanks (e.g. Institute for 
National Policy Research, National Policy Foundation, Prospect Foundation and 
Taiwan Thinktank) and articles from Taiwan’s major newspapers, including 
China Times, Central Daily News, United Daily News and Liberty Times.82  
 
This study moreover draws on some interviews conducted with participants in 
Taiwan’s national strategy and defence policy process. The interviewees include 
current and former ROC government officials, legislators, military officers, 
think tank researchers, and academic strategic experts. The dates of the 
interviews range from 2003 to the present and the interviews were conducted 
mainly in Taiwan.83 Nevertheless, it is recognised that interviews tend to have 
their limitations, including the challenges of gaining access to key individuals, 
the sensitive nature of the subject of national security strategy, and inaccuracies 
due to the fallibility of memory and either intentional or unintentional attempts 
to mislead or misinform the interviewer.84 This however is not to suggest that 
interviews are not important and unworthy of consideration. On the contrary, 
interviews may sometime fill in gaps left by the published sources and provide 
                                                
82 Issue and Studies is published by The Institute of International Relations at National 
Chengchi University, Taiwan. MND military periodicals see 
http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=35 (accessed on 20 August 2012). Detail lists and 
relevant connections for secondary sources see in the bibliography of this thesis. 
83 As I used to be a senior legislative assistant in the ROC Legislative Yuan from 1991 to 1999, 
I have had some access to the aforementioned interviewees either in personal meetings or by 
telephone discussions. These interviews were conducted informally, to protect the 
confidentiality of my interlocutors, so that most interviewees are not identified by name in this 
study. 
84 Other general discussions about the strengths and weakness of interviews include Devine 
(1995) ‘Qualitative Methods’, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (ed.) (1995) Theory and Method 
in Political Science (London: Macmillan), pp. 142-145; Yin (2003) Case Study Research, pp. 
85-88.   
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insight into the decision-making process. Nevertheless, considering the 
limitations of interviews and the many available existing primary sources, 
wealth of well organised interview materials by others (e.g., for Lee Teng-hui 
and Chen Shui-bian) and more systematic explanations in the relevant 
researchers’ own works on the subject, this study thus focuses mainly on 
existing documentary sources and the related literature, and considers interviews 
as a supplementary source only.85  
 
C.1.5 Structure of Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I, ‘Introduction and analytical 
framework’, consists of the first two chapters, which first outline in greater 
detail the argument, importance, aims, claims and methodology of the thesis and 
set up a framework in which to conceptualise and analyse “grand strategy”. Part 
II consists of five chapters, which investigate how and to what extent the content 
and practice of Taiwan’s grand strategy were encapsulated and transformed in 
the context of particular politico-military events under different administrations. 
Part III offers ‘conclusions and implications’. The conclusion chapter also draws 
on the findings to explore some general theoretical implications, while also 
offering some policy suggestions for Taiwan’s political leadership 
 
                                                
85 Although only a limited number of interviews were conducted for this thesis, it does draw on 
many interviews and biographical accounts of key participants’ publications. For example see 
Fredrick F. Chen (2005) The Reminiscences of Chien Fu, Vol. 1&2: Diplomatic Dynamics (Qian 
Fu huiyi lu: waijiao fengyun dong) (Chinese Edition) (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing 
Group); Hau Pei-tsun (2000) Diary of Eight Years as Chief of the General Staff, Vol.1 & 2 
(Banian canmou zongzhang riji) (Chinese Edition) (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing); Lee 
Teng-hui (2004) Witness Taiwan: President Chiang Ching-kuo and Me (Jianzheng taiwan: jiang 
jingguo zongtong yuwo) (Taipei: Academia Historica & Asian Culture Publication); Zou 
Jing-wen (2001) A True Record and Confession of Lee Teng-hui’s Regime (Li denghui zhizheng 
gaobai shilu) (Chinese version) (Taipei: INK Publications); James C. H. Shen (1983), The US & 
Free China: How the US Sold Out its Ally (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books Ltd); David 
Tawei Lee (2000) The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act: Twenty Years in Retrospect (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press); Richard C. Bush (2005) Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the 
Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press); Hsu Hsin-liang (1995) The 
Rising People (Xinxing minzu) (Taipei: Yuan Liu Chubanshe); Yen Wan-chin (2003) Mainland 
Policy of Democratic Progress Party during an Opposition Party (Zaiye shiqi mingjindang dalu 
zhengce) (Taipei: New Wun Ching Developmental Publishing Co. Ltd.); Su Chi (2009) 











Following a brief introduction of the concept of grand strategy in the previous 
chapter, the purpose of this theoretical chapter is to develop a further analytical 
framework for understanding “grand strategy”, the term also interchangeable 
with “national strategy” in this thesis1. The approach is based on the works of 
those who for some time have sought to conceptualize the idea of grand strategy. 
Conceptualizing grand strategy encourages diversity because the use of 
particular methodologies and sources in relation to grand strategy involves 
considerable debate. The diverse approaches in grand strategy can be classified 
along the spectrum between “war” and “peace” perspectives. The war-centred 
aspect of strategic analysis, also considered the ‘classical’ strategic approach, is 
dictated by the context of war. Here the focus is on ways to apply military force 
associated with all other national resources to achieve the proposed political 
objectives. Carl von Clausewitz is the classical representative of this war-
centred strategic approach.2 While declaring that ‘strategy was nothing without 
fighting’3, Clausewitz argued that ‘War [as the means] in general is entitled to 
require that the trend and design of policy [as the goal] shall not be inconsistent 
with these means.’4 ‘The political object of war can be of two kinds’, according 
                                                
1 According to Dictionary of Military Terms, the term ‘grand strategy’ is also called ‘national 
strategy’ or ‘national security strategy’. See U.S. Department of Defense (1995) Dictionary of 
Military Terms (London: Greenhill Books), pp.255-256. 
2 For representative studies of Clausewitz see, for instance, Michael Howard (1983) Clausewitz 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press); Michael I. Handel (2001) Masters of War – Classical 
Strategic Thought (third ed.) (London: Frank Cass); Azar Gat (2001) A History of Military 
Thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Beatrice 
Heuser (2002) Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico).  
3 Michael Howard (1983) Clausewitz, p.16. 
4  Carl von Clausewitz (1976) On War (ed. and tran. Michael Howard and Peter Paret) 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 87. 
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to Clausewitz: ‘either to totally destroy the adversary, to eliminate his existence 
as a State, or else to prescribe peace terms to him.’5 Clausewitz’s war-centred 
strategic perspective was based on two assumptions, namely, the unique status 
of force and the perspective of the strategic realm as a zero-sum competition, 
which are generally accepted by Clausewitzan scholars such as Edward Mead 
Earl, Michael Howard, Colin S. Gray, Hew Strachan,  Robert J. Art and Barry 
Buzan. 6  As Michael Howard argues, ‘it is the element of force which 
distinguished “strategy” from the purposeful planning in other branches of 
human activity to which the term is often loosely applied.’7 Accordingly for 
Howard, the concept of grand strategy refers to how a state is to mobilize and 
deploy national resources, e.g. wealth, manpower, industrial capacity and 
alliance, to achieve the goals of national policy in the context of waging war.8 
For the American scholar Robert J. Art, the concept of grand strategy has an 
even narrower definition. For him grand strategy is about military means being 
used in support of foreign policy goals.9  While emphasizing international 
political structure as one of two fundamental variables in the analysis of strategy, 
Barry Buzan argues that the variable of military technology is another 
fundamental factor that affects the application of military force and sets a basic 
context of strategy.10 As a result, the reason why the classical approach of grand 
strategy tends to highlight the role of military power can be understood by the 
analytical attention that scholars give to the context of war, which includes 
assessments about the best ways of preparing for war and of applying it as a 
decisive instrument to secure and promote national interests.  
 
                                                
5 Michael Howard (1983) Clausewitz, p.16. 
6 Edward Mead Earle (1943) ‘Introduction’, in Edward Mead Earle (ed.) (1943) Makers of 
Modern Strategy: Military Though from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press); Michael Howard (1971) Studies in War and Peace (New York: The Viking Press); Colin 
S. Gray (2007) War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History 
(London: Routledge); Hew Strachan (2008) ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, in Thomas G. 
Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds.) Strategic Studies: A Reader (London: Routledge), pp. 
421-436; Robert J. Art (2009) America’s Grand Strategy and World Politics (London: 
Routledge); Barry Buzan (1987) An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and 
International Relations (London: Macmillan/IISS). 
7 Michael Howard (1971) Studies in War and Peace, p. 154. 
8 Michael Howard (1972) (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series) 
Grand Strategy Vol. IV, p.1. 
9 Robert J. Art (2009) America’s Grand Strategy and World Politics, p. 1. 
10 Buzan (1987) An Introduction to Strategic Studies, pp. 5-7. 
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 In contrast, a peace-centred strategic analysis, or as referred as “neo-classical” 
strategic approach here, is dictated by the context of peace, which in the 
discourse of strategy is pursued as a primary value. While not eliminating the 
strategic role of military force, the peace-centred strategic perspective revises 
the classical war-centred approach, which fundamentally focuses on means 
rather than ends in the realm of strategy. The neo-classical approach not only 
demands a more balanced perspective between ends and means, but also prefers 
and advocates non-violent ways to achieve strategic goals. Basil Liddell Hart, in 
his book Strategy, argues that ‘grand strategy looks beyond the war to the 
subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments [including 
war], but also regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – 
for security and prosperity.’11  When nuclear weapons were developed, in 
associated with heat of the cold war, the fear of atomic warfare led the 
increasing doubts about whether the classical war-centred approach could deal 
adequately with the modern context of warfare in particular and a normative 
guide of strategy in general, since the consequence of nuclear war was in effect 
unacceptable. Theories of deterrence along with other non-violent approaches 
(e.g. diplomacy, economics and arms control) have been adopted in lieu and 
been made the main concern of the peace-centred strategic approach in the 
nuclear era.12 Thomas Schelling, for instance, brings game theory, or what he 
calls the ‘game of strategy’, to bear on strategy, intending to combine the 
mechanics of the analytical method of game theory with the application of ideas 
on threat and bargaining. While assuming common interests between the 
adversaries, e.g. in the context of nuclear deterrence, the game of strategy is 
designed to find a rational and interdependent solution in situations of conflict.13  
Ken Booth argues that because general war has become unthinkable, 
                                                
11 B. H. Liddell Hart (1991) Strategy (2nd ed’n.) (London: Meridian), p. 322. 
12 Paul Kennedy (ed.) (1991) Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University 
Press); Terry L. Deibel (2007) Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Hedley Bull (1965) The Control of the Arms Race: 
Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger); 
Christopher Layne (2006) The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the 
Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); Lawrence Freedman (1989) The Evolution of 
Nuclear Strategy (2nd.) (London: Macmillan/IISS); Albert Wohlstter (1959) ‘The Delicate 
Balance of Terror’, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (ed) (2008) Strategic Studies: 
A Reader (London: Routledge), pp.224-239; Robert Ehrlich (1985) Waging Nuclear Peace: The 
Technology and Politics of Nuclear Weapons (Albany: State University of New York Press). 
13 Thomas C. Schelling (1980) The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press), pp. 3-20. 
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brinkmanship and military demonstration has in fact replaced coercive threats.14 
In Strategy and Conscience, Anatol Rapoport accuses the classical war-centred 
strategic approach, with its zero-sum perspective, of adopting a ‘closed system 
of thought in which the only reality [of strategy] is a struggle between 
participants with diametrically opposed interests.’15 Accordingly, it becomes 
clear that the neo-classical perspective of grand strategy contests the classical 
approach’s assumption of zero-sum military competition and seeks to establish 
a compromise relationship between adversaries, to live and let live, for the 
objective of preventing war so as to preserve peace, even if only from each 
state’s point of view. The peace-centred strategic approach echoes the teaching 
of the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu: ‘to subdue the enemy without fighting 
is the acme of skill’16 In this, the neo-classical perspective distinguishes itself 
from the classical war-centred approach, which fundamentally rests on 
Clausewitz’s belief that ‘war is merely the continuation of politics by other 
means.’17       
 
Among the diverse perspectives of grand strategy, one main line divides the 
classical approach, which regards strategy as a means in the context of war and 
seeks merit in the application of war, from the neo-classical approach, which 
takes strategy as an end in the context of peace and studies the ways associated 
with the prevention of war. The lack of an agreed definition and the varied 
theoretical approaches to examining grand strategy indicate the researchers’ 
diverse perspectives on possible ontological assumptions and epistemological 
choices regarding the context of strategy. The central concern of these diverse 
perspectives is to ascertain how far the subject of grand strategy shall and can 
focus on the role of military force, or war. To rethink the military factor in 
strategic studies represents a broader attempt to re-conceptualize the notion of 
what grand strategy entails and to reassess the agenda for acquiring and making 
grand strategy. Notably, there has been a general move towards attempts that 
claim to widen the strategic agenda more than to narrow it. As a result, rather 
                                                
14 Ken Booth (1973) The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy (Aberyswyth: The United 
Service Institute for Defence Studies), pp. 42-46. 
15 Rapoport, Anatol (1964) Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper & Row), p.110. 
16 Sun Tzu (1963) The Art of War, (tr. Samuel B. Griffith) (Oxford: Oxford University), p. 77. 
17 Clausewitz (1976) On War, p.87. 
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than from the military perspective only, it is believed that the subject of strategy 
is ‘best studied from an interdisciplinary perspective.’18 
 
The discourse of grand strategy involves analysis, design and implementation 
since strategy is about a theory of action as Bernard Brodie well put.19 I argue 
that a better understanding of grand strategy, by the interdisciplinary way, 
builds on the juxtaposition and reconciliation of the war-centred and peace-
centred perspectives, as well as assessing their limitations and benefits. It 
requires the clarification of both concepts and also requires methods for 
pursuing a wider strategic understanding in a coherent way. As strategy is a 
policy relevant activity, which refers to the process of power practice, it 
essentially requires us (1) to understand what strategic capabilities are involved; 
(2) to explain why particular strategic choices are made; (3) to identify how 
strategic environments are constructed; and (4) to know how a given strategic 
posture is adopted in response to a proposed strategic choice. Furthermore, it is 
worth noting that strategy is fundamentally a self-referential practice, because it 
is in the context of the practice of strategy, or strategiztion, that the relevant 
issues are contextualized as strategic issues. 20 Grand strategy can thus be 
defined here as a process in which a cognitive state agent takes actions in a 
dynamic context to create and manipulate power as a means to achieve its 
desired ends. Regarding the desired ends at stake for a state agent, grand 
strategy involves a process of who gets what, where and how during periods of 
war as well as peace.  
 
Accordingly, the conceptual framework of grand strategy in this chapter 
presents a convergent approach by building on current strategic theories and 
social constructivist perspectives.21 The convergent strategic framework here 
                                                
18 John Baylis, James Wirtz (2001) ‘Introduction’ in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and 
Coiln S. Gray (ed.) (2002): Strategy in the Contemporary World- An Introduction to Strategic 
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.3. 
19 Ibid, p.4 
20 The method of textual analysis, e.g. ‘politicalization’, ‘securitization’, is applied here to 
identify strategic issues. See Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaape de Wilde (1998) Security- A New 
Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner), Chapters 1 & 2. 
21 The constructivist perspective is referred here because the constructivist position stresses the 
importance of the interaction between the way of the defined cognitive state agent understood 
the world and how the state agent act within it. The relations between the constructivism and 
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has identified eight analytical elements, which are presented in four pairs to 
advance a holistic framework for strategic analysis. By emphasizing the 
complementary nature of a constructive process on the interdependent duality of 
these elements, the framework avoids attributing significance to only one or the 
other of the paired elements: these are the ends and the means, the ideational 
and material aspects, agency and structure, and defence and offence. In this 
chapter, the first section explains the need to reconcile ends and means in terms 
of making strategic choices. The second section examines the nature of strategic 
capabilities in terms of the duality of ideational and material factors. The third 
section investigates how the strategic environment emerges from the interplay 
between agency and structure. Finally, the fourth section addresses the 
formulation of the strategic posture adopted in response to challenges by 
exploring the synthesis of two basic orientations: defence and offence.  
 
 
C.2.1 Strategic Choice: Reconciling Ends and Means  
 
The first dimension of strategic analysis concerns the reconciliation process of 
making a strategic choice between ends and means. The reconciliation process 
involves the needs of three notions: pragmatism, rationality and creativity.  By 
“ends”, I mean the strategic actors’ predetermined demands to pursue their 
preferences.  “Means” refers to an assemblage of instruments to fulfill the 
predetermined aims. There are three steps that strategic choices involve ends-
means analysis by strategic actors. They are, first, to identify the content of 
desirable ends; second, to maximize the composition of available means; and 
finally, to reconcile the available means with the desired ends. According to 
Lawrence Freedman, ‘Effective strategy requires a clear sense of the dynamic 
relationship between ends and means; knowing how ends are defined in the first 
                                                                                                                                      
strategic studies see Freedman (2002) ‘The Future of Strategic Studies’ in Baylis, John, etc. 
(eds.) (2002): Strategy in the Contemporary World, p.338. For the main works on 
constructivism, see Alexander Wendt (1999) Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Martha Finnemore (1996) National Interests in International 
Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.) (1996) The Culture of 
National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia).  
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place is critical to whether means will be adequate.’22 The dynamic relationship 
represents the reconciliation process between desirable ends and available 
means, or in James C. Gaston’s term, the ‘marriage of ends and means’, which 
indicates neither simply a specification of objectives nor a choice of instruments 
for their attainment, but a union of the two.23 The ends-means reconciliation 
results in a strategic choice whereby the ends prescribe the means to be applied 
and the available means impose not only a constraint on the ends which can be 
desired but also, more importantly, are likely to be attained in practice.    
 
One of the distinctive features of strategy is its teleological character, in the 
sense that it makes the desired outcome of the anticipated ends as the basis for 
principles of evaluation and of conduct.24  The term “strategic choice” simply 
cannot be understood without reference to an expected outcome (the desired 
ends), which is associated with the means to achieve them. The attainment of 
the ends applies as much to the possession of strategy as it does in the more 
obvious case of its exercise. It is unlikely that anyone will possess or exercise 
strategy unless there is an objective which strategic choice intends and an 
outcome which strategic choice expects. This is the reason why for decision-
makers the first task is to define the content of desirable ends and also 
simultaneously to consider the potential outcome in making a strategic choice. 
According to the teleological character of strategy, the rightness of any action 
depends only on the success of achieving a desired outcome – even if only from 
the strategic actor’s own point of view. The significance accorded to achieving 
strategic objectives appears to be greatest in the context of war for the pursuit of 
victory. When states go to war, ‘there can be no substitute for victory,’ in 
General Douglas Macarthur’s dictum, ‘and it is fatal to enter any war without 
the will to win it.’25 War is miserable but defeat is more miserable still, since 
the stakes of war, either survival or ruin, are so high for states that the expected 
                                                
22 Freedman (2002) ‘The Future of Strategic Studies’ in Baylis, John, etc. (ed.) (2002): Strategy 
in the Contemporary World, p.338. 
23 James C. Gaston (1992) ‘A Conceptual Foundation for the Development of Strategy’, Gaston, 
C. James (ed.) (1992) Grand Strategy and the Decision-making Process (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press), p.73 
24 Ibid. For a definition of teleological ethics, see in Mautner (2000) The Penguin Dictionary of 
Philosophy, p.558.  
25 John M. Collins (2002) Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey), p.38. 
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consequences of war will and do dictate the strategy. As Thucydides 
demonstrated in his account of the Peloponnesian Wars, ‘It is a common 
mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first and wait for 
disaster to discuss the matter.’ 26  The identification of the desired ends 
associated with their expected outcomes is, therefore, the necessary starting 
point in any analysis of strategic choice. 
 
Despite the advice to let the ends dictate the means, for most strategic analyses 
undertaken by the analyst and strategic actors it is the means, rather than the 
ends, that dominate the concerns in the realm of strategy.27 Seen as ‘an 
intellectual approach to a specific problem’28, strategy refers to power, choices 
and actions that are meant to deal with the problems under review. All forms of 
this power, choices and actions are functional in order to know how strategic 
actors can remove, eliminate or overcome the problems preventing them from 
attaining the desired ends. From this aspect of its “know how to do it” character 
in strategy, the means represent an instrumental dimension of strategy. Strategy, 
as Bernard Brodie argues, should be seen as ‘an instrumental science for solving 
practical problems’.29 Brodie’s means-oriented scientific approach to strategy 
assumes and emphasizes the concept of rationality, which has had a profound 
influence in strategic studies. Along with Brodie, scholars such as Herman 
Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder and Albert Wohlstetter are preoccupied 
by the way in which strategic actors make rational choices in the decision-
making process and behave in a rational manner in the pursuit of the desired 
ends.30 As John Garrnett puts it, the rationality assumption results in the 
                                                
26 Thucydides (1950) The History of the Peloponnesian War (tr. Richard Crawley) (New York: 
E.P. Dutton & Co.), p.52. 
27 John Garnett (1987) ‘Strategic Studies and its Assumptions’ in Baylis, John, Ken Booth, John 
Garnett and Phil Williams (1987) Contemporary strategy I, p.5 
28 Freedman (2002) ‘The Future of Strategic Studies’ in Baylis, John, etc. (ed.) (2002): Strategy 
in the Contemporary World, p.337. 
29 Brodie later made a ‘mid-course correction’ of his scientific perspective in strategy. See 
James Wirtz (2001) ‘Introduction’ in Baylis, John, etc. (ed.) (2002): Strategy in the 
Contemporary World, p.5; for Brodie’s overall scientific approach see Bernard Brodie (2008) 
‘Strategy as a Science’, Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds.) (2008) Strategic 
Studies: A Reader (London: Routledge), pp.8-21. 
30 Herman Kahn (1965) On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (Baltimore: Penguin Books); 
Thomas C. Schelling (1980) The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press); Glenn H. Snyder (1961) Deterrence and Defense – Toward a Theory of National 
Security (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press); Albert Wohlstter (1959) ‘The 
Delicate Balance of Terror’, Mahnken and Maiolo (eds.) (2008) Strategic Studies. 
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tendency of strategic studies to focus on the means for achieving the ends rather 
than the ends themselves since one can only comment on the rationality of the 
means chosen to pursue such ends as generally relate to the subject of values 
and beliefs, which are difficult to assess and manage in a rational way.31 The 
means-oriented dimension of strategy is much taken for granted, since the 
means represent the ways by which strategic actors pass from the state of not 
having attained their ends to the state of having attained them. A well-known 
proverb in China encapsulates the need for means to bring about the desired 
ends: ‘even the cleverest housewife cannot cook a meal without rice’ (qiao-fu 
nan-wei wu-mi zhi-chui). Just as in cookery, without the means, the rice, to 
attain the end, the meal, all the actors’ intellectual process in relation to an 
assigned mission is mere illusion, no matter how brilliant a cook the housewife 
is. Nevertheless, the means need to be adjustable, since the means must be 
subordinated to the proposed ends, even if to some extent the means have an 
impact on and influence the ends because of the relationship of reconciliation 
between them.  
 
Moreover, the means have an intermediate and dynamic character, since means 
may itself be an end with reference to some other means and each end may be a 
means to further ends. The judgment of the strategic actors whether means are 
available and acceptable, therefore, usually owes nothing to the relationship of 
the means to any intermediate end, and everything to the relation to the 
proposed ultimate ends and must be seen in the light of them. In the case of a 
nation debating war, the notion of national power, for instance, presents its 
intermediate and contradictory character in the ends-means dimension of 
strategic analysis. The national power is a means to some ends, such as national 
security. What are the means by which national power can be established? Such 
means can be generally classified into four types of power: diplomatic, 
economic, psychological and military influence. But these means do not always 
exist; they may still have to be achieved. So they are themselves ends. If 
economic power is an end, it is also a means – not only to the overall notion of 
                                                
31 John Garnett (1987) ‘Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions’, John Baylis, Ken Booth, John 
Garnett and Phil Williams (1987) Contemporary strategy I: Theories and Concept (2nd ed.) 
(London: Croom Helm), pp. 16-20. 
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the national power but many other ends. Each of these other ends can similarly 
be a means to acquire and sustain power but to various other ends. With regard 
to the ends-means transition, even power itself is an end as well as a means, 
depending on context. The fact is that the need for means is a need for effective 
agencies wherewith to overcome the gulf between a certain beginning-point as a 
means, and a certain stopping-point, as an end.32 According to traditional 
strategic analysis in the ends-means discussion, the political end usually stands 
for a certain stopping-point and the military means emerge as an accepted 
beginning-point. ‘Strategy is the bridge’, as Colin Gray argues, ‘that relates 
military power to political purpose; it is neither military power per se nor 
political purpose.’33 
 
In conclusion, why strategic choices are made with respect to what is at stake as 
the expected outcome is the central concern of ends-means analysis in strategy. 
In this regard, strategy stands as an effective agency not only for linking but, 
more importantly, for reconciling the ends-means complexity. In strategy, it is 
vital to identify the content of the desirable ends associated with their expected 
outcomes and to maximize for these ends the possible options among the 
available means. Nevertheless, to implement strategy is neither dogmatically to 
specify the desirable ends nor to instrumentalise their attainment only, but 
eventually to reconcile the two. The ends do dictate the means to be employed, 
but at the same time the ends are constrained by the availability of the means: 
actors’ value assumptions, external structural obstructions, etc. The fact of 
making a strategic choice is that no strategic actors can have complete freedom 
to pursue what they want and to apply whatever means they like. They have to 
reconcile themselves to this limited freedom. Such reconciliation refers to a 
process of pursuing a balance between the ends and the means. And how the 
reconciliation process unfolds is intimately linked to the use of pragmatism, 
rationality and creativity by those involved. 
 
                                                
32 K. S. Shelvankar (1938) Ends Are Means: A Critique of Social Values (London: Lindsay 
Drummond LTD.), p.39. 
33 Colin S. Gray (1999) Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.17 
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First, the notion of pragmatism stresses flexibility and sensitivity to the 
corresponding relative capabilities and situations. As Bernard Brodie argues, 
‘strategic thinking, or “theory” if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic.’34 
Consequently, the resort to pragmatism will influence the relationship between 
ends and means as well as the practical consequences. Second, rationality refers 
to all forms of logical choices produced to manage the ends-means interactions 
in the interests of the consequences expected by the strategic actors. Rational 
reconciliation, based on the available information, is thus about making a 
decision among those existing choices, which are approached in terms of 
instrumental calculations to bring forth the most suitable result with reference to 
cost-effectiveness reasoning. 35  This rationality makes scientific strategic 
reasoning possible, allowing grand strategy to be defined not only as an art but 
also as a science.36  Third, there is creativity. Creativity represents the human 
intellectual gift of resolving problems with a unique and unburdened vision, 
which can be beyond scientific understanding and command. The notion of 
creativity in relation to reconciliation of ends and means, in Clausewitz’s terms, 
suggests that some may have a natural talent for developing solutions the 
grammar of which eludes the realm of instrumental rationality.37 Accordingly, 
the notion of creativity makes the realm of strategy not only a science of 
rationality but also an art of possibility.  
 
As one of the dimensions in strategy, the ends-means reconciliation concerns 
the decision-making process in the pursuit of expected favourable outcomes by 
making strategic choices. The notion of reconciliation seeks to emphasize the 
decision-making process as a method of treating the value-rooted ends and the 
rationality-centred means as a whole rather than in separately. As Lawrence 
Freedman suggests, ‘A key aspect of strategy is the interdependence of 
decision-making. This does not only refer to the need to take the goals and 
capabilities of opponents into account. It must take in the need to motivate one’s 
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own forces by appealing either to their very personal goals of 
survival/comfort/honour or to their broader values.’38 In the face of the frictions 
which agitate the realm of the ends-means relationship, the process of 
reconciling ends and means presents a self-restraint in that strategic actors’ 
decisions necessarily reflect the need to make choices in a way which keeps in 
balance their unchecked wills and their limited strategic capabilities. This is 
examined in the next section. 
 
 
C.2.2 Strategic Capabilities: The Ideational-Material Duality 
 
The duality of ideational and material factors constructs strategic capabilities, 
which here mainly refer to resources of power.39 The importance of both 
material and ideational factors is generally obvious, since they coexist and 
converge in the strategic realm. In any strategic calculation, it is unduly 
restrictive and misleading to deliberately confine oneself to either of them 
without the other. Strategy must therefore be conceptualized as a way of 
acknowledging the material-ideational duality and then going beyond ideational 
and material monism, whose one-sided perspective, such as the determinism of 
the material or the ideational factor, would affirm the isolation of its substance 
in the context of strategy. Juxtaposing the ideational and material factors 
presents a possibility and a starting-point for integrating these parallel lines of 
strategic analysis, even as it demonstrates some of the unavoidable conflicts 
stemming from their different methodologies and levels of analysis. The 
contending lines of analysis between the ideational and material approaches 
well reflect the complexity of strategy, in Edward N. Luttwak’s phrase: 
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‘strategy does not merely entail this or that paradoxical proposition, blatantly 
contradictory and yet thought valid, but rather that the entire realm of strategy is 
pervaded by a paradoxical logic of its own, standing against the ordinary 
“linear” logic by which we live in all other spheres of life.’40 In other words, the 
seemingly competitive perspectives between materialism and idealism in the 
realm of strategy never exclude each other and both need to be taken account of, 
although in different strategic circumstances, either ideational or material 
factors may be supported to strategic actors.    
 
In fact, the ideational-material duality in the context of strategy is already noted 
in the literature of strategic studies. Sun Tzu, considered to have written ‘the 
best work on war ever written’41, indicates that there are five fundamental 
factors of war in strategic calculations, namely ‘moral influence, weather, 
terrain, command and doctrine’.42 He argues that the acme of skill in strategy is 
‘to subdue the enemy without fighting’, thus the object of supreme importance 
is ‘to attack the enemy’s strategy (mou)’ and the ‘next best is to disrupt his 
alliance, the next best is to attack his army and the worst policy is to attack 
cities.’43 Carl von Clausewitz proposes that strategic elements can be classified 
into five distinct types in the context of war: moral, physical, mathematical, 
geographical and statistical. 44  In modern terminology, according to the 
American Dictionary of Military Terms, strategy is composed of political, 
economic, psychological and military forces.45 All of these varied divisions of 
strategy not only demonstrate the context of strategy as constituted by ideational 
and material factors, but also suggest the need for understanding strategy by 
appreciating the influence of these ideational-material duality as a whole rather 
than in isolation. To understand the content of strategic capabilities in the 
context of strategy, it is necessary to specify more precisely the meaning of the 
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ideational and the material factors and then to explore how these two 
dimensions can both be applied to strategic analysis.  
 
First, the realm of ideas comprises various intellectual and psychological 
qualities and influences, which are manifest in reasoning, perception, belief, 
morale, conceptualization, memory, emotion, intention and imagination.46 The 
present study treats these collective mental processes as a single variable, the 
“ideational”. It also treats the manifestations of these ideational influences 
under the term “ideational” as a potential instrument for strategic analysis. In 
the analysis of decision-making, for instance, as Robert Jervis suggests, 
perceptions and misperceptions of the world and of other actors are 
fundamentally decisive in the choice by decision-makers of actions and 
reactions in the international arena. 47  Alexander Wendt highlights the 
importance of ideas in making sense of “power” and “national interest”, vital 
analytical terms in security and strategy.48 Alan Macmilliam and Ken Booth 
explore the ideational sector, using the term “strategic culture”, to identify and 
explain lasting features of thought and behaviour patterns in states to make 
sense of their particular ways of ‘adapting to the environment and solving 
problems with respect to the threat and use of force.’49 Clausewitz believes that 
‘[T]he moral elements are among the most important in war.’50 ‘The cause of 
war’, Liddell Hart contends, ‘is fundamentally psychological rather than 
political or economic.’51 Accordingly, the ideational sector emerges as an 
indispensable component in the strategic realm.  
 
As it refers to a feature of human activity, strategy has to be put into action and 
implemented by human beings who cannot help being ideational in part by their 
nature. Reasoning, perception, belief and morale are the four key dimensions of 
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the ideational in terms of strategic capability. Reasoning is a quality of 
intellectual power. It involves calculation, planning and resolving problems in 
accordance with rationality in the assessment of cause and effect, win and lose, 
advantage and disadvantage, risk and opportunity, cost and effectiveness, etc. 
Perception is the capacity to experience, acquire, interpret, select and systemize 
sensory information to understand given referent objects and contexts. Although 
the strategic actors’ subjective and insufficient information may also cause 
misperception, perception is also the main source of creation and imagination, 
generally regarded as intellectual virtues, which may not be logical or obtained 
through the objective use of logical reasoning. Belief here refers to the content 
of a particular assertion in which strategic actors are convinced of the truth of a 
moral proposition. Ideology, as it relates to a distinctive way of looking at 
political, social, or economic issues, for instance, is a typical example of belief. 
Morale refers to the quality of the strategic actors’ psychological condition in 
maintaining their enthusiasm and determination in the pursuit of beliefs or 
assigned missions. From the ideational dimension, as Andre Beaufre explains, 
strategy may be understood as ‘a method of thought’ rather than ‘a single 
defined doctrine’ and he maintains that it is ‘the art of the dialectic of two 
opposing wills using forces to resolve their dispute’.52 
 
For the scientific approaches of those positivists who endeavour to treat 
strategic analysis as a predictive science, the ideational poses considerable 
problems. Nevertheless, the ideational framework, such as constructivism, 
stressing the importance of ideas and the interaction between the way we 
describe the world and how we act within it, represents a real advance over the 
realist tradition, whose simplistic thinking of power as a set of measurable 
resources leads to a view of strategy as no more than a mechanical matter of 
expending material resources in the pursuit of clearly defined objectives.53 
Clausewitz rightly argues, ‘In formulating any [theory] concerning physical 
factors, the theorist must bear in mind the part moral factors may play in it; 
otherwise he may be misled into making categorical statements that will be too 
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timid and restricted, or else too sweeping and dogmatic.’54 It is worth keeping in 
mind that it is the ideational factors which expose human frailties and 
irrationality when strategic actors encounter danger, stress and uncertainty, 
these being common though crucial phenomena in strategic context. 
 
Second, having established that the nature of strategic capability is composed of 
a distinctive ideational and material substance, it is now the turn of the content 
and role of the material substance to be defined. In contrast to unquantifiable 
ideational substance, the concept of material substance illustrates a unique 
characteristic, the quantifiable, visible and touchable properties of power 
resources. The material dimension of strategy has always sought to capture the 
objective features of strategic capabilities – to see strategy and its components 
as they are, rather than as they might be. The material elements of strategic 
capabilities include: armed force, technology, economics and geography.55  
 
Armed force denotes an aggregation of military personnel, weaponry, 
organization, logistics, or any combination thereof.56 Armed force, a member of 
Clausewitz’s often-quoted “the remarkable trinity”, occupies a central place 
among the material factors making up the strategic capabilities. It is an 
inevitable, wicked and darker part of strategy that makes strategy “a deadly 
business” such as John Garnett describes. 57  Lacking this material force, 
ideational factors alone cannot make a sensible strategy. The importance of 
overwhelming brutal material force is shown, as Raymond Aron notes, in the 
case of machine-gunners easily mowing down the waves of assault on open 
ground, whatever the morale of the soldiers.58 It is armed force that gives one 
side the essential capability to compel others to do its will and creates chances 
through applying threats. Without armed force, strategic doctrines, such as those 
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on deterrence, coercion, flexible response, etc., are simply abstract intellectual 
concepts and cannot be applied in practice. Clausewitz praises the factor of the 
armed force, ‘If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the 
bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper 
hand.’59  It is not surprising that as “the ultimate arbiter of political disputes”, 
the threat, use and control of armed force remain the central subject of strategic 
studies, despite its attempts to widen the concern by other factors, e.g. 
diplomacy and economics.60 Technology, which Michael Howard regards as 
one of four indispensable dimensions in the conduct of war,61 is the other 
unique part of the material capabilities on strategy. Technology involves all 
forms of the practical application of knowledge to material objects of use to 
humanity. In most popular accounts, it refers to applied science and machinery. 
From a historical review, the invention of gunpowder, the steam engine, breech-
loading rifles, railroads, electricity, the telegraph, tanks, aircraft, submarines, 
missiles, the atomic bomb, computers, satellites, etc., provide substantial 
evidences to suggest that the form, conduct and sometimes the outcome of war 
have been intrinsically linked with the nature of the technology available. From 
John Garnett’s standpoint, ‘technological innovation is probably the most 
significant driving force behind contemporary strategic thought. No strategist 
can afford to ignore the application of science to warfare.’62 In fact, technology 
not only impacts on military affairs, but also relates to decisive ways to improve 
a state’s comprehensive power, which also bring in the role of economics, the 
third power factor in the material dimension of strategic capabilities. 
 
Economics comprises human activities related to ‘the production and 
distribution of goods and services and the development of wealth’.63 In spite of 
different interpretations and emphases on the role of economics in strategic 
literature, it is commonly agreed that economic capability is an indispensable 
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part of national strength to produce and practise in the context of strategy.64 The 
relationship between economics and strategy may be indirect, but it is obvious 
with respect to a nation’s influence and international interaction. According to 
Chinese traditional strategic wisdom from the Legalist School (Fa Jia),65 to 
become wealthy first is a premise for a state to establish a strong military (in 
Chinese terms “Fu-quo Qiang-bing”). To explore how the interaction of 
economic and military forces involves the progress of nations, Paul Kennedy in 
his famous book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, concludes that wealth 
and power are always relative.66 Moreover, in the era of globalization, the 
linkages between economics and strategy in the international context are 
increasingly relevant, while longstanding military concerns still abound. Finally, 
as a visible and influential element of the material strategic factors, geography 
stands out as a constant and objective dimension in a country’s strategic 
resources. Geography provides a natural obstacle to, as well as advantages for, 
strategic actors in formulating a particular strategy to deal with their own unique 
material circumstances. Strategy can be analysed as a concern for the 
geographical conditions to which it is intentionally applied in the spheres of 
land, sea, air and space. As Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley observe, the 
way of policy-makers conceptualising strategy is crucially permeated, 
stimulated and structured by a concern with “the size and location” of a 
nation.67  The influence of geography on strategy in practice can be classified in 
two ways: in geopolitical terms and on the battlefield. Halford Mackinder’s 
“heartland” theory, Alfred T. Mahan’s “sea power” theory and Guilio Douhet’s 
“air power” theory all indicates the vital impact of the geographical setting on 
strategy.68   
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In conclusion, assessing strategic capabilities involves an understanding in 
which both the ideational and material realities are juxtaposed, interplaying and 
complementing each other. The understanding derives from a realization of the 
limitations of treating the ideational and material monistically and in doing so 
has generated apprehension that strategic capabilities may be constituted by 
ideational-material duality. As regards the relationship between the ideational 
and the material dimensions in strategy, a constructive view is necessary in 
order to apprehend the important dynamic relationships between the ideational 
and material factors, since neither of the two alone can in itself capture the 
reality of strategic capability. A sensible strategy is unlikely to result if 
ideational and material factors are absent. As Clausewitz describes this 
indispensability, ‘[T]he effects of physical and psychological factors form an 
organic whole which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical 
process.’ 69  Michael Howard well notes in Clausewitz that ‘the dialectic 
[between moral and physical forces] was not Hegelian: it led no synthesis which 
itself conjured up its antithesis. Rather it was a continuous interaction between 
opposite poles, each fully comprehensible only in terms of the other.’70 This 
dialectical understanding indicates the nature of strategic capabilities, dually 
constituted by ideational and material factors, which penetrates and acts on one 
another in the realm of strategy. 
 
 
C.2.3 Strategic Environment: Interplay of Agent and Structure  
 
The interplay in the agency-structure relationship makes for the third dimension 
in the realm of strategy. The context of the interplay relationship is used to 
identify the referent strategic environments, or circumstances, where strategic 
actors practise and are situated. In the broadest usage of the term “strategic 
environment”, the analysis of this relationship is derived from scholars’ debates 
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on international relations, which involve how far actors are free “agents” who 
can make their own fate and how far their choices are dictated and constrained 
by the “structure”.71 In other words, there are two different analytical levels on 
which to examine the strategic environment, depending on whether it is the 
agent or the structure that accounts for and influences more in the realm of 
strategy. A structurally oriented perspective emphasises the significance of 
circumstances and context rather than the actor’s own ability to shape strategy. 
This perspective is visible in works by the neo-realist school of International 
Relations.72 It has also, for instance, given rise to a theory of the strategic 
behaviour of small and weak states in the international system.73  By contrast, 
agent-centred approaches can provide an account of the way in which changes 
in circumstances and international structures are initiated and shaped by agents, 
great powers in particular.74 In Strategic Studies such approaches account for 
why an asymmetric strategy is pursued by weak states against their much 
stronger foes.75  Both structure-centred and agent-centred analyses have their 
merits and limitations, but, as Colin Hay observes, there is a “strategic-
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relationship” between structure and agency such that the structure-agency 
relation is interdependent and dynamic.76 Accordingly, it would be a serious 
mistake in the realm of strategy to treat them separately rather than as a whole. 
“Agency” refers to the decisions and practices of a cognitive strategic actor, 
whether individual or collective, and includes political and military elites, 
domestic and international institutions, peoples, states, etc., who act 
intentionally for their desired ends. All actors are embedded in a host of 
structures.  For instance, in the case of political elites, both domestic and 
international institutions are part of the structure; however, in the case of a state, 
its domestic institutions themselves provide actors with the possibility for 
agency while the international institutions are part of structure. A sensible 
strategy needs to be understood in where strategic actors make their choices and 
adopt their actions to confront, and utilize as well, a given and created structure, 
no matter whether the structure is subjectively perceived or exists objectively, to 
pursue their desired ends. As a result, to understand the strategic environment 
one has to consider the notion of structure, of agency and of their interactions 
simultaneously. 
 
The strategic environment can be seen as a correlated realm of actors, referent 
structures and their interactions. To appreciate the strategic environment is 
decisive to strategic actors in the realm of strategy, since this refers to actors’ 
understanding of the strategic environment where the actors can identify 
themselves and other referent objects, so as to make sense of their situations, to 
shape the structures if the structural change if possible, to adjust their actions if 
structural change is unlikely and to pursue their desired ends accordingly. 
Nevertheless, the strategic environment is dynamic rather than static, since 
actors and structures interplay upon one another. The purpose of agency-
structure interaction is a strategic agenda-setting process in which strategic 
actors frame themselves and the referent structures in a specific issue within 
which actors act. Colin Hay has proposed a “strategic-relational approach” to 
overcome the boundary between structure and agency and suggests that the 
interplay of structure-agency needs to be understood as it results in practical 
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actions in contexts of social and political interaction.77 ‘The key [structure-
agency] relationship in the strategic-relational approach is not that between 
structure and agency’, as Hay argues, ‘but rather the more immediate interaction 
of strategic actors and the strategic context in which they find themselves.’78 
Colin Hay comments, ‘They [agency and structure] do not exist as themselves 
but through their relational interaction. Structure and actor, though analytically 
separable, are in practice completely interwoven.’79 As regards Hay’s analysis, 
the notion of the structure-agency relationship not only demonstrates the 
conduct of strategy as a process rather than only an outcome dictated by 
structure or agent alone, but also indicates the crucial interdependent 
relationships between agents and structure which mutually construct the 
strategic environment. Without agency or structural sectors, the constitution of 
the strategic environment would not exist from the first; without their interplay, 
there can be no implementation in the realm of strategy. As strategy is to do 
with actors’ practical actions in an environment where agents and structures 
interplay, as Hay’s strategic-relational approach suggests, it is not feasible for 
any strategic calculations to ignore either agency or structure and assume that 
one of them alone can provide an exclusive and persuasive vision of the 
strategic environment.  
 
A key lesson of strategy from history is that one cannot mainly expect to take or 
depend on taking advantage of strategic environment whose nature is dynamic 
and arguably always beyond one’s control and expectation. One of the most 
enduring patterns of strategic history, as Brian Holden Reid observes, is “to 
expect the unexpected” in the uncertainty of strategic environment.80 In other 
words, one can do anything that depends on oneself; but what depends on the 
external context, e.g. the enemy, cannot be certain. Therefore, a strategic actor 
is bound to try to be strong enough in the first place to control the variables and 
secure his position from hostile acts or influences, so as to wait for the 
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emergence, if any, of favourable circumstances. As Sun Tzu suggests: ‘[T]he 
skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy’s 
moment of vulnerability. The invincibility depends on oneself; the enemy’s 
vulnerability on him[self]. It follows that those skilled in war can make 
themselves invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be certainly vulnerable.’81 
Sun Tzu’s original analysis was in the context of war, but it provides insightful 
advice for strategic actors, to be strong first in their own right, in order to deal 
with the dynamic interaction among the contending parties. In the agency-
structure dimension of the strategic environment, a self-help mind-set to make 
themselves strong first leads most strategic actors to take domestic factors into 
consideration.  
 
While the structured context constrains actors, it also provides freedom for 
action and unleashes, or at least provides, opportunities. The core of exploiting 
the structured context against an enemy involves strategic actors bringing about 
confrontation only under the most advantageous circumstances and the 
preference to fulfill their goal without serious fighting. The more advantageous 
the circumstances, the more freedom of action the actor possesses, the less 
resistance there is likely to be on the part of the enemy and the greater the 
possibility that favourable victory will be secured. As Sun Tzu mentions: 
‘Those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which 
he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take and with 
lures of ostensible profit they await him in strength. Therefore, a skilled 
commander seeks victory from situation and does not demand it of his 
subordinates.’82 Accordingly, the impact of the structured context on strategy is 
similar as the power of the tide for a boat. To push the boat along with the tide 
is much easier than to go upstream or push against the tide. The actor has to 
know how to exploit the advantage, if any, of the structured context and create a 
favourable situation as best he can. In operational terms, with self-help and 
diplomatic arrangements, the agency-structure dimension in the realm of 
strategy refers to one fundamental consideration: in what ways and to what 
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extent can both of them contribute to improving the structured strategic 
environment on the actor’s preferred terms. 
 
 
C.2.4 Strategic Posture: Synthesis of Defence and Offence  
 
Strategic debates have always centred on competing perspectives between 
offence and defence in settling whether defensive or offensive postures are 
more relevant in the realm of strategic actions.83 The fourth dimension of 
strategy, accordingly, is about the relationship between offence and defence and, 
as such, the action-reaction process of integrating initiatory and reactive 
postures in the conduct of strategy. On the one hand, an offensive posture here 
is understood as a coercive stance in pursuit of initiatory actions under the belief 
in a first-strike advantage and the intention to revise the status quo.84 On the 
other, a defensive posture amounts to a stance of deterrence, which centres on a 
passive reaction to preserve the status quo, to discourage any possible attack 
first and to wait for favourable circumstances to launch a counterattack if 
necessary.85 Nevertheless, there is unlikely to be a pure posture of offence or 
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defence in practice, since offence and defence are normally intertwined and 
transformed to fit dynamic strategic circumstances in relation to particular 
strategic choices.  Clausewitz, for instance, argues that the concept of defence is 
only relative, compared with offence, since defence is ‘not a simple shield, but a 
shield made up of well-directed blows.’86 Equally, Sun Tzu describes the 
complexity of the offence-defence relationship by arguing that ‘in battle there 
are only the normal [defensive] and extraordinary [offensive] forces, but their 
combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all. For these two forces 
are mutually reproductive; their interactions as endless as that of interlocked 
rings. Who can determine where one ends and the other begins?’ 87  The 
transformation between defence and offence indicates that, when circumstances 
change, in practice, a defender can become an attacker and an attacker can turn 
into a defender. There is, as a result, a synthetic process of strategic posture in 
the dialectical relationship between defence and offence. 
 
In the context of war, for instance, it is believed that the offensive concept plays 
a decisive role in starting the confrontation because of a belief that offence is 
generally regarded as the best defence.88 In spite of negative views on offence, 
there is also ample historical evidence, e.g. Israeli offensive doctrine in the 
Arab-Israel wars, to demonstrate why many strategic decision-makers are so 
fond of the offensive perspective.89 In fact, the very virtue of offence derives 
from the concept of initiative, which is about freedom of action, hence 
flexibility.90 Those strategic actors who possess freedom of action enjoy the 
great advantage of choosing their own favourite times, places and other related 
elements to engage their adversaries. In contrast, strategic actors lacking 
freedom of action will be forced to react rather than pro-actively engage at their 
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own discretion. Sun Tzu explains the advantage of initiative that if the enemy 
‘does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in great many 
places. And … those I have to fight in any one place will be [relatively] few. 
For if he prepares to the front his rear will be weak and if to the rear his front 
will be fragile … when he prepares everywhere he will be weak everywhere.’91. 
Nevertheless, the concept of freedom of action is relative rather than absolute, 
since there is a dilemma in freedom of action in relations to strategic 
competitors. Similarly as in the notion of the security dilemma,92 the freedom 
dilemma occurs when two or more strategic actors each feel unfree vis-à-vis 
other actors, since one’s own freedom of action always comes at the cost of the 
opponents’ freedom. What one gains, the other loses in the competition for 
freedom among strategic actors. In the conduct of strategy, especially for 
weaker powers against their stronger foes, appreciating the value of freedom of 
action, strategic actors look for the initiative and seek to maximize freedom in 
their own terms, even though the available freedom of action is significantly 
constrained by insufficient resources, the reconciliation of ends and means, and 
the structured contexts. The very notion of offence lies in the idea that it is 
having the initiative that mainly ensures freedom of action. The more freedom 
one enjoys, the more options one can choose from, and the more opportunities 
are open to be exploited. This is why Sun Tzu said that ‘those skilled in war 
bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him.’93 For 
him, to move as an attacker in the end is the decisive way to achieve victory.94 
In short, the notion of offence is an overall posture, which dictates that strategic 
actors prefer to act first rather than to react to their adversaries’ initiative for the 
possible change of status quo between them. According to Sun Tzu, the idea of 
initiative is linked in offensive strategy to three operational concepts: to disturb, 
to probe and to surprise. In practice, a coercive-rooted strategy trying to initiate 
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behavior by fear of the consequence,95 for instance, can be regarded as one of 
the typical forms of offensive strategy.  
 
In contrast to the offensive posture, the notion of defence is associated with a 
distinct passive posture, which emphasizes reaction rather than acting first. The 
idea of defence, nevertheless, does not mean only sitting still, although the 
defence declines the initiative in the first place.  In fact, defence itself may also 
contain aspects of offence. Proclaiming that defence was a stronger form than 
offence in the context of war, Clausewitz described the concept of defence as ‘a 
shield with blows’, insisting that ‘defensive warfare … does not consist of 
waiting idly for things to happen. We must wait only if it [defence] brings us 
visible and decisive advantages.’96 ‘The natural course of war’, he concludes, ‘is 
to begin defensively and end by attacking.’ 97  Sun Tzu also observes, 
‘Invincibility lies in the defence; the possibility of victory in the attack.’98 The 
upper hand of defence is achieved by preventing any direct challenge to 
strategic competitors in a well-prepared position in which the defender 
possesses a comparative advantage in terrain and in moral terms. Sun Tzu 
describes defensive physical advantages as follows: ‘Close to the field of battle, 
they [defenders] await the enemy coming from afar; at rest [against], an 
exhausted enemy; with well-fed troops [against], hungry ones.’99 Moreover, it is 
more effective for a defensive actor that he can focus on the controllable 
variables by himself in the first place, rather than fighting his opponent under 
uncontrollable variables, since strategic actors can never be sure of the 
opponent’s moves, counter-moves, or mistakes. The defender eventually will 
have enough advantage to launch his own counterattack on the enemy’s 
vulnerable points, since, after successfully parrying the enemy’s attack, all 
forms of weakness and mistakes by the offender will emerge and can be 
exploited by the defender. Accordingly, under the notion of defence, there are 
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four operational concepts in defensive strategy: to discourage, to wait, to 
preserve and to counterattack. In practice, a deterrent-rooted strategy trying to 
inhibiting behaviour by fear of the consequence,100 either in conventional or 
nuclear war for instance, is a topic much discussed in the realm of defensive 
strategy. 
 
The conduct of strategy can generally be defined on two different operational 
levels: the strategic (which relates to purpose) and the tactical (which relates to 
the necessary measures for the purpose). Accordingly, the offence-defence 
posture here can be classified according to its four types: first, strategic offence 
with offensive tactics; second, strategic offence with defensive tactics; third, 
strategic defence with offensive tactics; and, fourth, strategic defence with 
defensive tactics. The first and second types amount to an offensively-oriented 
strategic posture, whereas the third and fourth types are defensively-oriented. 
The four types of offence-defence posture not only provide an illustrative 
classification of strategic postures, but also, more importantly, demonstrate an 
intertwining relationship between the concepts of offence and defence.  In short, 
strategic actors need the synthetic assessment and application of the two 
strategic concepts between offence and defence, because of their dialectical 
relationships. Strategic actors may comprehensively apply mixes of these four 
types to deal with the dynamic and uncertain strategic context. The intertwining 
offence-defence postures reflect again the need of a constructive process to 
juxtapose, integrate and complement the two contrasting alternatives in specific 
situations of strategic decision-making.  
 
 
Conclusion: Toward a Convergent Understanding of Grand Strategy 
 
To understand the realm of grand strategy needs a systematic way to explore its 
meanings and components. Many of the strategic literature choose exclusive 
dimensions, e.g. military, diplomacy, economics or culture, as their analytical 
lenses in the historical context by examining the grand strategy, which is 
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adopted by the state agent in the contexts of war or peace. To provide an 
alternative approach, the aim of this theoretical chapter has been to establish a 
conceptual framework of strategic analysis to understand the idea of grand 
strategy in general and to be applied to the case of exploring Taiwan’s grand 
strategy in particular. This chapter proposes a theoretical analysis of grand 
strategy in terms of a convergent understanding. It focuses on a description of 
strategic actions – relating to strategic actors’ decisions, power, situation and 
pose – which are applied across the periods of war and peace. That is not to say 
that it covers all the scholarship in Strategic Studies. Instead, this convergent 
understanding of grand strategy here intends to offer a relative broader but 
fundamental map of essential insights derived from Strategic Studies. 
   
The primary task of strategic analysis is not only to help us understand what 
strategy is, but also to enable us to know how to use it effectively, for the realm 
of strategy simply cannot be separated from policy as Bernard Brodie suggested. 
To explain and find how strategy works effectively, one needs in advance a 
conceptual framework to explore what it is and how it is constructed. The 
concept of grand strategy can only be substantialized by a conscious agent 
through the practice of it. The preceding four sections of this chapter are 
designed to provide a constructive process by which to understand the 
theoretical context of grand strategy. It begins by defining the meaning of grand 
strategy, which refers to the process of power practice by a cognitive strategic 
state actor. The central body is designed to establish a conceptual framework for 
understanding the concept and conduct of grand strategy. It highlights four 
distinct analytical dimensions: the elementary pairs of ends-means, ideational 
and material factors, structure-agency, as well as defence and offence. 
Associating with these four dimensions, the central terms of the typology here 
are in fact common, but many take them much for granted and fail to consider 
them in a systematic way: strategic choice, strategic capabilities, strategic 
environment and strategic posture reasoned together in the realm of strategy. 
 
In the first section, the chapter explores the linkages between ends and means in 
the decision-making process and shows that the strategic decision is determined 
above all by the reconciliation process between the desired ends and the 
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available means. Section two emphasizes the duality of ideational and material 
factors constituting the content of strategic capabilities. Section three suggests 
that the strategic environment is constructed by interplay in the relationship 
between structure and agency. Section four proposes that the point of the 
defence-offence synthesis is to let us know how strategic actors adopt a posture 
to answer challenges leading to the proposed strategic choice. Accordingly, the 
analysis of strategy refer to a constructive process of integrating the ways of 
strategic actors how to create power, to reconcile desired ends, to manipulate 
the environment and to react to challenges.  
 
The concept of grand strategy thus refers to a practical activity that is 
fundamentally policy relevant in a dynamic environment. The overall context 
within which the strategic analysis framework has developed must be seen as 
intimately tied up with all of the four dimensions (ends-means, ideational-
material, structure-agency and defence-offence) into a mutually constructive 
process. In the interrelated convergent strategic perspective, the line between 
the advantages and disadvantages of the four interdependent pairs is mutable 
and impermanent. This is because the convergent strategic perspective builds on 
a logical process of establishing a systematic and interrelated analysis between 
the four intertwining pairs together rather than in isolation from each other, so 
as to overcome the narrowness, partiality and one-sidedness of one particular 
view. After establishing the theoretical analytical framework of the concept of 
grand strategy, the defined terms of the typology, namely, strategic choice, 
strategic capability, strategic environment and strategic posture, will be applied 

















The Chinese nationalist Chiang Kai-shek retired officially from the presidency 
of the Republic of China (ROC) in early 1949 when his force in Mainland 
China was doomed and he tried to negotiate peace with the Chinese 
Communists. At the same time, however, he had already started to prepare to 
turn Taiwan into “the base of operations for national restoration” against the 
Chinese Communists, because the island was geographically separated from the 
mainland and was less susceptible to Communist infiltration.1 When the ROC 
government retreated to Taiwan in December 1949 and Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) 
resumed the ROC Presidency on 1 March 1950, the Chinese civil war between 
the Chinese Nationalists (the Kuomintang, or KMT) and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) entered a new phase: cross-Strait confrontation. 
Instructing the KMT soon after he resumed power in Taiwan, CKS pledged that 
the overall goal and mission of his government for the island would be, as he 
encapsulated them: ‘to restore the ROC, to eliminate the international 
communists’.2  He never relinquished that national goal and mission for the rest 
of his life.  
 
The outbreak of the 1954-55 first Taiwan Strait crisis and the 1958 second Strait 
crisis reflected the intensity of cross-Strait political-military confrontation. Both 
crises centred on the little-known groups of offshore islands near the Chinese 
                                                
1 Steve Tsang(1993) ‘Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT’s Policy to Reconquer the Chinese 
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mainland – Jinmen, Mazu and Dachen3, but brought the US and the PRC to the 
brink of direct military confrontation. The 1954-55 crisis emerged as 
negotiations aiming at a US-ROC defence treaty became public in late July 
1954. The PRC responded immediately with a mass propaganda campaign, 
which called for “the liberation of Taiwan” (jiefang taiwan). Subsequently, the 
Central Military Commission (CMC) established a Zhedong (East Zhejiang) 
Front Command in late July 1954 to prepare an attack on the Dachen islands. 
The crisis started on 3 September 1954 when the PLA artillery in Fujian shelled 
Jinmen4, on the same day that the first meeting of members of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) convened. 5  The crisis escalated on 8 
December 1954, when the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai verbally attacked the US 
for signing the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) with the ROC on 2 December 
1954. The Strait crisis culminated on 5 February 1955 as the ROC evacuated its 
forces and civilians from Dachen and eased when, on 23 April 1955, Zhou Enlai 
announced at the Bandung Conference that China did not want war with the US 
and was willing to relax the tensions in the Taiwan Strait.6 US President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower recalled that the effect of the first Strait crisis was to ‘threaten a 
split between the United States and nearly all its allies and carry the country to 
the edge of war, thus constituting one of the most serious problems of the first 
eighteen months of my administration.’7  
 
The second Taiwan Strait crisis erupted on 23 August 1958 and centred on the 
PLA’s massive bombardment of Jinmen. To renew America’s problem of its 
involvement on the offshore island and test Washington’s commitment on the 
ROC-US MDT accordingly, Mao Zedong instructed the Fujian Military 
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7 Dwight D. Eisenhower (1963) The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday), p.459. 
 73 
Command to ‘attack the KMT troops on Jinmen [not Matsu] with a 
concentrated, surprising and extensive artillery shellfire and at same time, 
blockade [the strait surrounding Jinmen and Mazu]…Whether we attack these 
islands will depend on how the military situation changes. One step at a time.’8 
Except for Mao’s diplomatic calculations, it is believed that preparations for the 
bombardment began early in the summer of 1958; the aim of the operation was 
to resume the 1954-55 battle plan for the offshore islands to recover, if possible, 
Jinmen and Mazu.9 The bombardment intensified over the following days and 
weeks into a full-scale military campaign because of Beijing’s attempts to cut 
off the supplies of the defending forces and undermine their will to fight. On the 
first day of the bombardment, the PLA fired around 20,000 shells and caused 
serious casualties in the headquarters of the ROC Jinmen Defence Command. 
Those included General Ghao Chia-hsiang and General Chi Hsing-wen, who 
were killed, and the ROC Defence Minister, Yu Ta-wei, who was wounded. 
Having experienced the 1954-55 Strait crisis, the US this time responded swiftly 
and vigorously to the PRC attack on Jinmen since Washington had anticipated 
and prepared for a crisis to erupt across the Strait and had determined that 
Jinmen should be defended.10 Three days after the PLA’s initial bombardment, 
Eisenhower instructed the US military to prepare to escort ROC supply ships 
and to be ready to attack PRC coastal military bases if necessary. This included 
the possibility of pursuing nuclear options.11 In the event, the Chinese blockade 
was breached by a joint US-ROC convoy. By 21 September the PLA had lost its 
advantage of local control and begun to suffer heavy casualties, to its air forces 
in particular. 12  Generally, the garrisons’ morale on the offshore islands 
remained good throughout, as it had been during the August shelling and there 
was never a serious supply problem throughout the crisis.13 To escape from the 
deadlock, the PRC officially announced a unilateral ceasefire on 6 October.14 
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On 25 October, the PRC further announced that it would resume shelling but 
only on odd-numbered days and the ROC, on the same day, decided in response 
to bombard the coastal provinces on alternate days.15 The state of exchanging 
fire in this regular way in the Jinmen and Matsu area was maintained until 1979.  
 
Beijing’s strategy for the offshore islands in the two Strait crises had similar 
rationales: first, to remind the world of China’s continuing civil war and claim 
to Taiwan; second, to probe America’s real intention regarding its security 
commitment to Taiwan; and third, to make the Taiwan issue enough of a 
problem for the US to persuade Washington to disengage from it eventually.16 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is a debate about whether Mao really 
intended to seize the offshore islands. For instance, Michael Szonyi argues that 
Mao did not intend to capture them because this would have denoted the first 
step in  the permanent separation of the two regimes into “Two Chinas” across 
the Strait.17 Eric Herring, however, argues that ‘China would have invaded the 
offshore islands if the US had not made its extended deterrence commitment.’18 
Moreover, Gerald Segal observed that while military force was not used in the 
same way in both crises, by the very nature of its probe, Beijing kept its 
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objectives and strategy flexible in order to react to the US response.19 From 
Taipei’s strategic point of view, the Nationalist government adopted the stance 
that there was a continuing Chinese civil war across the Strait but intended to 
link the civil war with Washington’s global containment strategy against the 
Communists in its own favour. In Chiang Kai-shek’s national address soon after 
the end of the 1958 crisis, he pointed out three major strategic implications of 
the defence of the offshore islands: first, its strategic importance for the 
promising future of the ROC and the Chinese people; second, its crucial 
relationship with the stability of the Asia Pacific region and its people; and, 
third, its significant contribution to the peace and security of the free world.20 
Chiang then concluded by saying that the success in safeguarding the offshore 
islands represented the total failure of Beijing’s attempt to “liberate Taiwan”. 
While appreciating war as a necessary means to advance revolution, Chiang 
proclaimed that it would be an excellent strategic opportunity for Taipei to 
retake the Chinese mainland if Beijing dared to escalate a full-scale military 
confrontation across the Strait.21   
 
Despite the fact that CKS did not explicitly express Taiwan’s grand strategy in 
any comprehensive manner, his national address in 1958 reflected his overall 
national strategic perspective. The latter had four distinct characteristics. First, 
there was no option of peaceful coexistence in the context of the Chinese civil 
war across the Strait. A primary concern of this zero-sum competitive strategic 
perspective was to restore the ROC on the Chinese mainland rather than on 
Taiwan. This perspective on the part of CKS’s resulted in what I call an 
outward-looking strategic choice, whereby Taipei’s strategic concern focused 
fundamentally on the Chinese mainland. The outward-looking strategic choice 
prioritized the restoration of political control on the mainland as the most 
important aim of securing the further existence and development of the ROC, in 
terms of pursuing its sovereignty and territorial integrity. To serve this aim, 
CKS initiated domestic political reform starting from rebuilding the KMT as a 
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Leninist-style party,  as a means by which to compete with the CCP across the 
Strait.22  This  mission by CKS’s to re-conquer the mainland also justified in his 
eyes him the imposition in May 1949 of martial law, which in turn legitimized 
the KMT dictatorship in Taiwan.23 Second, to implement the outward-looking 
strategic choice, CKS deliberately championed ideational factors, i.e., ideology, 
by means of what might be called national spiritual mobilization, to cope with 
Taiwan’s obvious material disadvantage in terms of competing for power 
against its much bigger foe. Third, to compensate for its material inferiority 
Taipei sought to secure on its side support by an external power. America’s 
global anti-communist containment strategy in the 1950s created a favorable 
strategic environment for the Nationalist government. CKS’s management of 
the ROC’s strategic environment, associated also with upholding Taiwan’s 
domestic security, was designed to link Taipei’s national strategy with 
Washington’s containment strategy and to exploit this linkage. Fourth, Taipei’s 
strategic posture associated with its outward-looking strategy in the 1950s was 
offensive rather than defensive in nature. While regarding war as a necessary 
means for his national mission of Chinese restoration, CKS’s emphasis on the 
strategic importance of these remote offshore islands demonstrated his 
relentless ambition to launch a military counter-attack in the Chinese mainland, 
if necessary over a period of many years. Accordingly, this chapter will 
examine the above four factors so as to understand Taiwan’s grand strategy 
under Chiang Kai-shek’s rule in the 1950s.            
 
 
C.3.1 CKS’s Outward-Looking Strategic Choice  
 
Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 
October 1949, the national grand strategy of the Republic of China was 
                                                
22  For a further discussion, see Chapter 3.3 ‘Upholding Domestic Security’ in this thesis. For a 
discussion of CKS’s domestic political reform to consolidate the KMT’s control in Taiwan, see 
also Steve Tsang (1993) ‘Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT’s Policy to Reconquer the Chinese 
Mainland, 1949-1958’, pp. 64-68; Steve Tsang (1999) ‘Transforming a Party State into a 
Democracy’, Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien (eds.) (1999) Democratization in Taiwan, pp. 1-
10; Shelley Rigger (1999) Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (London: Routledge), 
pp.55-80. 
23 Rigger (1999) Politics in Taiwan, pp. 16-19. 
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fundamentally designed to impose and secure the ROC’s sovereignty claim, not 
constrained in space to Taiwan but territorially extended to the Chinese 
mainland. From CKS’s point of view, the ROC was “China” and represented 
the only legitimate government of China as a whole. The intensive military 
conflicts in the 1950s reflected the lasting hostility of the unfinished Chinese 
civil war. For both the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists, the nature of 
the confrontation across the Taiwan Strait had by then focused on the struggle 
for the control of China as a whole, rather than maintaining the status quo. The 
options of two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan across the Strait were at 
this time not contemplated by either side. As a result, President Chiang Kai-
shek’s rigid belief in the pursuit of the cross-Strait unification against the PRC 
without any compromise had fundamentally shaped Taiwan’s national grand 
strategy, which centred on his outward-looking strategic choice. And the 
outward-looking strategic choice could be understood with reference to the 
unfinished Chinese civil war, his determination to defend the legitimacy of the 
ROC, and his statecraft of risk taking. 
 
 
The Unfinished Chinese Civil War 
 
While CKS resumed the ROC presidency in Taiwan, the island of Hainan, 
China’s second largest island, was not seized by the PRC, nor would it be until 
April 1950; many of the offshore islands, however, such as Chusan, Dachen, 
Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), remained under the ROC’s control. 
However, the security of the ROC on Taiwan was fragile though rather stable. 
The PRC possessed overwhelming superiority in most aspects of strategic 
capability, e.g. men, weapons, logistics and morale, since the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) was massing for an invasion of Taiwan to fulfill its 
unfinished task of unifying China. In fact, CKS did in fact expect the PRC to 
invade Taiwan between July and late September 1950.24  
 
                                                
24 Waichiapu telegram to Washington Embassy 357, 19 July 1950, File B.13(1)b, Box 145, 
Paper of Wellington Koo, Butler Library, New York. 
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By then, the defeated Nationalist regime on Taiwan seemed an easy prey for the 
victorious PRC. In early 1950, Chiang’s forces in Taiwan experienced a 
shortage of military equipment and, recently defeated, demonstrated low poor 
morale and a low degree of general preparedness. The American Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the State Department intelligence section 
concluded that the Kuomintang could not ‘effect political and military 
adjustments sufficiently realistic to make possible a successful defense of 
Taiwan.’ 25  General Chen Cheng, the new Governor of Taiwan Province 
appointed in 1949 and later vice president of the ROC, described the dangerous 
situation: ‘At that juncture the general situation on the mainland was 
deteriorating fast, the morale of the people on Taiwan was low, economic 
confusion and social unrest were rampant and it looked as though anything 
might happen.’26 General Chen also admitted that Taiwan’s defence was ‘barely 
adequate’ and that there was ‘no prospect for counterattack on the mainland in 
the foreseeable future’.27 Nevertheless, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 
June 1950 relieved Taiwan’s dangerous situation and reversed the entire 
strategic outlook and military balance across the Strait, because Washington 
changed its China policy and decided to secure the ROC on Taiwan. From this 
point, with Washington’s security commitment in hand, the CKS administration 
was able to adopt an offensive outward-looking strategic choice for the so-
called “sacred mission” of national restoration in the Chinese mainland.     
 
Given Taipei’s threat perceptions, the Chinese Communist regime was an 
irreconcilable and aggressive foe. CKS asserted that a continuation of the war 
against the Communists was inevitable because to eliminate the Chinese 
Communist regime was “my life-long responsibility” as well as “the key to the 
existence of the Chinese nation and the success of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three 
People’s Principles”. 28  Chiang’s perception of China’s future and the 
                                                
25 CIA Report ORE 7-50, 20 March 50, in Steve Tsang(1993) ‘Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT’s 
Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1958’, p.50. 
26 Chen Cheng (1961) Land Reform in Taiwan (Taipei: China Publishing Company), p.X. 
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Communist threat caused him to fight the PRC ruthlessly and without 
compromise. Since “ the loyal and the treacherous cannot co-exist” (han zei bu 
liang li)29, as he put it, there was no possibility of peaceful coexistence between 
the two regimes, as expressed in the proposal of “two Chinas” or “one China 
and one Taiwan” to resolve the Chinese civil war. From CKS’s strategic 
perspective, to safeguard Jinmen and Mazu was decisive for concluding the 
Chinese civil war. Accordingly, Chiang maintained that those islands were 
indispensable to the defence of Taiwan, in that in the short term they ensured 
the regime’s survival and control and in the long term they helped to retain his 
claim to sovereignty on the mainland.  
 
Beijing obviously possessed a similar perception of threat in the context of the 
cross-Strait Chinese civil war, as Taipei’s existence, with Washington’s support, 
imposed a constant threat to the newly established Communist regime. 
Accordingly, Beijing’s primary national strategic choice was either the 
“liberation” of Taiwan, or unification with Taiwan on its terms.  Its strategic 
choice of liberation explains why Beijing began offensive operations on the 
offshore islands during the two Strait crises and sought to seize those offshore 
islands, if at all possible, as a first step in the unification mission. From 
Beijing’s point of view, to liberate Taiwan was a matter of principle for the 
unfinished Chinese Communist revolution and, more importantly, for its 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The military operations against the 
offshore islands served the long-term political goal of resolving the Taiwan 
issue. As Beijing had already successfully occupied the Hainan and Chusan 
islands in April and May, respectively, of 1950, the PRC hailed both operations 
as harbingers of victory in the struggle against Taiwan as “the last battle in 
completing the liberation and unification of our country.”30 It was believed that 
well before the 1954-55 crisis, presumably in late 1952, Mao had approved a 
plan to occupy all the offshore islands, but suspended this offensive in response 
to the 1953 Korean armistice.31 Accordingly, the PRC was strongly motivated 
                                                
29 After the evacuation of the Dachen Island, Chiang replied to the proposal for “two Chinas” in 
a press conference on 14 Feb., 1955. See Chiu (ed.) (1973) Documents and Analysis, p.261. 
30 Allen S. Whiting (1960) China Cross the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War 
(Stanford: RAND/Stanford University Press), p.21. 
31 Eric Herring (1995) Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes 
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to invade the offshore islands as a stepping-stone to the eventual liberation of 
Taiwan; in practice, however, doubts persisted whether the PRC had the 
capacity to do so given the signing in late 1954 of the Mutual Defense Treaty 
between Taipei and Washington. 
 
Washington’s security commitment notwithstanding, Taipei’s relentless military 
preparations against Beijing in these offshore islands bore witness to its 
outward-looking strategic choice.  In line with its position concerning the 
Korean armistice, for instance, CKS’s nationalist government constantly refused 
to accept any UN-sponsored cease-fire proposal to settle the cross-Strait issue 
during those two Taiwan Strait crises. Taipei’s strategy of declining the idea of 
an armistice to stabilize cross-Strait relations clearly expressed CKS’s 
preference to continue the unfinished Chinese civil war.  This stance would not 
only justify all his military and political struggles against the Chinese 
Communist regime, but also enable Taipei to launch a counterattack against the 
Chinese mainland when the time came. Thus, CKS’s determination to conclude 
the Chinese civil war resulted in his outward-looking strategic choice “to restore 
the ROC, to eliminate the international communists”, which stood at the heart of 
Taipei’s national grand strategy. His determination was by no means what most 
people in international society summed up as a simple rhetorical claim.                                                 
                          
Defending the Legitimacy of the ROC 
  
The origins of Taipei’s outward-looking strategy can be traced to CKS’s 
perception of a relationship between the political ends of war and the military 
means to attain it. Taiwan’s grand strategy, shaped by China’s attempt at 
“liberation” in the two Strait crises, reflected Chiang Kai-shek’s political beliefs 
and his view of the merits of military means. Chiang defined strategy as 
follows: ‘Strategy is the art of creating and utilizing advantageous situations to 
achieve the goals of war, campaigns, or decisive battles, of a nation or of a 
group of nations in order to increase the probability of success and the final 
                                                                                                                                      
(Manchester: Manchester University Press), p.123. Herring argues that ‘China would have 
invaded the offshore islands [as part of its overarching strategy to liberate Taiwan] if the US had 
not made its extended deterrence commitment.’ 
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victory.’32 To avoid possible contradiction between political ends and military 
means, Chiang established guidelines whereby military strategy should accord 
with the national political goals. In his view, military leaders were not permitted 
to decide strategies by themselves and it was the political leaders who were in 
charge of directing war and responsible for dealing with the strategic problems, 
although they should not intervene in military operations.33 Accordingly, from 
Chiang’s vantage point, national strategy served political objectives and war 
was a legitimate instrument in the pursuit of political victory. The primary 
objective in CKS’s outward-looking national strategy was to uphold the 
legitimacy of the ROC on Taiwan as well as on the Chinese mainland. 
 
Since his retreat to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang had formulated his government’s 
fundamental national strategy against the PRC as follows: ‘First, concentrate all 
armed strength; second, safeguard Taiwan; third, rescue our compatriots on the 
mainland and fourth, rejuvenate the Chinese Republic.’34 This strategy was 
informed by his belief and experience acquired over 25 years of dealing with 
the CCP; Communism was the biggest threat to him, to the survival of the ROC 
and to the Chinese nation as a whole.35 He regarded the war against the 
Communists as a ‘life and death struggle’; thus ‘to fight the Communists to the 
bitter end’ was, as he put it, ‘the only way by which our compatriots can save 
themselves as well as their country’.36 He saw nothing wrong with using force 
for political purposes and he had already demonstrated his relentless willingness 
to do so for a variety of specific objectives during the Chinese civil war.  
 
In the 1954-55 crisis, because of US pressure and the militarily indefensible 
position of Dachen Island, Chiang traded this offshore island for the US security 
commitment regarding Jinmen and Mazu. Part of his purpose was also to 
concentrate his forces on these islands. However, in the case of the 1958 crisis, 
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Chiang firmly resisted the US political pressure and PRC military coercion to 
retreat from these offshore islands and deliberately linked the defence of the 
offshore islands to the defence of Taiwan and the survival of the ROC. After the 
1958 crisis, in a joint communiqué with the US, Chiang did half-heartedly 
promise not to use force to achieve his “sacred mission” – “the restoration of 
freedom to [China’s] its people on the mainland”.37 However, in view of 
Chiang’s active military preparations later in June 1962 in an attempt to take 
advantage of China in the chaos of the Cultural Revolution38, Chiang never 
deviated from his outward-looking strategy to seek, if possible, the 
reestablishment of political control over the mainland and he firmly believed 
war was an appropriate and necessary means in the pursuit of the ROC’s 
legitimate existence. Following the two Strait crises of the 1950s, the main 
difference in the outward-looking strategy would have been the added emphasis 
on “political warfare”, a concept that CKS understood as “all operations except 
those directly using force against the enemy.”39 
 
Although it had become more and more illusory, CKS’s insistence on pursuing 
a policy of returning to the mainland, the core of his outward-looking strategic 
choice, had its own reasons. As demonstrated already, the Nationalist 
government could not abandon its political goal of achieving national 
restoration by re-occupying the Chinese mainland, no matter how illusory and 
unfeasible this objective was, because, in terms of its concern for sovereignty, 
the government’s political agenda also included securing the legitimate 
existence of the ROC on Taiwan. After all, Taipei declined to end the formal 
state of civil war and proclaimed itself to be the only legitimate Chinese 
government across the Strait. From CKS’s perspective, the abandonment of the 
policy of returning to the mainland would have meant not only legitimizing the 
existence of the PRC but also accepting the permanent political division of 
China across the Strait. Moreover, for personal reasons, such division would 
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eventually have affirmed CKS’s failure and responsibility for the Nationalist 
defeat in the Chinese civil war. All of these three effects were utterly 
unacceptable to the former ruler of China. The potential dilemma for his 
government was that Taipei felt obligated to adopt what ultimately might be a 
futile outward-looking strategy against the Chinese Communists, coming at the 
cost of Taiwan’s domestic development and more stable cross-Strait relations. 
For instance, the basis for the KMT government’s legitimacy was the 1947 
Constitution, rooted in a liberal and democratic political system, which was 
severely limited by a set of constitutional amendments, namely, the “Temporary 
Provisions Effective during the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of 
Communist Rebellion”, in May 1948. Given the declared state of emergency 
because of the worsening civil war against the CCP, the Constitution was 
further restricted after the proclamation of martial law in May 1949. In the end, 
these constitutional arrangements helped to legitimize the prolonging of the 
KMT authoritarian rule and the unchecked power of Chiang Kai-shek.40   
  
A Statecraft of Risk Taking 
 
Personality is important in politicians’ choices between ends and means. In a 
study of the relations between personality and politics, Fred I. Greenstein argues 
that political consequences significantly result from the personal characteristics 
of political actors, or their “personality”, which refers to ‘a construct that is 
introduced to account for the regularities in an individual’s behavior as he 
responds to diverse stimuli.’41 As Chinese historian Huang Ren-yu observed, 
CKS was the ultimate adventurer, who used to say famously that ‘life (ren 
sheng) is adventure (mao xian), without adventure there is no life. … If we 
don’t take real action and try, we will never know whether it is right or 
wrong.’42 While Beijing boldly launched military operations to test Washington 
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and Taipei planned to engage in military confrontation against Beijing for the 
restoration of nationalist rule in the 1950s, in the two Strait crises both sides 
adopted an offensive strategy to challenge their much stronger opponents. One 
of the most distinct features of Taiwan’s grand strategy under CKS leadership 
was Taipei’s willingness to take a calculated risk in opting for its outward-
looking strategic choice to revise the cross-Strait status quo.  
 
 In the two Taiwan Strait crises, neither Taipei nor Beijing assumed that war 
across the Strait could be avoided. On the contrary, each was not only not afraid 
of war, but also relentlessly and deliberately applied military power to pursue its 
respective political objectives, i.e. “recovering the mainland” and “liberating 
Taiwan”. However, war was a matter of life or death given the challenge of a 
much stronger foe. From CKS’s point of view, “[n]ational regeneration can 
follow closely upon a national crisis”.43 Meanwhile, Mao applied his experience 
of guerrilla warfare which emphasized “the solution of problems by war”, while 
retaining “the ability to run away” if necessary.44 Their respective strategy of 
pursuing political ends by deliberate risk-taking during the two Strait crises 
demonstrated that these crises were characterised by two contradictory 
elements– opportunity and danger.45 Which one would predominate in the crises 
would depend on the skill of leaders to address and exploit the risks. 
 
From Chiang Kai-shek’s perspective, the nature of war was total rather than 
limited and the whole country would have directly or indirectly to be involved 
in war, in particular because for him it was a war of the weak against the 
strong.46 In assessing why the PRC abandoned its attempt in 1955 to attack 
Jinmen and Mazu after successfully capturing Dachen Island, Chiang and his 
subordinates indeed stressed the value of waging total war against Mao’s war of 
calculated limits. As the ROC Vice President General Chen Cheng claimed in 
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1957: ‘the [Communist] bandits attempted to use limited war to sunder apart our 
battle line in the Taiwan Strait. We nevertheless used total war to defend the 
security of the Taiwan Strait. The [favourable] result was that, because of our 
determination and our ability to support our determination with our power, the 
scheme of the enemy was frustrated.’47 Although this was a rhetorical claim in 
praise of Taipei’s victory, there was in fact no difference between the front and 
rear lines, given that Taiwan’s grand strategy was designed to fight a total war 
against the PRC. After the 1954-55 crisis CKS took the serious risk of firmly 
holding on to the easy targets (for the PRC) of Jinmen and Mazu as both 
offshore islands were the last territory connecting the mainland province with a 
vital operational front base. He clearly did this in order to defend Taiwan and 
pursue his political goal of “recovering the mainland”. The key to holding 
Jinmen and Mazu was to deploy his main forces on these vulnerable offshore 
islands so as to intensify the possible cross-Strait confrontation and prepare to 
launch a decisive battle on the Chinese mainland whenever the opportunity 
arose. This strategy, which amounted to confronting the adversary with the 
prospect of death so that both would launch an all-out fight for survival, was a 
life and death battle for CKS’s regime. Accordingly, the US faced a strategic 
dilemma: to help him on his own terms or to risk the loss of the ROC. It was in 
fact a kind of brinkmanship strategy on the part of CKS, meant to test 
Washington as well as Beijing. The maximum payoff for Chiang’s bold gamble 
would be four-fold: first to retain the offshore islands as the bridgehead for 
implementing plans for national restoration; second, to reinforce the American 
security commitment to the ROC; third, “to embroil the US with his enemies, 
the [Chinese] Communists”48 in the cross-Strait confrontation; and, fourth, to 
demonstrate his determination to fight the Chinese civil war to the bitter end. 
Consequently, for CKS, to hold Jinmen and Mazu at all costs, though very 
dangerous, was a decisive strategic decision that had significant political 
overtones concomitant with his outward-looking strategy.  
 
Meanwhile, Mao Zedong, who had initiated the two Strait crises of the 1950s, 
                                                
47 The Political Report of Chen Cheng to the Eighth Congress of the Kuomintang [in Chinese]. 
Reprinted in Reconstruction in China [Taiwan], October, 1957, pp.3-6. 
48 Text of the Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s Statement on United States Policy Regarding 
China, New York Times, September 7, 1958, p.3. 
 86 
had long believed in using war to achieve political objectives. His most famous 
dictum whereby “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” demonstrated 
his perspective on the relationship between military means and political ends. In 
order to gain experience in amphibious warfare for a future operation across the 
Taiwan Strait and to remove Chiang’s increasing threat on the eastern Chinese 
coast, the PRC in the early 1950s mainly focused its attention on the Chiang-
occupied offshore islands49 By then, Mao’s military strategy to recover these 
offshore islands was to move ‘from small to large, one island at a time, from 
north to south and from weak to strong.’50 However, as Eisenhower was 
entering into closer military relations with Chiang and giving him increasing 
support, Mao had to find an available means to clarify and test – and if possible 
to undermine – the US security commitment to Taiwan before he could launch a 
further large-scale military attack against Chiang. The Nationalist-occupied 
small offshore islands were the proper place at the right time for Mao to employ 
his limited war strategy. While Chiang regarded physical control of the offshore 
islands as a possible stepping-stone to “recovering the mainland”, these 
vulnerable offshore islands also provided a valuable chance for Mao to 
reactivate the physical and psychological confrontation at any time; this 
favoured his forces, since Mao possessed a decisive geographic advantage.51  
 
Mao’s strategy of limited war paid off in the 1954-55 crisis even though he 
could not prevent the proposed US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty from being 
signed. Mao not only succeeded in occupying the Dachen islands in early 1955, 
but also used the occasion, just after the signing of the MDT in late 1954, to 
demonstrate his will and capacity to challenge the US, which he referred to as a 
“paper tiger”. In the beginning of the 1958 crisis, the Chinese leaders believed 
that relying only on artillery fire52 they would be able to impose against a 
blockade the offshore islands that would in turn make America exert pressure 
on CKS to abandon the indefensible offshore islands as the US had done in the 
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case of Dachen in 1955.53 However, this scenario did not recur in the 1958 crisis; 
on the contrary, it backfired seriously because the US assured the world of its 
commitment to defending Jinmen and Mazu. To prevent a direct military clash 
with the US, Mao then demonstrated his flexibility and appealed for 
negotiations to end the 1958 crisis by agreeing on a ceasefire. This kind of 
strategy, which was combining limited bold acts of war with calculated acts of 
political initiative (the so-called “da da, tan tan” strategy), was precisely the 
same as the one Mao had used in the Chinese civil war against the Nationalists. 
He Di, a Chinese scholar, concluded that the experience of the two Strait crises 
demonstrates that ‘confrontation (“da da”) would prove more fruitful than 
conciliation (“tan tan”), as a means of achieving the ultimate goal of national 
reunification.’54 As a result, both sides’ distinctive risk-taking strategy to fulfill 
their own political objectives by deliberately applying military means initiated a 
turbulent cross-Strait context and imposed a zero-sum type of political 
competition across the Strait throughout the 1950s and 1960s.   
 
 
C.3.2 National Spiritual Mobilization  
 
With an inescapable cross-Strait military conflict seemingly in sight, President 
Chiang Kai-shek unshakably regarded the spiritual (jing shen) factor as decisive 
in war.55 He believed that ‘the magic effect of the spirit could be attained by the 
noble mind, supreme courage and talent’.56 Chiang himself had come to know 
“the spiritual magic” during his military career when he won the revolutionary 
war in the late 1920s with less than 100,000 men against the Chinese warlords, 
whose forces numbered more than one million. Equally, however, he lost the 
civil war to the Chinese Communists in the late 1940s despite the Nationalists’ 
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numerical and material advantage. He concluded from his experience of victory 
and defeat that ‘the most serious problem in war was not necessarily the 
[material] strength of the enemy, but the lack of adequate spirit, knowledge and 
ideas of one’s own forces.’57  
 
It was generally believed that without US assistance Chiang’s defeated regime 
in Taiwan was doomed to fall sooner or later, in view of the PLA’s 
overwhelming material advantage following Mao’s victory on the Chinese 
mainland. It may thus be difficult to understand why during the 1954-54 and 
1958 Strait crises Chiang repeatedly objected to an American plan whereby 
Taiwan’s status quo would be maintained under a UN ceasefire resolution, 
unless one takes account of the fact that Chiang appreciated “the magic effect of 
the spirit” associated with his outward-looking grand strategy of waging 
revolutionary warfare against the PRC. The significance of ideational factors, 
particularly the “Five Beliefs” doctrine, a strong dose of anti-communism as 
well as an optimist outlook can help to understand why CKS was confident that 
his regime could overcome Taiwan’s material disadvantage in the fierce and 
prolonged cross-Strait competition. The following will outline what I call here a 
strategy of national spiritual mobilization.  
 
“Five Beliefs” of ‘Ideology, Leader, State, Duty, Honour’ 
 
By early 1949, CKS acknowledged that the mainland phase of the civil war was 
lost and concluded that the main reason for the KMT’s failure was the lack of 
both revolutionary commitment and integrity, which showed itself in myriad 
ways, not least corruption and factionalism.58 CKS had earlier made a similar 
point about the spiritual failure of the Nationalists in his famous 1932 utterance. 
As he put it then, ‘[t]he Revolution has failed. My only desire today is to restore 
the revolutionary spirit that the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) had in 1924’.59 
Given the threat of imminent invasion by Beijing in 1949 and early 1950, one of 
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the fundamental challenges to Taiwan’s national security was the low morale 
and defeatism rampant among his forces by then. CKS indeed described the 
ROC on Taiwan as a “subjugated state” (wang guo) and demanded that his 
KMT government should restore the revolutionary spirit against the CCP.60 It 
was clear in CKS’s mind that the revolutionary spirit was vital for his overall 
national strategy since before he could gain any foreign assistance he would 
need to instil among his supporters a fresh revolutionary spirit and advance the 
reform of the KMT as well as the armed forces so that all would subscribe to the 
notion of virtuous revolution in the pursuit of national restoration.  
 
The “Five Beliefs” doctrine was derived from this need to revive the 
revolutionary spirit. It was constituted by “ideology”, “leader”, “country”, 
“duty” and “honour” (zhuyi, lingxiu, quojia, zeren, rongyu), which had in the 
past been mainly invoked to underpin military education by building up 
invisible spiritual power (wuxing zhanli) of the ROC revolutionary armed forces 
to pit against tangible material power (youxing zhanli). 61  Addressing his 
generals in March 1953, CKS set out the “Five Beliefs” doctrine by referring to 
the motto of the US Military Academy (duty, honour, country) but he added 
“ideology” and “leader” to fit the revolutionary purpose of the ROC armed 
forces in the particular context of cross-Strait confrontation.62 Ever since then, 
the “Five Beliefs” doctrine has underpinned the training and preparations of 
Taiwan’s armed forces under the Nationalist governments.63  
 
First, regarding itself as a revolutionary government, the CKS administration 
instilled  “ideology” as the leading ideational foundation for Taiwan’s armed 
forces. According to CKS, this was because this ideology, the Three Principles 
of the People (San Min Zhu Yi), represented the fundamental guideline for 
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‘national reinvigoration and state construction’.64 As CKS put it, ‘[b]eing a 
revolutionary, despite the hardship and the seemingly unbearable risks, we 
should devote ourselves sincerely to implementing the ideology with our heart 
and soul by sacrificing personal interests, affairs, sentiments and even our life 
for the purpose of national restoration which will eventually see the Three 
Principles of the People win over communism.’65 Second, the idea of “leader” 
was related to the relationship between the President of the ROC and the loyalty 
of the ROC armed forces. The demand for the armed forces’ loyalty was made 
because the ‘leader’, or the President, was the agent who alone represented the 
state and gave meaning to the ‘ideology’.66 In this regard, CKS had obviously 
learned a hard lesson in the Chinese civil war, in which he blamed his forces for 
their treason to the leader, namely himself.67 Thirdly, the concept of “country’ 
involved a sentiment of patriotism. The core of patriotism, according to CKS, 
was to be able to sacrifice a small ego (xiao wo), the individual, for a big ego 
(da wo), the state, since the existence and value of the individual would 
fundamentally rest on the survival and development of the state.68  Fourth, the 
belief in “duty” was about the obligations of a professional soldier. As CKS 
explained, the duty involved, from a micro perspective, a sense of moral 
commitment to the soldier himself and his job and from a macro perspective, it 
was related to carrying out whatever task was demanded by the country and the 
revolution.69 Finally, the belief in “honour” was a sense of honesty, self-respect 
and integrity. As CKS bitterly pointed out, the Nationalist military failure on the 
mainland was closely related to the disgrace, dishonesty and defeatism of his 
armed forces themselves.70   
 
In short, the purpose of the “Five Beliefs” doctrine was to equip Taiwan’s 
armed forces with revolutionary spiritual zeal and power. CKS had witnessed 
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the ideational influence as an energizing factor for establishing a powerful and 
effective force when his Whampao cadets were vanquishing the warlords in 
their early combat (1926-1927). Analyzing the Nationalist military failure 
against the CCP in the late 1940s, CKS admitted that he had not put sufficient 
efforts into ideational education for his armed forces and as a result they lacked 
the discipline and spirit that a revolutionary force should have.71 It was with this 
understanding that he decided to devote great effort to restoring the 
revolutionary spirit of his armed forces on the basis of the “Five Beliefs” 




To understand CKS’s national grand strategy, it is important to appreciate his 
revolutionary-centred perspective on national reconstruction and his embrace of 
the political ideology of the Three Principles of the People, which is associated 
with hard-line anti-communism. CKS started his career as a revolutionary 
officer in Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist revolution. Soon after Sun’s death, he 
assumed the Nationalist leadership and, against heavy odds, defeated the 
warlords with his revolutionary forces to unite China. Despite experiencing 
numerous rebellions and much social conflict, economic depression and foreign 
invasions, CKS had been a political-military strong man who managed to 
dominate China for 25 years until 1949, when the Nationalists were driven off 
the mainland by the CCP, leading him to take refuge in Taiwan. His career had 
its highs and lows, but one thing is certain, as Steve Tsang observes: that CKS 
genuinely believed in the revolution and behaved as a revolutionary whose 
commitment to unify and establish China as a powerful modern state along the 
lines of the Three Principles of the People never wavered.72 CKS’s devotion to 
the cause of the Chinese revolution can be seen from a statement made by 
himself: 
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‘The only purpose in my revolutionary career is the realization of the 
 teaching of the Tsung-li [Sun Yat-sen]. That is to say, we must make 
 our party a revolutionary and democratic party, our government a 
 modern constitutional government based on the exercise of the five 
 powers and the principle of efficiency and integrity and our country 
 into a country where the Three Principles of the People prevail.’73  
 
Taking refuge in Taiwan to continue the Chinese civil war, CKS defined the 
situation as “the third phase of the Nationalist revolutionary” whose central 
mission was to eliminate the Chinese Communists in the pursuit of Chinese 
unification under the Three Principles of the People.74  
 
Every revolution needs the guideline of an ideology to make sense of the 
complex world, for which revolutionaries strive, and take action in response. 
The core values of CKS’s so-called third phase of the Chinese national 
revolutionary mission rested on the ideology of the Three Principles of the 
People (nationalism, democracy and social well-being), or collectively the San-
min Doctrine, which also appears in the national anthem of the ROC. The San-
min Doctrine is a set of interrelated ideas developed by Sun Yat-sen to make 
China an independent, free and prosperous nation.75 In 1947, it was the state 
ideology, officially incorporated into the Constitution by the government of the 
ROC. According to Article 1 of the ROC Constitution, ‘The Republic of China, 
founded on the Three Principles of the People, shall be a democratic republic of 
the people, to be governed by the people and for the people.’76 The San-min 
Doctrine, as CKS put it, should be upheld as the highest guiding principle for 
the Chinese revolution, as well as the blueprint for the KMT in the missions of 
national reconstruction and regeneration during the third phase of the Chinese 
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revolution.77 It was clear to CKS that the task of the Chinese revolution had not 
been completed, as the state ideology of the San-min Doctrine could not be 
implemented on the Chinese mainland. Moreover, from CKS’s point of view in 
Taipei, the ROC Nationalist government, founded by Sun Yat-sen as the 
legitimate successor of the Qing Dynasty, represented the Chinese orthodox 
tradition whereas the PRC’s communism-rooted regime was a “heresy” which, 
given the later Cultural Revolution, not only destroyed China’s cultural heritage 
but also amounted to “immorality”. CKS obviously intended to define the cross-
Strait confrontation as a sign of the revolutionary ideological competition 
between Sun’s Three Principles and communism, rather than as a personal or 
party level power struggle.     
 
Because he saw himself as the political heir of Sun Yat-sen, CKS’s 
determination to put his heart and soul into implementing the San-min 
Doctrine should never be ignored – in fact it was what made him adopt the 
anti-communist perspective which decisively shaped Taipei’s grand strategy. 
CKS’s ideological perspective on the ongoing Chinese revolution was 
straightforward and consistent. From his point of view, the Chinese 
Communist government was not only the “puppet” regime of the USSR but 
also a disaster for the Chinese people and their culture; accordingly, Taipei’s 
anti-communist policy was the key to ensuring Chinese national survival and 
development.78 For him, the very meaning of the existence of the ROC and 
Taiwan lay in concluding successfully the cross-Strait political-military 
confrontation with reference to the San-min Doctrine. Moreover, the doctrine 
was vital in justifying his war against the Communists, and was meant to 
build up a strong spiritual force to underpin the political and social 
mobilization of his people.  He disagreed profoundly with most rational 
observers, including American government representatives, who believed that 
Taiwan’s national material capacity was too limited to carry out his ambitious 
national restoration to overthrow the Chinese Communist regime. That CKS 
relentlessly pursued the unlikely national restoration mission and rejected any 
idea of abandoning his revolution as a trade-off for assurances regarding 
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Taiwan’s security can be best understood by his ideological faith in the San-
min Doctrine. Accordingly, Taipei’s national grand strategy could be 
understood by the grounds of the San-min Doctrine, CSK’s views on state 




To understand CKS’s perspective on Taiwan’s grand strategy, it is also 
important to take into account his distinctive optimism as regards the 
revolutionary war against the PRC. A conviction that his forces could hold on to 
the offshore islands, for instance, was the most obvious display of this 
optimism, which was understood in Taiwan as building on confidence, 
imagination and courage. When the Chinese Communists established the PRC 
in Beijing, CKS declared that ‘we should not be discouraged by our past 
military failure. I would not admit that the war against the Communists has been 
lost. The whole war is not finished until the last shot is fire.’79  CKS’s 
confidence was derived not only from his belief in the supremacy of the San-
min Doctrine but also his calculation that the developing strategic situation was 
turning in his favour. Well before the two Strait crises, the ROC secured a 
victory in the Jinmen campaign in October 1949 and annihilated the Chinese 
invasion force of 15,000 men in October 1949. This was the first significant 
military defeat of the PLA since the mid-1930s.80 After the outbreak of the 
Korean War led the US to re-involve itself in the Chinese civil war, Chiang 
became more confident over not only the offshore islands but also the security 
of Taiwan. In an interview, he revealed that the US Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles ‘promised us that, after our [US-ROC] evacuation of the Dachen 
Islands, the US would jointly defend Jinmen and Mazu.’81 In the 1958 Strait 
crisis, it was believed that ‘the overriding reasons for defending the islands 
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[Jinmen and Mazu] were psychological’.82 Chiang convinced the US, including 
Eisenhower, that if the ROC lost Jinmen its main forces on Taiwan would “lose 
their will to fight” and such a loss of morale, Eisenhower thought, would lead to 
the disaster of having to defend Taiwan and Penghu.83 Obviously, then, the 
concerns with respect to morale were a vital factor in US-ROC considerations 
about playing their strategic hand in the context of the cross-Strait political-
military confrontation. 
 
In the words of Edward N. Luttwak: ‘the entire realm of strategy is pervaded by 
a paradoxical logic of its own, standing against the ordinary linear logic by 
which we live in all other spheres of life.’84 In other words, in strategy, the 
ideational factor of imagination is no less important than rational calculation 
when it comes to dealing with uncertain and illogical phenomena. Without 
imagination, one would have failed to foresee the outbreak of the Korean War, 
which drew the US again into the Chinese civil war and helped the ROC to 
survive even after its disastrous defeat on the mainland. During the 1958 Strait 
crisis, America found it difficult to understand why CKS insisted on taking an 
unaffordable risk by concentrating one-third of all his troops on the islands, 
numbers which seemed to exceed the needs of an efficient defense.85 However, 
the perspective of imagination helps indeed to understand that Chiang’s bold 
military and political gamble in this deployment derived in fact from his 
imagination, which led him to push the US into combat against China. His 
effort did in the end bring the USA and the PRC to the point of war during the 
two Strait crises. Some have argued that CKS even imagined that the outbreak 
of the third World War and rebellion within Mainland China would help him to 
retake the Chinese mainland.86 Such thoughts were never borne out in fact, but 
he eventually pushed the reluctant Americans into the defense of Jinmen and 
Mazu and enabled his forces to use these offshore islands uninterruptedly as 
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political-military counterattack bridgeheads for his aggressive outward-looking 
strategy.  
 
As Jay Taylor observes, CKS was “the ultimate survivor”, as he was always in a 
weak position in dealing with his allies and enemies.87 Having fought with the 
Chinese warlords, the Chinese Communists and the Japanese from the early 
1920s, Chiang was well enough able to understand the importance of the morale 
factor in national strategy. Given his unique personal experiences and his 
reading of military history, CKS, a professional soldier, firmly believed that 
superiority of numbers was not always decisive in war. Rather, it was morale 
that was always vital. Having been victorious over the Chinese warlords and the 
Japanese but defeated by Mao, CKS was more convinced that superior spirit in 
war could overcome material disadvantage, e.g. of numbers and equipment, and 
one should never trust one’s enemy, in particular the Chinese Communists. 
Courage in facing risks was an optimistic assertion of the superior spirit. As he 
argued, ‘if one does not dare to take risks, there is no other way to show one’s 
own spirit. Only when one dares to fight to death against the enemy can one 
expect to win the battle.’88 He explained the psychological effect of courage: 
that ‘if one does not fear the enemy, the enemy will begin to fear him; if one 
feels scared by the enemy, the enemy will gain courage.’89 During the two Strait 
crises, the assertion of courage manifested itself in the strategy of deploying his 
main forces on the offshore islands in greater numbers than were necessary, 
which might have been dangerous for the defence of Taiwan. When the US 
suggested an internationally sponsored ceasefire resolution across the Strait, 
CKS did not believe at all that it would last and that Beijing would also 
renounce the use of force. Nor did he accept Zhou Enlai’s “peaceful liberation” 
announcement in 1956; to him this showed the “art of deception” which the 
ROC ‘[should] not even consider’.90 Chiang’s optimistic attitude regarding his 
Chinese revolutionary mission can be understood in the light of his early 
personal experiences in China, which had profoundly influenced his perspective 
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on Taiwan’s national strategy. In the end, the endeavour of CKS to impose his 




C.3.3 Taipei’s Management of the Strategic Environment 
 
It would be impossible to discuss the confrontation across the Taiwan Strait 
without reference to the ROC’s persistent efforts to maintain its legitimacy on 
the mainland and the PRC’s resolute attempts to pursue the integrity of Chinese 
sovereignty and territory in the international context. Moreover, it turned out to 
be difficult for both sides to adopt a proper national strategy without paying 
attention to domestic considerations. During the two Strait crises in 1950s, 
Mao’s intention to seize the offshore islands and Chiang’s risky decision to 
retain these vulnerable possessions hardly follow from “structural” stimuli alone. 
Both sides rejected categorically the UN intervention and were resolute in 
regarding the confrontation across the Strait as an internal affair. However, 
without the structured context of the Cold War background, it would also be 
difficult to explain why the US became re-involved in the Chinese civil war and 
went to the brink of war with the PRC for these small Nationalist-held offshore 
islands. Furthermore, the involvement of foreign states, the US in particular, 
constructed a regional structured context, which constrained the behaviour of 
the ROC and the PRC throughout the two Strait crises and fundamentally 
shaped the ROC’s national strategy. Accordingly, further analysis is needed of 
the way in which the ROC grand strategy was influenced by factors of structure 
as well as Taiwan’s own, so as to fully understand the mutually constructed 
structure-agent strategic environment. The core of CKS’s management of 
Taiwan’s strategic environment can be encapsulated in two themes: the 
upholding of domestic security and situating Taiwan within the US-led global 
containment strategy against international communism. 
 
 
Upholding Domestic Security 
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As Taiwan was the only base of the third phase of his revolutionary mission, 
CKS’s management of Taiwan’s domestic security in the 1950s had four 
strands: the reconstruction of the KMT, political militarization, the military 
buildup and modernization, and social stability. As regards the reconstruction of 
the Nationalist Party, Chiang reviewed the weaknesses of the KMT and the 
strength of the CCP during the Chinese civil war. He believed that the collapse 
on the mainland ‘had resulted from the weakness and mistakes of the 
Nationalists themselves, rather than from foreign [American] influences’.91 As 
he saw it, ‘To tell the truth, never, in China or abroad, has there been a 
revolutionary party as decrepit [tuitang] and degenerate [fubai] as we [the 
KMT] are today; nor one as lacking in spirit, lacking in discipline and even 
more, lacking in standards of right and wrong as we are today. This kind of 
party should long ago have been destroyed and swept away!’92 Accordingly, the 
first objectives in consolidating the KMT’s power in Taiwan were to reform the 
party and to restore its revolutionary character so that it could become an 
effective instrument to control the country and serve his revolutionary purposes 
in opposing the Communists. To reform the KMT in Taiwan then, Chiang had 
first to eliminate such ills as corruption, factionalism, empty talk, lack of 
revolutionary spirit, selfishness, laziness and bureaucracy, all of which had 
undermined the strength of the KMT on the mainland.93 Then, in 1952 Chiang 
reorganized the KMT as a quasi-Leninist party, which emphasized the 
important role of ideology, the principle of democratic centralism, the necessity 
of strict party discipline, the establishment of a party-state and the pervasive 
presence of party cells throughout society.94 Consequently, the KMT took over 
the state and Chiang took over the party. 
 
Second, CKS pursued a unique form of political militarization to consolidate his 
domestic control in the interests of security. Chiang described it as a move ‘to 
militarize domestic politics and to manage all domestic political programmes by 
                                                
91 Lloyd E. Eastman (1981) ‘Who Lost China? Chiang Kai-shek Testifies’, China Quarterly, 
No.88 (Dec., 1981), p.664. 
92 Ibid. It was originally quoted from Chiang Kai-shek (1966) Collection of the Thoughts and 
Speeches of President Chiang (Taipei, 1966), Vol.19, p.291. 
93 Steve Tsang ‘Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomingtang’s policy to Reconquer the Chinese 
Mainland, 1949-1958’, p.66. 
94 Ibid. 
 99 
military command.’ 95  As Monte R. Bullard observes, CKS’s methods of 
political militarization included a combination of authoritarian, 
elitist/paternalistic and benevolent values. Accordingly, Chiang hoped to 
accomplish his intended national goals by placing most emphasis on three work 
areas: education, developing the economy and building a strong national army 
and police force.96 In order to legitimize the political militarization, Chiang 
promulgated early in May 1948 a set of constitutional amendments called 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Mobilization for the 
Suppression of Communist Rebellion and imposed martial law in May 1949. In 
this political militarization, the ROC on Taiwan was not only a party-state under 
the leadership of the KMT but also a military regime under the military 
command of Generalissimo Chiang. The efforts of Chiang’s political 
militarization in Taiwan reflected his strategic aim of safeguarding the island as 
a revolutionary base. An intense fear of the communist threats led to this 
extensive militarization of the political system and social life as well. 
 
Thirdly, similar to Mao’s dictum about power flowing from the barrel of a gun, 
Chiang believed that military strategy was the most important pillar in national 
grand strategy, which, in CKS’s point of view, was generally constituted by 
politics, economics, society, culture, psychology and military affairs.97 Chiang 
knew that the ROC had to build up and modernize its armed forces to cope with 
its serious numerical disadvantage against the PRC. He was also aware that 
military excellence could not depend on modernizing his military hardware 
alone. It needed to be linked to the reinstatement of military software – relating 
to organization, discipline and morality.98 It was believed that in the early 1950s 
Chiang’s troops were poorly trained and badly equipped, with low morale as 
well as a serious shortage of ammunition and spare parts.99 However, since 
April 1951, the American military aid programme under Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG) had been helping with the reorganization and re-
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equipment of the ROC’s armed forces.100 Chiang himself formulated three 
principal areas of reform: (1) the restoration of the national spirit, (2) 
organizational restructuring and (3) consolidating military units throughout the 
areas controlled by Taiwan.’101 One of his most important decisions, learning 
from the Communists, was the re-establishment and reform of the political work 
system in the military.102 According to the Guidelines for the Political Work of 
the National Revolutionary Army, the main task of the political work was ‘to 
conduct political education and ideological leadership of the military to build a 
spiritual armament in order to guarantee the success of the military combat 
missions.’103 That Chiang put such huge efforts into the political education of 
the armed forces reflects his belief in the supremacy of ‘the spiritual factor over 
material ones in war’.104  
 
Finally, a state could not have a feasible national security strategy against its 
enemy without domestic social stability and support. Sun Zi suggested that the 
most important element of strategic planning was to ‘cause the people to be in 
harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto 
death without fear of mortal peril’.105 After the 28 February 1947 incident, 
which involved a bloody clash between the Chinese Nationalist regime and 
local Taiwanese, Chiang’s Nationalist government made itself an alien regime 
on Taiwan.106 To regain domestic support, Chiang later executed General Chen 
Yi, then the first Governor of Taiwan, and blamed the Communist conspiracy 
                                                
100 From April 1951 to December 1978, the US Military Advisory Assistance Group in Taiwan, 
formally the 8678th American Advisory Unit, was to assess, advise, and assist Taiwan’s 
military, and assigned advisors down to the division level. The first Commander of MAAG in 
Taiwan was Major General William C. Chase. Further details see Bernard D. Cole (2006). 
Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects. (London: Routledge), pp. 26-27. Chiang Kai-shek 
also recruited Japanese and German veterans to advise and train his armed forces. See Lin Zhao-
zhen (2007) The Shadow Troop: Japanese White Unite in Taiwan (Taipei: China Times Press); 
Lai Ming-tang (1994) The Reminiscences of General Ming-Tang Lai, Vol. I and II (Taipei: 
Academia Historica). 
101 Bullard (1997) The Soldier and the Citizen, p.80. 
102 Ibid. This system, under his son Chiang Ching-kuo’s control, was first established in 1950 
and was named the Political Work Department, later renamed the General Political Warfare 
Department (GPWD) in 1963. See in Thomas A. Marks (1998) Counterrevolution in China, 
Chapter 4, pp. 124-181.  
103 Bullard (1997) The Soldier and the Citizen, pp.80-81. 
104 Tien Chen-Ya (1992) Chinese Military Theory, pp. 179. 
105 Sun Tzu (1963) The Art of War, p. 64. 
106 Detail of the Incident see in Lai Tse-Han, Ramon H. Myers and Wei Wou (1991) The Tragic 
Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 29, 1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
 101 
and “ambitious” Taiwanese for the government’s action. However, with the so-
called 228 Incident, the Nationalist government had allowed a serious gap to 
open up between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders and had lost the support of 
many local Taiwanese. The incident became ‘the most significant formative 
experience in preventing the consolidation of a Chinese national identity for the 
island [Taiwan] over the following decades.’107 To ensure that Taiwan would be 
a solid operational base for the restoration of his rule on the Chinese mainland, 
Chiang knew he needed not only to build up military defence forces and a 
powerful effective party-state government but also to pursue social stability and 
support from the Taiwanese society.  
 
The first step in this was the land reform in the early 1950s. At this time, the 
social and economic conditions of Taiwan still rested on an agricultural basis. 
Farmers constituted more than three-fifths of the population and more than two-
thirds of all farm families were tenants.108 General Chen Cheng, the Governor at 
the time, believed that ‘social stability, improvements in people’s livelihood and 
economic development could take place only through land reform.’ 109 
Furthermore, to create domestic unity Chiang in the early 1950s applied five 
interrelated sets of guidelines in Taiwan to secure political socialization: ‘(1) a 
clear rationale for the requirement of national and party unity, (2) resolute and 
decisive leadership, (3) persuasive belief in the Communist threat, (4) a 
powerful belief in the role of ideology [the Three Principles of the People] and 
(5) an optimistic and determined vision of the role that Taiwan would play in 
the recovery of the Mainland.’110 By then, although there were two important 
domestic incidents, the dismissal of Wu Kuo-cheng (as Governor of Taiwan) in 
1954 and of General Sun Li-jen, (the Army Commander) in 1955, the political 
and military elite remained loyal to Chiang. As Steve Tsang argues, ‘politics in 
the ROC in Taiwan during the 1950s was conditioned by [the] official policy of 
recovering the mainland.’111 Generally speaking, by the time of the two Straits 
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crises in the 1950s, CKS had secured the political and social stability in Taiwan 
that enabled him to concentrate on dealing with the factors of a structured 
external context for the practice of his national strategy. 
 
Linking up with America’s Global Containment Strategy 
 
The ROC on Taiwan, compared with the PRC, is a small, weak and vulnerable 
state.112 The most obvious fact about small powers is that their security strategy, 
in terms of foreign policy above all, is governed by the policy of other, major 
powers and the international system.113 Therefore, M. I. Handel argues that the 
most important condition for the security of the weak state is its ability to appeal 
to other states for support and the most dangerous condition for the weak state is 
isolation from the international system, or inclusion in the sphere of influence of 
adversarial great powers.114 From the structural perspective of formulating a 
national security strategy, Steven M. Walt suggests: ‘When confronted by a 
significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is 
defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers 
to alignment with the source of danger.’115 As the cross-Strait political-military 
confrontation was zero-sum and ideological in nature, Chiang Kai-shek’s 
strategic preference was obviously “balancing” over “bandwagoning”. Three 
structural factors were fundamentally shaping Taiwan’s grand strategy in the 
1950s: first, the PRC’s relentless threat, second, conditional US assistance and, 
third, the structured context of the Cold War. All these three structural factors 
were interrelated and shaped Taipei’s decision to link its national security 
strategy with the American global strategy of containment.116 
 
Indeed, Beijing’s overall strategy was to push the US forces away from the 
Taiwan Strait so as to create a favourable environment for either coercing 
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Taiwan on its terms or “liberating” it, if at all possible. By then, the CCP 
leadership deemed it a feasible strategy to focus on exploiting differences 
between CKS and the US about Taiwan’s vulnerable offshore islands in order to 
undermine their strategic alliance. Mao reasoned then that in view of Beijing’s 
military threat, the US would eventually force Chiang to withdraw his forces 
from Jinmen and Mazu since the US would be unwilling to risk a direct war 
with the PRC.117 Furthermore, since war with the US was unlikely to break out 
for what were essentially insignificant offshore islands, it was further believed 
that Mao’s attack on the offshore islands would also demonstrate his 
determination to unify Taiwan and boldness in overcoming his country’s fear of 
the US. As Mao argued, ‘Do not be afraid of ghosts [the US]. The more you are 
afraid of ghosts, the more likely you are not to survive, to be eaten up by them. 
We are not afraid of ghosts; that is why we bombard Jinmen and Matsu.’118 And 
Mao asserted that the US was trapped on Jinmen and Mazu.119 As such, the two 
Strait crises in the 1950s demonstrated that Mao applied military force on the 
offshore islands to express Chinese anger about the intervention of foreign 
powers in Taiwan’s affairs, to remind everyone, the US in particular, of the 
danger of engaging with the PRC, to test and clarify the US commitment, to 
erode American willingness to intervene and to strengthen his bargaining 
position. 
 
Chiang’s preference for managing Taiwan’s strategic environment centred on 
Taipei’s alliance with the US. This was because CKS believed that there was a 
mutual national interest against the Communists between Taipei and 
Washington. In CKS’s view, grand strategy referred to “the strategy of allied 
nations” (tongmengguo jian di jiti zhanlie), or alliance politics. 120  The 
foundation of grand strategy, in terms of his perspective of alliance politics, was 
based on ‘their mutual interest to promote cooperation in order to take unified 
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steps and achieve their common goal with their joint efforts.’121 In practice, the 
primary strategic concerns of the alliance politics involved the confirmation of 
the common enemy, the methods of dealing with the enemy, and the priority of 
targets and possible actions.122 When the Truman administration abandoned the 
KMT in the late 1940s, Chiang was confident that sooner or later the US would 
reinvolve itself in the Chinese civil war. As Chiang asserted, ‘[t]ime is the 
creator of history… Rapprochement and estrangement, gain and loss in 
diplomatic relations cannot be everlasting and without change. Today’s loss 
may be the foundation of future gain… Given a prolonged period of time and 
with power in one’s grasp, international development can all be in one’s 
hands.’123 Later, the structured context of the Cold War, the PRC’s hostility 
against the US, Mao’s policy of “leaning to one [the Soviet] side” (yi mian dao) 
and the outbreak of the Korean War did move the international context in 
Taiwan’s strategic favour and provided the ROC with the great opportunity to 
foster its alliance with the US against their common enemy, the Communists. 
The US had since the early 1950s adopted a hard-line policy to contain, isolate 
and undermine the PRC. Notably, the US then assisted Taiwan in establishing 
the second largest military force in the Far East; and the $ 260 million annual 
American aid contribution provided two-thirds of the ROC budget.124 That the 
US-ROC security alliance was took the form of the ROC-US Mutual Defense 
Treaty in 1954 represented a major strategic triumph for Taipei. The alliance 
thus became the cornerstone of Taiwan’s grand strategy. Given the evidence of 
the two Strait crises, as long as the US-ROC security alliance existed, the PRC 
was unlikely to successfully use military means to coerce or “liberate” Taiwan. 
However, Chiang was blinded by his confidence in the permanent nature of US-
PRC hostility, which derived from shared ideological confrontation and the 
context of the Cold War. By the late 1960s, the US had started to normalize its 
relations with the PRC and this eventually posed a serious security challenge 
(analyzed in Chapter 4) for the ROC.  
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Chiang’s perspective of strategic environment was built on an assumption of 
Sino-American permanent hostility. This assumption not only failed to grasp the 
reality of the dynamic nature of international politics, but also led him not to 
maximize Taiwan’s advantage in the two Strait crises of the 1950s, in the light 
of establishing a practical and stable relationship across the Strait under UN’s 
intervention. Because of recent bitter experience of World War II and fear of a 
possible nuclear catastrophe, international society became worried that the 
conflict across the Strait under Taipei’s hard-line policy against Beijing might 
trigger another world war. In September 1958, Dulles implied that America 
would defend Jinmen with nuclear weapons, while Khrushchev warned that an 
attack on China would be regarded as “an attack on the Soviet Union”. The 
British Prime Minster Harold MacMillan protested that these small islands did 
not justify taking the world to “the brink of World War III.”125 Other Western 
major powers like the UK opposed America’s Taiwan policy and would have 
preferred to see a UN ceasefire arrangement across the Strait. However, under 
the protection of the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, Chiang took bolder and 
more aggressive measures to proceed with his die-hard mainland restoration 
policy, which involved deploying his main forces in Jinmen and Mazu.  
 
Failing to appreciate the advantages of normative constraints on the prevailing 
use of force in the international system of the Cold War,126 Chiang firmly 
rejected the idea of a UN supervised ceasefire which would have 
internationalized the Taiwan issue and led to de facto separation across the 
Strait, as in the cases of Germany and Korea. During the two Strait crises in the 
1950s, Taiwan had the best opportunity to exploit a favourable international 
context, not only in relation to the US but also the UN, to enhance its strategic 
position against the PRC’s relentless threat. In dealing with its external threats, 
a weak state such as the ROC on Taiwan could not afford international 
isolation. However, Chiang’s unrealistic mainland policy and ideological-rooted 
perspective of international politics ultimately made the ROC government 
commit itself to a wretched and much less favourable situation in the world: that 
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C.3.4 Strategic Offensive Posture for Military Counterattack 
 
In the 1950s, Taiwan’s strategic posture, in military terms in particular, was 
offensive in nature. The offensive strategic posture was fundamentally derived 
from CKS’s outward-looking strategic choice, as well as his perception of 
threats. Meanwhile, Beijing’s security concerns focused mainly on the threat 
emanating from the ROC-US anti-Communist alliance, which sought to 
constrain, isolate and undermine the PRC regime. To enhance the security of the 
PRC, it was natural for Beijing to apply the mainland’s geographic advantage to 
manipulate the issue of the offshore islands for its political purposes. Beijing’s 
conduct at the very beginning of the 1958 Strait crisis, for instance, was 
characterized by an active, or offensive, opportunism. As Mao himself 
explained, his original aim of applying the initial bombardment was to bring 
about the withdrawal of Chiang’s troops from Jinmen and Matsu as a stepping-
stone for his ultimate liberation of Taiwan.127 Mao’s offensive strategy was thus 
designed to test the determination and political will of the ROC and US before 
irrevocably committing his forces against them. However, when the US and the 
ROC demonstrated unity and a willingness to hold Jinmen and Mazu in early 
September 1958, Mao immediately adopted a different strategy whereby he 
sought to confront the ROC and the US separately. On the one hand, vis-à-vis 
Mao adopted an offensive strategy that would allow him to reactivate the armed 
conflict over the offshore islands at any time and in any place, with options of 
his own choosing; however, because of his concerns about American 
intervention he tactically left the offshore islands to Chiang and continually 
exerted military pressure on them, e.g. by bombarding them on odd dates. On 
the other hand, he confronted the US by engaging in rhetorical assaults. Mao 
seriously criticized US imperialism and tried to push the US to revise its Taiwan 
policy, but at the same time, to prevent any direct military clash with the US, he 
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appealed for peace and negotiations. In view of the US position, Mao applied a 
protracted strategy to unify Taiwan, but it was never his intention to allow a 
rival Nationalist regime to exist on the island. 
 
Given Mao’s strategy, Taiwan’s grand strategy in the 1950s unsurprisingly was 
informed by Taipei’s perspective on the overt military threat from Communist 
China.128 Many people, today more than ever, would argue that Chiang’s 
perception of the Communist threat was exaggerated, since the PRC had neither 
the capacity nor the intention to invade Taiwan.129 However, this argument 
misses the point that at the time the Communist threat to “liberate Taiwan” was 
real rather than a mere figment of Chiang’s imagination.130 From Taipei’s point 
of view the offshore islands were symbols of its determination to recover the 
mainland and were a base for initiating raids and blockade operations. In the 
case of the two Strait crises, Taipei’s deep commitment to the offshore islands 
was designed to create opportunities and to make use of the islands to achieve 
its ultimate political end – the restoration of China’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity under the banner of the ROC. Taipei’s offensive strategic posture 
could be better understood more fully by its relentless military preparations and 
the presumed strategic role of the offshore islands associated with Eisenhower’s 
calculated “Unleash” Policy to check Beijing’s offensive posture. 
 
 
Relentless Military Preparation 
 
Ever since the Nationalist forces retreated to Taiwan in late 1949, CKS firmly 
believed that a military clash across the Strait was inevitable. In terms of 
strategy, he combined defensive and offensive postures in the early 1950s. On 
16 June 1950, after the evacuation of Hainan and Chusan, CKS announced that: 
“our first step is to concentrate all of our military strength. Our second step is to 
fortify Taiwan and its adjacent islands. Our third step is to launch a counter-
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offensive on the mainland. Our fourth step is to restore the ROC and to establish 
a free and independent New China.”131 Even though he rhetorically asserted his 
commitment to retaking the mainland, Chiang argued that based on ‘the 
objective circumstances at the time and the strength of our government, we have 
to realize that unless we concentrate our strength [to defend Taiwan] we could 
find it difficult to win the final victory.’132 Chiang even predicted that the 
Communists would invade Taiwan between July and late September 1950.133  
 
By then, Chiang’s major strategic concern was to defend Taiwan rather than the 
offshore islands - Dachen, Jinmen and Matsu. And there is no evidence in the 
early 1950s that CKS intended or prepared to fight a decisive war with all his 
military resources against the PRC on these small offshore islands. In fact, 
Chiang did not deploy his main forces on the offshore islands until the 
aftermath of the 1954-55 Strait crisis. General Chen Cheng, Chiang’s most 
important military and political ally, admitted in the early 1950s that Taiwan’s 
defense was “barely adequate”. This assessment took account of the manpower 
strength of the PLA of an estimated 3.7 million, as well as the PRC’s capability 
to transport 200,000 troops by sea for an assault on Taiwan.134 Given its 
numerical disadvantage against the PLA, Taipei’s posture of strategic offence 
with tactical defence aimed not only to defend Taiwan but also to recover the 
territory lost against the Communists. As Yang Chih-heng put it, ‘before the 
signing of the Taiwan-US Defense Cooperation Treaty, Chiang Kai-shek’s 
military strategy was still predominantly offensive.’135 Against the advice of the 
US, CKS insisted on continuing to enlarge his military, maintaining 600,000 
personnel in his regular forces during the 1950s. Accordingly, perhaps he 
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committed 15 percent of Taiwan’s GNP and around 85 percent of total 
government expenditure to the military.136 
 
The ROC strategic situation and posture changed dramatically after the US 
again became involved in the Chinese civil war following the outbreak of the 
Korean War. Before the US Seventh Fleet began to patrol the Taiwan Strait in 
June 1950, Taiwan’s security situation was precarious; it had adopted a military 
posture of mixed defence and offence in view of its weak defensive capacity to 
ensure its survival. On March 1, 1950, the day that Chiang resumed the 
Presidency, Zhu De, Mao’s Commander-in-Chief, announced that the 
‘elimination of the Chiang Kai-shek regime from Taiwan has become the most 
pressing task of the whole country.’137 However, the PRC’s imminent invasion 
was stopped by the outbreak of the Korean War. With US intervention and 
assistance, the safety of Taiwan and Penghu were basically secured while the 
more vulnerable offshore islands were still in danger, given their geographical 
disadvantage and the deliberate ambiguity of US strategy with respect to them. 
By then, as Robert A. Scalapino says, ‘it [the Nationalist military force] is much 
more than adequate to defend Taiwan at present and much less than adequate to 
engage the Communists on the continent…. If Taiwan has to be defended 
militarily, the ultimate burden will surely fall upon the United States in 
company with the Taiwanese.’138  
 
From June 1950 (when the Seventh Fleet began to patrol the Strait) to 
December 1954 (when the MDT was signed), Taipei’s tactical defence posture 
was also adjusted, with greater emphasis put on offence. After the Communist 
threat to Taiwan was gradually neutralized on the back of US intervention, 
Chiang concentrated on improving the quality and quantity of his military 
forces, shifting towards a more overall offensive strategy that would eventually 
allow him to recover the mainland. At the same time, Chiang adopted embraced 
offensive tactics by treating the offshore islands as operational bases from 
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which to launch guerrilla activities and harass China’s eastern coast. In August 
1950, it was reported that the underground guerrillas had fought 1,800 pitched 
battles, both large and small, with the Communists, inflicting 300,000 
casualties. 139 In November of the same year, Beijing reported that it had 
repulsed a landing attempt by Taipei on the Zhejiang Coast.140 As Chiang at the 
time still lacked the military capacity to wage major war on the mainland, small 
and limited guerrilla activities were the only option that could relieve 
frustration, boost morale, affirm the existence of the ROC and strengthen the 
claim to sovereignty over the mainland. 
 
Mao captured the evacuated Dachen islands at the end of the 1954-55 Strait 
crisis. However, in the event Chiang skillfully relied on what constituted a 
defensive tactical retreat to win a clear US security commitment regarding 
Jinmen and Matsu, whose status had deliberately been left ambiguous in the 
ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty. This was CKS’s strategic achievement. 
Building on US support, Chiang was able to improve Taiwan’s overall strategic 
position, especially offshore islands. Indeed, according to the MDT, the US was 
not formally committed to defending these offshore islands unless Taiwan or 
Penghu was threatened. From a military standpoint, in Washington’s estimation, 
Jinmen and Mazu were ‘important but not essential to the defense of 
Formosa’. 141  However, soon after the first Strait crisis, Chiang gradually 
deployed 100,000 of his best forces, roughly one third of the entire ROC army, 
on these small offshore islands. As we saw, before the 1958 Strait crisis, he 
successfully linked the defence of Jinmen and Mazu to the defence of Taiwan. 
Eisenhower recalled that the US did not have much choice but to help Chiang to 
defend Jinmen and Mazu in the second Strait crisis, since their loss would 
“probably” threaten not merely KMT’s control of Taiwan but also the American 
position in the whole of Asia.142 
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When Mao Zedong had the PLA attack Jinmen and Mazu during the 1958 Strait 
crisis, he could not muster more than a wasteful military campaign, since Mao 
failed to seize any of Chiang’s islands. Similarly, the PLA failed to break down 
the ROC-US determination to defend these islands, or to create a favourable 
strategic situation. Indeed, Chiang eventually succeeded in extending the US 
commitment to securing Jinmen and Mazu and retained his offensive posture 
with reference to his continued military threat to the Chinese coast. Obviously, 
the offensive military advantage of the offshore islands was conditional on 
Washington’s allowing Taipei to exploit it. As his intention was to remove the 
PRC threat permanently, however, Chiang seemed to deliberately ignore the 
fundamental geographic advantage that the PRC enjoyed vis-à-vis these 
offshore islands and this allowed for the possibility that the PLA might launch 
an attack whenever it chose.  
 
The Offshore Islands and Eisenhower’s “Unleashing” Policy 
 
Chiang’s persistence in holding on to these exposed islands after the 1954-55 
Strait crisis derived from his belief in the supremacy of offence and his 
assumption that, with Washington’s military alliance in hand, Taiwan itself was 
secured from the PLA attack. For Chiang, a defensive posture alone could 
perhaps have mitigated the Communist threat to the existence of the ROC 
temporarily but it would not have removed the danger permanently and attain 
his goal of national restoration eventually. The explicit US security commitment 
to Taiwan and Penghu under the MDT more or less removed Chiang’s fear of 
an insecure rearguard. Moreover, Chiang was informed that the US would 
jointly defend Jinmen and Mazu after the first Strait crisis, although the promise 
was still informal and ambiguous.143 It seemed that Taipei could keep all that it 
already possessed. Nevertheless, would Chiang then be satisfied with the status 
quo across the Taiwan Strait? The answer was no, since for Chiang at this time 
war against the Communists was not only inevitable but also desirable. Seeking 
to exploit the US security commitment, CKS’s offensive stance against the 
Communist threat became more pronounced after the 1954-55 Strait Crisis.  
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Giving a speech to the KMT’s political and military elite in October 1954, 
Chiang comprehensively outlined his strategy vis-à-vis the PRC. In view of its 
importance for understanding CKS’s offensive strategic posture in the 1950s, it 
deserves to be quoted in full:144  
 
(1) In terms of the goals of counter-attacking Mainland China and 
protecting Taiwan within the constraints of the international situation and 
other factors, Taiwan and the PRC are in competition. Both are looking for 
the opportunity to defeat the other. War will break out at any time, but no 
one knows precisely when.  
(2) Taiwan’s military preparation[s] will make no distinction between war 
and peace. Taiwan has to maintain all-out defence readiness in order to deal 
with a war at all times.  
(3) The recovery of Mainland China means that the Communist Party has to 
be eliminated. The war may become a long-term affair, certainly if [the] 
Soviet Russia supports the PRC.  
(4) Public opinion in Mainland China is on the side of the KMT. Once the 
ROC’s armed forces have landed, thousands of thousands of Mainland 
Chinese will begin to overthrow the Communist regime everywhere.  
(5) The international situation is increasingly favourable to the ROC. Once 
war with China has broken out, international friends and allies will support 
Taiwan, not only in protecting the islands themselves, but also in [offering] 
assistance in the air and at sea near the offshore islands. 
 
Combined, the front forces on the offshore islands and the guerrilla forces on 
the mainland constituted the two pillars of Chiang’s military offensive strategy 
in the 1950s. On the one hand, deploying his main forces on Jinmen and Mazu 
was a measure to attain two objectives with a single move. The first objective 
was to ensure that the reluctant US would become involved in the defence of the 
offshore islands; the second was to consolidate his defensive as well as 
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offensive position against the Communists. On the other hand, the ROC claimed 
that in June 1950 there were some 400,000 guerrillas, due to increase to 
1,600,000 in August, who were operating against the PRC on the mainland.145 
These potential guerrillas were either previous ROC supporters or the remnants 
of ROC forces. They had been either too slow to escape from the troubled 
mainland, or they had merely not been convinced of the need to do so.146 While 
retaining the offshore islands and waging guerrilla warfare, Chiang could hope 
to wait for a favourable opportunity to launch a counter-attack in Mainland 
China, either in the event of the Communists making a move that would 
provoke America or with the onset of a Hungarian-type uprising against the 
PRC. Mao’s calculated but provocative bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu 
provided Chiang with the opportunity to put his offensive strategy into action. It 
was reported that Chiang was sensitive to this opportunity and repeatedly said 
“Good, good, good” when he was informed of Mao’s bombardment of Jinmen 
on 23 August 1958.147  
 
Summarizing the insights derived from his own experiences of Chinese civil 
war, Chinese traditional strategic wisdom and foreign strategic thinking, Chiang 
formulated his ten principles of war, which had a profound influence on the 
ROC’s military academy and its military doctrines. These ten principles were as 
follows: (1) target and major point (mubiao yuanze yu zhongdian), (2) initiative 
and flexibility (zhudong yuanze yu tanxing), (3) offence and preparation 
(gongshi yuanze yu zhunbei), (4) organization and duty (zuzhi yuanze yu zhize), 
(5) unity and cooperation (tongyi yuanze yu hezuo), (6) concentration and thrift 
(jizhong yuanze yu jieyue), (7) manoeuvring and speed (jidong yuanze yu sudu), 
(8) raids and deception (qixi yuanze yu qidi), (9) safety and information (anquan 
yuanze yu qingbao) and (10) morale and discipline (shiqi yuanze yu jilV).148 
Among these ten principles, Chiang particularly emphasized the principle of 
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offence for the proposed operations against the Mainland.149 As Chiang saw it, 
the ROC was at a manpower disadvantage but could compensate for this by 
taking the initiative. Accordingly, Chiang asked his officers to take an 
offensive-oriented perspective on the future war. He said: ‘All in all, in the 
operation of the counter-offensive against the Communists, we have to 
emphasize the spirit of initiative, manoeuvre and mobility…in every campaign. 
Attacks from the front and flank, outflanking attack, [and] unstoppable 
attacks… [we must] continuously attack with a lightning surprise force, like a 
rolling stone down a ten-thousand-foot mountain.’150 This reasoning could have 
come from Mao. Indeed, Mao also provided a plausible interpretation of the 
dialectical relationship between defence and offence, saying: ‘A revolution or 
revolutionary war is an offensive yet also has its defensive phase and retreat. To 
defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to take a flanking action 
in order to take a frontal action, to be devious in order to direct – these are 
inevitable occurrences in the process of development of many things and 
military movements cannot be otherwise.’151  
 
Before the 1958 Strait crisis, Chiang’s offensive strategy was also encouraged 
by what amounted to little more than half-hearted efforts by Washington to 
persuade Chiang to give up the idea of attacking the mainland. Early on 2 
February 1953, Eisenhower announced his famous policy of “unleashing” 
Chiang, which ‘created the impression that Eisenhower’s administration was 
prepared to rely on a more vigorous strategy to “roll back” communism.’152 
Furthermore, at the time it was argued that ‘important members of his 
administration favor a policy of improving the offensive as well as the defensive 
capacity of the Nationalist forces in order to pose a threat to the mainland and 
keep open the possibility, should favorable circumstance develop, of permitting 
and assisting the Nationalist to return the mainland.’153 In December 1954, the 
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MDT and the Exchange of Notes, signed eight days later, clearly encouraged 
Chiang to take bolder measures against the Communists, despite the defensive 
character of the pact and his military weakness vis-à-vis the PLA.154 When 
Chiang asked Eisenhower to support his counter-attack policy in April 1956, 
Eisenhower wrote back, ‘we do not consider that to involve military force is an 
appropriate means of freeing Communist-dominated peoples and we are 
opposed to initiating action which might expose the world to a conflagration 
which could spread beyond control’. He agreed, however, that ‘we must be 
prepared to take advantage of any such developments [Hungarian-type 
uprisings] in an appropriate manner when the time arrives.’155 Understandably, 
Chiang would interpret this US policy in accordance with his mainland recovery 
policy and assume that “the international situation was increasingly favorable to 
the ROC”. 
 
However, in practice, Chiang’s desire during the two Strait crises to apply an 
offensive strategy, to wage counter-offensive actions and to escalate the Strait 
crisis, was consistently discouraged by the US, although Eisenhower was half-
hearted support CKS’s initiation to check Beijing. The US was obviously aware 
that the escalation of the Strait crisis was likely to trigger a major war in the 
Asia-Pacific that would serve Chiang’s interests but damage those of the US. As 
John Foster Dulles mentioned, the Nationalists would be very likely to ‘view 
this [Washington’s military retaliatory action] as a golden opportunity for 
recovering the mainland as the outcome of a war between the US and Red 
China.’156 O. Edmund Clubb concluded that ‘the Nationalists were far too weak 
to engage the Communist armies in open warfare and could only hope that the 
US would fight the war on their behalf.’157 Despite CKS’s declaration that ‘he 
only needs America’s logistic support and does not want America to fight on his 
behalf’158, it became obvious that American assistance was an indispensable 
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part of Taipei’s offensive strategy. Chiang’s extensive military and economic 
dependence on the US eventually allowed the US to constantly constrain CKS’s 
offensive strategy to a reasonable extent. In the ROC-US Communiqué of 23 
October 1958, under US pressure at the end of the second Strait crisis, Chiang 
first publicly renounced the use of force to bring about the restoration of 
freedom to the people on the mainland. However, this renunciation soon proved 
a half-hearted statement rather than a significant change of his offensive 
strategy.159 In June 1962, for instance, Chiang again actively prepared to launch 
a military attack on the mainland while the PRC was experiencing the domestic 
chaos in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward. Although ‘no one seriously 
expects Chiang Kai-shek to return to the mainland’160, Chiang was always 
looking for ways to push forward his offensive strategy to return the mainland 
at the first obvious opportunity. 
 
 
C.3.5 Conclusions: Taiwan’s Grand Strategy under Chiang Kai-shek in the 
1950s 
 
The 1954-55 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises highlight the strategic role for 
Taipei of the offshore islands, mainly Jinmen and Mazu, and this provides 
valuable empirical evidence to examine Taiwan’s grand strategy under Chiang 
Kai-shek’s administration in the 1950s. In reviewing the legacy of the two Strait 
crises and why these small offshore islands were of such vital strategic concern 
to the ROC, four important features of CKS’s national grand strategy have been 
distinguished, as follows: an outward-looking strategic choice, his belief in 
spiritual supremacy, jumping on the coattail of America’s global containment 
strategy, and his perspective regarding the value of a strategic offensive posture.  
 
First, Taiwan’s grand strategy was in the 1950s fundamentally characterized by 
CKS’s preference for an outward-looking strategy which was designed to 
                                                
159 Chiang’s interpretation of the communiqué was contrary to that of the US. See Gordon, 
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restore the ROC on the Chinese mainland, not only on Taiwan. From CKS’s 
point of view, the offshore islands and Taiwan were both only a springboard to 
his ultimate goal of achieving the cross-Strait national restoration of China. To 
understand Chiang’s outward-looking strategy in the 1950s requires a clear 
sense of the deadlock brought by the incompatible political ambitions of Chiang 
and Mao: Chiang’s objective of “recovering” the mainland as opposed to Mao’s 
goal of “liberating” Taiwan. Chiang emphasized the importance of waging total 
war, whereas Mao manipulated a strategy of limited war in the offshore islands. 
Both sides intended to proclaim to international society that the Chinese civil 
war was still unfinished. Chiang’s perspective embracing total war associated 
with his outward-looking strategy made him willing to take the serious risk of 
deploying his major forces on Jinmen and Matsu, so as to secure these small 
and vulnerable offshore islands as a means to claiming the ROC’s legitimate 
sovereignty over Mainland China.  
 
Second, in the cross-Strait zero-sum competition, it is difficult to understand 
how Taipei could have been so determined and convinced of its final victory 
against the PRC, unless one can appreciate CKS’s belief in spiritual supremacy. 
In reviewing CKS’s public speeches about his national restoration plans, one 
can see that he particularly emphasized the power of ideational factors, which 
were designed to allow Taipei to overcome the inferior material capabilities. 
CKS’s endeavor to equip Taiwan with the presumed ideational powers for his 
revolutionary war can be understood by what I have called his strategy of 
national spiritual mobilization, whose contents are constituted by three main 
themes: the “Five Beliefs” doctrine for his armed forces, Sun Yat-sen’s San-min 
doctrine that is strongly associated with anti-communism, and his distinctive 
optimism for his so-called third phase of the mission to further China’s national 
revolution. However, it would be naïve to claim that these ideational forces 
alone could capture the big picture of CKS’s national grand strategy against the 
PRC. Other factors, e.g. military preparations, domestic security and the 




Third, CKS’s ways of upholding domestic security and abiding by 
Washington’s global containment strategy are also important for understanding 
Taiwan’s grand strategy in the 1950s. To engage the external communist threat, 
Chiang had in the first place to consolidate his fragile regime on Taiwan, since 
the domestic situation at the time could be described as politically and socially 
fragmented and economically chaotic. Chiang did learn the lesson of his defeat 
on the mainland and focused on four strategies to establish domestic security: 
KMT reconstruction, political militarization, a military buildup and 
modernization, and social stability. The state of war and the state of emergency 
against the PRC justified the need for martial law and the restriction of civil 
liberties, and accordingly legitimized the dictatorship of the KMT and CKS in 
Taiwan. However, a small state such as the ROC on Taiwan was still unlikely to 
fight alone against a strong power such as the PRC. Accordingly, three 
interrelated structural factors fundamentally shaped Taiwan’s grand strategy in 
the 1950s: namely, the PRC’s relentless threat, the US-ROC Mutual Defense 
Treaty and Cold War dynamics. And Taipei’s way of managing these three 
structural factors was encapsulated in CKS’s strategy of supporting 
Washington’s global containment strategy.  
 
Fourth, the predominant factor in Taiwan’s decision making in the 1950s was 
the overt military threat from the Mainland. Taipei’s strategic posture to deal 
with the Communist threat was in general oriented towards offense. Before the 
US Seventh Fleet patrolled the Taiwan Strait, the priority in Taipei’s national 
strategy was to ensure Taiwan’s continued survival. Soon after the first Strait 
crisis, however, the US explicit security commitment to Taiwan, Penghu, 
Jinmen and Mazu, enabled CKS to take a more offensive posture in dealing 
with the Communist military threat. Furthermore, during the intervening period 
between the two Strait crises, Chiang’s offensive strategy was also encouraged 
by the half-hearted efforts of the US to persuade Chiang to give up the use of 
force as a means to constrain Beijing’s international activity for Washington’s 
interests. Only at the end of the 1958 Strait crisis, when he was under pressure 
from the US, did Chiang publicly renounce the use of force in the confrontation 
across the Taiwan Strait, albeit not wholeheartedly. By contrast, the PRC has 
never renounced the use of force and this has given the PRC a vital strategic 
 119 
advantage – the flexibility to apply defensive as well as offensive measures to 
deal with dynamic strategic challenges. 
 
In short, Taiwan’s grand strategy in the 1950s is distinguished by CKS’s 
outward-looking strategic choice, an emphasis on spiritual supremacy, the 
dominating structural factor of the US global containment strategy, and the rigid 
belief in the usefulness and importance of pursuing an offence-oriented strategy. 
All these four factors are reflected in CKS’s perspective on sovereignty that the 
ROC was to be seen as “China” and represented the only legitimates 
government of China as a whole against the newly established PRC. While the 
ROC managed to withstand Mainland pressure in the two Strait crises, Taipei 
failed to discover, or to admit, to a strategic reality – that Taiwan alone was too 
small and lacked the available capabilities to recover the Mainland in the long 
term. The two military confrontations across the Strait in the 1950s were crises, 
but also provided a precious opportunity for the ROC to internationalize the 
Taiwan issue in order to secure its de facto sovereign status in the international 
context. However, already at the time Chiang’s perspective against the PRC was 
isolating the ROC from the mainstream of international society, which tended 
more and more to accept the legitimacy of the PRC’s existence. Taipei’s rigid 
stance in relation to the lack of international legitimacy of the PRC was thus 
soon counter-productive. This would later impact on Taiwan’s national strategy 





The Beginning of Taiwan’s International Isolation:  






The relations between the Republic of China (ROC), the United States, and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) were an unusual phenomenon of 
international politics during the 1950s and 1960s. Although the ROC controlled 
only a very small part of China and was no longer in control of the mainland 
after October 1949, the US supported diplomatically Chiang Kai-shek’s 
unrealistic claim that the ROC on Taiwan represented the only legitimate 
government for the whole of China. Accordingly, the US declined at this time to 
formally recognize the PRC, even though America’s major allies, such as the 
UK and France, did so in 1950 and 1964 respectively1. It is obviously ironic that 
the PRC, covering a territory of 3,690,500 square miles and boasting the 
world’s most populous nation, should not have been recognized by the United 
States while a small polity, the ROC on Taiwan, was. In the name of China, it 
even continued to hold a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. By the 
1970s, however, many held that Taipei’s insistence on its sovereignty claim 
over all of China turned the ROC leadership into something of a laughing-stock 
in international society.2 
 
This unusual situation can be regarded as a result of Chiang Kai-shek’s skilful 
manipulation of the hostility between China and the US. For decades, Taipei 
                                                
1 Britain was the first Western power to recognize the PRC on 6 January 1950, but it did not 
establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC until the two countries had exchanged 
ambassadors on 13 March 1973. For details, see Feng Zhong-ping (1994) The British 
Government’s China Policy, 1945-50 (Keele: Ryburn Publishing), p.134. 
2 Shelley Rigger (1999) Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (London: Routledge), p. 106. 
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had effectively obstructed Sino-American relations, aiming to isolate the PRC, 
so much so that Taipei in fact wielded a vastly greater influence than most 
countries of its size could do.3 This success came about generally because 
Taiwan took advantage of the Cold War context and ideological tensions 
between the PRC and US. It is also due to Taipei’s detailed understanding of the 
American political system and its ability to make use of a well-organized group 
in the US Congress and government, as well as deploying a wealth of skills to 
influence American public opinion. For decades Taiwan successfully dissuaded 
the US from seeking an accommodation with Beijing and persuaded 
Washington to Mount Massive diplomatic campaigns on Taiwan’s behalf 
against the PRC, in the UN in particular. As Nancy B. Tucker observes, ‘the 
manipulation of the United States, a skill developed early by Chinese 
Nationalist leaders, became fundamental to Taiwan’s foreign policy ... No 
government learned to manipulate the system more expertly than Chiang Kai-
shek’s regime.’4  
 
However, unusual feats often come to a sudden end. In this case, the unusual 
situation of Sino-American mutual non-recognition ceased due to the dynamic 
nature of international politics. In effect, Chiang had only limited power to 
manipulate the US in order to prolong the latter’s containment, isolation and 
weakening of the PRC. The main weakness of CKS’s manipulation rested on 
his assumption that the PRC was America’s permanent strategic rival, a rival 
itself allied irreversibly to Moscow in the bipolar Cold War context. In the 
event, change in the structure of global alignment was beyond Taiwan’s 
capability to shape; it was Taiwan that lacked the strategic influence to keep the 
PRC in opposition to the US. The significance of this structural factor had 
already manifested itself in the fact that the Truman administration would 
arguably have abandoned the ROC and recognized the PRC as far back as the 
early 1950s if the PRC had not joined the Korean War against America.5 
Furthermore, the ROC’s unrealistic and uncompromising policy of claiming that 
                                                
3 Robert A. Madsen (1999), Chinese Chess: US China Policy and Taiwan, 1969-1979 (PhD 
thesis, International Relations at Oxford University), p.7. 
4 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (1993), Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: 
Uncertain Friendship (New York: Twayne Publishers), pp. 335. 
5 Thomas J. Christensen (1996) Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, 
and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 106-122. 
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it represented the whole of China pushed the US into a difficult diplomatic 
situation, which was to undermine its strategic flexibility in the global context.  
 
For the US, the emergence of Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s was 
unexpected, as was the case earlier with the outbreak of the Korean War, which 
led Washington to reconsider the state of Sino-American relations. The far-
reaching international significance of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, escalating 
greatly in the late 1960s, induced US leaders to rethink the ‘unthinkable’ 
possibility of Sino-American “rapprochement”, or “normalization”, so as to take 
advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and to enhance America’s strategic position 
Early in 1959, the Colon Report suggested that the US should recognize the 
existence of the PRC, adjust its policy of containing and isolating China and 
adopt a policy of engagement to split apart the Sino-Soviet partnership, and to 
replace the ROC in the UN by the PRC.6 Although these reconsiderations still 
did little to change America’s concrete policy across the Strait in Taipei’s 
favour during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the idea 
of “normalizing” US-China relations was always mentioned as a feasible option 
for enhancing America’s global strategic situation. 
 
In the event, surprising many, Sino-American “rapprochement” materialized 
under President Richard M. Nixon, well regarded as a strongly anti-communist 
politician who even had backed General MacArthur’s efforts to extend the War 
in Korea to Communist China. Soon after assuming the Presidency, Nixon 
initiated new contacts by high officials on both sides in 1969. He also assigned 
Henry Kissinger to undertake a secret trip to Beijing in 1971, and himself 
became the first American President to visit Communist China on 21 February 
1972. These developments took Taiwan by surprise; the Nixon shock provoked 
a crisis that virtually challenged all the major elements of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
national grand strategy, which was still centred on his outward-looking strategic 
choice. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on examining the causes and 
implications of this decisive change in Taipei’s strategic environment for 
                                                
6 US Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations (1 November, 1959), United States Foreign 
Policy: Asia, a research report to the Committee, by Colon Associated, Ltd. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office), pp. 145-155. 
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Taiwan’s grand strategy, the way in which Taipei responded to the US-China 





C.4.1 Unfavourable Changes in the Strategic Environment – Détente in 
Sight 
 
One of the principal tasks of managing the strategic environment is to exploit 
or, if possible, create an advantageous structural context, which can more 
feasibly and efficiently produce the outcome most preferred for an agent’s 
proposed strategic objectives. From the 1960s to the early 1970s, Taiwan’s 
major concern was centred on transformation of the strategic environment. The 
key challenge was to respond to Sino-American rapprochement in the late 
1960s, which in many ways was the consequence of Nixon’s strategy of global 
détente. Motivated by the desire both to extricate the US from the Vietnam War 
and to quash any possibility of superpower nuclear confrontation, the Nixon 
administration sought to rely on Sino-American and Soviet-American détente in 
the context of these states’ triangular relations to achieve the said twin aims: to 
extricate US forces from Vietnam and to build a stable structure of peace.   
 
However, Nixon’s strategy of détente and Sino-American rapprochement were a 
decisive shock for Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, which still regarded the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) as an irreconcilable ideological enemy; not only as a 
threat to the existence of the ROC and the “free world” but also as a wholly 
illegitimate regime. While Nixon’s détente policy opened the door to integration 
into international society to the PRC, America’s subordination of the ROC’s 
international status to ensure that Sino-American détente was the starting point 
for the ROC’s more pronounced international isolation. Facing this challenge, 
Taipei’s response rested on two major beliefs: (1) that Washington’s security 
commitment to Taipei would not change, and (2) that international politics was 
still bipolar in nature deriving from an irreconcilable ideological competition 
between the communist and anti-communist camps. These beliefs, associated 
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with CKS’s continuing zero-sum competition over sovereignty with  the PRC, 
which allowed for no flexibility to the arrangement of possible co-existence 
across the Strait, eventually reinforced the ROC’s international isolation. In 
order to understand the impact on Taiwan’s grand strategy, this section will 
examine Nixon’s détente strategy, the Nixon Doctrine and his Sino-American 
rapprochement in greater detail.    
 
 
The Origin of Détente 
 
The primary motivation of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente was to 
reduce the risk of nuclear war. 7  As President Nixon asserted ‘the two 
superpowers cannot afford to go to war against each other at any time or under 
any circumstances’.8  In Kissinger’s words, ‘[w]e are in favour of détente 
because we want to limit the risks of major nuclear conflict.’9 The horrifically 
destructive power of nuclear weapons, above all the hydrogen bomb, made it 
unacceptable for the nuclear powers to apply military means on their own terms 
in pursuing political ends. Obviously, if one cannot either annihilate one’s 
enemy or compel him to act in accordance with one’s will to enhance one’s own 
security, eventually both sides may come to believe that the pragmatic strategy 
in this security dilemma is to learn to live with one’s adversary as peacefully as 
possible. Rejecting Clausewitz’s view of war as “the continuation of political 
activity by other means”, Nixon in the era of nuclear warfare believed that 
‘there can be no real peace in the world unless a new relationship is established 
between the United States and the Soviet Union … War is an option whose time 
                                                
7 In its literal sense the term détente means a “relaxation of tension”; in the diplomatic sense, it 
represents an easing of strained or tense relations between states. As early as 1963, J. F. 
Kennedy had already used détente to describe the process of relaxing tensions with the Soviet 
Union. For discussions on the meanings and uses of détente, see Raymond L. Carthoff (1994) 
Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Regan (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution); Robert S Litwak (1984) Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American 
Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press); and Richard C. Thornton (1989) The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping America’s 
Foreign Policy (New York: Paragon House). 
8 Richard Nixon(1983) Real Peace (London: Sidgwick & Jackson), p.1. 
9 Henry Kissinger (1973) “Interview at Peking, November 12”, Department of State Bulletin, 
Vol.69 (December 10, 1973), p.716. 
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has passed. Peace is the only option for the future’.10 At the high tide of the 
Cold War with the decline of American global power in the late 1960s, it was 
this perspective of emphasizing the theme of peace, rather than war that 
underpinned the new relationship of the superpowers which prompted the 
Nixon-Kissinger focus on détente. 
 
However, the pursuit of peace was not the only objective of Nixon’s détente 
strategy; the content of this peace was an equally vital matter. As Nixon 
insisted, ‘The peace we seek must be coupled with justice’ and ‘the West must 
adapt its policies to the realities of the world today.’11 Nixon’s conditions for 
peace, corresponding to American justice and recognizing international 
conditions, explain why Nixon asserted there were always intractable 
differences and inevitable competition between the two superpowers. Nixon 
later referred to his détente as a ‘hard-headed détente’ which ‘… does not mean 
that the United States and the Soviet Union agree [on some crucial matters, e.g. 
ideology]. Rather it means that we profoundly disagree. It [détente] however 
provides a means of peacefully resolving those disagreements that can be 
resolved, and of living with those that cannot.’12 Even though there were 
stubborn differences between the US and the Soviet Union, Nixon believed that, 
from the American standpoint, détente was about ‘breaking the ice, where that 
is possible, and trying to approach our differences rationally.’13 The rational 
negotiation of differences came from a common ground of national interests – 
avoiding nuclear war and pursuing national prosperity. Nixon explained, ‘Our 
differences make a perfect, ideal peace impossible, but our common interests 
make a pragmatic, real peace achievable.’14  
 
Accordingly, Nixon’s détente involved reconciling the goal of national interests 
with the means of rational negotiation, which can be regarded as the peace-
centred neo-classical strategic perspective. From Nixon’s perspective, ‘Peace is 
                                                
10 Nixon (1983) Real Peace, pp.1-2. 
11 Nixon (1983) Real Peace, p.96. 
12 Nixon (1983) Real Peace, p.26. 
13 Richard Nixon (1980) The Real War (New York: Warner Books), p.288. 
14 Nixon (1983) Real Peace, p.17. 
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not an end to conflict but rather a means of living with conflict.’15 The concept 
of détente gave rise to profoundly paradoxical relations between egoism and 
altruism, disagreement and agreement, competition and cooperation and reality 
and idealism. It was also reflected in Nixon’s policy towards China and Taiwan 
– to normalize relations with the PRC- but concurrently to maintain America’s 
security commitment vis-à-vis Taiwan. Notably, these aspects of détente were 
designed to negotiate a new mutually accommodating international order, so as 
to establish a ‘stable structure of peace’, albeit a conditional and imperfect 
peace. As such, Nixon’s peace-centred strategic perspective of détente for 
mutual accommodation fundamentally contended with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
classical strategic perspective of insisting on a zero-sum competition between 
the ROC and the PRC. The difference in the end not only insolated Taipei from 
the mainstream of international society but also brought about the beginning of 
the end as regards diplomatic relations between Taipei and Washington.   
  
The Nixon Doctrine 
 
When in Guam in July 1969, Nixon enunciated a new overall principle of 
American foreign involvement, later known as the Nixon Doctrine, which was a 
logical complement to the notion of détente. Most closely relevant to crises in 
the peripheral areas of American allies and friends, the Doctrine consisted of 
three guidelines for American intervention: first, keeping the assurance of 
American treaty commitments; second, providing a shield for American allies 
or countries vital to American security against nuclear threats; and third, in 
cases of non-nuclear aggression, looking ‘to the nation directly threatened to 
assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for defense.’16 
The third guideline, in fact, was the core of the Doctrine, which put a 
precondition on American interventions and distinguished Nixon from his 
predecessors who had Americanized their foreign interventions, in particular in 
the Vietnam War. ‘At the heart of the Nixon Doctrine’, in Nixon’s own word, 
                                                
15 Ibid, p.4. 
16 For full details of Nixon’s remarks in Guam, see US President, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1971), pp.544-56. 
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‘is the premise that countries threatened by communist aggression must take the 
primary responsibility for their own defense.’17  
 
The emphasis on winning public support through minimizing American 
casualties was a unique character of the Nixon Doctrine. The major goal of the 
Doctrine was not designed ultimately to win wars such as the Vietnam War. In 
the latter case the goal was instead to “negotiate an honorable extrication” of 
American combat forces from the War by all possible means.18  Emphasizing 
the “primary” role of indigenous forces, no matter how inadequate they were, 
the doctrine, in effect, was a solution to minimize American casualties sustained 
in US military intervention. This political sensitivity to casualties resulted from 
the characteristic of modern liberal democratic politics, in which government 
policies were fundamentally influenced by domestic public opinion. The impact 
of “the bodybags effect”, revealing the bloody character of the Vietnam War, 
devastated American public support for its government’s foreign policy. 
Understandably, the Nixon doctrine was thus designed to make war less painful, 
in terms of reducing the risk to US forces, so as to better manage domestic 
public opinion. As a result, arms transfers and financial aid, instead of military 
manpower, became the major instruments for Nixon’s administration in 
continuing American foreign intervention, in Vietnam in particular. 
 
America’s political-military commitments were, however, ambiguous. Even 
though the first guideline of the Nixon Doctrine pledged that the US would stick 
to its commitments, ‘the key issue in the Nuclear Age’, as Kissinger argued, 
‘was not whether commitments would be kept, but how they would be defined 
and interpreted.’19  Litwak observes that Nixon and Kissinger were determined 
to exploit the Nixon Doctrine’s underlying ambiguity so that Washington’s 
manoeuvring and ability to discriminate among cases would lead it to not 
become a prisoner of its declaratory stance.20 The purpose of the strategic 
                                                
17 Nixon (1980) The Real War, pp.106-7. 
18 Kissinger later recalled and reflected on the lesson that ‘when American commits itself to 
military action, there can be no alternative to victory’. For the lessons of the Vietnam War, see 
Henry A. Kissinger (1994) Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone Book), pp. 674-702. 
19 Kissinger (1994), Diplomacy, p.708. 
20 Litwak (1984) Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of 
Stability, 1969-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.124. 
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ambiguity was to create space for freedom of action so as to both maintain 
flexibility and regain the initiative in the dynamic domestic and international 
contexts. Indeed, since the nature of the strategic context was to be full of 
uncertainty, the doctrine deliberately declined to provide technical details and 
tangible criteria for American intervention.  
 
In short, the Nixon Doctrine was intended to enable Washington to disengage 
from painful and unpopular foreign interventions. Nixon asserted, ‘Our 
objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with 
a sound foreign policy … We are not involved in the world because we have 
commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests 
must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.’21  However, 
the tension between commitment and possible disengagement called into 
question of American global containment against Soviet expansionism22: how 
then did the Nixon Doctrine help to reconcile the continuous “consolidation” of 
American commitments with the requisite “retrenchment” of American 
intervention? Nixon’s solution to this tension rested on the pursuit of an overall 
Sino-American-Soviet détente, which served as an end to justify Washington’s 
pursuit of the status quo and as a means to create stable conditions in the 
peripheral areas to which America was committed. The Sino-Soviet split 
provided a timely opportunity for America to normalize Sino-American 
relations, which would provide a new structural context favourable to the US. In 
the event, Sino-American rapprochement fundamentally reshaped Taiwan’s 
strategic environment, affecting not only Taipei-Washington-Beijing relations 
but also Taipei’s overall international status in every respect. This structural 
change put a final end to CKS’s intention of drawing on Sino-American 
hostility in order to exploit a possible Sino-American military clash for the 
purpose of pursuing his ultimate mission of national restoration. Nevertheless, 
                                                
21 US President (1970), US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace. A Report 
to the Congress by Richard M. Nixon, 18 February 1970 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1970), p. 119. 
22 Nixon asserted that ‘there can be no détente without containment’. John L. Gaddis observes 
that there were “striking similarities in the approaches to containment” advocated by George 
Kennan and Henry Kissinger, in relation to the aspects of threats, interests, response, and public 
justifications. For details, see Nixon, Real War, pp.281-286, and John Lewis Gaddis (1982) 
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.307-8. 
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his priority of restoring the ROC on the mainland, rooted in the question of 
sovereignty associated with his anti-communism, which still dominated every 
aspect of Taipei’s grand strategy, never wavered throughout the development of 
the unfavourable structural change.  
 
Nixon’s Sino-American Rapprochement 
 
The Nixon Sino-American rapprochement of the late 1960s already signaled the 
eventual Sino-American normalization of 1979.23 The rapprochement not only 
improved America’s global strategic position to contain Soviet expansionism, 
but also created more favourable regional circumstances in the Asia-Pacific, 
which eventually allowed the US to disengage from the Vietnam War. The 
starting point of the rapprochement involved reassessing relations with China, 
its de facto existence of the PRC, and the escalation of Sino-Soviet 
confrontation. 
 
Nixon’s rapprochement served to revise America’s hard-line China policy, 
which was at odds with international developments in the late 1960s. Assuming 
a monolithic communist world and still suffering from the bitter experiences of 
the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Washington regarded Communist China as more 
implacably hostile toward the West than the Soviet Union had been in the 1950s 
and 1960s.24 Accordingly, the US was very reluctant to recognize the de facto 
existence of Communist China, adopting instead a policy of “containment and 
isolation” against the PRC which involved supporting the ROC on Taiwan as 
the only legitimate government of China. However, the escalation of Sino-
Soviet confrontation in the late 1960s called into question the policy of the US 
to  “contain and isolate” China. Indeed, neither the PRC’s strategic significance 
nor the increasing Soviet threat could be ignored if Washington wanted to 
improve its global strategic position, which had been significantly undermined 
by the Vietnam War. In his article, Asia After Viet Nam, Nixon signaled the 
                                                
23  To deal with the Watergate crisis, Nixon increasingly depended on the support of 
conservative Congressmen, who firmly supported Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, and he ultimately 
failed to accomplish Sino-American normalization, the recognition of the PRC, during his 
presidency.  
24 Nixon (1980) The Real War, pp.134-35. 
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possibility of Sino-American normalization in the following words: ‘Any 
American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of 
China … Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever 
outside the family of nations … There is no place on this small planet for a 
billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.’25 Nixon’s 
pragmatic perspective of accepting the existence of the PRC eventually was 
incompatible with Washington’s long-standing “containment and isolation” 
policy towards China, which Taipei took too much for granted because it 
assumed an ideological hostility between China and the US.  
 
The US-PRC détente served as a key element of Washington’s strategy vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union. Nixon recalled that the Sino-Soviet split was “the most 
significant geopolitical event since World War II”, which made Sino-American 
rapprochement possible. 26  The strategic importance of China for Nixon’s 
détente strategy derived not only from the China’s immense material resources 
and its vital geographical position, but also from the new Chinese perception of 
Moscow as Beijing’s primary security threat. In view of this structural change, 
Nixon stated in September 1968: ‘We must not forget China. We must always 
seek opportunities to talk with her, as with the USSR … We must not only 
watch for changes. We must seek to make changes.’27 The Nixon Sino-US 
rapprochement culminated in the Shanghai Communiqué of 28 February 1972, 
which has provided, in Kissinger’s words, “a road map” for Sino-American 
relations since then. Indeed, Sino-American rapprochement well reflected 
Nixon’s sense of seizing a strategic initiative and his determination to exploit 
the rapprochement as an available means to pursue his overall strategic 
objective – a “stable structure of peace”. 
 
In order to clarify matters, amid the rumours surrounding US-ROC relations at 
the time, President Nixon on many occasions publicly promised Taipei that his 
administration would not abrogate US-ROC diplomatic relations and the US-
                                                
25 Richard M. Nixon (1967), ‘Asia After Viet Nam’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.46, No.1 (October, 
1967), p.121. 
26 Nixon (1980) The Real War, pp. 133-4. 
27 “Nixon’s View of the World – from Informal Talk”, an interview in US News & World 
Report, no. 12 (September 16, 1968), p.48. 
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ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) as a trade-off for Sino-American 
rapprochement.28 In Nixon’s own words, “I will never sell you [the ROC] down 
the river.’’29 From Washington’s perspective on the cross-Strait relationship, 
following the Nixon-Kissinger logic of détente, Sino-American rapprochement 
would not in fact harm Taiwan; on the contrary, it could be a win-win game for 
the US, the ROC and the PRC. It would enable Washington to moderate 
Beijing’s hostility toward Taipei; accordingly, the likelihood of China attacking 
Taiwan would diminish. Washington already had Mao Zedong’s private 
assurance that China would not use force against Taiwan.30 As a result, despite 
the Sino-American rapprochement, Nixon could still hold firm to his 
proclamation that the US ‘could not and should not abandon the Taiwanese’ 
because America was ‘committed to Taiwan’s right to exist as an independent 
nation.’31 Nevertheless, Nixon’s alignment with Beijing signified that the ROC 
on Taiwan, a peripheral small state, would henceforth play only a marginal role 
in pursuing US national interests in the global context. In fact, the Nixon 
administration always worried that Washington’s commitment to Taiwan might 
become a substantial obstacle to the newly prioritized objective – Sino-
American rapprochement. In the end, Taiwan’s strategic role for the US 
dramatically shifted from that of being a valuable anti-communist fortress to 
essentially becoming a strategic burden in the context of America’s strategy of 
global détente.  
 
 
C.4.2 Continuity in Taipei’s Outward-Looking Strategic Choice 
 
The fundamental changes in Beijing’s favour of Washington’s cross-Strait 
policy associated with Taipei’s eviction from the UN resulted in a crisis for 
Taipei that saw Taiwan slip into deeper international isolation. Nevertheless, 
CKS’s particular pursuit of his outward-looking strategy in the context of the 
                                                
28 Shen James C. H. (1983), The US & Free China: How the US Sold Out its Ally (Washington, 
D.C.: Acropolis Books Ltd), p.51. Shen was the last ROC ambassador to Washington, where he 
served for eight years.      
29 Ibid. 
30 Kissinger (1994) Diplomacy, pp.726-9. 
31 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey (2007) Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to 
Pragmatism (Oxon: Routledge), p. 32.  
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cross-Strait political-military confrontation never wavered. Although he felt 
obliged to accept Sino-US rapprochement not least in order to continue his 
country’s diplomatic and military alliance with Washington and decided on the 
ROC’s ‘honorable withdrawal’ from UN to maintain the ROC’s national 
dignity, he never formally compromised Taipei’s sovereignty claim over the 
Chinese mainland. Instead, he always vowed that ‘the ROC and the treasonous 
bandits [the PRC] would never coexist.’ 32  There were three domestic 
determinants of Taiwan’s grand strategy at the beginning of Taiwan’s 
intensifying international isolation, namely, Taipei’s perception of threat, 
nationalist sinocentrism and the primacy of Taipei’s sovereignty claim33, which, 
when combined, can help to explain CKS’s insistence on maintaining his 
outward-looking strategic choice, despite his awareness of the unfavourable 
structural change.  
 
Taipei’s Threat Perception 
 
Because of the unfinished civil war between the two rival governments across 
the Strait, Taipei’s perception of national security threat was derived from its 
understanding of the unlikelihood of peaceful co-existence and Beijing’s 
changing approach to Taiwan: from military liberation to a strategy of 
diplomatic isolation. As the Sino-American rapprochement drew nearer, one of 
the most significant characteristics of Mao’s cross-Strait strategy was his 
demonstration of confidence and calculated patience to resolve the Taiwan 
issue. This characteristic stemmed from the favourable change in the strategic 
environment and the need to make the most of the change in the international 
system. In the 1950s, facing the threat of isolation and containment from the 
US-Taiwanese security alliance, Mao had constantly probed America’s real 
intentions toward China to ascertain whether opportunities existed to “liberate” 
Taiwan, once and for all. However, the US had demonstrated its determination 
to defend Taiwan during both the first and second Strait crises and the US-ROC 
                                                
32 Chiang Kai-shek’s 1972 New Year Address, in You Zi-xiang (2006) Leaders’ Rhetoric: 
Important Speech Collections of Cross-Strait Leaders, 1906-2006 (Taipei City, Taiwan: Wu 
Nan Publishers), p. 356. 
33 For the point regarding ‘the primacy of Taipei’s sovereignty claim’, see the later analysis in 
this chapter on the back-firing of Taipei’s ‘one China’ policy. 
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MDT compelled Beijing to reassess how it could draw on its limited military 
means to accomplish its ambitious goal of “liberation”. Subsequently in the 
1960s, the PRC had suffered the devastating effects of “the Great Leap 
Forward” and the chaos of “the Cultural Revolution” on the domestic front. 
Furthermore, under Mao’s “two line” doctrine aimed at both American and 
Soviet ‘imperialists’ simultaneously, Beijing’s strategic environment was 
indeed severe and unfavourable by then. Finding it difficult to manage such 
domestic and international conditions, Beijing desisted from exploring how to 
“liberate” Taiwan. However, Nixon’s enthusiasm to proceed with Sino-
American rapprochement after the late 1960s not only helped Beijing to 
overcome the dilemma of “opposing two sides [the Soviet Union and the United 
States]”, but also enabled it to change the nature of the ROC’s relations with the 
US. 
 
From Taipei’s point of view, this strategy of “killing two birds with one stone” 
was designed to exploit the current developments in international politics so as 
to gain Beijing’s objective over Taiwan. There were two substantial steps 
implementing what amounted to Beijing’s strategy to achieve Taiwan’s 
isolation. The first was to separate the Sino-American issues from the Sino-
Taiwan ones so as to sidestep the Sino-American differences on Taiwan, which 
might damage the establishment of the Sino-American overall strategic 
partnership. Mao made this point clearly to the US when he said that, “[T]he 
question of the US relations with us should be separate from that of our 
relations with Taiwan.”34 Second, according to a united-front strategy, Mao was 
to put forward a doctrine of “one horizontal line” doctrine, which replaced his 
former “two lines” doctrine, to unite the US, Japan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and 
Europe against Soviet imperialism.35 Attaining this united front within the 
international context, in which the US would take the most important role, 
would create a favourable strategic environment for the PRC against the Soviet 
threat, as well as isolating Taiwan.  
 
                                                
34 William Burr (ed.) (1998) The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks with Beijing & 
Moscow (New York: The New Press), p.186. 
35 Ibid, p.94. 
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It became obvious that, when Taiwan was isolated from the US and 
international society, time would be on China’s side, giving Beijing the 
confidence to expect an inevitable victory in the Strait competition. Kissinger, 
for example, believed that, without American intervention, Taiwan would 
eventually be absorbed by the PRC.36 Beijing’s confidence may explain why 
Mao displayed calculated patience on the Taiwan issue in the course of the 
Sino-American rapprochement. Mao told Kissinger, ‘I say that we can do 
without Taiwan for the time being and let it come after one hundred years. Do 
not take matters on this world so rapidly. Why is there a need to be in such a 
great haste?’37 Kissinger obviously interpreted Mao’s calculated patience as a 
positive signal for peace. He highly appreciated Mao’s consideration and 
patience on the Taiwan issue, since ‘Mao asked for no reciprocity for the 
assurance [renouncing force on Taiwan] America had been seeking for twenty 
years.’38 However, Mao’s declared patience, claimed to last “one hundred 
years”, was merely an exercise in political expediency and did not signal 
genuine goodwill in accepting the existence of the ROC. In fact, one should 
focus on Mao’s very next phrases in the above conversation with Kissinger, 
which revealed his real intention on Taiwan. Mao said, ‘It [Taiwan] is only … 
an island with a dozen or more millions. As for your [American] relations with 
us, I think they [ issues of Taiwan] need not take a hundred years.’39 Ironically, 
although Washington was still Taipei’s ally at this stage, Kissinger applauded 
Mao’s optimism about the disappearance of the ROC and said, ‘I would count 
on that. I think they [issues of Taiwan] should come much faster.’40  
 
Mao’s isolating strategy was clearly a continuation of “liberating” Taiwan by a 
peaceful means. Mao’s calculated patience was based on two fundamental 
strategic considerations: (1) as regards the strategic environment – isolating 
Taiwan from the US and international society; and (2) as regards strategic 
                                                
36 Van Vranken Hickey (2007) Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 33. 
37 Burr (ed.) (1998) The Kissinger Transcripts, p.186. 
38 According to Kissinger, Mao assured Nixon that China would not use force against Taiwan. 
Kissinger (1994), Diplomacy, p.727. However, except for Kissinger’s own interpretation of 
Mao’s patience, there would not appear to be relevant other empirical evidence nor public 
pronouncements on China’s part that would serve to underpin Mao’s apparent assurances. 
39 Burr (ed.) (1998) The Kissinger Transcripts, p.186. 
40 Ibid. 
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capability – taking advantage of Taiwan’s limited comprehensive national 
resources. Mao’s isolating strategy explains why he insisted on separating Sino-
American rapprochement from Sino-Taiwanese competition. Mao’s patience 
was a kind of “indirect approach” in the face of Taiwan’s global anti-communist 
strategy that aimed to undermine Taiwan’s fighting will. Mao’s strategy of 
isolating Taiwan also echoes Sun Tzu’s famous doctrine: ‘What is of supreme 
importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; next best is to disrupt his 
alliances; the next best is to attack his army; the worst strategy is to attack 
cities.’41 CKS’s perception of Beijing’s threat to absorb Taiwan was undeniably 
correct but the coming international isolation did not shake his outward-looking 
strategic determination to compete with Beijing. However, CKS’s classical war-
centred strategic perspective in the context of cross-Strait confrontation, which 
followed from his insistence on Taipei’s zero-sum sovereignty claim vis-à-vis 
the Chinese mainland, prevented him from adjusting to the dynamic 
international changes and consequently maximized the effects of Mao’s “one 




To understand the reason for Taipei’s continued embrace of its outward-looking 
strategy from the 1960s to the early 1970s, it is also important to appreciate 
Chiang Kai-shek’s perspective on the relationship between his country’s 
national strategy and traditional Sino-centrism. According to CKS’s definition, 
‘National strategy is the art of building and using the national powers (quo li) 
and of developing the national powers in an integrated way (tonghe li) so as to 
achieve the national goals.’42 In other words, CKS’s perspective on national 
strategy focuses on ways to create and apply national powers. From CKS’s 
point of view, the national powers were constituted by five elements, namely, 
political, economic, social, cultural and military forces, and that the five powers 
should be aligned and integrated with the basic national goals at any given 
                                                
41 Sun Tzu (1963), The Art of War, tr. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University), pp.77-8. 
42 Chiang Kai-shek (1971), “The Importance of Studying Strategy in Military Education”, in 
The Collection of Military Speech of President Chiang (Taipei: The Editorial Committee of 
Zhongxing Speech Collections of President Chiang), Vol.3, p.1202. (My translation) 
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time.43 For CKS, Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles of the People” was the 
ultimate guide to nation-building. These centred the primary national objectives 
on three components: nationalism, democracy and social well-being.44 In the 
event, one of the above objectives dominated CKS’s perspective on national 
strategy, namely nationalism. The Principle of Nationalism, according to Sun 
Yat-sen, referred to China’s national freedom and independence and was the 
very foundation of CKS’ perspective of international relations that nationalism 
accordingly had become a decisive part of CKS’s national strategy and inspired 
his unique belief in Sino-centrism. In effect, Taipei’s foreign policy should be 
subordinated to the Chinese “domestic” issue across the Strait, namely, his 
perspective on sovereignty, framed in terms of national restoration and unity. 
This underlay his continued adoption of an outward-looking strategy to counter 
the unfavourable changes in the strategic environment. 
 
The so-called “Sino-centrism”, or Middle Kingdom (zhong guo) mentality, is 
about the traditional Chinese perception of world order and of China’s role in 
this order.45 Sino-centrism refers to a perspective that puts China at the centre, 
isolated and unaware of the growth and progress being made outside its 
borders.46 Sino-centrism reflects a nationalist mentality that nothing in the 
world is important except China’s own concerns. This Sino-centrism was a kind 
of domestic bases of national grand strategy that the agent’s ideational factor 
charted a nation’s response to the dynamics of the external context. As CKS 
was a rigid Chinese nationalist, this mentality played a vital part, surprisingly 
ignored by many, in CKS’s method of managing the changing strategic 
environment hostile to the ROC. From Chiang’s point of view, the primary state 
mission for the ROC on Taiwan was still focused on China rather than Taiwan, 
the island being evidently designed as a stronghold for Chiang’s national 
restoration. Accordingly, CKS constantly paid more attention to China’s affairs 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Sun Yat-sen (1983) The Three Principles of the People (Taipei: China Publishing Company), 
pp.5-6. 
45 For more information on the traditional Chinese view, see Norton Ginsburg (1968) ‘On the 
Chinese Perception of a World Order’, in Tang Tsou (ed.) (1968) Chinese in Crisis, Vol.2 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press), pp.73-91 and C. P. Fitzgerald (1964) The Chinese View of 
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than to those of Taiwan or international affairs more generally. Chiang’s Sino-
centrism suggested that Taiwan’s fate would depend fundamentally on China’s 
future. As Taiwan should appreciate China’s efforts to liberate it from Japanese 
colonial rule, CKS believed that Taiwan, as a part of China, should in return 
devote itself at all costs to the future development of China. Thus even when 
retreating to Taiwan as a ‘political refugee’, Chiang was somewhat arrogant 
toward local Taiwanese people, just as he was toward the so-called ‘bandit 
regime’ in Beijing. As Hsieh Chiao Chiao rightly observes, ‘his mentality was 
still that of supreme leader of China, a big country with an enormous reservoir 
of natural resources and the strategic potential to play a role in balancing East-
West relations.’47 As a result, CKS was determined to believe that, as long as 
cross-Strait affairs were resolved, external matters could run their proper course. 
Accordingly, the cross-Strait issue, an affair assumed to be purely domestic, 
was prioritized at the cost of Taipei’s wider diplomatic relations.  
 
As the dominant feature of CKS’s management of external relations, the mode 
of Sino-centrism resulted in Taipei’s insistence on the “one China” principle 
across the Strait despite of its growing international isolation. Taipei’s obsessive 
one-China policy was in fact a synthesis of CKS’s sinocentrism, anti-
communism and optimism, which yielded a desire to achieve a united China 
and to turn it into the great power that it had formerly been. Regardless of 
Taiwan’s limited material resources and the unfavourable changes in the 
international system, Chiang was determined to fulfill his sacred task to recover 
the mainland and destroy the Communist Chinese regime at all costs, a typical 
instance of his outward-looking strategy associated with the war-centred 
classical strategic perspective. To justify this strategy internationally and 
domestically, Chiang Kai-shek firmly maintained that the rule of the Chinese 
Communist regime was ephemeral and illegitimate. After Taipei’s withdrawal 
from the UN, CKS still vigorously claimed that the government of the ROC on 
Taiwan ‘is the true representative of the seven hundred million Chinese, 
expressing their common will, heeding their anguished outcries and inculcating 
within them a maximum of courage and hope with which to struggle against the 
                                                
47 Hsieh Chiao Chiao (1985) Strategy for Survival, p.285. 
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violence of the Mao regime and win back their human rights and freedom.’48 
From Chiang’s perspective, the struggle against the regime of Communist 
China was a war between ‘evil and justice’ and it was vital to rescue the whole 
Chinese race from “tragedy”.49 The final points of his UN withdrawal statement 
so clearly demonstrates Taipei’s cross-Strait policy that is worth quoting in full: 
‘1) The restoration of human rights and freedom to our 700 million compatriots 
on the mainland is the common will of the whole Chinese race and is our 
unalterable national purpose and the holy task which we must accomplish. 2) 
The Republic of China, an independent sovereign state, will tolerate no external 
interference. 3) Regardless of the changing international situation, we shall 
unhesitatingly make whatever sacrifices may be required and persevere in our 
struggle. We shall never waver. We shall never compromise.’50 To compete 
with Communist China in the name of safeguarding the Chinese people under 
Sun Yat-sen’s Chinese nationalism, Chiang’s continued outward-looking 
strategy (associated mostly with the one-China principle opposing any 
diplomatic arrangement for co-existence, such as the “two Chinas” option) can 
be also understood with particular reference to his ignored nationalist 
perspective of sinocentrism. 
 
 
C.4.3 Backfiring of Taipei’s “One-China” Policy 
 
Despite the structural change so unfavourable to Taipei, one of the most distinct 
characteristics of Taipei’s grand strategy under CKS’s administration was to 
insist on the “one China” policy perpetually challenging Beijing’s legitimacy. 
Taipei’s one-China policy was derived from CKS’s unaltered political goal: 
China’s national restoration, so as to securing the integrity of the ROC’s 
sovereignty. However, in pursuing Taipei’s fundamental political goal Chiang 
deliberately ignored the significance of material factors. Taipei never possessed 
sufficient material and substantial means to attain its primary political ambition 
                                                
48 President Chiang Kai-shek’s statement on the withdrawal of the ROC from UN, October 26, 
1971. In Chiu Hungdah (ed.) (1973) China and the Questions of Taiwan, pp.344-5. 
49 Ibid. 
50 President Chiang Kai-shek’s statement on the withdrawal of the ROC from UN, October 26, 
1971. In Chiu Hungdah (ed.) (1973) China and the Questions of Taiwan, pp.344-5. 
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unaided. Facing the coming of international détente, Taipei continued its 
strategic stance of rejecting political co-existence with Beijing, while it also 
took too much for granted its diplomatic and security relations with 
Washington. CKS for years had assumed that the ideological struggle at the 
heart of the bipolar international system would always serve Taipei’s interests 
and that the Cold War’s structural context would be immune to change. Taipei’s 
relentless pursuit of its one-China principle was however inconsistent with the 
emerging international consensus for compromise and failed to appropriately 
contemplate the option of more moderate policies toward the PRC. The rigidity 
of Taipei’s one-China principle in the end made for a serious dilemma when the 
Nixon administration decided to proceed with the Sino-American 
rapprochement so as to improve its global strategic position.  
 
Taipei’s “one China” principle, which had become an accepted norm in 
international society, indeed backfired seriously. Taipei was forced to isolate 
itself from its former allies and the UN system when a majority of members in 
international society favoured Beijing’s representation rather than Taiwan’s. 
Also, the one-China principle soon became perhaps the most powerful tool for 
the PRC to claim Taiwan as part of its sovereign jurisdiction. CKS’s single-
minded focus on the one-China policy thus became a major failure in terms of 
Taiwan’s leadership not being able to adjust the ROC’s national strategy to the 
complexity of international politics and, in particular, the structural change of 
the emerging US-PRC-Soviet strategic triangle. The backfiring of Taipei’s “one 
China” principle associated with CKS’s interpretation of international affairs 
resulted in the loss of the ROC’s UN seat and inevitably led to Taipei’s 
international isolation.  
 
Origins of Taipei’s “One China” Policy 
 
After the Nationalist regime retreated to Taiwan, three basic interrelated 
positions informed the content and practice of Taipei’s “one China” policy: 1) 
there was only one China; 2) the ROC was the only legitimate Chinese 
government; and 3) Taiwan was a part of China. Accordingly, the ROC 
government on Taiwan was the only sovereign authority in the whole of China. 
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On the other side of the Strait, the PRC also insisted on a “one China” policy 
whose basic position was the same, mutatis mutandis, as that of the ROC. In 
essence, then, the difference between Taipei and Beijing lay in who should be 
the only legitimate Chinese authority. Because both Chinese governments 
totally rejected the legitimacy of the other side, ROC-PRC sovereignty 
competition in relation to the “one China” policy became a zero-sum 
competition in international society. Owing to American support, Taipei’s one-
China policy was generally accepted by international society during the 1950s 
and 1960s. However, after the Nixon administration decided to proceed with 
Sino-American rapprochement, the end to widespread international acceptance 
of Taipei’s one-China claim was obviously only a matter of time. 
 
Four calculated political aims underpinned Taipei’s “one China” policy: first, to 
justify the legitimacy of the ROC regime; second, to prevent the international 
recognition of the PRC; third, to preserve the right to recover the Chinese 
mainland; and fourth, to oppose any possible international support for the 
Taiwanese independence movement. The synthesis of the four presumed 
objectives rested on CKS’s relentless pursuit of Chinese national restoration in 
his grand strategy. Because of the Sino-American antagonism in the 1950s and 
1960s, Washington basically felt obliged in the United Nations in particular to 
support Taipei’s claim that its sovereignty extended to the whole of China. At 
the same time, the US government also tried to persuade the ROC to adjust its 
uncompromising one-China policy for the purpose of promoting peaceful co-
existence and maintaining regional stability.51 Nevertheless, taking into account 
Chiang’s insistence and the complexity of PRC-US-ROC relations, the US had 
not exerted much pressure on the ROC to adjust its “one China” policy. As a 
result, the continuity of Taipei’s “one China” policy in the 1950s and 1960s 
built on a mixture of the ROC’s political ambitions, Chiang’s ideological 
insistence and American strategic support. 
 
Since the early 1960s, however, some in international society quietly explored 
scenarios other than that based on Taipei’s one-China principle, whereby both 
                                                
51 Richard Nixon, for instance, said he preferred the “two-Chinas” solution. See Lasater, Martin 
L. (2000) The Taiwan Conundrum in U.S. China Policy (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 116-118. 
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the PRC and the ROC could be diplomatically accommodated together and thus 
participate together in the UN.52 From CKS’s point of view, this was a scenario 
that derived from the notion of “two Chinas”, which he persistently rejected. 
Under Chiang’s one-China principle, Taipei simply severed diplomatic ties with 
any country that recognized the legitimacy of the PRC. In answering questions 
about the implications for Taiwan of France’s recognition of the PRC in 1964, 
Chiang famously made the following comment: ‘this [Taipei’s termination of 
the ROC-France diplomatic relations] was done on the basis of the traditional 
Chinese principle that a legitimate government and a regime of traitors do not 
exist side by side, just as there is no room for coexistence between justice and 
evil.’53 Asked what he thought of the likelihood of moving toward the “two 
Chinas” approach, Chiang replied, ‘I myself and the Chinese people are 
resolutely opposed to the “two Chinas” concept. The Republic of China will 
never consent to any “two Chinas” arrangement.’54 Although France would 
have preferred to retain its diplomatic relations with Taipei, the ROC 
government refused to comply, denouncing the proposal as a “most unfriendly 
act” and “a plot to create two Chinas” and demanding that all French people 
should leave Taipei.55 After this, Chiang confidently claimed that the Sino-
French case could ‘produce only a negligible effect on the free world as a 
whole. It can in no way affect the international position of the ROC.’56 In fact, 
contrary to Chiang’s calculation, there was evidence that Taipei’s 
uncompromising position with respect to its “one China” policy would be 
profoundly counter-productive for Taipei’s later struggle to defend its UN 
membership and prevent its international isolation. This rigid policy, 
challenging Beijing and putting international society in a dilemma of having to 
choose between Taipei and Beijing, reflected his lack of a response to the 
changes in international politics which required Taipei to adopt a more flexible 
                                                
52 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey (2007) Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principles to 
Pragmatism (London: Routledge), pp.11-12. 
53 For “President Chiang Kai-shek’s reply to the questions of Armando Rivas Torres on March 
26, 1964”, see Chiu Hungdah (ed.) (1973) China and the Questions of Taiwan, p. 321. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Hsieh Chiao Chiao (1985) Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations 
of the Republic of China on Taiwan (London: Sherwood Press), pp.151-2. 
56 “President Chiang Kai-shek on March 26, 1964”, Chiu (ed.) (1973) China and the Questions 
on Taiwan, P.321. 
 142 
and pragmatic strategy to deal with the pair of de facto Chinese governments 
across the Strait.  
 
As both the ROC and the PRC consistently believed in and implemented the 
“one China” formula, this principle gradually became accepted as a norm in 
international society. For the ROC, it had the unfortunate consequence that once 
a majority of UN member states wanted the PRC to take up the China seat in 
1971, the ROC had no option but to leave. Then, in the 1972 Sino-US Shanghai 
Communiqué, the ROC’s sovereignty position in international society was 
further undermined when the US ‘acknowledged’ that ‘all Chinese on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is 
a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that 
position.’57 Losing the authority to represent China internationally, Taipei was 
forced to accept that its own rigid “one China” principle had seriously 
backfired, not least because it allowed the PRC to justify its sovereignty claim 
over Taiwan, which fundamentally undermined in international society the 
statehood of the ROC on Taiwan. Ever since then, because of its unfavourable 
“one China” approach, Taipei has lost the diplomatic flexibility to defend itself 
as an independently sovereign state, which has evidentially constrained Taipei’s 
international space and resulted in its international isolation. 
 
CKS’s Perspective on International Reality 
 
In facing the dramatic changes in the Sino-American-Soviet triangular relations, 
CKS’s lack of flexibility in responding to structural change could also be 
attributed to his rigid ideological perspective on the outside world. Chiang’s 
international perspective was a value-oriented worldview centring on political 
beliefs of anti-communism and Chinese nationalism. His longstanding anti-
communist worldview had been reinforced by the Kuomintang’s humiliating 
defeat in the late stages of the Chinese civil war. Chiang’s former experiences 
of victory against Chinese warlords and Japanese invaders also convinced him 
that the importance of nationalism, as a moral strength and inspiration, was a 
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vital component of national strategy, irrespective of any overwhelming material 
advantage that an enemy might possess. Consistent with his worldview, 
Chiang’s notion of national grand strategy thus constantly emphasized the 
decisive importance of spiritual strength.58  
 
But in the late 1960s Chiang’s ideologically rooted worldview proved outdated. 
The first and, in a way, the most fundamental of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
misjudgments of the changes within the international system was his assertion 
of the continuity of bipolarity at a time when the emerging Sino-American-
Soviet strategic triangle was already imminent. Unlike both Nixon and Mao, 
Chiang failed to adequately perceive the significance of international 
developments, given his concentration on ideological priorities.59 As a result, 
Chiang lacked the kind of imagination that Nixon and Mao had, and was thus 
unable to adjust appropriately to the practical context of détente. Moreover, 
Chiang’s assertion, which was based on  ideological grounds, reflected the fact 
that his regime on Taiwan had been the biggest beneficiary from Sino-American 
confrontation. 
 
According to Brian Crozier, one of Chiang’s important intellectual 
characteristics was that he tended to over-simplify the complexity of the 
world.60 In his world-view, for instance, there was a dichotomy in international 
politics between the communist and anti-communist camps. His rigid anti-
communism formulated a way to differentiate between friend and enemy in 
international society. This could be useful for constructing political propaganda 
to justify his rule on Taiwan, but was seriously counter-productive to the extent 
that the over-simplification endorsed his strategic decisions. Even after the 
international situation had dramatically changed as the result of Sino-American 
rapprochement, for instance, CKS thus persisted in de-recognizing those who 
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recognized the PRC. It seemed that he wanted without compromise to defend 
everything, everywhere, all the time and by every possible means, against 
Beijing. Regardless of Taiwan’s limited overall strength in terms of economic 
resources, military capability and diplomatic instruments, Chiang over-extended 
his struggle against Communist China and eventually lost control over Taipei’s 
foreign relations, as he found diplomatic space cut by country after country and 
organization after organization. Sino-American rapprochement in the end 
signified the beginning of Taipei’s loss of recognition and support in 
international society. 
 
Chiang’s concern with the zero-sum sovereignty competition against the PRC in 
many ways reflected his personality and ideology rather than realistic strategic 
considerations. So strong was Chiang’s subjective vision of the incompatibility 
between communism and anti-communism that, after Nixon on 15 July 1971 
announced his visit to China to seek Sino-American normalization, he accused 
the US leadership of having “lost their courage” and of actually becoming 
China’s stooges in the vain hope that this would obviate the need to fight 
international communism with armed force.61 From Chiang’s perspective, the 
Chinese Communists for a long time had prepared for an ultimate and 
unavoidable confrontation against not only Taiwan but also the “free world”. 
Accordingly, he believed that if the “free world” countries sincerely wanted to 
prevent a third world war, they should attack and defeat the PRC immediately, 
before it grew more powerful.62 His preference for an offensive strategy vis-à-
vis Communist China, however, was by then far removed from the consensus of 
international society. Therefore, Chiang’s worldview of the communist threat 
associated with his rigid “one China” claim led him to fail to put forward a 
creative and relevant strategy under which Taiwan’s grand strategy should have 
more flexibility to respond to unfavourable structural change and prevent itself 
from being internationally isolated.  
 
The Loss of the ROC’s UN Seat 
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From CKS’s perspective in the 1950s and 1960s, the strategic role of the United 
Nations was rather limited, in terms of serving his outward-looking strategy. 
UN representation was important mainly because it provided Taipei with the 
best possible international stage to present the legitimacy of the ROC and to 
interact with other countries on key international issues, within both the UN 
Security Council and other UN bodies. However, these functions of the UN 
were not decisive for Taipei’s pursuit of its primary strategic goal - national 
restoration, while for many years, the United Nations possessed neither the 
military means nor political consensus to intervene against the status quo across 
the Strait in Taipei’s favour. In contrast, the UN now became an international 
platform for the PRC to constantly challenge the ROC’s illusory claims of 
sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. From 1949 until October 1971, the 
ROC was for years always on the defensive when the General Assembly voted 
on the question of which government should be the “rightful” representative of 
China.63 This was an exhaustive mission for Taipei to challenge the de facto 
existence of the PRC. The frustrated Chiang Kai-shek accused the world body 
in 1960 of having ‘ … failed to discharge its obligations toward its member 
states in defending international justice and in asserting the power of moral 
principles.”64 When the ROC was forced to withdraw from the United Nations 
in October 1971, Chiang furiously blamed the UN for ‘ignoring and completely 
disregarding law and justice, shamelessly bowing to the forces of evil and 
timorously yielding to violence. Thus the United Nations, which this country 
[the ROC] helped to establish after so many years, has finally degraded itself 
and become a den of iniquity.’65  
 
By publicly voicing these accusations, CKS revealed his true feelings about the 
limitation of the UN’s role in his grand strategy against Beijing. It would appear 
that he calculated that, if the PRC had lived as a viable political entity without 
UN recognition for decades, why could the ROC not do the same? Therefore, 
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UN representation was not indispensable for the state’s survival, not least 
because the US continued to honour its security commitment vis-à-vis the ROC. 
In fact, during Taipei’s series of international setbacks in the early 1970s, its 
primary strategic concern in dealing with the crisis of international isolation was 
to secure the ROC-US diplomatic relations and their mutual defence security 
treaty.66 That the ROC wanted to remain in the UN was certain. However, this 
position could not be allowed to upset the prospect of the  absolute political goal 
of the ROC’s sovereign integrity, since UN representation was a means rather 
than an end in its strategic calculation. Accordingly, by the 1970s it became 
obvious that Chiang Kai-shek despised the role of the UN and regarded it as an 
expendable means for his national strategy. Hence, there was no need for him to 
relinquish the ROC’s sovereign integrity if staying in the UN was the 
alternative.  
 
Mao’s guerrilla diplomacy of mass mobilization of the developing countries 
during the 1960s played a key role in Beijing’s UN triumph. The core of Mao’s 
guerrilla diplomacy was to win over the ‘masses’ of international society. In 
other words, the goal was to target most of the developing countries, rather than 
the two superpowers. The idea was to locate itself on the side of the masses and 
then, to get their sympathy, apply an independent foreign policy focused on 
anti-hegemonism. Consequently, Mao’s strategic perspective on the 
international system was multi-polar rather than bipolar. This strategy rested on 
his theory of the “Three Worlds”,67 whereby he divided international society 
into three worlds to define the part which China should play in the multi-polar 
system.68 Assuming that the major contradiction of international politics was 
between “the first world” and “the third world”, Mao appealed to the 
developing states to cooperate as “a united front” against the two imperialist 
superpowers. In fact, the application of Mao’s guerrilla diplomacy in the 1960s 
had its own purpose of supporting his “two line” doctrine, which was designed 
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to contend against the US and the Soviet Union simultaneously. The “two line” 
doctrine did entail the risk that China might have to fight a diplomatic war on 
two fronts. However, in this way he also created an opportunity to promote 
China’s independent foreign policy, which won the moral support of 
international society, primarily in the developing countries. The independent 
policy eventually enabled China to succeed in crafting the Sino-American-
Soviet strategic triangle in the early 1970s. These achievements created a 
favourable strategic context for Beijing’s later UN success in replacing Taipei 
as the representative of China. In contrast, the core of Taipei’s foreign policy 
and its anti-communist strategy was centred on drawing on the support of only 
one country, the United States, rather than the other way around. Given Sino-
American rapprochement and other international setbacks, Taipei’s US-centred 
policy not only constrained its freedom of action but also increased its 
psychological and security dependence on the US. This put Taipei in a very 
vulnerable diplomatic situation. 
 
As John W. Garver observes, instead of condemning its allies’ betrayal or 
blaming the unfavourable international situation, Taipei itself, if it could have 
reacted differently from its adamant policy of non co-existence with the PRC, 
should have assumed the primary responsibility for the loss of its UN 
membership in 1971.69 In the event of the UN’s vote on the decisive day on 25 
October 1971, for instance, many of Taipei’s allies in the UN did not even know 
what Taipei really wanted them to do when the US publicly endorsed a proposal 
of dual representation.70 The main reasons for Taipei’s defeat at the UN thus 
relate to Chiang Kai-shek’s single-minded pursuit of the ROC’s sovereign 
integrity associated with the “one-China” principle and his nonchalant attitude 
toward the world body. Both made him reluctant to adopt a new and more 
flexible policy with the objective of remaining in the UN. Almost as important 
for this outcome was that, during the 1960s, Taipei had ignored the signs of 
structural change. Mao’s “guerrilla” diplomacy won the sympathy of a great 
many new and developing states in Africa and Asia, which began to be admitted 
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into the UN after 1960 and gradually dominated the UN General Assembly. 
Taipei was poorly prepared to accept and adapt to these international changes 
and shocked by Washington’s shift in favour of Beijing. As a result, Taipei’s 
shortcomings, as well as the unfavourable international context, eventually 
played a key part in Beijing’s UN triumph.  
 
 
C.4.4 The Offensive Posture of “70 per cent Political Work and 30 per cent 
Military Effort ” 
 
Chiang Kai-shek always believed that he would be able to recover the mainland 
eventually, even after he publicly renounced the use of force in the 1958 ROC-
US Joint Communiqué. His determination to pursue the ROC’s sovereignty, 
along with the “one China” principle, resulted in his “70 percent political work 
and 30 percent military effort” strategy of national restoration. The said 
restoration strategy was grounded in his sino-centrism, anti-communism and 
revolutionist idealism. Chiang had adopted this recovery strategy since the late 
1950s as a reaction to Taiwan’s limited capabilities and its international 
position, which did not permit him to initiate military campaigns against the 
PRC without agreement from his American ally. Nixon’s Sino-American 
rapprochement and the loss of the UN seat in the early 1970s constituted a 
decisive setback to his grand strategy, which, according to CKS, was centred on 
the management of Taipei’s foreign relations, in particular to its allies.71 It 
represented the end of Chiang’s strategy of drawing on the ROC-US alliance in 
his revolutionary plan to recover the mainland. As a result, CKS’s former 
military-centred national strategy to retake the mainland was in the first instance 
gradually transformed into an offensive strategy for national restoration based 
on non-violent political warfare.  
 
 
Retaking the Mainland by Political Means 
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While encountering numerous international setbacks after the late 1960s, CKS 
did not waver in his pursuit of national restoration across the Strait. By this 
stage, as mentioned, his cross-Strait strategy had, however, turned to 
emphasizing political, instead of military warfare, encapsulated in the political 
phrase of  “70 percent political work and 30 percent military effort”. The origin 
of the underlying politically-centred strategy can be traced back to CKS’s 
private talk about the task of retaking the mainland in 1949-1950.72 It took until 
1958 and the ROC-US Joint Communiqué however for this politically-centred 
strategy to be publicly espoused. CKS’s strategy of national restoration 
maintained that while the ROC considered ‘the restoration of freedom for its 
people on the mainland as its sacred mission’, it regarded ‘the implementation 
of Dr Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles and not the use of force’ as ‘the 
principal means of successfully achieving its mission.’73 In his 1959 New 
Year’s Speech, Chiang Kai-shek explicitly then endorsed his mainland recovery 
strategy as “70 percent political work and 30 percent military effort”.74 From 
this point it was adopted as Taipei’s blueprint to compete with Beijing until the 
end of CKS’s regime. Notably, the US Department of State soon interpreted 
Chiang as saying that two Chinese nation-states would be a permanent 
arrangement.75 Many others similarly understood CKS as making a U-turn with 
respect to Taipei’s mainland policy, which in essence implied the abandonment 
by Chiang of his goal of recovering the mainland.76 Steve Tsang, for instance, 
argues that CKS’s “re-conquer the mainland” claim was rhetorical in nature and 
its true intention was mainly to establish Taiwan as a quasi-Leninist party state 
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so as to maintain the Nationalist rule and put down challenges to the 
government’s legitimacy and Taiwanese independence.77 
 
However, upon closer examination, it is difficult to uphold this assessment of 
CKS’s claim of national restoration as ‘rhetorical’. First, it fails to appreciate 
Chiang’s mentality as a revolutionary whose ideology, passion and optimism 
were the distinctive drivers of his actions. Second, the assessment mentioned 
above rests on the assumption of a rational, materially-oriented strategic 
evaluation of Chiang’s chances of retaking the mainland. This rational 
evaluation, assuming that material capability matters more than ideas in 
strategy, is obviously different from Chiang’s ideationally-centred strategic 
perspective. Third, it ignores other empirical evidence, principally Chiang’s 
statements and plans to accomplish the recovery mission. For instance, in the 
winter of 1960, Chiang secretly organized a special military meeting at which 
all his generals were asked to pledge to retake the mainland and ordered the 
General Staff Headquarters to establish a so-called Guo-Guang Operation 
Office which carried out a substantial amphibious operation and a national 
mobilization schedule, called the Wu Han Plan, to prepare a possible invasion.78 
In the Easter of 1962, Chiang explicitly threatened to invade the mainland and 
followed up the threat with a gradual military buildup.79 Fourth, the assumption 
that Chiang sincerely renounced his recovery mission also cannot explain why, 
if his strategy was for sake of domestic control associated with maintaining the 
cross-Strait status quo only, he later insisted on a rigid “one China” foreign 
policy, which eventually cost Taipei’s membership in the UN. As is suggested 
below, Chiang’s cross-Strait strategy of “70 percent political work and 30 
percent military effort”, far from discarding this strategic goal, was meant to 
emphasize a different approach designed to accomplish the mainland’s 
recovery.  
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The Chiang’s political-centred strategy in the counter-offensive war against the 
PRC can be examined in its nature and operation. First, the core of this strategy 
was centred on political rather than military warfare. In Chiang’s words, ‘its 
strategic principle …would be primarily a political one; the military would only 
play an assisting role.’80 There were subjective and objective reasons for Chiang 
to fight the Mainland Chinese politically instead of militarily. Chiang believed 
that ‘faith [was] the foundation of our national restoration’ and his counter-
offensive war was ‘for righteousness, freedom, justice, against tyranny and in 
answer to the unanimous wish of a people for survival.’81 At the same time, 
Chiang could not obtain the necessary international support, in particular that of 
the US, to compensate for his inferior military capability in launching a military 
invasion on the Chinese mainland. Second, from the operational aspect, Chiang 
insisted that any war for the purpose of the recovery of the mainland would be 
conducted from within enemy territory. Indeed, the strategy of “70 percent 
political work and 30 percent military effort” was linked to Chiang’s notion that 
he needed to concentrate 70 percent of his effort on enemy-occupied areas in 
where he intended to win over the Chinese popular support for a likelihood of 
the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, whereas 30 percent would be required for the 
front military campaigns if the opportunity did emerge.82 Thus, as CKS put it, 
‘The major battlefield would be on mainland China, not in the Taiwan Strait 
which would only be a field in supporting the campaigns on the mainland.’83  
 
From Interdependence to Dependence 
 
Chiang’s politically-centred strategy of retaking the Mainland was linked to his 
optimistic perspective on Taiwan’s overall security situation as long as the 
ROC-US Mutual Defence Treaty existed. During the early 1950s, the periodical 
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mass campaigns undertaken in the PRC to “liberate” Taiwan represented a 
severe security threat to the ROC. Not many years after the ROC-US Mutual 
Defence Treaty came into effect in 1954, the outbreak of the second Taiwan 
Strait crisis in 1958 became the first test of the ROC-US Mutual Defence 
Treaty. In the event, the US demonstrated its determination to defend Taiwan as 
well as other offshore islands by every possible means. In the 1958 ROC-US 
Joint Communiqué, President Eisenhower particularly emphasized that 
‘opposing aggression by force is the only position consistent with the peace of 
the world.’ 84  Ever since then, Washington’s seemingly resolute security 
commitment associated with the ROC-US MDT had significantly attenuated 
Beijing’s military threat from Taipei. Working on the assumption that Taiwan 
was safe, given the US commitment to its security, Chiang believed that he 
could try to pursue any initiative, except those mainly involving military 
options, to create a more favourable strategic situation in the hope of prevailing 
in the cross Strait competition. Chiang’s political warfare strategy against the 
PRC was the product of this context.  
 
Despite of Taipei’s security being decisively relying on Washington by then, the 
ROC-US security alliance was interdependent, or mutually-needed, in character 
in the 1950s and 1960s. The alliance basically rested on mutual rather than 
unilateral interests in the context of America’s global containment strategy. 
Taiwan’s strategic value for America by then was real and specific. As the 1955 
American Congressional “Formosa Resolution” stated, ‘the secure possession 
by a friendly government of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa 
[Taiwan] is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States.’85 
Meanwhile, Taipei could easily link itself with American vital interests, sharing 
the same anti-communist outlook as the US. Their common interests and values 
put the ROC-US alliance into an interdependent relationship, which provided a 
favourable strategic environment for Chiang’s political warfare in Mainland 
China. And Chiang’s strategy of political-military warfare against the enemy 
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rear did impose a partial threat over the PRC’s southeastern provinces and made 
a contribution to the US containment of China. 
 
However, Nixon’s Sino-American rapprochement signified the imminent end of 
ROC-US interdependence, which was replaced by Taipei’s unilateral 
dependence on Washington, in terms of military security in particular. This 
change had a profound impact on Chiang’s formula of “70 percent political 
work and 30 percent military effort”. First, as Chiang Kai-shek did not give up 
his goal of retaking the mainland, the politically-centred strategy of “70 percent 
political work and 30 percent military effort” had become the only available and 
workable option for his national restoration. Second, after Taipei was evicted 
from the UN, CKS retuned the politically-centred strategy by changing its tone 
to one which emphasized the construction of Taiwan’s status as a model 
province rather than launch-pad for further political warfare to the enemy rear, 
as before. The “battlefield” between the ROC and the PRC shifted from 
Mainland China to the Taiwan Strait, both politically and militarily. It was only 
then that Taiwan’s grand strategy under the Nationalist regime started to 
concentrate its attention and efforts on Taiwan rather than the mainland. 
Equally, since this time, US government concern over Taiwan’s future 
gradually shifted from Taiwan’s international status to Taiwan’s domestic 
affairs, particularly the political democratization of Taiwan. These domestic and 
international changes significantly paved the way for Chiang Ching-kuo’s 
“inward-looking” national strategy (discussed in the next chapter), which 
resulted in Taiwan’s successful political and economic reform after the mid-
1970s. CKS’s politically-centred strategy of “70 percent political work and 30 
percent military effort” to compete with the PRC thus underlies Taiwan’s later 
domestic political and economic achievements, even though the result was not 
what Chiang originally intended. 
 
Combining Political Offensive with Military Defence 
 
The practice of Chiang Kai-shek’s recovery strategy focused on a major effort 
of offensive political warfare targeting the mainland and a limited effort of the 
defensive military posture across the Taiwan Strait. The underlying strategy was 
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that the ROC could leave to the US the major responsibility of defending 
Taiwan by force. As a result, one of the most counterproductive consequences 
of this strategy is Taiwan’s failure to develop a proper composition of its armed 
forces, in accordance with the nature of the demands associated with the 
island’s defensive warfare, which should give priority to the air forces and navy. 
Instead, to prepare for the invasion of the mainland, the ROC invested its major 
military resources in the army. In the 1960s, Taiwan’s military forces consisted 
of 600,000 troops, but 400,000 of them were in the army and only 50,000 in the 
navy (including marines), while 100,000 were air force personnel. 86 
Furthermore, one-fourth of the army was deployed in the offshore islands of 
Jinmen (85,000) and Matsu (15,000). It is estimated that the total military 
expenditure consumed 80 per cent of the Taiwanese government’s total budget 
per year during CKS’s regime.87 This army-centred military structure, huge 
military expenditure and the significant force deployment in the offshore island 
indicate that Chiang’s practice of the “70 percent political work and 30 percent 
military effort” was still an offensive strategic posture, despite the existence of 
America’s security commitment. 
 
In Chiang’s view, Washington’s security commitment to the ROC represented 
both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, with the advantage of 
Washington’s security commitment, Taipei seemed assured that time would be 
on its side and it could wait for a favourable change on the mainland in this 
cross-Strait competition. On the other hand, with the cost of Washington’s 
security commitment, Taipei now faced the dilemma of not being able to pursue 
its ultimate strategic goal, which was to retake the mainland, largely because the 
US preferred to maintain the status quo across the Strait. For Chiang, the 
preferred solution was the politically-centred strategy of “70 percent political 
work and 30 percent military effort” which was designed to make the most of 
Washington’s security commitment, while Taipei could still pursue its strategic 
goal of retaking the mainland. This was because the core of the politically-
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centred strategy was not only to wait, but also to initiate a possible change of 
strategic environment, mainly in the cross-Strait context, which would enable 
Taipei to maintain the offensive and progress towards its strategic goal when an 
opportunity did emerge.  
 
In practice, three different phases can be discerned during which Taipei’s 
politically-centred strategy was applied in relation to different contexts. From 
the early to the mid-1960s, the “first phase”, the ROC pursued opportunities to 
invade the mainland. However, the ROC mainly waged political warfare against 
the PRC by looking for a favourable moment to plunge into possible military 
action in the event of unsuspected errors made by Beijing. In the spring of 1961, 
three years after he renounced the use of force, Chiang emphasized Taiwan’s 
strategic priority as focusing on ‘raising operational capabilities, enlarging 
military bases, supporting the population of mainland Chinese in opposing 
tyranny and counter-attacking in time.’88 From a strategic perspective, this was 
an offensive strategic posture, which did not correspond with his renunciation of 
the use of force, causing some concern in Washington. However, in January 
1966, Chiang revised his strategic priority, aiming to ‘consolidate recovery 
bases [including the offshore islands], guide the mainland Chinese people to 
oppose tyranny, control the Taiwan Strait, enhance military readiness and, in 
due course, counter-attack mainland China.’89 It is believed that this change in 
Chiang’s recovery strategy was mainly derived from the PRC’s first nuclear test 
in October 1964. 90  From this point onward until the Sino-American 
rapprochement in the early 1970s, the practice of Chiang’s “70% political and 
30% military” recovery strategy went into a “second phase” in which Chiang’s 
major strategic posture shifted from offence by preparing an invasion to defence 
by waiting for a chance to return to the mainland. 
 
The “third phase” of Taipei’s politically-centred strategy followed the Sino-
American rapprochement in the early 1970s and lasted until 1975, when CKS 
                                                
88 Ministry of National Defense, ROC (ed.) (1970) ‘Defense Military Construct’, in The ROC 
Sixtieth Commemoration, October 1970 (Taipei: Ministry History & Translation Bureau), p. 251. 
89 Ibid. p. 251-2. 
90 Yang Chih-heng, ‘The Evolution and Adaptation of Taiwan’s Military Strategy’, in Martin 
Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (ed.) (2003) Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan’s 
Defence Policy and Military Strategy (London: RoutledgeCurzon), p. 57. 
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died. For CKS, this period denoted the end of the interdependent, or mutually-
needed, security relationship with Washington and should have marked the 
moment to develop a more defensively oriented and self-reliant national 
strategy to deal with China’s threat at a time when America might be absent. 
However, despite the loss of the ROC’s seat at the UN, Chiang was still 
unwilling to adopt a more flexible stance and to revise his longstanding 
outward-looking strategy. Rather, in line with its gradually increasing 
international isolation, Taipei became more dependent on the security 
assurances from Washington to cope with its external threats and uncertainties. 
In fact, to deal with this unfavourable structural change, Taipei’s strategic 
measures were exclusively focused on securing its diplomatic and military 
relations with Washington.91  As enshrined in the Mutual Defence Treaty, 
Washington, concerned about domestic public opinion, was about to honour its 
security commitment on Taiwan for the time being. However, Washington 
started to withdraw troops from Taiwan in the early 1970s in keeping with the 
implementation of Nixon’s Guam doctrine and the necessity of a Sino-
American rapprochement. As a result, Chiang’s recovery strategy in effect 
underwent further change, in so far as during the “third phase” Taipei’s strategic 
priority shifted mainly to defending and building up Taiwan even though it 
retained the hope of recovering the mainland. Ever since then, Taipei’s sense of 
China’s threat has increased enormously, accompanied by the realization that 
retaking the mainland should not be the priority of its national strategy. 
 
 
Conclusions: Taiwan’s Grand Strategy under Chiang Kai-shek in the 1960s 
and the early 1970s 
 
In the 1960s, the general strategic environment seemed to favour Taipei. The 
PRC was suffering increased chaos under Mao’s endless and ruthless domestic 
political struggles, from the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution. In 
its foreign relations, Beijing fought a border war with India and its radical 
foreign policy of spreading communist revolution in Vietnam, Laos and 
                                                
91 Taylor (2009) The Generalissimo, pp. 577-578. 
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Cambodia increased the enmity between itself and the US.  The Sino-Soviet 
split intensified Beijing’s strategic difficulties and compelled the PRC to 
confront both superpowers simultaneously. Accordingly, the ROC had good 
reason to be confident about its status, both in the cross Strait competition and 
the international arena. Indeed, at the time Taipei’s leaders were allowing 
themselves to believe that time was on their side, that Taiwan’s strategic 
importance was decisive for the free world and that the US might still support 
their efforts to return to the mainland. As a result, CKS generally did not waver 
in his outward-looking strategic choice, designed to change the status quo 
across the Strait, in terms of extending the ROC’s claim of sovereignty to the 
Chinese Mainland. 
 
However, crisis and opportunity always come together. Chiang Kai-shek’s 
overconfidence backfired when Nixon subordinated the Taiwan issue to his 
pursuit of Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s. Chiang Kai-shek’s 
single-minded outward-looking strategy was not significantly adjusted to 
respond to the dramatic changes occurring in international politics. Indeed, 
Chiang’s revolutionary perspective, associated with his nationalist sinocentrism, 
had led him to ignore, deliberately or not, the signals of change in Washington’s 
China policy. In 1970, American Vice President Spiro T. Agnew unusually 
visited Taipei twice within a half year to probe Chiang’s attitude in relation to 
the changes in US-ROC-PRC relations. Chiang adamantly resisted any proposal 
of reconciliation from his most important ally to live with Beijing. Agnew 
recalled that ‘Chiang and his subordinate gave no indication that they were 
willing to alter their traditional ideology, exercise flexibility in their relations 
with the PRC, or do anything to reconcile themselves to developments within 
the US.’92 As this chapter has shown, Chiang’s conceptualization of ROC-PRC 
relations as a zero-sum sovereignty competition may be attributed to his 
personality and idealist vision and his failure to appreciate the importance of 
international politics for a small country such as his. In fact, during his twenty-
five years in power in Taiwan, CKS made only one foreign visit, in 1949, 
although Taipei before its eviction was a prestigious permanent member of the 
                                                
92 Madsen (1999) Chinese Chess, p.57. 
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Security Council of the UN.93 Chiang’s single-mindedness and insistence on 
continuing to espouse his perspective of the ROC’s sovereign status as the only 
legitimate state for China as a whole can be better understood with reference to 
his revolutionist mentality rather than his naïve take on international affairs. As 
a result, even though he had renounced the use of force across the Strait under 
American pressure in 1958, he continued to aspire to ultimately retake the 
mainland. He merely adapted Taipei’s outward-looking strategy, primarily by 
emphasizing political over military warfare encapsulated in the formula of “70 
percent political work and 30 percent military effort”. Nixon’s Sino-American 
rapprochement and the loss of the UN seat resulted in increasing Taipei’s 
international isolation that put an end to Chiang’s outward-looking strategy of 
manipulating the ROC-US alliance for the sake of  retaking the mainland, which 
was his goal. 
 
Chiang Kai-shek died on April 5, 1975. During his rule on Taiwan, the pursuit 
of the ROC’’s sovereignty along with his “one China” principle was the single 
and important perspective that involved his insistence on the ROC as the sole 
representative of China in international society. The sovereignty-centred 
doctrine, namely, the identity of the ROC as “China”, fundamentally informed 
all his choices and actions relating to Taiwan’s grand strategy. Chiang’s 
consistent practice and insistence on the sovereignty-centred doctrine had 
profound implications in both the domestic and international contexts. As a 
result, the US recognized Taiwan as part of China and in the 1972 US-PRC 
Shanghai Communiqué acknowledged that there is only one China on both 
sides of the Strait, even though the US government still honoured its security 
commitment vis-à-vis the ROC government on Taiwan. Ever since, the “one 
China” principle has been fully accepted as a norm in international society. On 
the one hand, the norm of “one China” across the Strait essentially justifies the 
PRC claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. On the other, this claim fundamentally 
challenges the very existence and international status of the ROC as an 
independent sovereign state, although the ROC has had full control of Taiwan 
                                                
93 In 1949, CKS visited the Philippines and South Korea to form an anti-communist military 
alliance, but failed because Washington did not support his idea. See Hsieh (1985) Strategy for 
Survival, pp. 144-145. 
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as a de facto political entity beyond the PRC’s authority since 1949. This 
influential impact of the one-China principle not only caused the diversity of 
Taiwan’s domestic national identity later but also still constrains the ROC’s 
international status as a sovereign state. Both of them have undermined the 
efforts of the later leaders of Taipei to formulate an effective national grand 
strategy, e.g. to internationalize the Taiwan issue, as a better position from 
which to safeguard the existence of the ROC on Taiwan.  
 
In short, Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan was both the beneficiary and 
victim of the structural contexts of Sino-American relations in particular and the 
Cold War in general. Sino-American rapprochement gave rise to a new decisive 
strategic environment in which triangular US-ROC-PRC relations developed. 
Although this new strategic environment obviously favoured the PRC and 
caused the ROC’s international isolation, CKS’s national grand strategy to deal 
with its unfavourable aspects focused exclusively on upholding its existing 
diplomatic and security relations with Washington. Taipei did succeed to some 
extent in doing this for a time. However, the end of the ROC-US strategic 
alliance indicated Taiwan’s need to develop a more self-reliant national security 
strategy against the PRC’s sovereignty claim, which threatened whether the 
ROC could still survive as an independent sovereign state in the long term. As 
CKS famously put it, the way to confront this unfavourable situation was ‘Not 
to be upset in time of adversity but remain firm with dignity and strive to be 
self-reliant with vigour’ (chubian bujing, zhaungjing ziqiang). 94  However, 
Chiang insisted on maintaining the ROC’s sovereignty claim over the whole of 
China, which isolated the ROC from the mainstream of international society and 
by doing so, he threw away what may have been the last opportunity available 
to internationalize the ROC-PRC issue that would provide a better strategic 
position for Taipei against Beijing’s sovereignty threat. While the ROC 
continuously strove for its primary strategic goal - to secure its independence as 
a sovereign state, its international isolation became one of the most 
unfavourable strategic consequences to be locked into, creating  a deadlock on 
the issue of sovereignty competition with a great power such as the PRC. As a 
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result, the ROC had no choice but to continue to increase its dependence on 





The Challenge of Taiwan’s Self-Defence: 






On December 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter unilaterally announced the 
abrogation of diplomatic relations between the ROC and the US, the termination 
of the ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the withdrawal of all 
American military personnel from Taiwan.1 Before this announcement, there 
was barely seven hours’ advance notice given to its long-standing ally, the ROC, 
when President Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) was roused at approximately two 
o’clock in the morning by American Ambassador Leonard Unger to receive the 
news of Carter’s announcement. It is regarded that in diplomatic terms this 
rudely disconcerted the ROC.2 As Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) put it to Leonard 
Unger, ‘this [notice] is a serious personal insult to me. I had thought over the 
possible changes of ROC-US relations already. However, I was still surprised 
by America’s perfidious and abrupt announcement, which did not even allow 
my country an opportunity to express its opinion. This will have very serious 
consequences.’3 While CCK felt humiliated and frustrated by Washington’s 
high-handedness, the abrogation of the US-ROC diplomatic-military relations 
also revealed “serious consequences” for Taiwan’s defence policy, which since 
1950 had mainly relied on America’s security commitment in the face of the 
Chinese threat. However, there was no room for Taipei to accuse America of 
being “insulting” and “perfidious”, since the U.S. still remained the most 
important provider of such security as the ROC could have as a member of 
international society. Nevertheless, while aiming to keep its security ties with 
                                                
1 ‘President Carter’s Address to the Nation’ (1978), in Hsiao, Gene T. and Michael Witunski 
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Publishers), p.243. 
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(July/August), p. 339. 
3 Fredrick F. Chien, former Foreign Minister of the ROC, (2005) The Reminiscences of Chien 
Fu, Vol. 1: Diplomatic Dynamics (Qian Fu hui yi lu: wai jiao feng yun dong) (Chinese Edition) 
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the US as close as possible, probably the most important and difficult issue in 
constructing Taiwan’s grand strategy during CCK’s regime was whether 
Taiwan could establish an effective self-defence capability to guard against the 
PRC once the US shifted its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. 
 
In the event, Sino-American normalization was hardly a surprise for the ROC 
government in Taiwan in the early 1970s, as Nixon had already begun to seek 
Sino-American rapprochement, which signaled a fundamental change in 
Washington’s policy toward Taipei. In effect, the ROC leadership realized that 
the US, the ROC’s most important ally and security provider, would no longer 
show enthusiasm for maintaining the diplomatic and military relations with the 
ROC at the cost of Sino-American rapprochement and normalization. 4 
Consequently, Sino-American normalization caused the abrogation of the 
ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), bringing an unprecedented security 
challenge to Taipei. 
 
Faced with this challenge of the withdrawal of American diplomatic recognition 
and defence commitment posed by the growing Sino-American normalization in 
the late 1970s, the ROC had on the one hand to adjust its grand strategy and on 
the other to propose a new form of comprehensive relationship with the US, in 
particular in the diplomatic and military areas, which would mitigating the 
security impact. As Carter’s administration did not provide a proper substitute 
framework for maintaining the political, economic and cultural exchanges 
between the ROC and US after the de-recognition, the US Congress 
overwhelmingly passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which provided 
considerably more solid legislative support to Taiwan than the White House had 
expected.5 The legislation of the TRA significantly redeemed the termination of 
the formal Taipei-Washington diplomatic and military relations and provided a 
valuable but rather unusual way to maintain Taiwan’s ties to the US. Ever since 
then, the unique TRA has become the cornerstone of American policy vis-à-vis 
Taiwan. It played a decisive role for CCK’s administration as the latter built its 
national strategy against the backdrop of continuing ROC-PRC struggle over 
sovereignty. 
 
                                                
4 For discussions of the Sino-American rapprochement and normalization, see for example 
Robert S. Ross (1995) Negotiating Cooperation: United States and China, 1969-89 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press). 
5 Nancy Bernkopf Tuckner (2001) China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American 
Relations, 1945-1996 (New York: Columbia University Press), p.331. 
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Since the US security involvement in the cross-Strait issue under the TRA is 
implicit and ambiguous rather than explicit and unequivocal, CCK’s 
administration needed to adjust itself to establish a flexible and workable 
national strategy in order to deal with this change and uncertainty. To pursue 
such a national strategy without American security assurances, Taipei’s national 
strategy during CCK’s regime had three distinct features. First, CCK’s 
administration downgraded the importance of the cross Strait issue within its 
national agenda. Instead of relentlessly preparing military readiness to exploit 
any opportunity to return to the mainland as his father Chiang Kai-shek had 
done, CCK transferred the nation’s strategic priority from the cross-Strait issue 
to domestic reforms, notably economic growth and political democratization, as 
the most important means of maintaining and justifying a continued 
Kuomintang (KMT) regime on Taiwan which was still confronted with the 
PRC’s sovereignty claim. Second, faced with Beijing’s political strategy of 
“One Country, Two Systems” as an attempt to impose its own terms in relation 
to any future cross-Strait reunification. CCK formulated his famous doctrine of 
the “Three Noes Policy” (sanbu zhengce) (no negotiation, no compromise and 
no contact) in the face of Beijing’s strategy of peaceful reunification. His 
“Three Noes” doctrine, a peace-centred strategy but one entailing no search for 
reconciliation with the Chinese communist regime, remained at the heart of 
Taiwan’s national grand strategy until the end of his rule in 1988. Third, while 
facing the cessation of ROC-US diplomatic relations and the MDT, CCK’s 
administration had little choice but to continue to preserve the closest possible 
Taipei-Washington relations. The passage of the TRA, amidst Taipei’s strong 
lobbying, can be regarded as one of the most important strategic arrangements 
of CCK’s administration in its continued competition against the PRC. 
Nevertheless, for the first time since 1950, the ROC was by 1980 forced to 
encounter the PRC security threat alone without an explicit defence 
commitment from America, which at the same time hastened Taipei’s build-up 
of an autonomous defence capacity of its own.  
 
To understand how Chiang Ching-Kuo’s administration fought for the political 
survival of the ROC as an independent sovereign state, this chapter examines 
four key developments, which encapsulated Taiwan’s grand strategy in the 
CCK era. The first part examines the implications of Washington’s passing of 
the TRA, which imposed a new strategic environment on Taipei, and shows 
how CCK managed this decisive new development. The second part explores 
CCK’s strategic choice, which saw him shift from the outward-looking strategy 
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for the cross-Strait competition to an “inward-looking” strategy concentrating 
on domestic construction. The third part focuses on Taipei’s counter-measures, 
which derived from CCK’s Chinese nationalist perspective on Taiwan’s grand 
strategy, against Beijing’s “United Front” strategy. The fourth part discusses 
Taiwan’s strategic posture, which was designed to establish defensive-oriented 
military deterrence measures against Beijing’s military threat.  
 
 
C.5.1 Washington’s Taiwan Relations Act 
 
Since the beginning of Nixon’s rapprochement policy, Taipei had been aware 
that full Sino-American normalization was only a matter of time and the right 
conditions. In fact, early in 1976, Taipei had begun to work out a contingency 
plan, which built on ten scenarios about relations to deal with the possible 
rupture of diplomatic relations with the US 6 . After the 1972 Shanghai 
Communiqué, whereby the US and the PRC let Sino-American normalization 
go forward, Washington had guaranteed Taipei at least forty times that the US 
would continue its diplomatic recognition of the ROC and remain committed to 
the ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty.7 Indeed, the worst scenario that seemed 
likely to Taipei was Carter’s acceptance of the PRC’s three main normalization 
conditions: 1) diplomatic de-recognition with the ROC; 2) termination of the 
MDT; and 3) withdrawal of American forces on Taiwan, although the US did 
not fully comply with Beijing’s conditions, e.g. that the US should end its arms 
sales to Taiwan.8 As the White House almost totally excluded the involvement 
of the US Congress from the final chapter of the Sino-American normalization 
process, the US Congress responded by a strong involvement in the drafting of 
the Taiwan Relations Act so as to provide a substantial framework for 
maintaining the long-standing relations between Taipei and Washington, even 
after the end of their formal diplomatic and alliance relations. Exploiting the 
competition between the US Congress and the White House, CCK’s 
administration seized the opportunity and lobbied the US Congress to the 
utmost, a move which was designed to associate the TRA with Taipei’s “Five 
Principles” so as to establish a new framework for relations between these two 
countries after Sino-American normalization. In the end, the core of CCK’s 
                                                
6 Fredrick F. Chien (2005) The Reminiscences of Chien Fu, Vol. 1: Diplomatic Dynamics, pp. 
334-336. By this time, Chien, a Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of relations between Taipei 
and Washington, had finalized the plan. 
7 Fredrick F. Chien (2005) The Reminiscences of Chien Fu, Vol. 1: Diplomatic Dynamics, p. 
394. 
8 Ibid, p.335. Robert S. Ross (1995) Negotiating Cooperation, pp.133-141. 
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method of improving Taiwan’s strategic environment was managing 
Taipei-Washington relations under the new TRA.  
 
 
Taipei’s “Five Principles”  
 
The primary goal of Taipei’s strategy for handling America’s abrogation of its 
diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and its security commitment was to establish 
an alternative framework which would tie it as closely as possible to the US to 
maintain its security ties. Two weeks after its de-recognition by the Carter 
administration, CCK’s government proposed the “Five Principles” as a new 
guideline in building a comprehensive new relationship with the US. The “Five 
Principles” are: “continuity” (chixu xing), “reality” (xianshi xing), “security” 
(anquan), “legality” (fali) and “governmentality” (zhengfu quanxi).9 
 
Fredrick F. Chien, Taipei’s main negotiator, recalls the background to the design 
of these five principles10. According to him, in the aftermath of Carter’s 
announcement, Taipei’s initial concern was a functional one: that a “continuity” 
principle should secure the many non-political dimensions of treaties and 
executive agreements which seamlessly bond two countries to each other. 
Second, the “reality” principle was a political consideration, which called on 
America to accept, realistically and pragmatically, the fact that the ROC 
retained its sovereign status over Taiwan. Third, in the context of China’s 
immense threat, the “security” principle was at the heart of Taipei’s concern to 
manage the Taipei-Washington strategic relationship, on which depended the 
ROC’s very political survival and its ability to make a credible response to 
China’s threats in the continuing but dynamic cross-Strait sovereignty 
competition. To accomplish both goals, namely political survival and a credible 
response, Taipei desperately required Washington’s assurance and support for 
its national defence after the termination of the MDT. Fourth, following 
de-recognition, Taipei’s “legality” principle was a practical concern that was 
meant, despite its informal political status, to guide the non-political bilateral 
relationships in multifaceted forms of cooperation on the basis of solid law. 
Finally, the most problematic principle among the five was “governmentality” 
                                                
9 Document 31:‘President Chiang Ching-kuo’s Five Principles on US-ROC Relations in the 
Postnormalization Period, December 29, 1978’, in Chiu Hungdah (Ed.) (1979) China and the 
Taiwan Issue (New York: Prager), p.262. 
10 Fredrick F. Chien (1999) ‘The Taiwan Relations Act and ROC-US Relations: A Review After 
Twenty Years’, in The Central Agency (Ed.) (1999) TRA: The First 20 Years, A Critical Review 
of the Taiwan Relations Act (Taipei: The Central News Agency), pp. 18-23. 
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in the sense that, after Washington’s de-recognition, the ROC still expected a 
more durable and formal inter-governmental relationship with the US in the 
future.  
 
Put into practice the aim of the “Five Principles” was designed to preserve the 
existing Taipei-Washington relations by a unique arrangement. The 
“governmentality” principle, for instance, well demonstrated that Taipei wanted 
to maintain its inter-governmental relations with Washington, despite 
Sino-American normalization. Compared with Chiang Kai-shek’s previous rigid 
foreign policy vis-à-vis the PRC, CCK demonstrated a more flexible and 
pragmatic approach toward this most serious international setback to its national 
security. However, due to Beijing’s conditions for the normalization, Carter’s 
administration showed no interest in Taipei’s demands or in extending greater 
flexibility. During the Taipei-Washington negotiations, the White House 
refused altogether to consider the “Five Principles”.11 On 29 January 1979, 
without any advance discussion with Taipei, the Carter administration instead 
submitted the Taiwan Omnibus Bill, which sought ‘to promote the foreign 
policy of the United States through the maintenance of commercial, cultural and 
other relations with the people on Taiwan on an unofficial basis and for other 
purposes.’12  
 
Carter’s “unofficial basis” principle for constructing the new Taipei-Washington 
relations has ever since had profound negative impacts on Taiwan. However, 
CCK’s five principles were, one way or another, incorporated into the TRA, 
which eventually replaced Carter’s Taiwan Omnibus Bill.13 Many factors, in 
particular the clash between Congress and the White House, allowed the Act to 
pass. 14  Nevertheless, its legislation should not be attributed to American 
domestic factors alone. Had it not been for CCK’s vigorous lobbying of 
Congress and the pragmatic stance and clear purposes of the “Five Principles”, 
the TRA might not have been formulated so much in Taipei’s favour, much to 
China ’s consternation, as evidenced by the fact that Beijing has never ceased to 
oppose it strongly. As a result, the distinct pragmatism of the CCK’s approach 
to the new Taipei-Washington relationship comprised the following elements: 
first, to limit but still accept the complications in ROC-US-PRC relations and, 
                                                
11 Fredrick F. Chien (2005) The Reminiscences of Chien Fu, Vol. 1: Diplomatic Dynamics, p. 
412. 
12 Lee David Tawei (2000) The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act: Twenty Years in Retrospect 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.48-49. 
13 Ibid, pp.48-51. 
14 See Chapter 1, in Lee David Tawei (2000) The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act. 
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second, to isolate rather than combine the key difficulties within Taipei’s “Five 
Principles” by resolving any problems one by one through practical measures.  
Accordingly, the five principles were separately treated as individual goals to be 
pursued during the negotiations in the process of passing the TRA, but in the 
end they would be assembled as a comprehensive means to tie the ROC to 
America.  
 
America’s Formula of “Peaceful Resolution” 
 
For the US, the pursuit of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait has been a 
consistent strategic goal ever since it sides with Taipei in the ROC-PRC 
political-military competition in 1950. The cross-Strait situation has affected 
various American interests over time. During the Sino-American confrontation 
in the 1950s and 1960s, peace and stability across the Strait served as an 
indispensable goal in preserving the status quo in East Asia in favour of the 
American strategy of global containment. In terms of international 
commitments, maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait has always represented 
America’s credibility as a leader in international society. From the geopolitical 
point of view, the Taiwan issue relates to regional stability and prosperity. In 
the domestic context, to prevent Taiwan from attack by China is a matter of 
moral responsibility for the US as Taiwan has been its long-standing and loyal 
ally for decades, causing the American Senator Richard Stone to call the TRA 
an “emotional legislation” 15 . As a result, even in the de-recognition 
announcement on 15 December, 1978, President Carter unilaterally stated, ‘The 
US continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue 
and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese 
themselves.’16  
 
However, putting into practice Carter’s proposal, with its contradictory goals of 
both preserving peace and preventing interference across the Strait, highlighted 
the dilemma of how the US could maintain peace without actually being seen to 
interfere. This dilemma, later, brought about the further strategic debate whether 
America should adopt an ambiguous or clear policy to prevent the possibility of 
China’s invading Taiwan. 17  In fact, throughout the Sino-American 
                                                
15 Ibid, p.183. 
16 President Jimmy Carter (15 December, 1978), ‘US Statement Accompanying the Joint 
Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the US and the P.R.C.’, in 
Chiu, Hungdah (Ed.) (1979) China and the Taiwan Issue (New York: Prager), p.256. 
17 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey (1994) United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to 
Beyond Containment (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger), pp.30-32. 
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normalization negotiations, none of the officials in Carter’s administration 
pressed specifically for a formal guarantee by China that it would not use force 
against Taiwan.18  
 
Unable and apparently unwilling to win China’s unequivocal commitment to 
renounce the use of force and declining to intervene in a possible military clash 
across the Strait, the Carter administration unilaterally proclaimed the need for a 
“peaceful resolution” across the Strait, but this was wishful thinking rather than 
a practical policy. Nevertheless, Carter’s statement that the US wanted “the 
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue” provided Taipei with a starting point to 
construct a new security arrangement with the US. The sound endorsement of 
the “peaceful solution” formula was embodied later in the TRA, even though in 
a ‘lengthy and convoluted form’.19 The content of this endorsement is in 
sections 2 and 3 of the TRA. Here the US commits itself: 
 
S.2. (b).2 “to declare that peace and security in the [Western Pacific] 
area are in the political, security and economic interests of the 
United States and are matters of international concern”; 
S.2. (b).3 “to make clear that the United States decision to establish 
diplomatic relations with the PRC rests on the expectation that the 
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; 
S.2. (b).4 “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by 
other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes [would 
be considered] a threat to the peace and security of the Western 
Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States”; 
S.2. (b).5 “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and  
S.2. (b).6 “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any 
resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the 
security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan”.  
Also, in accordance with S.3. (c) “the President is directed to inform the 
Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or 
economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the 
interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and 
the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional 
                                                
18 Martin Schram, ‘China Policy: A Born-Again Brzezinski’, Washington Post, 8 February 
1979. 
19 Ibid, p. 149. 
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processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any 
such danger.”20 
 
Since China persistently refused to renounce the use of force, Washington’s 
endorsement of achieving the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue within the 
TRA can be regarded as a vigorous expression of American concern for 
Taiwan’s security following the formal abrogation of the MDT. Considering 
that there were no diplomatic relations between Taipei and Washington, this 
strategic arrangement was not as good as the MDT but it nevertheless enabled 
Taipei to link its national security with the core of America’s cross-Strait policy, 
i.e. the interest in a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Taiwan and 
China. In the end, the American formula of cross-Strait peaceful resolution 
helped not only to alleviate Taiwan’s security concerns about China’s military 
threat (e.g. Washington’s interference in the 1995-96 Strait crisis see in next 
chapter), but also to justify US arms sales as a way of enhancing Taiwan’s 
self-defence capability in the post-MDT era.  
 
Problems of Taipei’s Arms Acquisitions  
 
The nature of Taiwan’s arms acquisitions is naturally linked to a desirable 
military balance across the Strait in terms of Taiwan’s power to defend its own 
sovereignty against the military threat from China. Without available and 
adequate arms, Taiwan’s grand strategy is seriously undermined by this 
disadvantage, not only physically but also psychologically. The view in Taipei 
has been that any ongoing military imbalance would eventually increase 
Beijing’s determination to invade, given the prospect of an easy military victory. 
Accordingly, the military balance across the Strait has raised a serious strategic 
challenge for Taipei: how would it be possible to secure Washington’s 
commitment to continuing arms sales to Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries? Not surprisingly, one of CCK’s preferred 
solutions to deal with this predicament was to embed the arms sale issue within 
the TRA.    
 
Being committed to bringing about “the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue”, 
Washington has also been keen to prevent a military clash with Beijing over the 
cross-Strait confrontation. A feasible way of attaining these two goals was for 
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the US to equip Taiwan with sufficient arms to defend itself without risking its 
own direct involvement in war. This was an echo of Nixon’s Guam Doctrine. In 
accepting China’s three normalization conditions, namely, severing its 
diplomatic relations with Taipei, withdrawing its armed forces from Taiwan and 
terminating the MDT, President Carter had presented America’s own conditions 
on the Taiwan issue: the continuity of its arms sales to Taiwan and a 
commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict across the Strait. However, 
both American conditions were indignantly rejected by China. 21  China’s 
opposition to American arms sales on Taiwan was built on the rationale that the 
arms sales would not only challenge Beijing’s sovereignty claim, but also 
maintain Taipei’s defence capacity and symbolize America’s continued defence 
commitment to Taiwan. This in turn would undermine ‘the PRC’s ability to 
isolate Taiwan and … pressure it to acquiesce to Beijing’s demands.’22 
 
Despite Beijing’s persistent opposition, however, Washington continued to 
supply Taiwan with weapons to maintain a more or less favourable military 
balance across the Strait as a means of securing the “peaceful solution” formula 
in practice. To substantiate this formula with respect to Taiwan, Washington 
pledges, in sections 2 and 3 of the TRA, to “provide Taiwan with arms of a 
defensive character” and to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and 
defense services in such quality as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity.”23 In fact, at the time Taiwan had 
not signed any new contracts for US weapons since the early years of the Ford 
administration.24 To complete the normalization, President Carter during the 
negotiations made a last-minute concession to Beijing – he agreed to a 
moratorium on arms sales to Taiwan for one year.25 Nevertheless, the US arms 
sales to Taiwan in fact increased after the passage of the TRA; the US sold to 
Taiwan weapons worth approximately $ 1.4 billion during the first four years 
following the passage of the Act.26 However, because of the ambiguous terms 
(e.g. “security”, “defensive” and “sufficient”) in the TRA and the President’s 
executive power under the American Constitution, the interpretation and 
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implementation of the arms sales provision in the TRA ultimately depended on 
the White House. One of the clearest examples of the possibilities available to 
the White House to potentially undermine the TRA was the Sino-American 
Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan of 17 August 1982.  
 
Disregarding the TRA, which committed the US to provide Taiwan with arms, 
the Joint Communiqué of August 17 proclaimed a new formula under which the 
Reagan administration agreed to gradually bring to an end American arms sales 
to Taiwan. While “understanding and appreciating” Beijing’s efforts for the 
promotion of peaceful cross-Strait reunification, Washington in the 
Communiqué, stated that ‘it [the American government] does not seek to carry 
out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan… and it intends to reduce 
gradually its sales to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final 
resolution.’27 This statement obviously diluted the TRA’s commitment to sell 
American arms to Taiwan and raised a groundswell of criticism that the Reagan 
administration had compromised Taiwan’s security.28 To balance the impact of 
the Communiqué on the arms sales issue, the Regan administration then gave 
Taiwan what it called the “Six Assurances”, as follows: 
 
1. The US has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the ROC. 
2. The US has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the Chinese 
Communists on arms sales to the ROC. 
3. The US will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing. 
4. The US has not agreed to revise the TRA. 
5. The US has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan. 
6. The US will not exert pressure on the ROC to enter into negotiations 
with the PRC.29 
 
To deflect these criticisms of the Communiqué and the fear which it aroused, 
President Reagan, confirmed in this regard that ‘Our Taiwanese friends are 
going to continue to get everything they need for their own self-defence.’30 
Nevertheless, a serious lesson could be drawn from the changes in the American 
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position on this issue in the 1982 Communiqué, namely that America’s arms 
sales policy would change from time to time and was not influenced by the 
terms of the TRA in terms of the willingness to maintain Taiwan’s “sufficient 
self-defense capacity”. Rather, the policy would substantially depend on the 
global context of Sino-American strategic relation and the current American 
perspective on whether China would resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully. All of 
these strategic issues were and still are beyond Taiwan’s control.  
 
Taipei’s Triumph? The Passing of the TRA 
 
The passage of the Taiwan Relations Act was a considerable strategic 
achievement for CCK’s administration. In effect, the TRA generally embodied 
CCK’s “Five Principles”, although many of them were worded vaguely. During 
its legislative process, the American government did not consult with Taiwan 
over the Act since the TRA was a piece of domestic legislation, despite the 
fundamentally foreign scope of its content. Taiwan could hardly expect to be 
granted more of an American security guarantee when Carter’s administration 
was overwhelmingly anxious to placate Chinese interests, concerns and 
sensitivities in the context of the prioritized Sino-American strategic alignment 
against the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, the Taiwan Omnibus Bill did not 
mention any of the peace preservation across the Strait or its security concerns 
over Taiwan. The administration insisted that any further explicit language in 
the TRA assuring Taiwan’s security was unnecessary and unacceptable, since 
America had already made a clear declaration when calling for the “peaceful 
resolution” of the cross-Strait conflict.31 When the Congress overwhelmingly 
passed the TRA as a replacement for the Omnibus Bill, President Carter, in 
order to express his reluctant approval, sat on the Act and waited to sign it until 
the last day of the statutory ten-day period.32 
 
Given the lack of diplomatic recognition and a security assurance from the US, 
the most immediate problem for CCK’s administration in the wake of the 
Sino-American post-normalization agreement was how to construct a 
comprehensive new relationship with Washington as a means of perpetually 
shielding the ROC’s de facto sovereignty and security on Taiwan from the risk 
of forced reunification with Communist China. By then, the TRA had become a 
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favourable alternative to grant Taipei an acceptable relationship with 
Washington, after the initial rejection by Carter’s administration of Taipei’s 
proposal of the “Five Principles” framework. The verdict on the passage of the 
TRA is that ‘perhaps for the first time in the history of modern foreign affairs, a 
state had broken relations with another only to create a new legal arrangement 
so as to maintain virtually most relationships that had existed before.’33 Beijing 
immediately expressed its protest at Washington’s part concerning the passage 
of the TRA and this became the first serious complaint made by the PRC after 
the setting up of full diplomatic relations. 34  Beijing objected to three 
“unacceptable” aspects of the TRA: America’s continued security commitment, 
albeit diminished, towards Taiwan, Taipei’s retention of its diplomatic 
properties, and the fact that the Taiwanese authorities were still considered a 
“foreign government”.35 However, regardless of Beijing’s protest, as Senator 
Frank Church said, the passage of the TRA proved that the United States had 
not “walked away from an old ally.”36 
 
After the legislation, in a press conference in June 1979 when CCK asserted 
Taiwan’s continuing cooperation with the US leadership in international society, 
Chiang Ching-kuo commented that while the ROC had a ‘deep sense of 
appreciation’ for America’s friendship as shown in the TRA, the actual effect of 
the Act would still rely on whether the American government could faithfully 
implement it.37 Indeed, the key benefits of the TRA, which Taiwan associated 
with its grand strategy, were not whether words and commitments would be 
uttered but how the White House would define, interpret and implement them. 
The main cause of this derived from the distinctive character of the TRA, which 
incorporated “masterful ambiguities” deliberately created by its constructors.38 
These masterful ambiguities reflected the complexity of ROC-US-PRC relations. 
The ambiguity was designed not only to accommodate the competition between 
the Congress and the White House, but also more importantly to allow 
Washington flexibility in its Taiwan policy, in accord with the dynamic 
international situation and in line with America’s interests. According to Prof. 
Parris H. Chang, a former American Taiwanese who participated in the making 
of the TRA, its provisions have never been fully and faithfully implemented 
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since its enactment in 1979.39 The varying attitudes to its implementation from 
time to time have been caused by the different perspectives on its provisions 
taken by successive US administrations. As a result, these various 
interpretations have inevitably increased the uncertainty and difficulty felt by 
Taipei’s leaders in associating the American enactment with its national grand 
strategy.   
 
 
C.5.2 Toward an Inward-Looking Strategic Choice 
 
Soon after the US severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979, thus plunging 
Taiwan into its most unfavourable strategic environment since 1950, a serious 
strategic challenge arose for Chiang Ching-kuo’s administration: how might the 
government revalue and adjust the country’s grand strategy to deal with this 
crisis in the context of cross-Strait confrontation? The most distinct 
characteristic of Taiwan’s grand strategy under CCK’s leadership can be 
described by then as its strategic choice to look inward, giving priority in its 
mission to domestic construction rather than the cross-Strait competition. The 
changed priority revised Taiwan’s grand strategy fundamentally. The content of 
CCK’s inward-looking strategic choice was determined by his ways of pursuing 
economic development, striving for Taipei’s political survival, maintaining 
domestic order and implementing constitutional democracy. Of the four ways of 
domestic construction, CCK’s national strategy appeared to be overwhelmingly 
economic in its scope. The major reason for such a national grand strategy was 
quite straightforward and pragmatic. Taiwan’s increasing international isolation 
gave the island little choice but to rely mainly on its own efforts. And the way 
to improve the island’s chances against China’s threat would rest on its national 





It is believed that economic failure, in particular the financial crisis, was one of 
the main factors that had caused the defeat of the KMT in Mainland China.40 In 
a self-examination after the defeat, Chiang Kai-shek confessed in his journal, 
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‘in the past twenty years in power [in mainland China], I made no effort to 
pursue social reform and people’s welfare. The staff in our party, the military 
and the government were concerned only with their own official status; they 
ignored the implementation of the Three Principles of the People. In future all 
our efforts in education [in the KMT reforms] will begin with a concern for 
people’s livelihood.’41 CCK learned his father’s lesson and commented, ‘this is 
a thoughtful assessment of our defeat and will be a permanent guideline for our 
revolutionary policy.’42 In 1986, after creating a so-called “Taiwanese miracle” 
under his administration, CCK proudly ended his account of the course of his 
successful experience, ‘We have grasped a very salient point: the people’s 
well-being is the core factor of history.’43 
 
As Taiwan was a developing country, the people’s well-being depended on 
economic development. The guideline for Taiwan’s economic policy associated 
with CCK’s inward-looking strategy, following Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of the 
People’s Livelihood, was that ‘[its] economic development should get started 
with land reform and the promotion of industries that provide for the basic 
needs of life – food, clothing, housing and transportation.’44 CCK’s first major 
economic initiative was “The Ten Major Development Projects” (shi da jianshe) 
in the early 1970s, which laid a solid foundation for Taiwan’s economic 
development. Responding to critics of the difficulties of the Projects in the 
beginning, his determination took shape in a dictum, “If we don’t do it today, 
tomorrow we will regret it!”  
 
The character of Taiwan’s economic policies under CCK was ‘more 
problem-oriented than ideology oriented’.45 “I learned a serious lesson on the 
mainland”, CCK said as Premier to the Legislative Yuan in 1972: “namely, the 
economic issue must be resolved by economic means and principles, not by 
political means.”46 In fact, ever since the early 1970s when CCK took control 
of the government, the nature of his administration was economy-centred. The 
main reason for saying this is that CCK, in contrast to his father, focused the 
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country’s major effort on domestic economic development rather than other 
issues. In the 1980s, facing increasing calls for domestic democratization and a 
more flexible policy across the Strait, CCK still insisted that economic 
development take precedence.47 It was the first time in the KMT’s history that 
economics, instead of politics, together with the mainland issue, enjoyed a 
higher place in government policy. 
 
The pursuit of economic development stood at the very heart of CCK’s 
inward-looking national strategy. It was not only an end in itself to attain 
prosperity and spread social welfare by improving the living standards of the 
Taiwanese people and thus winning their support as the KMT had failed to do 
when in power on the mainland. It was also an indispensable means to enhance 
Taiwan’s overall national capabilities, to put the government in a better position 
to defend itself despite its state of relative international isolation. Furthermore, 
according to the modernization theory of the developing state, the more a 
country’s economy develops, the easier it is for it to implement political 
democracy. 48  Accordingly, the government’s claim that Taiwan was 
developing into a model which would appeal to the people of Mainland China 
would be substantiated only when Taiwan made considerable improvement in 
relation to its citizens’ economic and political well-being.  
 
Political Survival  
 
In late January 1979, the month of America’s de-recognition of Taipei, Hedley 
Donovan of Time magazine asked Deng Xiaoping about the meaning of 
Beijing’s initiation of the peaceful reunification approach and its effect on 
cross-Strait relations. He replied, ‘Ten years is too long a time [to wait for 
reunification]’. 49  No doubt, when the ROC lost America’s diplomatic 
recognition and its commitment to the island’s security, Deng was optimistic 
that Taipei would lose its morale and come to accept Beijing’s terms for 
reunification. Deng’s confidence well reflected the view that Taipei’s political 
survival, defined in terms of political independence and the preservation of 
sovereignty, was in imminent and palpable danger. 
 
To pursue political survival is “the bottom line” and “a minimum requirement”, 
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according to Muthiah Alagappa’s observation, for any discourse about a state’s 
security.50 The meaning of the ROC’s political survival, however, might have 
changed if the ROC’s leaders had looked at the country’s sovereign status 
across the Strait from a different perspective. Ever since 1949, when Chiang 
Kai-shek (CKS) had retreated from the communist forces to Taiwan, the ROC 
in Taiwan had struggled for political survival as a sovereign entity. However, 
Chiang Ching-kuo and Chiang Kai-shek gave different meanings to preserving 
the ROC government in Taiwan. For CKS, the political survival of the ROC in 
Taiwan was undeniably vital, but it was more important for him that this 
survival was applied to fulfilling Taipei’s ultimate political mission: the 
restoration of Mainland China under the KMT rule. In the end, the nature of the 
ROC’s political survival under CKS was characterized by his outward-looking 
strategic choice to pursue cross-Strait unification. From CKS’s perspective on 
national survival, therefore, any approach that disconnected the ROC’s political 
survival from the task of reunifying with the mainland was not only unsound 
but also immoral.51   
 
Chiang Ching-kuo had a somewhat different perspective on Taipei’s political 
survival, even though in many ways he shared his father’s vision of the 
relationship between Taiwan and China in the matter of cross-Strait unification. 
In other words, for CCK, the ROC’s political survival during his regime was 
more of an end than a means. The reason for this adjustment reflected not only 
Taiwan’s apparent material disadvantages but also the unfavourable 
international political structure as perceived by Taipei in the context of 
cross-Strait competition. Since Taiwan’s favourable strategic environment – in 
the form of Sino-American hostility – had already disappeared, Taipei could not 
afford any longer to take for granted its political survival as it had formerly 
done. According to Ray S. Cline, CCK’s close personal friend and a former CIA 
Station Chief in Taipei, CCK often said, ‘Small nations have to adjust to 
international geopolitical circumstances and protect themselves the best way 
they can.’52 CCK’s awareness of the limitations of a “small state” such as 
Taiwan reflected his realism, which revised his father’s outward-looking 
strategic choice of a national grand strategy for Taiwan in this dynamic strategic 
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CCK’s pursuit of the ROC’s political survival was, then, closely associated with 
his inward-looking strategic choice. When Washington opted for strategic 
alignment with Beijing and severed its military-diplomatic relations with Taipei, 
CCK’s administration had little choice but to turn its strategic attention to the 
domestic context, choosing first to look inwards for its political survival rather 
than outwards to the Mainland China. In the negotiations to establish new 
overall relations with the US following de-recognition, CCK’s administration 
called sternly for Washington to recognize that Taiwan had never been part of 
the PRC’s sovereign domain.53 For CCK, the predominant strategic concern 
was not so much to recover the lost mainland as to secure Taiwan as the last 
foothold of the Nationalists.54 At the very least, Taiwan had to be sustained as a 
free China, beyond the dominion of the Chinese Communists, for the sake of 
CCK’s vision of sovereignty, of establishing a “liberal, democratic and 
prosperous” China across the Strait. Accordingly, the ROC’s political survival 
was a matter of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, which was 





Domestic order requires a political authority to maintain its effective control to 
ensure political and social stability. The increasing external threats of 
international isolation and China’s challenge led to CCK’s concern with 
securing Taiwan’s domestic order. Domestic disorder of any kind, political 
instability in particular, represented a serious internal threat to the authority of 
the government, as well as the KMT. CCK’s concern for domestic order could 
be traced back to the painful experience of the Chinese civil war. Then the 
KMT lost control domestically before suffering its military defeat at the hands 
of the Chinese Communists.56 The loss of domestic order meant the failure of 
government authority and credibility. For CCK’s authoritarian government, 
securing domestic order was an indispensable part of its inward-looking 
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national strategy because Taiwan was the last and only place where the 
Nationalist regime held sway and there was nowhere else to go.    
 
In fact, ever since the 228 Incident in 1947, the KMT leaders constantly feared 
that local Taiwanese would challenge the authority of the Nationalist 
authoritarian government.57 In the 1977 elections for magistrates, mayors and 
the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, the anti-KMT Taiwanese organization, also 
called Tangwai, which later became the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 
won an unprecedented victory in a fiercely-fought election contest with the 
KMT. However, KMT’s election fraud in Tao-yuan County soon triggered the 
Chungli Incident of November 1977, which was regarded as the worst instance 
of mass violence since the 228 Incident.58 Facing increased internal political 
challenges, when the US derecognized the ROC in December 1978, CCK 
immediately decided to suspend the National Assembly and the supplementary 
election of the Legislative Yuan to reduce the impact of this diplomatic disaster 
on the domestic situation. When the Tangwai fiercely protested against this 
suspension, political strong man CCK responded by suppressing its opposition 
activities and detaining its leading members.59 The confrontation between the 
KMT and Tangwai gradually escalated. It culminated in the Kaohsiung Incident 
(the Meilidao Incident) of 10 December 1979, in which a violent encounter 
erupted between police and the supporters of the Formosa magazine. No one 
was killed in this fracas, but the incident led to the arrest of more than forty 
dissidents and eight members of staff on the Formosa were court-martialled for 
treason, while others faced trial in civilian courts.60 This serial confrontation 
and suppression of the anti-government party revealed CCK’s intention to first 
and foremost preserve national security by addressing threats from within the 
state rather than from outside it. 
 
CCK’s views on domestic order had two principal components: control and 
stability. The implementation of efficient control was a necessary means to the 
pursuit of stability; in return, stability as a property of order would sustain 
control. One of the most important measures of control was then to maintain the 
supremacy of the one-party authoritarian rule of the KMT. Not surprisingly, 
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Samuel P. Huntington’s book, Political Order in a Changing Society, which 
emphasizes the advantages of a one-party authoritarian rule as a necessary evil 
in developing countries by which to maintain political stability for the sake of 
achieving national modernization,61 was well received by the government to 
justify its authoritarian rule and became a textbook at many universities in 
Taiwan. In 1982, Minister of the Interior Lin Yang-kan remarked in the 
Legislative Yuan that a multiparty system would damage the government’s 
efforts to withstand Beijing’s threats and warned of the dangers associated with 
such a system, not least with reference to China’s political turmoil between 
1911 and 1923.62 In terms of seeking domestic order, the continuing threat 
from Communist China also justified CCK’s endorsement of the one-party 
system, in terms of seeking domestic order. Accordingly, Taipei’s leaders were 
convinced that the implications of multiparty competition in Taiwan would very 
likely undermine the government’s efforts to maintain domestic stability in 




The pursuit of constitutional democracy was related to the very existence of the 
KMT government on Taiwan, in terms of its legitimacy and legality, as part of 
CCK’s inward-looking strategy. For nearly two decades as an authoritarian ruler 
in Taiwan, CCK was in fact the one person who possessed the power to 
interpret and implement the Constitution. This enabled him to manipulate the 
Constitution so as to associate it with his national strategy. Ching-fen Hu puts it 
well: that Taiwan’s democratization in the 1980s ‘ultimately belonged to 
Chiang Ching-kuo’, for Taiwan’s experience clearly illustrates that democracy 
can be achieved through political leadership.63 Motivated to construct the ROC 
as a political model which would successfully compete with the PRC in political 
terms, CCK had decided in the 1970s that Taiwan would gradually move 
towards constitutional democracy.64 However, it was not until the late 1980s 
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that CCK actually took the first few steps to implement democracy. One of the 
most important steps at the time was to lift martial law in July 1987, although 
CCK insisted on retaining the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the 
Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion” 
(dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi tiaokuan) because Taiwan’s national security 
was still tenuous and special arrangements were necessary.65 In doing so, the 
move of the democratization in Taiwan would be a positive response both to the 
PRC’s threat and to the possibility of weakening moral at home while facing 
international isolation.66 As John F. Copper has pointed out, ‘Taiwan had to 
democratize quickly to tell the world that it was no longer an authoritarian 
dictatorship and consequently, that it deserved to be consulted about its own 
future’.67  
 
After decades of political socialization in Taiwan under the KMT, it became a 
deeply rooted ambition to implement popular sovereignty or democracy in 
accordance with Dr Sun Yat-sen’s fundamental doctrine. The people held this 
desire, as did the political leaders generally, and especially CCK himself. 
However, as mentioned, the democracy proclaimed by the ROC Constitution 
was not fully put into practice for some time because the government felt it had 
to focus on the need for stability and control in the interests of political survival 
and another, albeit less immediate national goal: reunification. The turning point 
of Taiwan’s democratic development came in 1979 with the Kaohsiung Incident, 
when Tangwai clashed with the KMT government. Indeed, 1979 was described 
by CCK as “the most difficult and dangerous year in the history” of the KMT in 
Taiwan.68 To transform the crisis into an opportunity, CCK decided to take a 
further step in implementing constitutional democracy, not only to maintain 
domestic order, but also, equally importantly, as an instrument of 
anti-communism which would distinguish the democratic China on Taiwan 
from the communist China on the mainland. Moreover, democratic reform 
could lessen Washington’s increasing demands on Taiwan to democratize. In 
the event, CCK’s implementation of constitutional democracy was incremental 
rather than unconditional. 
 
This conditional democracy sought to ensure domestic stability without violence. 
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As CCK asserted, “the security of the nation and society” was of “greater 
importance” than “human rights and freedom”.69 He pledged to establish “a 
stable democracy” in Taiwan where ‘freedom will not be transformed into 
permissiveness and democracy will not turn to violence.’70 He took three 
simultaneous goals as “the basis of democracy”: to “abide by public opinion, 
strengthen the rule of law and enhance responsible politics.”71 As a result, 
when the KMT hard-liners asked the president to take radical action against 
dissidents who had established the opposition party in 1986, CCK replied, ‘To 
arrest people cannot solve a problem … The government should avoid conflict 
and remain calm.’72 Near the end of his rule, CCK’s determination and belief in 
implementing constitutional democracy, even though conditional, eventually 
built a solid foundation, which enabled his successor to take democratic reforms 
further still.  
 
 
C.5.3 Taipei’s Counter-Measures against Beijing’s “United Front” Strategy  
 
The continuation of the cross-Strait confrontation, during CCK’s regime, came 
about because of the unfinished Chinese civil war between the Nationalists and 
the Communists in terms of the competition for Chinese sovereignty. In 
addition to its peaceful offensive to drive a wedge between Taipei and 
Washington as diplomatic and alliance partners, Beijing also initiated a “United 
Front” strategy which was designed to appeal to international society, and even 
Taiwan, by positing that sorting out the cross-Strait issue once and for all would 
be to the benefit of all. At the core of Beijing’s way of advancing the “United 
Front” strategy was Deng Xiao-ping’s proposal for cross-Strait reunification on 
the basis of  “One Country, Two Systems”. CCK’s counter-strategy to this 
proposed idea focused on his famous “Three Noes Policy” (sambu zhengce): no 
contact, no negotiation and no compromise with the Chinese Communist 
regime.73 The “Three Noes Policy” was mainly derived from the Nationalist 
perspective on Chinese nationalism, which proclaimed the Chinese Communist 
regime as a threat to Chinese society and international society as well. Because 
of this, Taipei’s grand strategy against Beijing comprised five major dimensions: 
emphasizing the importance of Taiwan for Chinese nationalism; pursuing 
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domestic consolidation for the sake of internal unity and stability; combating 
the “One Country, Two System” doctrine in order to preserve a free China on 
Taiwan; defending Taipei’s international status by strengthening its 
comprehensive relations with international society; and securing the US as an 
arbiter for peace across the Strait.    
 
 
Chinese Nationalism  
 
CCK had a fervent belief in Chinese nationalism that, like his father’s, derived 
from Sun Yat-sen’s writings on Chinese nationalism, in terms to unite all 
Chinese into a solid single state for China’s prosperity, freedom and 
independence. The application of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan served, from 
CCK’s point of view, to substantiate a vision of the whole of China across the 
Strait in conditions of economic prosperity, political democracy and sovereign 
integrity. Within this vision, the separation between Taiwan and China, deriving 
from the competition between the ROC and the PRC over sovereignty, was to 
be regarded only as a temporary situation, by reference to the concept of the 
one-China principle across the Strait.74 Adding the ideational consideration of a 
national mission, Chinese nationalism inspired the CCK government’s mainland 
policy, standing as the core of Taiwan’s grand strategy, which referred to the 
status and future of Taiwan vis-à-vis the Chinese mainland in terms of an 
ultimate unification across the Strait. In CCK’s words, ‘There is only one China 
[across the Strait]. It is a China that must be reunited, but only under a system in 
clear accord with the Three Principles of the People.’75 ‘There is only one wish 
for us all’ was how CCK in 1986 summed up his government’s vision of the 
ROC on Taiwan in the light of Chinese nationalism: ‘that is, to rebuild a united, 
free and democratic China [across the Strait] so that all Chinese may live and 
work in peace and contentment.’76 
 
CCK’s view of Chinese nationalism to pursue a united free China across the 
Strait, then, consisted of two interconnected steps: first, to develop Taiwan and 
then to pursue cross-Strait unification when the time was ripe. The strategy of 
developing Taiwan and unifying China both came under the banner of Chinese 
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nationalism, which fundamentally linked CCK’s focus on domestic construction 
with his mainland policy to resolve the cross-Strait competition. To develop 
Taiwan was not only an end itself, but also a means for devoting the Chinese 
people as a whole. CCK argued that Taiwan’s development of political 
democracy, economic prosperity and social justice was appropriate for the 
Chinese culture and people and was designed to map the right road for the 
development of the Chinese mainland.77 From this nationalist standpoint, a 
developed Taiwan was the very key to his national grand strategy; in turn, 
Taiwan’s development would enable his government to proclaim its 
commitment to the future development of China. In the end, the auspicious 
development of Taiwan would still need to unify with Mainland China and this 
unification could not succeed unless Taiwan could develop the potential of its 
economy first. CCK’s intention of relying on Chinese nationalism to connect 
the two concepts of cross-Strait unification and Taiwanese development 
reflected his strategic concerns to fight two ideological enemies, external 
Chinese communism and internal Taiwanese separatism.  
 
On the one hand, from CCK’s perspective, Chinese communism not only posed 
an imminent threat to the ROC’s political survival but also represented disaster 
for the whole Chinese people. 78  The unfavourable strategic situation of 
international isolation and material disadvantage in competition with the 
Chinese communist regime convinced CCK that the pursuit of self-development 
and domestic unification in Taiwan should be the priority among the ROC’s 
tasks, which it could and should undertake. Applying this Chinese nationalist 
perspective in the interests of self-development would help Taiwan to become a 
model for the whole of China and this accordingly would enable the ROC to 
compete with the PRC in a political rather than a military way in cross-Strait 
unification. On the other hand, CCK believed strongly that Taiwanese 
separatists were violating the ROC Constitutional Charter and undermining 
domestic security.79 As a political strongman acting on his Chinese nationalist 
beliefs, CCK had both the means and the will to suppress the political challenge 
of internal Taiwanese separatism. It was also feared that Taiwanese separatism 
might provoke an unpredictable confrontation with Beijing’s Chinese 
nationalism, which would lead to an unnecessary crisis threatening his regime. 
By the middle of 1987, the National Security Law replaced martial law, but it 
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also prohibited any advocacy, spoken or in print, of “Taiwanese independence”. 
However, CCK seemed confident that the Nationalist government could 
convince the Taiwanese people of the benefits of drawing on Chinese 
nationalism for Taiwan’s future development. At the end of 1987, CCK 
believed that if Taiwan and China did not unify, Taiwan would gradually lose 
its advantages and find it harder and harder to continue as an independent 
entity.80 CCK’s practice of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan was designed in its 
appeal to convince the people of Taiwan that Taiwanese separatism was no less 
serious than the threat of Chinese communism and would threaten the very 
survival of the ROC on its own. In adopting an inward-looking strategy and 
facing an increasing challenge to Taiwan’s independence, CCK’s insistence on 
Chinese nationalism was inevitable, and his anti-separatist measures on the 
domestic front, such as promulgating the National Security Law, became 
distinctive features within the development of Taiwan’s grand strategy during 




Domestic consolidation entails a process of unifying and fortifying the people’s 
will against external threats. It involves a series of actions on the means to 
enhance morale, which enables the political community to respond effectively 
to perceived threats. In 1979, after the normalization of Sino-American ties, the 
first task of CCK’s national agenda was to achieve internal unity and stability.81 
Thomas A. Marks observes that it was principally Taipei’s efforts to achieve 
domestic security that saved Taiwan from the near-complete collapse of its 
international position.82 The two vital pillars of CCK’s domestic consolidation 
to pursue unity and stability against Beijing’s “united front” strategy were to 
transfer the domestic focus from international isolation and to implement 
Taiwanisation to localize the KMT. Chiang Ching-kuo emphatically achieved 
both of these.  
 
First, CCK’s strategy to contend against Beijing’s “united front” strategy of 
alienating the Taipei-Washington relations in domestic context involved shifting 
the focus of the Taiwanese people from international isolated frustration to 
self-reliant confidence. Ever since Taiwan had retreated from the UN in 1971, 
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there had been a constant fear of international isolation. The long-dreaded but 
inevitable break in relations with America was Taiwan’s worst international 
set-back, but from CCK’s perspective, it also represented the worst moment of 
national crisis and had now passed.83 By then, the key to successfully shifting 
the domestic focus away from the disaster of Taiwan’s diplomatic setback 
would depend on whether CCK could convince the people in Taiwan that their 
destiny was in their own hands, not those of others’. During the turmoil of the 
Taipei-Washington’s changing relations, CCK endeavoured to persuade as 
many as possible of the importance and value of self-reliance. The injunction 
“Rely on yourself and stay calm in the face of dynamic changes” (zhuangjing 
ziqiang, chubian bujing) had always been the dictum that he most liked. CCK 
efficiently took advantage of his party’s control of the media, which was one of 
his most powerful means for politically socialising and mobilising his people. 
At the same time, CCK astutely launched extensive economic, political, military 
and social reforms associated with his inward-looking strategy to restore the 
nation’s confidence. Even leading dissidents, such as Kang Ning-hsiang, also 
joined the national unity parade to begin with.84 The achievement of Taiwan’s 
“economic miracle”, which CCK regarded as the core of his national grand 
strategy and the people’s welfare, provided a solid basis for the government’s 
effort to format its national confidence in self-reliance against international 
isolation.  
 
The second pillar of CCK’s consolidation strategy was “Taiwanisation” (taiwan 
hua), a process of political localisation designed to pursue reconciliation and 
consolidation in Taiwan. Taiwanisation was a function-centred process and 
formed efficient means of control. From a national identity point of view, 
Taiwanisation was designed to reduce the Taiwanese sense of alienation from 
the Chinese Nationalist regime. 85  CCK took two important steps as he 
proceeded with Taiwanisation: first, he recruited Taiwanese political leaders 
and, second, he endorsed the establishment of a democratic system. Thus, while 
Taiwanisation began as a tool for sustaining the minority rule of the KMT 
mainlanders, it gradually came to be a by-product of the KMT’s preparedness to 
seek political reform and ultimately evolved as a means to win Taiwanese 
support in a liberal democratic political system. In the early 1980s, CCK told 
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his American ally that he would end minority control by dint of “Taiwanisation” 
and would democratise Taiwan through “comprehensive 
elections”. 86 Accordingly, the strategy of Taiwanisation amounted to a 
combination of localization and democratization which essentially served the 
purpose of fashioning on Taiwan a consensus against the perceived two main 
security threats: Chinese communism and Taiwanese separatism. ‘After living 
in Taiwan for forty years’, CCK famously told the island’s residents in 1987, ‘I 
am a Taiwanese, of course also a Chinese.’87 At the end of his regime, it was 
believed, according to Lucian W. Pye, that ‘the KMT had become largely native 
Taiwanese and that decision-making had moved to a generation that had come 
to political maturity on the island.’88  
 
Opposing Beijing’s “One Country Two System” 
 
After Beijing succeeded in bringing the Taipei-Washington diplomatic relations 
to an end, Deng Xiao-ping in 1982 sought to apply the “one country two 
systems” political solution to the cross-Strait reunification problem. Deng 
himself gave a simple and operational definition of his political strategy when, 
also with reference to the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong he 
proposed that ‘the mainland practises socialism while Hong Kong and Taiwan 
remain capitalist.’ 89  Thus, a distinguishing characteristic of the strategy 
emerged: to accept differences across the Strait so as to unify through peaceful 
means. Deng further explained the concept in 1983, ‘[As] peaceful reunification 
has been a common goal and interest between [the] CCP and KMT and [the 
reunification] is neither I annex you nor you annex me, we hope that both 
parties can cooperate in the process of national unification.’90 Accordingly, the 
“one country, two systems” has become the guideline for Beijing’s peaceful 
reunification with the ROC. Standing behind Deng’s proposal by then, 
representatives of the pro-Beijing American policy making establishment, such 
as Henry Kissinger, the main architect of Sino-American rapprochement, 
lobbied Washington to consider Deng’s unprecedented offer, since it was ‘an 
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historic opportunity’ to peacefully resolve the Taiwan problem.91 
 
To fight Beijing’s peaceful reunification strategy, as we have seen, CCK 
proposed his famous “Three Noes Policy” (sanbu zhengce): no contact, no 
negotiation and no compromise with the CCP regime.92 With regard to the 
possible negotiations with Beijing to justify his “Three Noes” doctrine, CCK 
warned, ‘To talk peace with the Chinese Communists is to invite death. This is 
an agonizing, bloodstained lesson that we and many other Asian counties [e.g. 
South Vietnam] have learned.’93 The main implication of CCK’s warning can 
be understood to mean that Beijing’s push for peaceful unification was seen as a 
strategy to downgrade the ROC’s de facto sovereignty and international status, 
to weaken the island’s domestic consolidation and to undermine 
Taipei-Washington relations, for instance, by hindering American arms sales. 
Nevertheless, while the “Three Noes Policy” lasted during the time of his 
regime, it is worth noting that CCK also decided to adopt a more flexible stance 
with which to develop working relations with China so as not to risk losing the 
cultural and civil connections across the Strait.94 In October 1987, for instance, 
CCK launched a dramatic new policy, which allowed Taiwanese residents to 
travel to Mainland China for family visits, as a gesture of humanity.95 This 
dramatic change can be regarded as his intention to prevent the island’s being 
alienated from the Chinese mainland after decades of cross-Strait political 
confrontation. More importantly, the change also demonstrated his confidence 
and flexibility in taking the initiative of opening up to China. The confidence 
derived from the growth of Taiwan’s economic prosperity and political 
democracy, which was in obvious contrast to conditions across the Strait. For 
CCK, these achievements mattered and told their own story. Indeed, he believed 
that they would undermine Beijing’s unification strategy of “one country, two 
systems”. In CCK’s last media interview in December 1987, he asserted that 
‘[the Chinese Communists] are changing to cope with our position, not vice 
versa.’96  
 
The backbone of CCK’s strategy against Beijing’s approach to peaceful 
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reunification was to emphasize the differences across the Strait. In doing so, 
CCK insisted that it was because of the one-China principle across the Strait 
that the ROC, as the free China, should not give up its own efforts to unify 
China under the Three Principles of the People. CCK then urged, ‘[Taiwanese 
and Chinese] Patriotism requires anti-Communism and anti-Communist actions 
mean patriotism.’97 ‘The heart of the problem [across the Strait]’, his Premier 
Sun Yun-suan responded to Beijing’s proposals for peaceful reunification, ‘is 
whether China should adopt a free and democratic system or a totalitarian and 
dictatorial one.’98 From Taipei’s perspective, the difference across the Strait 
mattered fundamentally and its political system could therefore not be 
compromised. ‘There is no such thing as the “Taiwan problem”’, CCK claimed. 
‘What we have is a “China problem” – a problem of how to reunify China 
[under Dr Sun’s doctrine].’99 CCK’s strategy of highlighting differences across 
the Strait served not only to justify his efforts to preserve the existence of the 
ROC against the backdrop of Beijing’s “one country two systems” strategy, but 
also to ultimately mark a way to maintain the cross-Strait competition because 
of his perspective of the ROC as the free China that should unite the countries 
on both sides of the Strait.  
 
Defending Taipei’s International Status 
 
After losing its seat in the United Nations in 1971, the ROC suffered a series of 
international setbacks while Taipei continued its rigid sovereignty claim over 
China as a whole. The UN soon became the most formidable channel for 
Beijing’s international united front strategy, as it has been ever since. Beijing 
has determinedly exploited its growing international prestige, which has enabled 
it to face off Taipei in a zero-sum diplomatic competition over the ROC’s 
international status. Its strategic goal has consistently been to isolate the ROC 
on Taiwan. By labeling it as a province of China, Beijing has not only sought to 
clarify Taiwan’s status in relation to Beijing, but also to undermine the morale 
of the Taiwanese people and to prevent international involvement in the issue.  
 
In the face of China’s international united front strategy, CCK soon adopted four 
approaches to counteract Beijing and to defend the ROC’s international status 
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as the sovereign and free China. First, Taipei worked hard to strengthen existing 
diplomatic relations with other states, such as South Korea, not least by 
appealing to common values of democracy and capitalism. Secondly, Taipei 
sought to develop new diplomatic relations with certain newly developing 
mini-states in Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America by offering 
them generous foreign aid packages.100 Third, Taipei pursued comprehensive 
channels of communication to maintain its substantive relations with friendly 
countries, which had no diplomatic relations with Taipei. Fourth, Taipei made a 
considerable effort by adopting a more flexible stance in pursuing its desire to 
take part in international organizations. Taipei called these measures “total 
diplomacy” (quan fangwei waijiao). In short, it made use of several different 
channels – political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, culture and 
sport – to achieve new levels of substantive cooperation and interaction with an 
array of countries and organizations.101 One aspect of the implementation of 
“total diplomacy” was the establishment of non-governmental representative 
offices. As CCK said, ‘[With] more than a hundred countries continuing to 
maintain their solid economic, trade and cultural relations with us, we shall 
never permit the Communists to succeed in their sinister design to isolate us.’102 
 
CCK’s “total diplomacy” strategy makes him the pioneer of Taiwan’s pragmatic 
diplomacy. Reconsidering Chiang Kai-shek’s zero-sum strategy against Beijing, 
CCK’s “total diplomacy” saw Taipei’s full attention redirected to the question 
as to what could realistically be done to avoid the spectre of growing 
international isolation. In other words, maintaining the ROC’s international 
existence was certainly no less important for the government than maintaining 
its claim to sovereignty over the whole of China. In fact, to the extent that since 
the early 1980s CCK had claimed sovereignty over the mainland on the 
domestic front, this was done mainly for the sake of maintaining Chinese 
identity and pursuing in declaratory form a longstanding policy of unification. 
CCK’s “total diplomacy” allowed Taipei to maintain “comprehensive and 
substantive” relations with countries that did not officially recognize the ROC. 
‘On the basis of equality and mutual benefit’, CCK pledged that, ‘[we] will 
carry out our international responsibilities and welcome international 
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cooperation.’103 Thereafter, Taipei’s energetic international activities would not 
only boost the ROC’s international visibility, but would eventually give solid 
evidence of its de facto statehood. At the end of his regime, CCK was pleased 
with the ROC’s overall international position, despite a lack of formal 
recognition of the ROC as an independent sovereign state by much of 
international society.104 
 
America as Arbiter  
 
Throughout this period, Washington remained the main target of Beijing’s 
international united front strategy to isolate the ROC. The main reason for this 
was that Washington’s diplomatic support and security involvement were 
crucial and indeed decisive aspects of Taiwan’s grand strategy in the context of 
cross-Strait confrontation, although the relationship with the US was ultimately 
not without ambiguity. On the one hand, Washington had remained the most 
important security provider that the ROC could have in international society; on 
the other, it was the long-standing security reliance on Washington that 
constituted the most vulnerable part of Taiwan’s national security strategy. In 
the end, Washington’s involvement in the cross-Strait confrontation represented 
a combination of opportunity and danger for Taipei. It was an opportunity if 
Taipei could enlist Washington’s support and yet there was also a danger of 
abandonment to the extent that Washington sought closer relations with Beijing. 
Ever since Washington had strategically aligned with Beijing against Moscow 
in the early 1970s, Taipei lived in constant fear that Beijing would apply this 
advantage in the cross-Strait confrontation.  
 
To appeal for a peaceful negotiation and solution to the cross-Strait 
confrontation was a key element of Beijing’s calculated strategy to neutralize 
Washington’s long-term security support for Taipei. ‘[Peaceful] mutual 
accommodation between Beijing and Taipei’, in the American view, was ‘not 
only desirable and necessary for the stability of East Asia, but also to be the 
only way to relieve the United States of a dilemma of future confrontation on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait.’105 Beijing’s proposal of peaceful negotiation 
was understandably welcomed by Washington, which regarded the maintenance 
of peace as the most important goal in its cross-Strait policy. On the first day of 
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Sino-American normalization, 1 January 1979, Beijing calculatedly announced 
that it would cease its shelling of Jimmen and Mazu, which had gone on since 
1958. Then Beijing launched several offensives to promote “one country, two 
systems” as a route to peaceful reunification. Beijing’s peaceful proposal 
successfully created a positive image in international society. The Reagan 
administration, for instance, was impressed and appreciative of Beijing’s peace 
proposal vis-à-vis Taiwan. 106  The combination of Washington’s shift in 
strategic favour and Beijing’s peaceful posture placed Taipei in a very difficult 
strategic position. Beijing’s main goal in its united front strategy was clear: 
either to neutralize possible intervention from American across the Strait, or 
preferably to win over American support.  
 
Responding to the trend of Sino-American normalization, CCK had already in 
1973 outlined three basic principles of his foreign policy to American 
Ambassador Walter P. McConaugh107: first, Taipei would resolutely follow 
Washington’s leadership and policy; second, Taipei would never in any 
circumstances establish relations with the Soviets to balance the Sino-American 
strategic cooperation; and third, Taipei would never negotiate, talk, or make 
contact with Beijing. CCK placed great emphasis on the third principle in 
particular. As CCK explained to Washington, any negotiations with Beijing 
would be regarded as a sign of surrender, which would cause domestic chaos. 
During the tumultuous period following American de-recognition some years 
later, CCK’s overall strategy did not change the above three principles. To be 
sure, Taipei also endeavoured to maintain strong and substantive relations with 
Washington and emphasized its support for American arrangements for global 
strategy. The passage of the TRA and President Reagan’s “Six Assurances” 
demonstrated that CCK’s strategy was successful and considerably mitigated 
the impact of Beijing’s united front strategy, which was designed to isolate 
Taipei from Washington especially in terms of their security relations.  
 
 
C.5.4 The Beginning of Taiwan’s Defensive-oriented Military Strategy 
 
The CCK administration’s military strategic posture evolved significantly as the 
end of the Taipei-Washington military alliance. Taipei opted for an 
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inward-looking strategic approach as the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act 
and Beijing’s peaceful “United Front” strategy came into sharper focus. As with 
the Chiang Kai-shek Administration, the government of CCK had initially 
maintained the continuity of its strategic posture since the mid-1970s: the trend 
toward greater self-reliance had continued; the attempt to secure arms from 
America had been pursued; and recurring concerns about the survival of 
Taiwan’s armed forces in the event of an attack by China had dictated various 
military modernization programmes. However, some of the strategic emphases 
of the CCK administration were significantly different from those of the CKS 
administration. Distinct was for instance CCK’s defensive strategic posture, 
which stood in obvious contrast to CKS’s offensive military preparations to 
retake Mainland China. Instead, the CCK Administration started to stress a 
defensive-oriented military strategy, which was designed to secure the island 
only. The defensive strategic posture adopted under CCK could be observed in 
Taipei’s adoption of a doctrine of non-provocative defence that was designed to 
prevent cross-Strait military clashes, the emphasis on strategic endurance to 
survive at least a year under Chinese attack, the pursuit of military 
modernization to make strategic endurance possible, and the attempt to establish 




Under the protection of the ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the 
geographic barrier of the Taiwan Strait, Taipei, in Chiang Kai-shek’s time, had 
intended to exaggerate Beijing’s military threat to obtain American assistance 
for its offensive political goal, namely the reunification mission. In fact, given 
the history during the time from CKS to CCK, Taipei’s grand strategy against a 
military threat from Beijing had consistently been linked to one overriding 
strategic assumption: Washington’s intervention. Indeed, Beijing’s military 
threat had fundamentally been mitigated as long as the MDT existed. To some 
extent in the post-MDT era, the passing of the TRA substantively continued 
Washington’s security involvement, an ambiguous commitment to Taipei 
though it is. For some like John Taylor, for instance, the ‘[TRA] extending US 
concern over Taiwan’s security interests to embargoes and boycotts seemed to 
go even beyond the existing treaty [MDT].’108 General Hau Pei-tsun, CCK’s 
major military adviser and Chief of the General Staff, recalls that the core of 
CCK national strategy was most concerned about ways to maintain and improve 
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the substantive military relations with Washington, namely, the arms sales, in 
the turmoil during and after Sino-American normalization.109  
 
Taipei’s strategic assumption of Washington’s involvement was seriously 
undermined by the developments in Sino-American normalization from the 
1970s onwards. When Taipei lost its UN seat, CCK immediately informed 
General Staff Headquarters (GSH) that ‘from now on, all our military 
preparations should be based on a defensive (fang yu) posture. There is no need 
to make much preparation for reunification from now on.’110 General Lia 
Ming-tang, by then Chief of the General Staff, described this as a “turning 
point” in Taipei’s overall military strategy. In 1973, CCK formally revealed this 
change to Washington, saying that Taipei would never threaten Beijing under 
any circumstances.111 At this point, Taipei for the first time agreed with its 
security provider Washington that preserving peace across the Strait was a 
common interest and a strategic goal for both of them. 
 
CCK’s defensive posture to preserve peace across the Strait consisted of two 
fundamental concepts: non-provocation and deterrence. First, non-provocative 
defence insisted that Taipei should neither deliberately encourage a military 
attack by Beijing nor initiate a military attack on Beijing, as it had done in the 
1950s and 1960s. Second, Taipei’s deterrence principally involved establishing 
a credible military force to discourage a military attack by Beijing.112 However, 
the core of CCK’s defensive-oriented strategic posture was associated with the 
idea of peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait competition, as stipulated in the 
TRA, which CCK fully endorsed. CCK’s emphasis on counter-attack instead of 
pre-emptive attack, for instance, derived from a belief that war was not an 
affordable instrument of policy for Taiwan in the cross-Strait confrontation. It 
was not feasible because Taipei did not possess the requisite military means to 
initiate war. More importantly, Taipei still needed to call for Washington’s 
interference on Taipei’s behalf. Without American support, Taipei would very 
likely be defeated to fight alone in a total war against Beijing given its 
insufficient material resources and limited capacity for conventional deterrence.  
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However, it is worth noting that CCK’s insistence on the state’s goal of 
cross-Strait reunification was not abandoned. This goal was to be pursued 
through a new strategy, however, which built on a defensive-oriented military 
strategy as a way of preserving the ROC’s political survival as the free China. 
He instructed his generals that ‘our [Taipei’s] strategic goal is to ensure the 
security of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Matsu and then to create the 
opportunity to carry out our task of mainland recovery. Without securing 
Taiwan first, there is no the mainland recovery.’113 CCK then explained how 
the new defensive military strategy and the unchanged political aim were 
related by arguing that ‘our defence programme must be amended to adapt to 
the change in the international situation; however, the goal of anti-communism 
and reunification should not be adjusted to suit.’ 114  In CCK’s strategic 
interpretation of competing with Beijing, the military defensive posture was 
designed to secure Taiwan first so as to launch a ‘strategic counterrevolution’ 
through peaceful political methods rather than by offensive military means.115 
 
Strategic Endurance  
 
If war did occur across the Strait, according to General Hau Pei-tsun, Taipei’s 
overall military strategic plan assumed that Beijing would apply an escalating 
military strategy rather than fight a swift decisive war.116 Accordingly, Taipei 
would exercise strategic endurance, sit tight and prolong the war, until a more 
favourable situation transpired, conceived mainly as American intervention. 
CCK outlined this stance of strategic endurance: ‘To survive after the enemy’s 
first strike is the core objective of our defensive warfare; if we can sustain the 
first strike, then the situation will change [in our favour].’117 Taipei’s strategic 
endurance was to be supported by three major requirements: the preservation of 
the island’s armed forces, the resort to total warfare and the likelihood of 
foreign intervention. 
 
The first requirement was that, despite the PLA’s advantage of material 
superiority and initiative, Taipei’s priority would be to preserve its main forces 
so as to launch a decisive counter-attack later by using the geographic obstacle 
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advantage of the Taiwan Strait. General Hau believed that the successful 
preservation of Taiwan’s limited armed forces, the air force and navy in 
particular, was based on a strategic calculation of avoiding a decisive battle at 
the very beginning of a cross-Strait war.118 He called the strategy “preparing for 
war while avoiding war” (beizhan er bizhan). Only if Taiwan succeeded in 
preserving its forces, he calculated, could it defend itself in a decisive battle 
later when the PLA launched amphibious operations to invade the island. He 
believed that Taiwan’s Air Force, which was vital to the pursuit of an endurance 
strategy in general and the tactic of a counter-attack in particular, would be 
neutralized within days if there were a full-scale air battle against the PLA. As a 
result, the most feasible strategy for preserving Taiwan’s Air Force was not 
only to avoid a decisive engagement at the outset but also to construct strong 
shelters to increase its chances of survival. In 1982, Taiwan started the 
Chia-shan Programme to build an unprecedented underground air base in the 
east Taiwan mountains, which would shelter the Air Force. CCK regarded the 
Programme as one of the most important constructions for Taiwan’s military 
readiness.119 
 
According to America’s military assessment, the PRC enjoyed a superiority of 
almost 10-to-1 over the ROC in terms of personnel and in all categories of 
military equipment.120 Given the quantitative asymmetry across the Strait, the 
second dimension of the strategy of endurance would require Taiwan’s 
determination and capacity to adopt a form of total warfare to which not only 
the armed forces but the whole society had to commit itself. To be able to call 
up the whole population in time of war involved an efficient plan of national 
mobilization. Furthermore, maintaining the national morale despite its material 
disadvantage became a major objective for Taipei’s endurance strategy. To 
secure high morale, CCK claimed that Taiwan would be fighting a just war 
against the Chinese communist invader. He said, ‘Our experience against 
Japanese and Communists tells us that ‘it is morality and will [instead of 
material power] that will decide the outcome of war.’121 According to General 
Hau, Taipei’s strategic plan was designed to withstand the PLA’s attack for at 
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least a year.122 But he also warned that, by applying total war, Taiwan’s people 
must have the determination to continue to fight to the death.123 
 
The third feature of CCK’s strategic endurance was that Taipei’s strategic plan 
encompassed the aim to hold out for a year. This was designed to provide 
sufficient time for international society, mainly the US, to react and perhaps to 
intervene. CKK’s expectation of international intervention was derived not only 
from America’s commitment as expressed in the Taiwan Relations Act, but also 
based on his perception of Taiwan’s geo-strategic importance, associated with 
his realist perspective on an inevitable power struggle between the US and 
China. Despite Sino-American normalization, CCK asked an American 
delegation in 1984 to brief President Reagan that Taiwan would continue to 
bring to bear its crucial geo-strategic role for the benefit of America’s global 
strategy, which sought to contain the possible expansion of China and the 
Soviet Union.124 In the event of a war across the Strait, Taipei’s war plan of 
holding out for a year well demonstrated that securing possible American 
intervention was no less important than Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself. This 
explains why CCK continued to be so concerned about America’s place in 
Taiwan’s overall national strategy. In the end, Taiwan’s endurance strategy, 
associated with its doctrine of non-provocative defence, was designed not only 
to consolidate domestic morale by presenting it as a just war, but also to justify 
any appeal to Washington to intervene for the sake of peace. 
 
Military Modernization  
 
The fundamental challenge that CCK’s administration faced in its plan of 
holding out for one year against Beijing’s attack was largely the consequence of 
the quantitative asymmetry in Beijing’s favour of the military material 
capabilities across the Strait. In order to cope with this material disadvantage, 
Taipei endeavoured to further its military modernization in order to attain 
qualitative superiority over Beijing. Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on “military 
modernization” had by then enforced CCK’s sense of urgency regarding the 
need to match the PLA’s improved capabilities. Taipei’s efforts paid off and 
achieved a slight, but crucial, qualitative superiority that enabled Taiwan to 
                                                
122 Hau Pei-tsun (1995) Fearless, p.422. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Chien Fredrick F. (2005) The Reminiscences of Chien Fu, Vol. 2: the Arduous Journey to 
Washington (Qian Fu hui yi lu: wai jiao feng yun dong) (Chinese Edition) (Taipei: 
Commonwealth Publishing Group), p.356. 
 198 
possess air and naval superiority over the Taiwan Strait at this time.125 
 
Under CCK in the 1970s and 1980s, Taiwan’s military expenditure stood at 
around 8%-10% of GDP. To enhance its capability, to increase its prospects of 
survival and to attain greater flexibility were the three main goals of CCK’s 
military modernization in the era of Sino-American normalization. First, to 
enhance Taiwan’s military capability, CCK implemented a series of proposals 
to upgrade Taiwan’s weapons systems. CCK’s upgrading focused mainly on the 
ROC’s Air Force (ROCAF) and Navy (ROCN). 126  The modernization 
programmes served three prioritized goals127: (1) to enhance the capabilities in 
air control, major programmes focused on upgrading Taiwan’s air-superiority 
fighter aircraft and missile systems (surface-to-air and air-to-air); (2) to improve 
the capabilities of sea control, anti-blockade warfare in particular, major 
programmes included preparing for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), purchasing 
two modern Zwaardvis-class submarines (the Jing-Long programme) and 
developing a new generation of warships (Chung-Yi and Guang-Hua 
programmes); (3) to augment the  capabilities of anti-landing warfare, major 
programmes were to upgrade the army’s major tanks and establish 
mechanization forces as the core of the ROC’s Army (ROCA). Second, to 
increase the prospects of survival for its armed forces, the Ministry of National 
Defence (MND) focused on developing the ability to preserve and operate after 
the PLA’s first strike, as Taipei’s overall military defence strategy was to 
maintain all available forces to fight a decisive battle on the main island of 
Taiwan. To do so, it sought to consolidate its military bases (e.g. by the 
Chia-shan programme) and establish a more effective early-warning radar 
system (e.g. by the Chang Bai programme) and by this means to increase the 
prospects of securing its major forces to launch a counter-attack in the 
homeland. Third, the concept of attaining flexibility was tied to its weapons 
procurement strategy: Taipei intended to diversify the sources of its arms 
acquisitions so as to mitigate the danger of relying solely on American arms 
supplies. The 1982 Sino-American Joint Communiqué, which proposed to 
reduce the quality and quantity of American arms sales to Taiwan, indicated the 
gravity of this possible danger. As a result, since the early 1980s, Taipei had not 
only started to purchase major non-American weapon systems (such as 
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submarines from the Netherlands), but, more importantly, had intensified its 
efforts to establish its own military industries so as to upgrade and develop its 
weapon systems.  
 
The build-up of self-reliant military industries has had a profound impact on 
Taipei’s national strategy. It has become one of CCK’s distinctive contributions 
to Taiwan’s military modernization. Two influential achievements of Taiwan’s 
military industries stand out: the Indigenous Defence Fighter (IDF) and the new 
missile systems: Sky Bow (surface-to-air), Sky Sword (air-to-air), Hsiung Feng 
(surface-to-surface) and Sky Horse (ballistic missiles). Technology obviously 
played a vital role in CCK’s military modernization plan. However, it is worth 
noting that some key military leaders within the MND had a conservative 
attitude regarding advanced military technology. General Hau Pei-tsun, CCK’s 
Chief of General Staff, with an army background, was the most influential 
representative of the conservative attitude. General Hau argued that the 
cross-Strait warfare would be conventional rather than high-tech in nature, 
mainly based on electronic warfare and missiles and neither Taiwan nor China 
had the capacity to apply high-tech warfare.128 General Hau’s passive attitude 
to high-tech warfare well reflected a major problem of Taiwan’s military 
strategy and in turn of the structure of Taiwan’s armed forces. At this juncture, a 
low-tech army was still the backbone of Taiwan’s armed forces; it accounted for 
over 50 percent of Taiwan’s total armed services and enjoyed a major share of 
its defence budget. This obviously was an obstacle to conducting a defensive 
war for the island. According to Defence Minister Soon Chang-chih who came 
from the Navy, the Air Force and Naval Force were considered more important 
than the Army for pursuing the homeland defence in the unique terrain of the 
Taiwan Strait. 129  During CCK’s regime, despite the competitive strategic 
perspective in Taiwan’s armed forces, an army-centred defence approach 
dominated Taiwan’s military strategic plan because of the traditionally 
influential role of the army in Taiwan’s military services.130    
 
Taipei’s “Controversial” Nuclear Option  
 
Faced with Beijing’s overwhelming conventional and nuclear forces, CCK’s 
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pursuit of nuclear weapons was an understandable, though not a radical, 
strategic move. Taipei’s nuclear option was mainly designed to enhance the 
credibility of Taiwan’s deterrence after Beijing’s success in ending the 
Taipei-Washington military alliance by the 1970s. Given the evidence of 
America’s three successful acts of nuclear blackmail against China in the 
1950s,131 a state that at the time was without nuclear capability, possessing 
nuclear weapons was considered a likely boon to avoid political-military 
bullying. This was all the more necessary because Taiwan has had to contend 
with a nuclear-armed China since the 1960s. CCK’s determination to obtain 
nuclear weapons reflected his concern over the vulnerability and credibility of 
Taiwan’s military deterrence at the time and the need to construct a better 
capacity for self-defence in the context of the cross-Strait military 
confrontation.  
 
In fact, Taiwan’s actual nuclear programme first started in 1958, the same year 
as the second Taiwan Strait crisis.132 In the name of the “peaceful use of 
energy”, Taiwan built its first nuclear reactor in December 1961. Soon after the 
PRC’s nuclear test in October 1964, Taiwan established the National Chung 
Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) whose mission was ‘the 
development of nuclear weapons’. 133  Despite signing the Treaty for 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in January 1970, Taipei did not 
abandon its nuclear programme. On the contrary, after witnessing America’s 
withdrawal from South Vietnam and its own serious international setback in the 
UN, Taipei was more determined than ever to achieve a deterrent capability via 
the nuclear option. By then, the Ministry of National Defence had prioritized the 
nuclear programme among its military projects to develop a nuclear warhead 
and a launching platform for it; nevertheless, Taipei’s nuclear programme was 
constantly disturbed by Washington.134 In September 1975, CCK surprisingly 
admitted Taiwan’s nuclear capability and announced Taiwan’s nuclear policy 
for the first time. ‘After 17 years of effort,’ CCK said, ‘we now have both the 
facilities and the capability to make nuclear weapons and actually considered 
building up a nuclear arsenal last year [1974]; but when I broached the idea to 
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the late president [CKS], he rejected it flatly on the political ground that we 
cannot make nuclear weapons to kill our countrymen.’135 CCK’s announcement 
of Taiwan’s nuclear policy, which emphasized the island’s capability to possess 
nuclear weapons even though it declined to produce and apply them itself, was a 
calculated psychological move serving three main purposes: to deter Beijing, 
since Taipei could be nuclear-armed if necessary; to allay Washington’s 
suspicions to the extent that Taipei declined to produce them; and to strengthen 
domestic morale by making public that the government of Taiwan possessed the 
means to quickly acquire a nuclear capability to safeguard the island. 
 
Despite risking military attack from Beijing and Washington’s strong opposition, 
CCK never gave up his determination to obtain nuclear weapons during his 
regime. His relentless efforts in this sphere achieved a significant breakthrough 
in the early 1980s when Taipei possessed the key technology to develop 
ballistic missiles, which, as a platform to deliver nuclear warhead, constituted 
one of the most important parts of his overall nuclear programme.136 In the 
mid- 1980s, MND not only confirmed its capability to produce nuclear weapons 
quickly if required but also was ready to produce medium-range ballistic 
missiles [of the Sky Horse type] to deliver these nuclear warheads.137 However, 
in January1988, soon after CCK’s death, his nuclear efforts came under 
American scrutiny. This time Washington destroyed all of Taipei’s clandestine 
nuclear facilities because of Colonel Chang Hsien-yi’s treason. 138  Since, 
Taipei’s nuclear capability has never fully recovered. CCK’s nuclear 
brinkmanship strategy, which focused on announcing and preparing to have 
nuclear weapons while explicitly declining to manufacture them, was designed 
to improve Taipei’s deterrence capability and to enhance its negotiating position 
against any hostile nuclear foe. But even if CCK, the last political and military 
strong man in Taiwan, could have lived long enough to complete his nuclear 
programme, it is an open question whether his nuclear brinkmanship strategy 
would have worked, since Taipei did not actually be a nuclear power. However, 
given his relentless nuclear efforts, CCK is no doubt the founder of Taiwan’s 
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nuclear strategy, a leader who dared to think the unthinkable. His thinking has 
not been lost on his successors, who no doubt will also have considered whether 
or not to have a nuclear option to maximize Taiwan’s self-defence capability 
against the threat posed by China in the current dynamic strategic context.  
 
 
C.5.5 Conclusions: Taiwan’s Grand Strategy under Chiang Chiang-kuo 
during 1970s-1980s  
 
The period from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s represents one of the 
most important periods in the evolution of Taiwan’s grand strategy, due to the 
effects of the Sino-American normalization. The rapprochement between 
Beijing and Washington achieved by the early 1970s developed to the point 
where Beijing could enter into formal diplomatic relations and foster its 
informal strategic alignment with Washington, while successfully insisting that 
the latter renounce the decades-old alliance with Taipei. Nevertheless, the 
passing of the Taiwan Relations Act by the US Congress was a considerable 
strategic achievement for Chiang Ching-kuo’s administration; the TRA focused 
on the preservation of comprehensive relations between Taiwan and the US, in 
particular American arms sales to Taiwan and the insistence on a “peaceful 
resolution” of the conflict across the Strait. Meanwhile, the shift from an 
authoritarian regime to a more democratic political system, which formed part 
of CCKs’ domestic management of Taiwan’s new strategic environment, also 
introduced new complications into Taipei’s strategic calculation. In particular, 
the uncertainty of Washington’s security commitment to Taiwan was felt in 
1979, whenTaipei had to establish an adequate self-defence capability of its 
own against the threat from Beijing. Meanwhile, the PRC was continuing its 
military preparations and put forward the proposal of “One County, Two 
Systems” associated with its “United Front” strategy to serve the mission of 
cross-Strait unification.    
 
These developments jointly made necessary a fresh strategic perspective for 
Taipei. Chiang Ching-kuo, the ROC’s last political-military strong-man, revised 
his father’s outward-looking strategic stance, which had focused on the 
single-minded and relentless pursuit of cross-Strait unification, and above all 
the attempt to apply military means to this end, as this posture was becoming 
obviously outdated and unrealistic. When the US bowed out of its bilateral 
alliance with the ROC, the PRC’s continued military threat acquired a new 
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urgency and significance, with Taiwan becoming steadily more vulnerable to 
the possibility of political-military attack from Beijing. The full development of 
these strategic concerns resulted in CCK’s new inward-looking strategic choice; 
this became the main aspect of Taiwan’s grand strategy during his regime, 
which focused on looking inwards at domestic developments rather than 
looking outwards to Mainland China for national restoration. Meanwhile, CCK 
stood firmly in the sovereignty competition against the PRC, in terms of 
securing the ROC, insisting that the ROC was legitimate because it stood for 
“the free China”. CCK’s “Three Noes Policy” well demonstrated his rigid 
position on sovereignty and his sense of the PRC’s lack of legitimacy. To 
respond to the unfavourable Sino-American diplomatic normalization, from 
Taipei’s perspective, CCK’s inward-looking strategic approach not only put the 
ROC on the road to cross-Strait reunification on its own terms, but also 
exhorted to the legitimacy and continuity of the KMT’s rule in Taiwan. CCK’s 
“Three Noes Policy”, as well as its “Total Diplomacy” and a defensive-oriented 
strategic posture were all closely related to this strategic choice.  
 
Notwithstanding the strategic posture described above, CCK’s strategic 
perspective on cross-Strait relations dictated competition rather than détente. 
This was because the ROC and the PRC were still fundamentally different, one 
being free and the other communist, making for a continued domestically 
determined clash of perspectives on sovereignty and of political ideologies 
despite the major change in international power politics that came at the ROC’s 
expense. After encountering the unprecedented diplomatic challenge with 
Washington, CCK’s national grand strategy to handle the cross-Strait 
competition was peaceful in character. The strategy sought: 1) to subordinate 
Taipei’s foreign policy to Washington’s global strategy so as to uphold their 
long-standing relations; 2) to pursue economic growth first for Taiwan’s 
national construction and then to implement political democratization for 
domestic consolidation; 3) to prevent war across the Strait; 4) to adopt “Total 
Diplomacy” to secure Taiwan’s comprehensive connections with international 
society; and 5) to insist on the “Three Noes Policy” vis-à-vis the Chinese 
Communist regime. In the event, the overall national strategy which CCK 
adopted to overcome Taiwan’s unfavourable strategic environment was 
successful and created a political and economic miracle for the small island 
which established crucially needed national confidence and morale to compete 
with China. At the end of his regime, despite his semi-authoritarian rule, the 
ROC had benefited from CCK’s achievements in decisively building on 
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previous foundations of economic growth, as well as fostering constitutional 
and legal processes, instilling a sense of strong discipline across society, 
promoting anti-corruption in government and exercising the provision of good 
leadership toward the people. All these have become aspects of the notable 












Between July 1995 and March 1996, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
conducted a series of military exercises, including missile tests and air-land-
naval joint operations, against the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROCOT) in 
the area of the Taiwan Strait.1 In the first wave manoeuvre, code-named “95 
Mission Exercise”, a total of six Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) DF-15 
was launched from bases in the Chinese province of Jiangxi province, targeting 
an area some 70 sea miles off the coast of northern Taiwan. Two per day were 
launched on three consecutive days, 21-23 July. In August, the second wave, 
code-named “Eastern Sea Live-fire Exercise”, continued for ten days, 
conducted by PLA naval vessels and aircraft, which carried out live-fire tests 
only 28 sea miles off Taiwan’s Dong-yin Island near the coast of Fujian. The 
third wave of exercises was conducted off the coast of Shandong from 15 
September to 20 October; it had the code-name “95 God’s Force Exercise”, 
apparently designed to show off the PLA naval force. From 31 October to 23 
November, the PLA conducted its fourth round, the “Success Fifth Exercise”, to 
practise its amphibious landing capabilities, including joint operations for the 
air force, army and navy off the south coast of Fujian. The fifth round of 
exercises, code-named “United 96”, was conducted in three parts between 8 
March and 25 March 1996. The first part, from 8-15 March, involved missile 
tests: four SRBM DF-15 missiles altogether were aimed at the sea lanes some 
15 sea miles off the northern port of Keelung and 25 sea miles off the southern 
port city of Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s two largest commercial ports. The second part 
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of the exercise, from 12-22 March, focused on naval and air-force live-fire tests 
and war games off the south coast of Fujian in the south of the Strait. The third 
part of “United 96” was conducted in the middle of the coast of Fujian, near 
Taiwan’s military stronghold of Mazu Island, to the north of the Taiwan Strait, 
between 18 and 25 March. It included joint operations involving amphibious 
and parachute landings and mountain warfare. These five waves made for the 
largest-scale military exercise in the recent history of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) in this area.2 Significantly, what was widely perceived as military 
intimidation against Taiwan unexpectedly led to the U.S. calling out the largest 
show of force in the Pacific since the Vietnam war, involving two battle groups 
of aircraft carriers which were deployed in the middle of March 1996 to deter 
any possible escalation of conflict across the Strait.3  
 
The trigger for the unprecedented Chinese military exercises was the private 
visit of Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui to America in June 1995. Beijing also 
sought to influence Taiwan’s first ever direct presidential election in March 
1996, which Lee Teng-hui, labelled the “separatist” seemed certain to win. 4 The 
more general goal of the Chinese military display was to coerce Taipei into 
accepting the inevitability of China’s authority in the cross-Strait sovereignty 
dispute.5 Furthermore, China also intended to issue a serious and unmistakable 
signal to international audiences, mainly the U.S., that, as Beijing was prepared, 
if necessary, to use force to unite Taiwan with China, there were tremendous 
risks and costs for any foreign power that meddled in Taiwan’s affairs if it 
                                                
2 Andrew Scobell (1998) ‘Taiwan as Macedonia? Strait Tensions as a Syndrome’, Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 21, Issue 2, (1998), p. 181. 
3 Bernice Lee (1999) The Security Implication of the New Taiwan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press/IISS, Adelphi Paper 331), p. 9.; Scobell (2000) ‘Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, 
Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No.2, 
(2000), pp. 238. 
4 For examinations of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, see, for example, in John W. Garver 
(1997) Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University 
of Washington); Zaho Suisheng (ed.) (1999) Across the Taiwan Strait - Mainland China, 
Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis (London: Routledge); James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (ed.) 
(1997) Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press); Greg 
Austin (1997) Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan’s Future: Innovations in Politics and Military 
Power (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies at Australian National University); Robert S. 
Ross (2000) ‘The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of 
Force’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; The forum of “The 
Taiwan Crisis“, in The China Journal, No. 36, (July, 1996), pp. 87-134. 
5 Andrew J. Nathan (1996) ‘China’s goal in the Taiwan Strait’ The China Journal, No. 36, (July, 
1996), pp. 90-91. 
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encouraged even the slightest advance of Taiwan’s independence movement.6 
In the event, the 1995-96 Strait crisis ended peacefully, and all three parties, 
Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, claimed to have attained their goals.7 While 
there are different opinions about who was responsible for causing what was 
arguably an unnecessary and avoidable crisis in the international arena,8 the 
1995-96 Strait crisis was in fact rooted in the complexity of the incompatible 
Taiwan-China sovereignty claims and the competing assessments of the status 
quo across the Strait in Taipei, Beijing and Washington.  
 
The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis presented the first security trial for the newly 
democratized Taiwan government, although Taiwan had lived under the threat 
of military attack and other coercive measures from the PRC since 1949. 
Compared with his Chinese-nationalist predecessors, Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) 
and Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK), Lee Teng-hui, the first Taiwanese-born president 
of the ROC, had a distinct perspective of the competitive and dynamic relations 
between China and a self-ruled Taiwan. According to Lee, the fundamental 
problem for the ROC on Taiwan in confronting outside challenges has been the 
lack of “Taiwanese subjectivity” (taiwan zhutixing), by which he understands 
an awareness of self-preservation.9 In his view, “Taiwanese subjectivity” has 
since 1949 always been undermined by two interrelated issues: the ‘ambiguity 
of Taiwan’s international status’ and the ‘uncertainty of Taiwan’s national 
sovereignty’. 10  Soon after winning the 1996 presidential election, despite 
China’s military intimidation, Lee in his inaugural speech on 20 May 1996 
proclaimed the victory and importance of “popular sovereignty” and asked 
                                                
6 Ross (2000) ‘The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation’, p. 89. 
7 Garver (1997) Face Off, Chapter 14, pp. 148-156. 
8 For example, Robert Ross criticizes Taipei’s “revisionism” as the source of instability in U.S.-
China-Taiwan relations. In contrast, Andrew Scobell describes Beijing’s military intimidation as 
“hawkish“ in nature and Alastair Iain Johnston argues that the Taiwan issue is “the most 
obvious exception“ to Beijing’s record as a status quo power. See Alastair Johnston (2004) 
‘Beijing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific’ in Suh, J.J., Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen 
Carlson (eds.) (2004) Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 77; Scobell (2000) ‘Show of Force’, pp. 244-6; and 
Ross (2000) ‘The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation’, pp. 122-3. 
9 Lee Teng-hui (2003) ‘My Belief and Vision of Taiwan’s Status and National Sovereignty’, in 
Zhang Yan-xian (2008) (ed.) An Interview with Lee Teng-hui: His Belief and Philosophy, Vol. 
III (Chinese version) (Taipei: Academia Historica & Asian Culture Publication), pp. 215-223.  
10 Ibid, p. 217. 
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Taiwan’s people to practise and consolidate “Taiwanese subjectivity”.11 Indeed, 
in the context of the cross-Strait sovereignty competition, Taiwan’s grand 
strategy under Lee’s administration can be encapsulated in his doctrine of the 
pursuit of “identity (ren tong) and existence (cun zai)”, which is derived from 
Lee’s perspective of popular sovereignty, or ‘sovereignty in the people’ 
(zhuquan zai min). As Lee defined the doctrine, the goal was ‘to establish 
ourselves [the people of Taiwan] as the ROC on Taiwan’ by substantiating 
popular sovereignty over the island, whereby ‘the people of Taiwan can fully 
express their free will and build their own future.’ 12  Accordingly, Lee’s 
perspective of the ROC’s sovereign status can best be described as ‘the ROC on 
Taiwan’. Lee made no secret of his “existence” doctrine, arguing that ‘[the ROC 
on] Taiwan’s existence is a fact, and as long as Taiwan exists, there is hope.’13 
In the end, Lee’s advocacy of Taiwan’s popular sovereignty worked as a unique 
approach not only to prove the legitimacy of the ROC on Taiwan but also to 
enable the KMT’s ideological legacy of Chinese nationalism to be adjusted to 
fit in with a democratizing Taiwan.14 
 
To explore the content of Taiwan’s grand strategy during Lee Teng-hui’s 
administration, from 1988-2000, the first section of this chapter examines why 
Taipei’s strategic choice - to create a peaceful sovereign coexistence with the 
mainland - was formulated and to what extent it was vital to redefine cross-
Strait relations as a necessary means to this choice. The second section 
examines to what extent the administration’s pursuit of national identity - or 
“Taiwanese subjectivity” - involved improving the island’s strategic capabilities 
in the face of Beijing’s threats. The third section assesses in what ways Taipei’s 
“pragmatic diplomacy” was practised in the international arena in order to 
ensure that the strategic environment would be in Taiwan’s favour. The fourth 
                                                
11  President Lee Teng-hui’s inaugural speech (20 May 1996), Chinese version in 
http://newcongress.yam.org.tw/taiwan_sino/05201.html (accessed on 21 April 2010)  
12 Lee Teng-hui (1999) The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity (English version) 
(Tokyo: PHP Institute), pp. 51-52 and 60-62. 
13 Ibid, p. 93. 
14 A discussion of Lee’s ‘popular sovereignty’ and its relations with the legitimacy of the ROC 
and the KMT, for example, see Hughes (1997) Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, pp.95-100 and 
153-155. A related discussion of party change on the national identity issue, see Dafydd Fell 
(2005) Party Politics in Taiwan: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan, 1991-
2004 (London: Routledge), pp. 85-128. 
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section examines how and to what extent Taiwan’s passive defence was adopted 
as a strategic posture to counter China’s military threats. The conclusion argues 
that the distinctive character of Taiwan’s grand strategy during the Lee 
administration rested on the strategic choice to promote sovereign coexistence 
across the Strait by redefining its status quo. This choice was based on several 
factors, including the goal of self-preservation, Taiwanese nationalism, the 
desire for sovereign equality across the Strait, and the aspiration to terminate 
Taipei’s international isolation. Rather than simplistically characterizing this 
conflict as one between Taiwan’s independence movement and Chinese 
revisionism, the clash between Taipei and Beijing in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait 
crisis is better understood as the continuation of the Taipei-Beijing sovereignty 
dispute, begun in 1949, and the complexity of competing perceptions in the 
international society of a unified China and the status quo across the Strait. 
 
 
C.6.1 The Choice of Peaceful Coexistence 
 
Lee Teng-hui took power in dramatic circumstances and, when the political 
strong man Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) died suddenly in January 1988, became 
the first ever Taiwanese-born President of the ROC on Taiwan and the chairman 
of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomingtang or KMT). 15  The most 
remarkable change in Taiwan’s grand strategy under Lee’s administration was 
linked to his unique vision of Taiwan which, he claimed, gave the people their 
right to defend Taiwan’s own welfare and existence; he did not see Taiwan as 
an instrument or springboard for the unification of China. During the 
authoritarian presidencies of Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) and Chiang Ching-kuo, 
the strategic role of Taiwan for the ROC had been continuously informed by an 
unalterable commitment to the national duty to reunify with Mainland China, 
either in terms of CKS’s “counter-attack stronghold” or CCK’s “model province 
of China”. For the first time since 1949, the Lee administration opted for a 
                                                
15 For an account of the dramatic process by which Lee took power, see the exclusive interview 
with Lee in Zou Jing-wen (2001) A True Record and Confession of Lee Teng-hui’s Regime 
(Chinese version) (Taipei: INK Publications), Chapters 1 and 2; Lin Chia-lung and Bo Tedards 
(2003) ‘Lee Teng-hui: Transformational Leadership in Taiwan’s Transition’ in Lee Wei-chin 
and T.Y. Wang (eds.) (2003) Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000 
(Lanham: University Press of America), pp. 25-62. 
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national strategy for Taiwan which liberated it from the former mission of 
Chinese unification. Nevertheless, Lee did not exclude possibility of cross-Strait 
unification; instead, following his unilateral announcement to end the Chinese 
civil war, he took an initiative by proposing the National Unification Guidelines 
(NUG), which emphasized that both the ROC and the PRC were two equal 
“political entities” such that neither was subject to the other’s jurisdiction.16 
Compared to CCK’s inward-looking strategy of “competitive coexistence”, 
Taipei’s new strategic choice under Lee’s administration built on the new 
perspective of peaceful sovereign coexistence across the Strait. This latter 
thereafter resulted in Lee’s controversial claim in late 1999 of a “special state-
to-state relationship” (teshu de guoyuguo de guanxi) between Taiwan and 
China.17  
 
The Nature of Lee’s Peaceful Coexistence Policy  
 
The most distinctive feature of Lee’s national strategy was rooted in his 
Taiwanese perspective of the cross-Strait relations between the ROCOT and the 
PRC. In contrast to his predecessors, Lee did not share their vision of removing 
the Chinese Communist government in Beijing, nor did he put the cross-Strait 
unification mission at the heart of Taiwan’s national interest. For Lee, Taipei’s 
former strategic choices of regime change in Beijing and the pursuit of a 
                                                
16 Although the NUG proclaimed cross-Strait unification as its final goal, it is worth noting that, 
from a strategic perspective, as Chia-lung Lin and Bo Tedards put it, ‘the function of the 
Guidelines was to diffuse and postpone the confrontation between independence and unification 
and to create a conceptual framework for the future debate after [Taiwan’s] democratization.’ 
See Chia-lung Lin and Bo Tedards (2003) ‘Lee Teng-hui: Transformational Leadership in 
Transition’,  in Lee, Wei-Chin and Wang, T.Y. (2003). Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui era: 
politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000. (Lanham, MD, University Press of America), pp. 35-36. In a 
later interview, Lee Teng-hui also said that the origins of the NGU had their own unique 
circumstances by then and he considered replacing the Unification Guideline by the ‘Cross-
Strait Guideline’ (liangan gangling) when the situation allowed it. See Zou Jing-wen (2001) A 
True Record and Confession of Lee Teng-hui’s Regime (Li denghui zhizheng gaobai shilu) 
(Chinese version) (Taipei: INK Publications), pp. 222-227. 
17 Lee’s thoughts on Taiwan’s sovereign status are best addressed in Lee Teng-hui (1999) 
‘Understanding Taiwan - Bridging the Perception Gap’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.78, No.6, 
(November/December, 1999), pp.9-14. Lee made his first public statement on what was called 
the  “special state-to-state relationship“ in an interview with Deutsche Welle in July 1999; see 
‘Responses to Questions Submitted by Deutsche Welle’, Deutsche Welle (9 July 1999). Also see 
the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC, Taipei), ‘Parity, Peace, and Win-Win: The Republic of 
China’s Position on the “Special State-to-State Relationship“‘, 1 August 1999 in 
(http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/rpir/2nda_2.htm) (accessed on 21 April 2010) and Seth Faison, 
‘Taiwan’s President Implies his Island is Sovereign State’, New York Times (13 July, 1999), pp. 
A1, A8.  
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unification mission were both elusive.18 To break the deadlock in the cross-
Strait sovereignty confrontation, Lee quickly embraced a new initiative by 
proposing an arrangement whereby Taipei could normalize relations with its 
longstanding rival. The first of his initiatives came in July 1990 when he 
organized the National Affairs Conference (guoshi huiyi) (NAC) to seek 
consensus on the themes of domestic political reform and a policy vis-à-vis 
Mainland China.19 In the event, the NAC decided to abolish “the Temporary 
Provisions” of the Constitution and to end “the Period of Mobilization for the 
Suppression of Communist Rebellion”, which enabled Taipei to start 
government-to-government talks with Beijing.20 On 22 May 1991, Lee then 
formally terminated the “Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of 
the Communist Rebellion”, which since 1949 had been the central operational 
constitutional code of the KMT-led authoritarian government against 
Communist China.21 By removing the two pillars supporting Taiwan’s civil war 
against Beijing, Taipei hoped to be in a better position to construct new 
relations with China and to proceed with constitutional reform in order to 
support Taiwan’s democratization in the post-authoritarian era.  
 
On 1 March 1991, Taipei made another decisive political move by issuing the 
National Unification Guidelines (NUG). These were designed to replace the 
constitutional provisions on “The Period of National Mobilization for the 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” in May 1991. The NUG was a 
substitute set of guidelines because Taipei needed an arrangement to outline its 
new Mainland China policy after unilaterally announcing the end of the Chinese 
civil war.22 The NUG proclaimed as Taipei’s goal ‘to establish a democratic, 
                                                
18 Lee Teng-hui (2003) ‘My Belief and Vision of Taiwan’s Status and National Sovereignty’, in 
Zhang Yan-xian (ed.) (2008) An Interview with Lee Teng-hui: His Belief and Philosophy, Vol. 
III (Chinese version) (Taipei: Academia Historica & Asian Culture Publication), pp. 215-223. 
19 For a discussion of the NAC, see, for example, Shelley Rigger (1999) Politics in Taiwan: 
Voting for Democracy (London: Routledge), pp. 151-3; Zou Jing-wen (2001) A True Record 
and Confession of Lee Teng-hui’s Regime (Chinese version) (Taipei: INK Publications), pp. 
330-2. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Lee Ten-hui (1992) ‘Termination of the Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression 
of the Communist Rebellion’, in Hu Jason C. (1992) Creating the Future: A New Era for the 
Chinese People (Taipei: Government Information Office, ROC), pp. 37-62. 
22 Lee Teng-hui (1991) ‘The Goal and Meaning of the National Unification Guidelines’ 
(Chinese version), in Lee Teng-hui (1995) Managing the Great Taiwan (Chinese version) 
(Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co.), p. 371. 
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free, and equitably prosperous China’, but stressed the following four principles 
as pre-conditions:23 
 
1. Both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory. Helping to bring about 
national unification should be the common responsibility of all Chinese people. 
2. The unification of China should be for the welfare of all its people and not be subject to partisan 
conflict. 
3. China’s unification should aim at promoting Chinese culture, safeguarding human dignity, 
guaranteeing fundamental human rights, and practising democracy and the rule of law. 
4. The timing and manner of China’s unification should first respect the rights and interests of the 
people in the Taiwan area, and protect their security and welfare. It should be achieved in gradual 
phases under the principles of reason, peace, parity and reciprocity. 
 
It should be noted that the essence of the NUG did not simply deal with the 
cross-Strait unification, but, more importantly, the NUG promoted the new 
vision of peaceful sovereign coexistence between two equal “political entities” 
across the Strait. The NUG asserted above all the principles of “reason, peace, 
parity and reciprocity” before initiating any Taipei-Beijing consultation.24 In 
Lee’s own interpretation, ‘[t]he most important issue within the NUG was to 
emphasise the concept (yishi) of the ROC [on Taiwan]. There is no unification 
or independence within the concept of the ROC; instead the concept of the ROC 
is beyond the ideas (quannian) of unification and independence.’ 25  ‘Mao 
Zedong’s greatest regret must be his decision to call his state the PRC,’ Lee 
continued; ‘if Mao had used the name ROC for his new China, we would have 
had a big problem. It is only because there is a state called the PRC that we as 
the ROC can still exist.’26 To reshape the cross-Strait relations in the NUG, Lee 
obviously intended to emphasise the concept of co-existing sovereign entities 
across the Strait, to underline the differences between the ROC and the PRC, 
and accordingly to preserve the ROCOT’s existing sovereign status by 
redefining Taipei-Beijing relations as existing between two “real, equal political 
entities”.   
                                                
23 The Mainland Affairs Council (ROC) (1991) “Guidelines for National Unification“, (English 
version) in http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/gnueng.htm (access on 21 April 
2010) 
24 Ibid. 
25 Lee Teng-hui (1991) ‘The Goal and Meaning of the National Unification Guidelines’ 
(Chinese version, my translation), in Lee Teng-hui (1995) Managing the Great Taiwan (Chinese 




Taipei’s conciliatory gesture, unilaterally terminating the prolonged Chinese 
civil war and recognizing the legitimacy of the PRC, created a so-called “golden 
age” across the Strait in the early 1990s which enabled unprecedented cross-
Strait dialogue to be held for the first time since 1949.27 In January 1991, the 
ROC established the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to take charge of 
planning, coordinating, evaluating and implementing Taipei’s mainland policy. 
One month later, when the government-to-government contact with Beijing had 
still not been established, the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) was formed to 
function as an unofficial agency, under MAC supervision, which would handle 
cultural, technical and economic issues across the Strait, and represent Taipei in 
negotiations with its PRC counterpart, the Association for Relations Across the 
Taiwan Strait (ARATS). After two years of preparation, the first ever Taipei-
Beijing public meeting since 1949 was held by Koo Chen-fu (head of SEF) and 
Wang Daohan (head of ARATS) in Singapore in April 1993. The latter 
Singapore meeting is also known as the Koo-Wang Talks. To make progress 
and agreements in functional issues as originally proposed, it was inevitable that 
both sides had to find a way in advance to address the ROC-PRC disagreement 
over the one-China principle. Before the Singapore meeting there were thus 
exchanges between the SEF and the ARATS to untie deadlock. In the end, 
according to Su Chi, the ARATS accepted the SEF’s proposal that ‘although the 
two sides uphold the principle of one China, each side’s interpretation of One 
China is different.’ 28 Nevertheless, this compromise did not appear in the join 
public statement of the Koo-Wang Talks. This subtle and ambiguous political 
solution to agree to disagree on the meaning of the one-China principle later 
became known as the so-called “1992 consensus”, or in Su Chi’s term as the 
                                                
27 Christopher Hughes (2001) ‘Living with “One Country, Two Systems”? - The Future of 
Beijing’s Taiwan’s Policy’, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 2, (April 
2001), p125.  
28 Su Chi (2009) Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (London: 
Routledge), pp.13-14. Discussions of the so-called ‘92 consensus’ in the Koo-Wang meeting, 
also see Christopher R. Hughes (2009) ‘New Trend in Taiwan’s China Policy’, The 
International Spectator, 44: 2, pp. 60-62; Xu Shiquan (2003) ‘The 1992 Consensus’, in Donald 
Zagoria (ed.) (2003) Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse (Westport: Praeger), pp. 81-102; and 
Bush, Richard C. (2005) Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), pp. 44-5. 
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“One China, respective interpretations” (OCRI) (yizhong gebiao) consensus.29 
From Taipei’s perspective, China was divided in the form of two equal political 
entities across the Strait, rather than united as one, and this divided China still 
needed to negotiate about whether and how to reunify in the future.30 Although 
Lee was by then vague over the one-China issue, his conciliatory gesture, unlike 
those of his predecessors, to pursue peaceful coexistence paved the way for the 
start of an uneasy peace between the ROC and the PRC, after both sides had for 
decades consistently declined to accept each other’s legitimate existence. 
 
Lee Teng-hui justified the choice of peaceful coexistence with a reference to the 
presence of a divided China across the Strait. Instead of challenging this 
reference, as his predecessors had done, Lee stated that the ROCOT had to find 
a way to live in these difficult conditions, because fundamental differences 
remained between the two sides on the issue of sovereignty.31 For Lee’s 
administration, the way forward was to choose peaceful sovereign coexistence. 
The implementation of Lee’s strategic choice involved two basic elements: the 
goal of preserving the status quo of the ROCOT’s sovereign independence and 
the means of redefining the Taipei-Beijing relationship across the Strait. 
Taipei’s choice of pursuing peaceful coexistence was a constant interaction 
between the goal of preserving its political independence and the means of 
redefining the cross-Strait relations, each fully comprehensible only in terms of 
the other. One could not understand the nature of Lee’s national strategy unless 
one appreciated his strategic choice for a cross-Strait rapprochement in the first 
place. But one would also have no practical explanation for Lee’s national 
strategy unless one understood the end and the means within the choice; in 
particular the pursuit of sovereignty as an end and the political move to redefine 
                                                
29 Lee Teng-hui constantly denied that the so-called “1992 consensus“ ever existed. Lee claimed 
that the controversial term of “1992 consensus” was never used during his administration to 
describe the outcome of the 1993 Singapore meeting. Instead, the term was created by Su Chi, 
by then head of MAC, to privately summarize his own understanding of the outcome of the 
Singapore meeting. Sue Chi later admitted that the term “1992 consensus” had been his own 
creation. See, for example, in Zou (2001) A True Record and Confession of Lee Teng-hui’s 
Regime, pp. 186-191; Su Chi (2004) ‘Driving Forces Behind Taiwan’s Mainland Policy’, in 
Steve Tsang (2004) Peace and Security across the Taiwan Strait (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, St Antony’ series), p. 46. Su Chi’s interpretation of the “1992 consensus” see Su 
Chi (2009) Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (London: 
Routledge), pp. 12-16. 
30 Lee Teng-hui (1991) ‘The Goal and Meaning of the National Unification Guidelines’. 
31 Ibid. 
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cross-Strait relations which were used to attain it. Therefore, only an 
examination of ends and means combined yields a full picture of Lee’s strategic 
choice for cross-Strait rapprochement. 
 
The Necessity of Preserving “National Sovereignty” 
 
The strategic goal of preserving the ROCOT’s sovereignty was the core of 
Lee’s strategic stance, to be achieved by way of a policy of peaceful sovereign 
coexistence across the Strait. Taipei’s sovereign stance was straightforward 
because the integrity of national sovereignty is the foundation for any 
independent state. The concept of national sovereignty involves an exclusive 
right for a state to exert control over a particular area of territory and over its 
people.32 National sovereignty is a prerequisite for international recognition. 
National sovereignty moreover is a relational concept and practice: one cannot 
meaningfully claim that a particular state “has national sovereignty” without 
also specifying the role of other parties in the international society. Accordingly, 
state and sovereignty are mutually constructed concepts; even in the 
contemporary era of world politics a state depends on sovereignty for its 
international acceptance and legitimacy as a state.33  
 
Taipei’s goal of preserving the ROCOT’s sovereign independence and integrity 
was also complex, given its international isolation deriving from the 
longstanding competition over sovereignty between the ROC on Taiwan and the 
PRC on the mainland. The nature of this competition became more complex 
when it transformed itself into a competition for sovereignty between the 
contending visions of independence, unification and status quo across the Strait. 
This complexity indeed turned evidential when Lee’s administration unilaterally 
abandoned its claim to sovereignty over Mainland China in early 1991. 
Moreover, the cross-Strait sovereignty confrontation became even more 
complex because other parties remained involved, mainly the U.S. Given that 
both sides had been prepared to defend their sovereignty claim by force, if 
                                                
32 The discussion of sovereign issues for statehood; for example, see Thomas J. Biersteker (2005) 
‘State, Sovereignty and Territory’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A Simmons 
(eds.) (2005) Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage), pp. 157-176. 
33 Ibid, p. 157. 
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necessary, it is believed that the military conflict across the Taiwan Strait had 
become one of the world’s most dangerous challenges for the United States, as 
it potentially entailed a direct clash with another great nuclear power, China, to 
maintain its dominant status in East Asia in particular and global politics in 
general.34 The events of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis illustrate clearly that 
any escalation of the competition for sovereignty across the Strait could have 
catastrophic consequences for regional peace and stability in the post-Cold War 
era.  
 
To ensure the ROCOT’s sovereign status was crucial for the Lee administration. 
This sovereignty concern was particularly important for the administration 
because after unilaterally choosing to pursue peaceful coexistence, the ROC not 
only renounced the use of force to unify China but also accepted the existence 
of the PRC. Lee constantly pointed to the cross-Strait sovereignty division and 
proclaimed that ‘the ROC has remained a sovereign state since 1912, although 
its jurisdiction now [is] extended solely to the territories of Taiwan, the 
Pescadores, Quemoy, and Ma-zu.’35 Aspiring to democratic mechanisms, Lee 
championed the principle of popular sovereignty, linking it deliberately to what 
he regarded as the ROC on Taiwan’s existing sovereign status in an attempt to 
consolidate a domestic consensus after encountering a mixture of phenomena 
between a deconstruction of Chinese nationalism and a rise of Taiwanese 
nationalism in the island.36 ‘The basic principle’, he said on the cross-Strait 
sovereignty conflict, is that ‘Taiwan’s [sovereignty] belongs to the people of 
Taiwan’.37  
 
                                                
34 Nancy Bernkopf Tuckner (2005) ‘Dangerous Strait: Introduction’, in Nancy Bernkopf 
Tuckner (ed.) (2005) Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia 
University Press), p. 1. 
35 Lee Teng-hui (1999) ‘Understanding Taiwan - Bridging the Perception Gap’, p. 11. 
36 A discussion of the deconstruction of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan, see Hughes (1997) 
Taiwan and Chinese nationalism, pp. 95-128 and 153-155. A discussion of the rise of 
Taiwanese nationalism, for example, see Dafydd Fell (2005) Party Politics in Taiwan, pp. 141-
142. 
37 Lee Teng-hui (1995) Managing the Great Taiwan (Chinese version, my translation) (Taipei: 
Yuan-Liou Publishing Co.), p. 469. An analysis of Lee’s idea of popular sovereignty, for 
example see Hughes (1997) Taiwan and Chinese nationalism, pp. 96-98. 
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Lee’s proclamation that the ROC on Taiwan enjoyed popular sovereignty was 
made in his Cornell speech in June 1995 and his 1996 inaugural address.38 In 
the former, entitled “With the People Always in My Heart”, Lee stressed the 
theme of popular sovereignty, arguing that the achievement of Taiwan’s 
democratization deserved recognition and respect from international society.39 
In response to Lee’s overtly popular claim, Beijing then organized a large-scale 
media campaign of more than 400 articles attacking Lee personally before 
initiating the series of military exercises from July 1995 until March 1996 
mentioned above, which were supposed to intimidate Taiwan.40 Despite such 
military intimidation, however, Lee again took up the theme of popular 
sovereignty which had contributed to his reelection. Although Lee did adopt a 
conciliatory stance on cross-Strait relations by the tone of possible reunification, 
he reaffirmed that democratization had ushered in an era of popular sovereignty 
in Taiwan.41 ‘From now on’, he claimed, ‘the people as a whole, rather than any 
individual or any political party, will be invested with the ruling power of the 
nation.’42 Lee asserted that the ‘legitimacy of the administration of state power 
can only be authorized by the Taiwanese people’.43 To him, the process of 
Taiwan’s democratization had finally consolidated the existing national 
sovereignty of the ROC on Taiwan. 
 
While the focus on national sovereignty was the primary driver of Taiwan’s 
grand strategy, in part because the ROC on Taiwan had become democratized, 
China’s assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan clearly was equally important. In 
August 1993, the Taiwan Affairs and Information Office of the PRC’s State 
Council issued a lengthy white paper on cross-Strait relations which was 
entitled “The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China”. Clearly, this 
                                                
38 Lee had first mentioned the theme of popular sovereignty in October 1994; see Richard Bush 
(2005) ‘Lee Teng-hui and “Separatism”‘, note 31, in Tucker (ed.) (2005) Dangerous Strait: The 
U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 231.  
39 For Lee Teng-hui’s speech at Cornell University (9 June 1995) (English version), see in 
http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/site/Tr/ct.asp?xItem=126&CtNode=119 (accessed on 21 April 
2010) 
40 Zhao Suisheng (2002) ‘Reunification Strategy: Beijing Verse Lee Teng-hui’, in Bruce J. 
Dickson and Chien-min Chao (eds.) (2002) Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s 
Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe), pp. 225-
228. 
41 Richard Bush (2005) ‘Lee Teng-hui and “Separatism”‘, pp. 85-86. 
42 Lee Teng-hui’s inaugural speech as President (20 May 1996). 
43 Ibid. 
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document was published in response to Taipei’s pursuit of international 
recognition of its sovereign status, not least by making attempts to rejoin the 
United Nations. The White Paper stated unequivocally that there was but one 
China, whose central government was in Beijing, and Taiwan was a part of it. 
This was also to be the premise for any cross-Strait negotiations.44 Rejecting 
Beijing’s treatment of Taipei as a subordinate political unit, Lee described 
Beijing’s sovereign claim over Taiwan as “ideological wishful thinking” since 
the PRC had never controlled Taiwan. Lee contended the White Paper by 
saying that ‘the attacks that Beijing makes on the legitimacy of the democratic 
government [the ROC on Taiwan] affront the people of Taiwan and the 
prevailing values [democracy and liberty] of the international community.’45 
Beijing’s rigid stance on sovereignty and Lee’s principle of popular sovereignty 
became irreconcilable, opening a new dimension of the security dilemma across 
the Strait because of the move in Taiwan towards a post-authoritarian era. 
 
The fragile peace between Taipei and Beijing in the early 1990s soon came 
under attack as a consequence of misinterpretation and revisionism. From Lee’s 
perspective, the existing independent sovereign status of the ROC on Taiwan 
was a condition of the status quo across the Strait which should be beyond any 
controversy over independence and unification. 46  Lee suggested that 
international society should understand Taipei’s one-China policy, as well as 
Beijing’s, and that it should not misinterpret Taiwan’s sovereign stance on the 
status quo as a policy aimed at independence.47 From Beijing’s perspective, 
however, Lee’s stance on sovereignty would lead to the consequence of either 
“two Chinas” or “one Taiwan, one China”. Both of these violated the bottom 
line of its One-China principle and unification policy.48 Beijing also felt that 
Taipei was taking it for a fool. Indeed, the PRC lost patience with Lee’s skillful 
manoeuvres on the independence-unification issue in his efforts to consolidate 
                                                
44 The Taiwan Affairs and Information Office (PRC) (1993) “The Taiwan Question and the 
Reunification of China“, in http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/index.htm (accessed on 21 
April 2010). 
45 Lee Teng-hui (1999) ‘Understanding Taiwan’, pp. 9-10. 
46 Lee Teng-hui (1991) ‘The Goal and Meaning of the National Unification Guidelines’. 
47 Lee Teng-hui (1999) The Road to Democracy, pp. 119-120. 
48 Zhao Suisheng (2002) ‘Reunification Strategy: Beijing Verse Lee Teng-hui’, in Dickson and 
Chao (eds.) (2002) Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics, pp. 224-7. 
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his national sovereignty claim.49 For some, the events of the 1995-96 Taiwan 
Strait crisis greatly annoyed Beijing, leading the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to reject his mainland policy and marking the failure of Lee’s 
rapprochement strategy.50 Nevertheless, Lee firmly believed that the sudden 
deterioration of cross-Strait relations in 1995-96 derived from the power 
struggle within the CCP. From his perspective, Beijing necessarily adopted a 
tough position on the Taiwan issue in order to unify the CCP.51 Lee also 
revealed in an interview that he had privately informed Beijing in advance about 
his 1995 visit to the US and added that at the time there had been no indication 
that Beijing would respond to his American trip by initiating such a large-scale 
political and military protest. 52  Obviously, since hostile experiences had 
accompanied the cross-Strait sovereignty competition for decades, both Taipei 
and Beijing were still mutually suspicious and could not properly communicate 
with each other. 
 
The Four-Step Process of Redefining Cross-Strait Relations 
 
In order to pursue the strategic choice of peaceful coexistence while planning to 
ensure the ROCOT’s independent sovereign status, Lee’s administration used 
the method of redefining cross-Strait relations as two “equal political entities”. 
This redefinition involved a four-step process: first, asserting the ROC’s 
sovereignty over Taiwan; second, recognizing the PRC’s sovereignty over 
mainland China; third, ending Taiwan’s image of being identified as Beijing’s 
so-called “renegade province” in international society; and fourth, resolving the 
divisions over the sovereignty issue by insisting on an equal basis from which to 
advance the future reunification of China. Months before the 1995-96 Strait 
crisis, Lee Teng-hui had put forward a “Six-Point proposal” to respond to Jiang 
Zemin’s first major speech on policy vis-à-vis Taiwan, also known as “Jiang’s 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid; Kuo Julian J. (2002) ‘Cross-Strait Relations: Buying Time Without Strategy’, in 
Dickson and Chao (eds.) (2002) Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics, pp. 
204-216. 
51 Lee Teng-hui and Nakajima Mineo (2000) The Wisdom of Asia (Chinese version) (Taipei: 
Yuan-Liou Publishing Co.), p. 48.  
52 Zou (2001) A True Record and Confession of Lee Teng-hui’s Regime, pp. 202-4. 
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Eight Points”.53 Both Lee’s “Six Points” and Jiang’s “Eight Points” represented 
landmark statements of their respective cross-Strait policies. ‘In the hope of 
normalizing bilateral relations’, Taipei urged Beijing to be realistic and to 
recognize that ‘the fact that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have been ruled 
by two political entities in no way subordinate to each other has led to a state of 
division between the two sides and separate governmental jurisdictions, hence 
the issue of national unification.’54 From Lee’s perspective, in the pursuit of 
peaceful coexistence, the first step for moving forward these new cross-Strait 
relations for both sides was to win acceptance of the fact that the so-called ‘one 
China’ was divided, and let both sides enjoy their own sovereignty in relation to 
specific territories, people and government.  
 
In his May 1996 inauguration speech, Lee’s proposal for “managing great 
Taiwan, establishing a new centre of culture” (jingying da taiwan, jianli xing 
zhongyuan) can be regarded as the synthesis of his pursuit of the four-step 
process of redefining cross-Strait relations. In the proposal, Lee vowed to 
pursue cross-Strait unification and hoped that Taiwan, as the new cultural centre, 
would play a leading role in fostering a new Chinese culture.55 Richard Bush, a 
former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), commented that 
Lee’s new proposal represented ‘the most telling refutation of the idea that Lee 
was opposed to Taiwan’s unification with China.’ 56  To be sure, while 
advocating cross-Strait unification in a timely and appropriate manner, 
Taiwan’s “new centre” proposal built on the emphasis given to Taiwan’s 
popular sovereignty and highlighted the differences between Taiwan and China 
after a long history of division in terms of political, economic, social and 
cultural facts.57 Lee made it clear that there was a distinction between the 
“wishful thinking” of political unification and the “reality” of the divided 
                                                
53 Jiang’s “Eight Points“ was stated on 30 January 1995. For Chinese and English versions of 
Lee’s “Six Points“ and Jiang’s “Eight Points“, see in (http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/rpir/1_5.htm) 
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55 Lee Teng-hui (1995) Managing the Great Taiwan (Chinese version) (Taipei: Yuan-Liou 
Publishing Co.), pp. 447-468; Lee Teng-hui (1999) The Road to Democracy, pp. 62-63; Lee 
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56 Bush (2005) ‘Lee Teng-hui and “Separatism”‘, p. 85. Established in 1979, the AIT is the US 
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 221 
situation across the Strait. Lee’s redefinition of the cross-Strait division came to 
another climax when he overtly described the cross-Strait relations as “special 
state-to-state relations” in an interview with reporters from Deutsche Welle on 9 
July 1999. In the interview, when asked for his opinion of Beijing’s view that 
Taiwan was a renegade province of China, he replied: 
 
The historical facts are as follows: since the PRC’s establishment, the Chinese 
communists have never ruled Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu, which have been 
under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China. In 1991, our country amended its 
Constitution … Consequently, the state organs subsequently formed will only represent 
the Taiwan people. The legitimacy of the administration of state power can only be 
authorized by the Taiwan people and has absolutely nothing to do with the people in 
mainland China. Since our constitutional reform in 1991, we have designed cross-Strait 
relations as nation-to-nation (guo-jia yu guo-jia), or at least as special state-to-state 
relations (te-shu guo-yu-guo de guan-xi), rather than internal relations within “one 
China” between a legitimate government and a rebel group, or between central and local 
governments.58 
 
From the NUG’s “two political entities” in 1991 to the 1999 formula of “special 
state-to-state relations”, Lee defended his transformed tone to define the cross-
Strait relations, arguing that the vague term “political entity” not only failed to 
accord with the evidence, but, more decisively in terms of international law, put 
Taiwan in an unequal position to conduct any unification negotiation with 
Beijing.59 The overt definition of the “special state-to-state relations” also 
reflected Lee’s prolonged frustration with Beijing’s constant treatment of the 
ROC on Taiwan as its subordinate after Taipei initiated its “goodwill” 
recognition of Beijing in 1991. ‘Based on the necessity of protecting national 
interests and dignity’, Lee explained to Beijing and the international community, 
‘it [the described “special state-to-state relationship”] was designed to lay a 
foundation of parity for the two sides, to elevate the level of dialogue, to build a 
                                                
58 “VOG Interviews Li Teng-hui“, Zhongyan Ribao, 10 July 1999, FBIS, OW12007135899, in 
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mechanism for democratic and peaceful cross-Strait interactions and to usher in 
a new era of cross-Strait relations.’60 
 
‘To clarify, not change the status quo and to seek peace, not to make trouble’, 
Lee constantly repeated his position on Taiwan’s stance: ‘there is no need to 
warn Taiwan about declaring independence because the ROC has been 
sovereign and independent since its founding in 1912.’61 Then, instead of 
challenging the PRC’s existence as his predecessors had done, Lee proposed a 
mutual acknowledgement that the two Chinese governments, Taipei and Beijing, 
could work together from a starting point of equal sovereignty to find a solution 
for the cross-Strait conflict.  
 
In the event, however, the outcome of the four-step process was acrimony, at 
least for Beijing and even for Washington. Against the backdrop of the 1995-96 
Taiwan Strait crisis and Lee’s 1999 statement on the “special state-to-state 
relations”, Beijing condemned Lee as ‘the general representative of Taiwan’s 
separatist forces, a saboteur of the stability of the Taiwan Straits, a stumbling-
block preventing the development of relations between China and the U.S. and a 
troublemaker for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.’62 While the 
Clinton administration worried about the risk of cross-Strait conflict erupting 
through accident or miscalculation after the experience of the 1995-96 Strait 
crisis, Lee’s “special state-to-state relations” statement caught Taiwan’s most 
important security provider, the US, by surprise. Washington was especially 
annoyed that Lee had not informed them in advance about his “state to state” 
formulation, which was new in that it explicitly defined the Taiwan-China 
relationship in terms of sovereignty status.63 United States officials have also 
complained privately that Lee has at times been a troublemaker.64 Julian J. Kuo, 
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a Taiwanese DPP scholar, has criticized Lee for proposing ‘new policies 
[involving the cross-Strait sovereignty issues]  … as ad hoc methods of crisis 
management in the face of external pressure, [which] … ended up without an 
overall sense of purpose - in short, without a sense of national strategy.’65  
 
Critics such as Kuo seem to lack a deeper historical perspective on the nature of 
the ROCOT-PRC competition for sovereignty and ignore Taipei’s willingness 
to accept the possibility of cross-Strait reunification under certain conditions. In 
fact, early in May 1991, Taipei’s strategic trade-off between preserving 
Taiwan’s sovereign status and offering a unification scheme had already taken 
shape when Lee proposed the National Guidelines (NUG) to normalize the 
cross-Strait relations. The firm stance on the “reality” of the ROCOT’s de facto 
sovereign independent status, combined with a vision of the possibility of cross-
Strait unification, represented the very core of the national grand strategy of 
Lee’s administration. Most important of all, these critics of Lee’s insistence on 
sovereignty as the cause of the cross-Strait crises ignore the crucial point that 
the demand to protect national sovereignty is of fundamental interest and value 
for any state and government. Since Taiwan’s democratization, in particular, the 
sovereignty of the ROC over Taiwan has belonged to the people of Taiwan, not 
to any individual or political party, let alone outside regimes. Lee’s 
administration has opted to normalize cross-Strait relations by way of redefining 
cross-Strait relations - establishing mutual recognition and equality as sovereign 
entities. This represented a revision of the national strategic choice by Taiwan’s 
former authoritarian regimes. In the past, Taipei’s authoritarian rigid mainland 
policies were rooted in a zero-sum cross-Strait game, which not only set up an 
illusory strategic goal of reunification against Beijing on its own terms but also 
made it impose the unlikelihood that any positive cross-Strait dialogue would 
proceed.  
 
To make sense of Lee’s national grand strategy, one needs to understand also 
how Taipei’s strategic choice of pursuing peaceful coexistence was formulated 
                                                                                                                                      
Robert S. (Fall 2000) ‘The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the 
Use of Force’, International Security, Vol. 25, pp. 87-123. 
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with reference to the four-step process of redefining cross-Strait relations in the 
first place. Indeed, one would seriously misinterpret Lee’s way of redefining 
cross-Strait relations if one opted to consider any of the steps in his four-step 
process in isolation, such as his insistence on the sovereignty issue, and not treat 
the four-step process as a whole. According to Lee’s vision, redefining the 
cross-Strait relations was vital to the very existence and integrity of the ROC on 
Taiwan and should go beyond the conventional ideas/debates on independence 




C.6.2 The Power of “Taiwanese Subjectivity” 
 
Beijing’s opposition to Taipei’s strategic choice of peaceful coexistence, 
involving the mutual acknowledgment of sovereign equality across the Strait, 
presented a new strategic challenge to the ROC on Taiwan.  Although freed 
from the burdensome national duty to reunify with Mainland China as his 
predecessors proposed, during Lee Teng-hui’s administration, Taipei 
encountered a demanding but familiar task: how to increase and manage 
Taiwan’s limited national power to guard against the threats associated with 
China’s overwhelming comprehensive national power. The reaction to the 
1995-96 Strait crisis presented an important illustration of the way in which 
Lee’s administration managed the complex national material-ideational 
resources for the task. Compared to previous governments, Lee’s administration 
had continually emphasized the vital role of drawing on material resources, such 
as economic power, to enhance national power. That said, the administration at 
the same time had also tried to build up a new national identity as a country 
strong on soft power to compensate for Taipei’s material disadvantages in the 
face of Beijing’s threats. However, instead of raising the banner of Chinese 
nationalism as his predecessors had done, Lee proposed a new concept of 
“Taiwanese subjectivity” (taiwan zhuti xing), Taiwanese awareness of self-
preservation and self-mastery, as a valued innovation of Taiwanese identity 
(taiwan rentong) to unify the heart and mind of the divided Taiwan society so as 
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to sustain and consolidate the fighting will of Taiwan’s people in the new era of 
a ‘post-nationalist’ national identity. 
 
 
The Nature of Lee’s “Taiwanese Subjectivity” 
 
Lee’s idea of “Taiwanese subjectivity”, the foundation of his state sovereignty 
perspective, derives from his understanding and rethinking of Taiwan’s colonial 
history. 66  Since the seventeenth century, through the Dutch and Japanese 
colonial masters and the different Chinese rulers (the Ming dynasty, Qing 
dynasty and the KMT’s authoritarian regime), the very purpose of Taiwan’s 
existence had always been to preserve and serve the prosperity of these outside 
masters rather than that of the people of Taiwan. According to Lee, ‘for 
centuries the people of Taiwan were denied the opportunity to govern 
themselves. No matter how hard they strove, their homeland was not their 
own.’67 Having been ruled by so many different outsiders for so long, Lee 
observed, the consequence of these diverse historical experiences of occupation 
initiated a negative state of mind within the people of Taiwan. As a result the 
Taiwanese not only have a very vague sense of who they are but also lack the 
confidence and determination to consider themselves as master and subject on 
the island.68 In an interview with the Japanese writer Shiba Ryotaro in March 
1994, Lee concluded that because of the unfortunate experiences suffered by 
Taiwan, the Taiwanese felt powerless in relation to their homeland, which he 
famously linked to “the pathos of being born a Taiwanese”.69 In fact, Lee also 
felt angry and worried about the “slavish” mind-set of the Taiwanese people 
who do not have the will to be their own masters.70 Accordingly, Lee’s 
“Taiwanese subjectivity” is presented as a discourse to lead the people of 
Taiwan out of past repression.  Lee’s “Taiwanese subjectivity” can be 
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68 Lee Teng-hui (2003) ‘My Belief and Vision of Taiwan’s Status and National Sovereignty’. 
69 Lee Teng-hui (1999) The Road to Democracy, p. 19. 
70 Zhang Yan-xian (ed.) (2008) An Interview and Narration of Lee Teng-hui: His Belief and 
Philosophy, Vol. III (Chinese version, my translation) (Taipei: Academia Historica & Asian 
Culture Publication), p. 106. 
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conceptualized as a Taiwan-centric perception of the demand for self-mastery 
and the pursuit of self-preservation.  
 
“Taiwanese subjectivity” also represents a belief in the importance of 
implementing popular sovereignty of the ROC over Taiwan. The concept is tied 
to a belief in self-mastery and self-preservation that is a matter of the greatest 
importance for Taiwan’s national strategy in the context of the competition for 
sovereignty across the Strait. For Lee, the sovereignty of the ROC over Taiwan 
has existed since 1949.71 Nevertheless, the sovereignty issue was not a vague 
abstraction. Rather, Lee held strongly that sovereignty should be practised and 
reaffirmed by the people of Taiwan. Accordingly, on the one hand, the notion of 
“Taiwanese subjectivity” underpins Taiwanese popular sovereignty; on the 
other, this subjectivity also symbolises a desire to pursue self-mastery. In the 
end, “Taiwanese subjectivity” became not only a cause of action, but also a 
source of ideational power in the discourse of Lee’s Taiwan’s national grand 
strategy. 
 
There is no doubt that during Lee’s twelve years in office, his last term in 
particular, his efforts in asserting “Taiwanese subjectivity” and his emphasis on 
popular sovereignty annoyed China significantly. Beijing became convinced 
that Lee’s claim to establish a “Taiwanese subjectivity” was at heart a conscious 
charade in support of Taiwanese independence. One Xinhua commentary, for 
example, concluded that ‘Lee was already revealed in his true colours of 
Taiwanese independence …. [and] Beijing could no longer show tolerance 
toward Lee’s visit to the US to create two Chinas.’72 China’s perception that 
Lee was promoting the idea of the ROCOT’s sovereignty justified Beijing’s 
resort in 1995/6 to military exercises as a serious and unmistakable signal aimed 
at deterring such independence. Rejecting Beijing’s accusations, Lee charged 
Beijing with slander, but at the same time repeated his pledge to build a new 
“great Taiwan”.73 From Lee’s point of view, the most important issue of his 
administration was ‘to listen to the voices of the people, to undertake 
                                                
71 Lee Teng-hui (1999) ‘Understanding Taiwan - Bridging the Perception Gap’. 
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73 John F. Copper (1999) ‘The Origin of Conflict Across the Taiwan Strait’, in Zhao Suisheng 
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thoroughgoing democratic reforms and to establish a new era in which 
sovereignty resides in the people’.74 In saying this, Taipei’s unprecedented 
promotion of the idea of “Taiwanese subjectivity” intended to articulate the 
ROCOT’s sovereign independent status and, more importantly, to integrate the 
diversified national identities at home, split mainly between those regarding 
themselves as Chinese or Taiwanese, in order to create a new Taiwanese 
identity. However the disagreement since 1949 between Taipei and Beijing over 
the issue of sovereignty has continued to make for irreconcilable differences 
regarding the status quo across the Strait.  
 
The Innovation of “Taiwanese Identity” 
 
The notion of Taiwan national identity (guojia rentong) rooted in the state-
building idea of Taiwanese subjectivity was for Lee’s administration a key 
element in constructing Taiwan’s national strategy. ‘National identity’, 
according to William Bloom, ‘describes that condition in which a mass of 
people have had the same identification with national symbols - have 
internalized the symbols of the nation - so that they may act as one 
psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement 
of, these symbols of national identity.’75 The link between national identity and 
national strategy thus amounts to a fundamental hearts-and-minds issue of 
strategic importance within a society in the context of confrontation, in 
Taiwan’s case over cross-Strait sovereignty. For Lee and his administration, the 
role of Taiwan’s identity served not only to justify Taipei’s primal strategic goal 
of preserving sovereign independence, but also to create a form of soft power, 
including patriotism, to integrate and mobilize Taiwan’s society against China’s 
threats. From Lee Teng-hui’s point of view, forming Taiwan’s national identity 
was the core hearts-and-minds innovation (xinling gaige), which was designed 
to adjust the longstanding China-centred paradigm of national identity into a 
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Taiwan-centred paradigm. 76  For Lee, this involved defining and living a 
Taiwanese national identity, which addressed the core question of ‘who am I’.77 
This identity transformation could be seen as a ‘deconstruction of Chinese 
nationalism’ and resulted in a ‘post-nationalist’ identity, in Christopher 
Hughes’s terms, which was established in Lee Teng-hui’s perspective of  
Gemeinschaft, a society as a ‘living community’ of ‘shared destiny’.78 The new 
Taiwanese identity not only enabled Lee to carry on Taiwan’s political 
democratization to re-establish the KMT’s legitimacy and rule in the island but 
also provided a crucial context for Lee’s advocacy of popular sovereignty 
through securing the ROCOT’s sovereignty, although Lee had noted Taiwan’s 
indispensable relations with mainland China and opened the possibility for 
future unification across the Strait, according to the Guidelines for National 
Unification.  
 
Lee’s discourse on establishing a new Taiwanese national identity was strategic 
and political in its objective. In other words, this discourse focused on more 
than conventional cultural considerations of self-identification. This was 
because Lee’s Taiwanese identity was applied mainly to overcoming the 
island’s divisions on grounds of national identity, in order to counter Beijing’s 
Chinese nationalism and also to reform the core values of his Nationalist Party 
(KMT) in order to compete with the DPP in domestic elections. After the 1995-
1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, Lee Teng-hui showed more enthusiasm on the 
identity issue and asserted that ‘the pursuit of national identity will become the 
decisive and central issue of Taiwan’s future political development.’79 To unite 
the four main ethnic groups (Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders and Aborigines) under 
one national identity in Taiwan, Lee proposed the idea of the “New Taiwanese”, 
which may be regarded as one of his most important political legacies. During 
the 1995 Strait crisis, Lee had first addressed the idea of a ‘New Taiwanese’ 
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identity, which referred to all of Taiwan’s residents as Taiwanese, disregarding 
ethnic differences and the question of who had come to Taiwan first, as long as 
people identified themselves as masters of Taiwan, devoted themselves to 
Taiwan and shared the common goal of state Gemeinschaft (guojia shengming 
gongtongti) (a political community as a state). 80 The idea of a ‘New Taiwanese’ 
identity did not attract much public attention at the time. The term did, however, 
become popular after the 1998 Taipei mayoral election, when Lee was speaking 
at a rally on behalf of the KMT’s candidate Ma Ying-jeou and called Ma, then 
the most popular political figure, of mainland Chinese origin, a ‘New 
Taiwanese’. Since this time, the concept of the ‘New Taiwanese’ identity has 
become a useful rhetorical device for forging a new self-awareness on the island. 
 
The transformation of Taiwanese national identity has been in evidence since 
Lee’s efforts to promote a new Taiwanese national identity. Opinion polls in the 
early 1990s indicated that less than 20 per cent of Taiwan’s population 
described themselves as Taiwanese (as opposed to Chinese, or “Taiwanese and 
Chinese”), but this figure rose to 50 per cent (more than double) in early 2000 
and to 57 per cent (nearly triple) in 2004.81 Those admitting to a Chinese-only 
identity saw their percentage drop strikingly from 24.1 per cent in 1994 to 8.3 
per cent at the end of Lee’s administration in 2000.82 Research on Taiwan’s 
national identity has concluded that Taiwan’s people have joined the movement 
to a Taiwanese-only identity.83 Many factors may account for this dramatic 
change over such a short period. While Lee’s administration played a key part, 
Beijing also contributed significantly to it. For instance, Beijing’s coercive 
strategy, which adopted the course of seeking to compel Taipei, as manifested 
in the 1995-96 missile intimidation, obviously did not endear Beijing to the 
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people of Taiwan. On the contrary, the threat of applying force not merely 
alienated many on Taiwan but in fact consolidated the very Taiwanese-only 
national identity that Beijing wanted to undermine, since it constituted a serious 
obstacle to its unification mission.84 There is no evidence to show that Lee’s 
administration deliberately adopted a strategy to create the crisis across the 
Strait so as to exploit it either to manipulate domestic politics or to consolidate 
Taiwanese identity. Nevertheless, the Strait crisis did provide an unexpected 
opportunity for Lee’s administration to forge a new and different Taiwanese 
national identity, which is at the core of the island’s political defiance. The 
absence of a shared national identity was to be avoided because it could have 
led to a situation in which reluctance to endorse this identity would have put 
Taiwan’s national security strategy in serious doubt. 
 
Lee’s Blueprint for “Managing Taiwan” 
 
The distinct strategy of building up and enhancing Taiwan’s comprehensive 
national power by Lee Teng-hui’s administration is encapsulated in the scheme 
of “managing great Taiwan and establishing a new centre of Chinese culture” 
(jingying da taiwan, jianli xin zhongyuan), which was deeply rooted in the 
notion of the new Taiwanese subjectivity.85 The scheme, which provided the 
first blueprint of Lee’s vision for managing Taiwan’s development strategy, was 
initially proposed in 1995 for the 1996 presidential election. For “managing the 
great Taiwan”, the starting point was domestically to establish a common 
ground of solid Taiwanese identity. This involved celebrating the idea that “we 
are all Taiwanese”, so as to bring together Taiwan’s people of different 
historical and ethnic backgrounds, forming a new common ethnic (zuqun) 
background distinct from that of mainland China.86 In practice, the management 
concentrated on three elements - the political, economic and social sectors - so 
as to construct a democratic and efficient Taiwan, to achieve its further 
industrial and technological advancement and to create a comfortable and 
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secure state.82 In addition, Lee’s administration wanted to “establish a new 
centre of Chinese culture”, which in the view of the government would lead 
Taiwan to be ‘a place where culture mixes and flourishes’ and which in the end 
could act as ‘an advanced new force’ for the Chinese community.87  
 
Lee’s identity-centred vision of strategy managing Taiwan can be decoded with 
reference to three main issues: a new identity, liberal democracy and national 
well-being. First, it involved composing a new Taiwanese identity, which would 
precipitate a clash between those keen to embrace it and those espousing a 
Chinese identity. Lee’s approach to reconciling the identity clash focused on the 
promotion of a “New Taiwanese” identity. Furthermore, to prevent Beijing from 
misinterpreting the emerging identification with Taiwan as the sign of a move 
toward independence, Lee’s vision of Taiwan as a “new centre of Chinese 
culture” was put forward, presenting Taiwan not only as closely related to the 
Chinese people of the past, but also committed to being a positive force for 
Chinese culture in the future. 88  Second, the promotion of a truly liberal 
democratic culture was at the core of Lee’s overall scheme of “Managing Great 
Taiwan”. For his administration, the goal of strengthening political democracy 
was crucial, because the mechanism of liberal democracy would consolidate a 
form of popular sovereignty and national identity which would allow the people 
of Taiwan to participate in the protection of Taiwan’s security and to decide the 
direction of Taiwan’s future. ‘What actually is the goal of Taiwan’s 
democratization?’, Lee was asked. His answer: ‘Speaking simply, it is the 
“Taiwanisation of Taiwan” (taiwan de bentuhua).”89 This well demonstrates the 
link between democratization and the building of a national identity within his 
state management scheme. Finally, as an economic expert, Lee Teng-hui firmly 
believed that the economy was a life and death matter for the nation’s 
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survival.90 Lee’s choice to pursue Taiwan’s well-being and prosperity was to 
ensure that Taiwan’s continuing economic growth would remain the central task 
of his administration. The more economic success Taiwan achieved, the more 
material resources would be available, which in turn would increase the chances 
of Taiwan’s preserving its independent existence. With regard to economic 
relations with China in Lee’s strategy of managing Taiwan, it is worth noting 
that Lee was constantly cautious about the issue of increasing trade and 
investment across the Strait if this would cause Taiwan to depend economically 
on China, given that economic dependence would eventually corrode loyalty to 
Taiwan and to Taiwan’s identity. Moreover, from an economic point of view, 
Taiwan’s economic dependence on China would raise the issue of cross-Strait 
economic inequality and damage to Taiwan’s access to other markets. In the 
end, Lee believed that Beijing would gain the upper hand and exploit Taiwan’s 
economic dependence as a means to dictate Taiwan’s future. Consequently, Lee 
created the investment and trade mantra of “no haste, be patient” (jieji yongren) 
that put restrictions on the deepening cross-Strait economic relations in the hope 
of revising the trend of Taiwan’s economic dependence on China.91The three 
elements of Lee’s approach, in the end, were pragmatic and idealistic in that 
they involved improving Taiwan’s overall national power in the shadow of 
China’s threats. By seeking convergence between the Taiwanese and Chinese 
identities or blending the so-called “cocktail of identities”92 into a new identity 
for Taiwan, the identity-centred strategic management of Lee’s administration 
could well be captured under the banner of “Taiwan’s post-nationalist identity”, 
to use Christopher R. Hughes’s term, which ‘attempts to maximise the benefits 
of Taiwan’s being a branch on this tree [the Pan-Chinese culture community] 
while not compromising the island’s political independence from the 
mainland.’93 
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Some have criticised Lee’s decision to raise the national identity issue, arguing 
that ‘an elite-orchestrated Taiwanese national-building project will inevitably 
run into a head-on collision with a state-orchestrated Chinese nationalism on the 
mainland, putting the security and well-being of the Taiwanese people at grave 
risk.’94 Nevertheless, this criticism, while it acknowledges the existing identity 
division within the island, fails to provide a feasible way forward to deal with 
the underlying issue: the importance for Taiwan of establishing a shared 
national identity as an ideational force for mobilising national resources in 
managing Taiwan’s national security strategy.95  To be sure, there remain 
weaknesses in Taiwan’s strategic capabilities, which mean that, despite all 
Lee’s efforts to forge a new Taiwanese identity with reference to the idea of 
Taiwanese subjectivity, Taiwan under his administration was still struggling 
with two types of competing nationalism, Taiwanese and Chinese. The lack of a 
domestic consensus on a shared national identity significantly undermined 
Taiwan’s overall strategic capacity to prepare for China’s threats.  
 
 
C.6.3 Pragmatic Diplomacy against International Isolation 
 
To make use of external resources, including the strength of others, or to deal 
with international political structures to secure a favourable strategic 
environment, constitutes an important option for any small state’s strategic 
arrangements vis-à-vis a much stronger foe. Lacking credible power of its own 
to deal with Beijing, Taiwan’s grand strategy has consistently relied on external 
powers. Like the preceding administrations, Lee Teng-hui’s government wanted 
to heavily rely on Washington’s support. Despite no longer having formal 
diplomatic relations with the US, Washington did offer the Lee government 
much needed assistance, as evidenced once more in the 1995-96 Strait crisis. 
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This interference by Washington was decisive and set a new context for 
Taiwan’s grand strategy which has remained ever since. This was an 
unexpectedly favourable development for the Lee government which had  
adopted a pragmatic foreign policy and initiated a new policy of peaceful 
coexistence with the PRC to break through its prolonged international isolation.  
 
The 1995-96 Strait crisis resulted in a serious setback in cross-Strait 
rapprochement, which - as mentioned - had started in the early 1990s. Although 
the crisis did not lead Taipei to abandon its efforts to seek peaceful coexistence 
with Beijing, it clearly reinforced Taipei’s belief in and practice of its 
“existence” (cunzai) doctrine, which led the Lee administration to articulate in 
international society its redefined sovereign status as the ROC on Taiwan.96 In 
effect, the emphasis on “existence” is a key aspect of Taipei’s “pragmatic 
diplomacy” (wushu waijiao). 97  Lee’s 1995 high-profile American trip 
represented the peak of Taipei’s pragmatic diplomacy, but it also resulted in the 
1995-96 Strait crisis, which saw Beijing apply military force to conduct 
coercive diplomacy as a counter-measure. The lessons of the 1995-96 Strait 
crisis then raised a fundamental question about Taipei’s strategic environment: 
if a competing relationship existed between its mainland policy and foreign 
policy, which one should be given priority in terms of improving Taipei’s 
strategic position? The dilemma is related to the management of Taiwan’s 
overall strategic environment, the question being whether to bandwagon with 
China or to ally with other powers to balance China’s threats. As both Taipei 
and Beijing have their own respective firm positions on the sovereignty issue, 
Taipei in the end chose the strategy of balancing instead of bandwagoning, 
despite pledging to adopt a balanced strategy characterized by efforts to 
improve cross-Strait relations and pursue pragmatic diplomacy. Lee’s focus on 
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Taiwan’s “existence” in his foreign policy, which was rooted in the concept of 
Taiwanese subjectivity, may ultimately be understood as an aspect of a 
nationalistic foreign policy. The nationalistic nature of its foreign policy was in 
fact very similar as that of his predecessors, except that Lee’s administration 
focused on a different referent when setting forth its stance - a new Taiwanese 
nationalism. 
 
Promoting the Idea of “Existence” in International Society 
 
When Lee Teng-hui explained his kind of foreign policy in the book “The Road 
to Democracy - Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity” in May 1999, he stressed that the 
foremost national mission of his administration was to find a way to secure the 
very existence of Taiwan and that the essence of Taiwan’s foreign relations was 
designed to substantiate this existence in international society.98 ‘To manifest 
the fact of Taiwan’s existence’, he said, ‘we have to establish relations with 
other countries.’99 The notion was thus essential to understanding Lee’s foreign 
policy as a whole and its pragmatic diplomacy in particular. Indeed, the latter 
would later become a distinctive feature of his foreign policy. 
 
Lee’s existence doctrine can be best understood with reference to his 
perceptions of the threats to Taiwan and his attempts to forge a new nationalist 
identity. First, although Beijing’s threats were nothing new for Taipei, it appears 
that Taipei’s perception of threat was reinforced by Beijing’s efforts to 
constantly impose its rigid “one-China principle” to the detriment of Taipei’s 
quest for international space and legitimacy, even though Taipei had initiated a 
policy of mutual co-existence in the early 1990s. Moreover, Beijing’s penchant 
for diplomatic blockade shows that there was no sign of resolving Taipei’s 
prolonged international isolation during Lee’s administration. This international 
isolation would in the end deprive Taiwan’s leadership of the possibility of 
applying external resources in its own strategic favour and thus compel the 
small Taiwan to face China, its much greater foe, alone. Following the 1995-96 
military intimidation by Beijing, Lee’s perception of the magnitude of China’s 
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threat became even clearer, namely, that China would continue to conduct its 
zero-sum sovereignty competition against the ROC on Taiwan in the 
international arena until it surrendered. As a result, Taiwan had to articulate its 
very existence in international society and pursue foreign relations with other 
countries to substantiate itself. Second, the existence doctrine extends from 
Lee’s idea of Taiwan’s “subjectivity”. The newly nationalistic identity of 
Taiwanese subjectivity led the people of Taiwan to rethink what they had in 
common and whether they should re-assess their own existence accordingly. 
When Lee was asked the “secret” of how he managed Taiwan’s foreign policy, 
he replied, ‘In fact, it is extremely plain and simple. It is only to hold firmly [to] 
the principle that Taiwan exists. Taiwan’s existence is a fact and as long as 
Taiwan exists, there is hope.’100 
 
It is in this context that Lee’s “pragmatic diplomacy”, or “flexible diplomacy” 
derived from CCK’s “total diplomacy”, was designed, as mentioned already, to 
articulate the existence of Taiwan so as to overcome the international isolation 
which had defined the ROC on Taiwan as a “pariah state” and fundamentally 
undermined its existing statehood. From the perspective of Lee’s administration, 
international isolation not only put Taiwan’s security in serious danger but also 
frustrated the Taiwanese people’s desire for self-respect and recognition as a 
sovereign state within international society. Soon after Lee Teng-hui first took 
office, he committed himself to adopting more “flexible measures” as regards 
participating in international activities to enhance Taipei’s international status 
and defend its national interests so as to break the international isolation.101 The 
core of Taipei’s pragmatic diplomacy thus focused on developing all possible 
“substantive” (shizhi) relations - political, economic, cultural, technological, 
civilian, academic, tourist, etc. - with anyone in international society, regardless 
of whether formal diplomatic recognition was granted or not. Taipei’s 
pragmatic diplomacy at the time can be summarized as consisting of three broad 
strategies: (1) emphasizing the importance of economic cooperation in 
international society; (2) forging official and unofficial relationships with other 
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countries; and (3) joining international organizations and activities.102  The 
innovative measures of pragmatic diplomacy under Lee’s administration 
included, for instance, dual recognition, informal diplomacy, economic 
incentives or dollar diplomacy and arms trade diplomacy.103 From 1993, Taiwan 
also began the pursuit to resume its UN membership. In line with Lee’s strategy, 
as long as Taiwan had better relations with others, Taiwan’s existence could be 
consolidated and manifested in international society, even if what was involved 
was only a marginal improvement. 
 
The desired effects of Taipei’s pragmatic diplomacy were to balance the PRC’s 
sovereign claim over the island and to demonstrate to the world that the ROC on 
Taiwan existed as a separate entity; these were both politically and 
economically accomplished.  As Taiwan had long faced a problem of 
international legitimacy in the experience of enforced diplomatic isolation, 
Michael Leifer observed that ‘[Taipei’s] pragmatic diplomacy is a euphemism 
for trying to overcome a fundamental impediment to separate international 
status, which is inherent in the concept of sovereignty that is the organizing 
principle of international society.’104  The PRC meanwhile asserted that the 
pragmatic diplomacy to ‘expand its living space internationally’ was a 
conspiracy to pursue ‘Taiwan’s independence’.105  However, the strong desire 
of the people on Taiwan to join the international community simply reflected 
the phenomenon of a more pluralistic society boasting a vibrant democracy. As 
June Teufel Dreyer has noted, ‘Taiwan’s democratic system makes it difficult 
for Lee Teng-hui or any other elected leader to compromise with mainland 
China on fundamental issues like sovereignty.’106 The resulting ambiguity in the 
relationship between Taiwan’s identity and sovereign status has also had a 
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decisive impact on Taiwan’s domestic politics that national identity rather than 
a socio-economic cleavage separates political parties and has constantly been 
one of the most salient electoral issues in a democratized Taiwan.107 Indeed, Lee 
regarded the issue of Taiwan’s foreign relations ‘as important as its 
democratization and in fact closely connected with that process.’ 108  As 
Christopher Hughes observes, the most important implication of Taiwan’s 
democratization is in its contribution ‘to the internationalization of the Taiwan 
issue by making it harder for the liberal democracies to turn their backs on 
Taiwan.’109 ‘Should we fail to steer a steady course for Taiwan’s foreign policy’, 
he argued, ‘not only will the success of democratization but Taiwan’s very 
survival will be endangered.’110 As a result, it can be said that, to understand the 
external arrangements for Taiwan’s grand strategy during Lee’s regime, Lee’s 
sovereignty perspective, foreign policy and political democratization are all 
interrelated as a whole and cannot be treated separately. The ROCOT’s 
sovereignty would be assured so long as there was no doubt about the 
ROCOT’s  existence in international society. 
 
Competing Interpretation of the Status Quo 
 
During the Lee years, Taipei’s perception of cross-Strait relations was reflected 
in its Mainland China policy. According to Taipei’s National Unification 
Council [NUC], the cross-Strait situation was that ‘China has been temporarily 
divided and each side of the Taiwan Strait is administered by a separate political 
entity [the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland].’111 For the first time, 
this acknowledgement meant that the ROC officially recognized the existence 
of the PRC as a state separate from itself. At the same time, it meant that 
Taiwan conceived itself as an independent de facto state  which was not under 
the legal jurisdiction of Beijing in any sense. While declaring two sovereign 
entities coexisting across the Strait as a reality, the NUC stated that, although 
there was only “one China” across the Strait, the “one China” referred to the 
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ROC on Taiwan.112 Taipei’s focus on “one-China, two political entities” across 
the Strait was a subtle way of referring to the one-China principle, but in a way  
which was designed to secure its own sovereign status and actual coexistence as 
a state. Lee Teng-hui revealed in an interview that the foremost aim of his 
mainland China policy during the historical and ice-breaking cross-Strait 
meeting in Singapore in 1993 was to assert to international audiences the 
existence of two equal political entities, the ROC and the PRC, across the 
Strait.113 The formula of “One China, two political entities” can thus be seen as 
serving Taipei’s strategy to define the meaning of the status quo across the 
Strait; in the name of reality, it in effect synthesised Beijing’s one-China claim 
and Taipei’s demand for sovereignty. 
 
Once Lee Teng-hui’s administration decided to initiate its policy of 
rapprochement to overcome the long-standing cross-Strait antagonism, it was 
necessary for Taipei to find a workable way to normalize relations with China. 
The primary method for Taipei would involve redefining the cross-Strait 
relations so as to safeguard Taiwan’s de facto and de jure independence. 
Taiwan’s embrace of the redefined status quo across the Strait represented a 
starting point for it to engage China. Taipei’s stance of the status quo was also 
justified by the fact that a substantial majority of Taiwanese residents supported 
the status quo. Indeed, according to a public opinion survey conducted by the 
ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) during the period from 1995 to 1998, 
the proportion of Taiwanese people who were in favour of the broadly defined 
status quo (including “status quo now, decision later,” “status quo now, 
unification later,” “status quo now, independence later,” and “status quo 
indefinitely”) formed a strong majority in 1995 (80.1%, after the missile crisis), 
having enjoyed a steady level of around 80% in previous surveys.114 It is 
obvious that no democratic government could afford to neglect such an 
overwhelming demand from its people. Despite the mass of public opinion 
favouring the status quo, shades of opinion within Taiwanese society coexist on 
                                                
112 Ibid. The idea and development of “One China” see Academia Historica (ed.) (2000) 
Documentary Collection on One China Discourse, Vol. I&II (Taipei: Academia Historica). 
113 Zou Jing-wen (2001) A True Record and Confession of Lee Teng-hui’s Regime, p.184. 
114 “Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China – (2),” MAC, Executive 
Yuan, ROC, August 1998 (http://: www.mac.gov.tw). 
 240 
the question of putting into practice the status quo in the form of ‘one China, 
two political entities’. In this context, suggestions include ‘one China, two 
areas’, ‘one China, two governments’, ‘two Chinas’, ‘one China, one Taiwan’, 
‘a federal system’ and ‘Multi-system nations’.115 However, according to a 
public opinion survey, Beijing’s ‘one country, two systems’ formula was 
constantly incompatible with Taiwan’s description of the status quo as ‘one 
China, two political entities’.116 
 
Taipei’s adoption of its cross-Strait stance on the status quo can also be traced 
to two other reasons: its perceived national and international interests. First, the 
status quo across the Strait, from Taiwan’s point of view, went hand in hand 
with the preservation of the existing territorial, political, ideological and 
economic distribution between the ROC and the PRC. It ensured that Taiwan 
could not only keep what it had already but also could be enabled to apply the 
policy of engagement without fear of China’s annexation. Second, the stance as 
a status quo power would provide Taipei with much greater moral stature as a 
defender rather than an offender against peace, order and stability in 
international society, which would gain much-needed external support for 
Taipei’s efforts to improve its strategic position. Accordingly, it is obvious that 
Taiwan was in favour of the status quo stance, because necessary and decisive 
strategic interests depended on it.117 During the 1995-96 Strait crisis, Taiwan 
benefited from its status quo stance when the US described China’s military 
intimidation as “reckless and potentially dangerous”.118 For the first time since 
the termination of the ROC-US defence alliance in 1980, the US in response to 
China’s military deployments deployed two battle groups of aircraft carriers to 
demonstrate Washington’s security commitment vis-à-vis Taiwan. In the event, 
both Taipei and Beijing came to the conclusion that China’s military actions 
against Taiwan would lead to US intervention. 119  Washington’s de facto 
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assurance of America’s security commitment was a favourable result for Taipei. 
Nevertheless, the lessons of the 1995-96 Strait crisis have also meant that there 
was and still is no consensus on the actual and operational meaning of the cross-
Strait status quo between Taiwan, China and the US, for all three parties regard 
themselves as status quo powers. As a result, the lack of consensus on the cross-
Strait status quo still makes for competing interpretations of the status quo by 
the states involved so as to propose and justify the strategic goals which they 
define in their own interests in the name of defending the status quo. It is in this 
context that the ambiguity of the cross-Strait status quo allowed Taipei to take 
action by defining it as ‘one China, two political entities’ so as to construct a 
propitious strategic environment.  
 
A Dilemma between Foreign Policy and Mainland Policy 
 
The strategic environment bearing on Taiwan’s security is determined above all 
by the international structure and cross-Strait relations, these two being 
interrelated. During the era of Lee Teng-hui, Taipei’s management of this 
strategic environment faced a fundamental challenge: namely, how to 
accommodate the PRC with the one-China principle, ensure the continuation of 
the US security commitment, and break the ROCOT’s international isolation 
without undermining the latter’s de facto sovereign independence. Before Lee 
assumed office, Taipei regarded its foreign policy only as a means of serving 
cross-Strait relations because there was no cross-Strait policy of engaging 
Beijing, in that the option of accommodating Communist China was simply not 
within Taipei’s strategic vision. In contrast to his predecessors, Lee’s mainland 
policy, as part of the national grand strategy, was that Taipei would discard the 
prolonged zero-sum antagonism policy that “the Han [ROC] and the rebel [PRC] 
cannot stand together” (han zei bu liangli) against Beijing and pursue a cross-
Strait “win-win” (shuang ying) policy of cooperation for the future of China as 
a whole.120 The four principles of this engagement policy were reason (lixing), 
peace (heping), parity (duideng) and reciprocity (huhui), to establish the kind of 
cross-Strait relations that had been encapsulated in the 1991 Guidelines for 
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National Unification.121 The Guidelines also spelled out Taipei’s version - the 
one-China across the Strait, in terms of “one China, two political entities”, 
which promised to reconcile the one-China issue with the demands of domestic 
interests, China and also international society. At the same time, Taipei focused 
attention on promoting its pragmatic diplomacy to break its international 
isolation and enhance Taiwan’s international status, in order to articulate and 
substantiate the existence of the ROC on Taiwan (ROCOT) as a fact in 
international society.122 The peak of Taipei’s pragmatic diplomacy was Lee 
Teng-hui’s American trip in 1995 when Lee unambiguously stressed the 
existence of the ROCOT to international audiences. Although Taipei’s 
pragmatic diplomacy did not at the time achieve significant progress in winning 
international recognition for Taiwan’s statehood, it did raise Taiwan’s 
international publicity by reminding governments around the world of Taiwan’s 
“democratic sovereignty” and emphasised that ‘Taiwan is not part of the PRC, 
nor it is part of the ‘China’ defined by the PRC and other states’.123  
 
Nevertheless, as Taiwan’s pragmatic foreign policy was intensified to manifest 
the existence of ROCOT’s sovereignty and its participation in international 
society, China gradually became convinced that Taipei’s international bid for 
recognition was an attempt to secure independence.124 Beijing’s accusations in 
the direction of Taipei escalated first with Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 trip to America 
and then with his special state-to-state pronouncement in 1999. Beijing’s threats 
to employ force, if necessary, put Taipei in a difficult situation, in relation to 
both its foreign policy and mainland policy. Moreover, Washington was also in 
the end disturbed and alienated by Lee’s active pragmatic foreign policy 
associated with his explicit sovereignty claim, which sparked tensions across 
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the Strait and generated problems for Sino-American relations.125  Indeed, while 
Taiwan struggled to find international living space - by following a pragmatic 
foreign policy to enhance its international status and to substantiate its 
international existence - this foreign policy challenged Beijing’s one-China 
principle, amplifying cross-Strait tensions. As a result, it was important for 
Taiwan to find a balance between the options, resulting in discussions within 
the government about whether foreign policy or mainland policy should take 
priority.126  
 
To find a way out of the dilemma, two choices presented themselves (in theory): 
first, a strategy of bandwagoning with China which would involve complying 
on the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty or, second, a strategy of coalition with 
other powers, which would involve relying on the US security commitment to 
balance the threat from China. In the event, Lee’s administration continued to 
apply the coalition balancing strategy adopted by previous governments, since 
the sovereignty issue was at the very core of Taipei’s grand strategy. As Richard 
Bush observed, ‘Whatever the case, there can be no fundamental solution to the 
Taiwan Strait issue while the sovereignty question is in dispute [against 
Taipei].’127 Another important strategic consideration to opt for a balancing 
instead of a bandwagoning strategy was that, in terms of creating a favourable 
strategic environment, Taipei could not simply allow Beijing’s presumption to 
hold that the cross-Strait issue was “China’s internal affair” because this would 
diminish the possibility of foreign intervention and allow Beijing to take the 
upper hand in managing Taiwan on its own. Despite Beijing’s threats and 
domestic concerns, Taipei hence continued to practise the pragmatic diplomacy 
until the end of Lee’s regime, because Lee firmly regarded international 
isolation as “the most decisive threat” to Taiwan’s national survival.128 The 
political desire to ward off and indeed reduce international isolation can be seen 
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as a clear attempt by the Lee administration to learn the hard lessons from its 
predecessor, Chiang Kai-shek, whose grand strategy had led to Taipei’s 
international isolation and, in so doing, to an unfavorable strategic position.   
 
Despite discarding the bandwagoning strategy, Taipei did try to reconcile its 
foreign policy with its mainland policy. Lee’s way of avoiding a direct clash 
with Beijing was his unique and subtle formula, “one China, two political 
entities”. To choose the term “political entities” was a well-calculated move. 
After all, there have been few attempts to come up with a clear definition of 
“political entities” in international law and international politics. 129  The 
ambiguous meaning of this phrase would provide Taipei with political space for 
manoeuvre as it sought to embrace it without sacrificing its core stance in 
relation to sovereignty in the cross-Strait negotiations. Nevertheless, the 
fundamentally different perceptions held by actors with respect to “one China”, 
“political entity” and the status quo across the Strait resulted in the failure by 
Taipei to establish normal relations with Beijing. The 1995-6 Strait crisis well 
presented the complexity and difficulty of managing cross-Strait relations while 
the sovereignty issue remained. Another example was Lee’s 1999 ‘special state-
to-state tie’ statement, while Lee turned to a more explicit and controversial 
tone to define the ROCOT’s sovereignty status. As a result, Taipei had little 
choice but to continue the strategy of a balance of power, instead of 
bandwagoning, to manage its strategic environment.  
 
 
C.6.4 Taipei’s Passive Defensive Posture 
 
Taipei’s strategic posture of deterrence to prevent a cross-Strait war and to 
maintain the cross-Strait status quo during Lee Teng-hui’s regime130 was 
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essentially a continuation of the military strategy initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo, 
who, as argued earlier, pursued the prime goal of ensuring Taiwan’s security, 
rather than retaking Mainland China. Nevertheless, in terms of putting the 
deterrence strategy into practice, there was a significant difference between the 
two governments. Taiwan’s defence doctrine shifted from an emphasis on 
unified offensive-defensive operations (gong shou yiti) to a passive defensive-
oriented posture (shoushi fangyu), which emphasized non-provocative and non-
preemptive military actions against China. 131  The guidelines of Taiwan’s 
passive defensive posture resulted in a new strategic doctrine of “resolute 
defence (fangwei gushou) and effective deterrence (youxiao hezu)” which was 
derived from the military lessons of the 1995-96 Strait crisis and first mentioned 
in the 1996 National Defence Report (NDR).132 On the one hand, the concept of 
“resolute defence”, which was not merely a rhetorical political statement as 
Alexander Huang and Michael D. Swaine describe it,133can be considered to 
refer to an arrangement of comprehensive military countermeasures which aims 
to formulate appropriate military doctrines and related operational guidelines 
for Taiwan’s armed forces when facing China’s invading forces. On the other 
hand, the concept of “effective deterrence” served as the core of Taiwan’s 
defence planning. Associated with its focus on robust “resolute defence” 
building in all other possible defensive ways, such as all-out civilian defense, it 
seeks to impose unacceptable costs and consequences which would punish a 
would-be invader as severely as possible, thereby discouraging a possible 
Chinese invasion. To understand Taipei’s overall strategic posture during Lee’s 
regime, one thus needs to consider how Taiwan practised the deterrent doctrine 
and why it pursued a missile defence system to deal with its perception of 
imminent military threats.  
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The Doctrine of Taiwan’s Deterrence Defence 
 
The underlying assumption of Taipei’s military deterrent strategy, “resolute 
defence, effective deterrence”, can be summarized with reference to two 
concepts: prevention and punishment. 134  The implementation of the two 
deterrent concepts presents enormous challenges and difficulties for Taiwan and 
raises a fundamental strategic question: can Taiwan on its own possess and 
maintain a credible military capability that is sufficient to avert or punish a 
possible PLA invasion? The answer to this question, during the 1990s, was 
cautiously positive, despite all the difficulties. This was because, 
notwithstanding the PLA’s numerical advantage, Taiwan’s conventional 
defences by then, thanks to the geographical obstacle of the Taiwan Strait, still 
enjoyed a qualitative edge, the air force in particular, seemed capable of 
defending the island and repelling China’s invasion if necessary.135 In practice, 
the credibility of Taiwan’s military deterrence is obviously closely related to the 
issue of how Taiwan should manage the delicate cross-Strait military balance, a 
dynamic process of intertwining qualitative and quantitative military 
capabilities. Under the design of Taiwan’s deterrent doctrine, “resolute defence, 
effective deterrence”, Taiwan’s creating a fear of being punished by 
unacceptable cost was intended to deter China from invading. Taiwan’s 
deterrent strategy, then, was heavily dependent on the credibility of its military 
countermeasures in the event of an invasion. This credibility was in the end 
rooted in the realities of the cross-Strait military balance. Lagging far behind 
China’s national material resources, it is self-evident that Taiwan has constantly 
encountered a quantitative inferiority, in terms of both military manpower and 
hardware, and is unlikely to close the gap in resources, let alone match China’s. 
The only possible way to redeem this weakness was to establish a qualitative 
edge over the PRC and to ensure operational excellence associated with the 
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natural geographical advantages offered by the Taiwan Strait. The core task of 
managing the delicate cross-Strait military balance thus depended on whether 
Taiwan could maintain superior quality in an age when information technology 
and associated systematic operational tactics and doctrines - described by some 
as a revolution in military affairs (RMA)136 - play a decisive part in modern air 
and sea combats which would decide the outcome for the island country of 
Taiwan. However, as both sides intended to maintain the military balance in 
their favour, it has inevitably resulted in an unwanted cross-Strait arms race, 
which Taipei is unlikely to win because of its material inferiority. 
 
Nevertheless, up to the 1990s, Taiwan did manage in cross-Strait affairs to have 
a military edge, albeit a diminished one, over Beijing.137 During Lee Teng-hui’s 
era, Taiwan achieved substantial military build-ups to enhance its deterrent 
capability in three defined key combat areas, listed in general order of priority - 
air defence, sea control and anti-landing warfare.138 Considering the priority of 
defence operations, the focus of Taipei’s military construction during the Lee 
years involved two major plans: to purchase advanced weapons systems and to 
reconstruct military organization. First, the acquisition of appropriate advanced 
weapons to fulfil the demands of its national defence planning and operational 
requirement has always been a challenge for Taipei because of China’s heavy-
handed interference in Taiwan’s efforts at military procurement in international 
society. Coincidentally or not, when Taipei in the early 1990s adopted the 
stance of pursuing peaceful cross-Strait coexistence and engaging in pragmatic 
diplomacy, Taiwan made a significant breakthrough in international military 
procurement, which involved arms deals mainly with the US and France. At this 
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time, Taiwan completed a major up-grade of its second-generation armed forces 
military, which included the purchase of 150 F-16s, 60 Mirage 2000-5s, 130 
indigenous developed fighters (IDFs) and 4 E-2T airborne warning and 
command (AWAC) planes. Similarly, Taipei also acquired 6 Lafayette (Kang 
Ding)-class frigates, 8 Perry (Cheng Kung)-class frigates and 8 Knox (Chin 
Yang)-class frigates for its navy; and three Patriot PAC-2 Plus Modified Air 
Defence Systems, 42 AH-1 attack helicopters and 120 M60-A3 tanks for its 
army.139 Second, while pursuing better high-tech military hardware, Taiwan 
emphasised the manpower factor to keep the qualitative edge since the 
application of these high-tech weapons in modern warfare requires highly 
trained personnel. In 1997, to make the most of its limited resources so as to 
establish small but highly professional armed units, Taiwan proceeded with the 
“Streamlining and Consolidation Programme” (jing-shi ji-hua), which was 
introduced with the “ROC Military Ten-year Force Target Programme” in 1993, 
to reduce its military personnel to fewer than 400,000.140 At the same time, 
Taiwan also reorganized the structure of its army, which comprised 51 per cent 
of Taiwan’s total armed forces personnel, by establishing brigades as its main 
battle units. Unlike the former division-centred army, the smaller brigade-
centred army was intended to better fit the demands for the island’s defence 
programmes against a possible Chinese invasion. In the end, both Taiwan’s 
military procurements and re-organization under Lee marked attempts not only 
to determine an appropriate size for its armed forces, but also to pursue military 
professionalism and to establish an organization and a force structure which 
fitted its unique strategic context and defined missions under the “resolute 
defence, effective deterrence” doctrine. 
 
It is worth noting that the 1998 National Defence Report stands out for its focus 
on the concept of “effective deterrence” as “defensive deterrence” (shoushi 
hezu), which is designed ‘to apply the smallest military forces to dissuade the 
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enemy that the costs of its use of force would outweigh its gains’.141 As long as 
Taiwan did not consider a nuclear option, this note actually raised a serious 
doubt about how Taiwan’s “effective deterrence” could be credible, because, in 
facing a determined China, Taiwan intended to devote only “the smallest” 
military effort to successfully deterring Beijing. This said, the intention to apply 
only “the smallest military forces” can help to explain why there was a steady 
decline in Taiwan’s defence budget during the 1990s, despite the increasing 
military threats posed by the PRC.142 Dreyer suggests that, considering the rise 
in Chinese military power, fuelled by its huge economic power, China would 
sooner or later possess the necessary military capability to invade Taiwan.143 
Rather than the wishful thinking of relying on “the smallest” military efforts to 
underpin its deterrence strategy, I would argue that the feasibility and credibility 
of Taiwan’s military deterrence depended decisively on whether Taiwan’s own 
military build-up could make a Chinese invasion sufficiently costly and difficult. 
Moreover, given the task, military measures could surely not constitute the only 
option for achieving successful deterrence. If the question is whether Taiwan’s 
deterrent posture was a success under Lee Teng-hui’s in the 1990s, the answer 
is mixed. On the one hand, Taiwan did by then possess a limited credible 
deterrent to prevent or punish China’s invasion, but this deterrent significantly 
depended on foreign assistance. On the other hand, it is obvious that Taiwan 
had too little military capability of its own to deter, let alone punish, China’s 
military intimidation, as seen in the 1995-96 Strait crisis. This military 
weakness allowed China to psychologically gain the upper hand and to threaten 
Taiwan without bloodshed by applying calculated military means for its 
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The Debate about Acquiring Theater Missile Defence 
 
During the 1995-96 Strait crisis, when the PLA posed an unprecedented missile 
threat vis-à-vis Taiwan, Taipei not only lacked missiles comparable to those 
available to the PLA but also any adequate defence against the missile threats. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the 1998 National Defense Report portrayed the 
‘Chinese missile attack as the most serious threat in the course of China’s 
invasion [of Taiwan]’.144 It is worth noting that Taiwan’s defence planners put 
the missile threat in the context of a Chinese invasion rather than anything else. 
This is because Taiwan’s national defence by then was devoted to the doctrine 
of “resolute defence, effective deterrence’, which was mainly designed to 
ensure the island’s ultimate ability to defend the homeland against invasion.145 
‘The core of our national defence’, the 1998 NDR stated, ‘is to prevent 
Communist China’s invasion and win the war if it occurs.’146 The linkage 
between Taiwan’s military defence doctrine and the perceived missile threat 
highlighted the role of the PRC missile threat as the decisive weapon in the 
scenarios of Chinese military invasion, although the missiles could serve as 
instruments of Chinese political and military intimidation, for the purpose of 
either deterrence or coercion.  
 
For Taiwan, consequently, the Chinese missile threat was closely linked to 
calculations about a possible invasion. The idea was that China was likely to 
launch preemptive missile strikes against Taiwan’s command and control nodes, 
air bases and other key infrastructure elements, such as fuel and power stations, 
to create the so-called “shock and awe” effect of rapid dominance, which would 
precede further military actions by the PLA.147 In the worst-case scenario, a 
preemptive strike by the PLA’s ballistic missile force could involve the launch 
of an attack by nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP).  Without causing mass 
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destruction to buildings and human life, it is believed that two EMP attacks 
would be enough to shut down all the equipment for command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) used by Taiwan’s three major armed services, so as to swiftly and 
effectively neutralize Taiwan’s crucial defence capabilities.148 Generally, the 
resort to missiles, like air power, serves as an offensive tool to neutralize an 
enemy’s willpower and means of resistance. The warhead, speed, accuracy and 
range of modern missiles make them a powerful military instrument which can 
be used flexibly when launching attacks on any chosen target. The Pentagon’s 
March 1999 Report suggested that ‘Taiwan’s most significant vulnerability is in 
its limited capacity to defend against the growing arsenal of Chinese ballistic 
missiles.’149 As a result, from a military point of view, it seems that Taiwan 
would in the worst case have had to deploy the Theater Missile Defence system 
(TMD) against China’s missile threats. In fact, only two years before the 1995-
96 Strait crises, Taiwan had already ordered three PAC-2 Patriot Modified Air 
Defence Systems, which were later upgraded to one full PAC-3 missile defence 
system.150 The principle of setting a course for Taiwan’s missile defence system 
in the long term was formulated in the 2000 National Defense Report. It was to 
involve a progression from TMD to National Missile Defense (NMD), which 
would see a development from ‘lower levels to higher ones, expansion from 
points to areas, the west [coast of Taiwan] to the east and equal emphasis on 
land and sea.’151 
 
Nevertheless, I would argue that there is a serious flaw in regarding Lee’s push 
for the so-called “bullet-hit-bullet” missile defence system as a decisive defence 
system sufficient to determine the outcome of battle and on its own create a 
military context in Taiwan’s favour in the event of a war across the Strait. Two 
main reasons significantly undermine the merit of TMD/NMD: immature 
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technology and extremely low cost-effectiveness. First, premature technology, 
inefficient performance and countermeasures from the adversary cause 
TMD/NMD to be unreliable in operation.152 It is believed that ‘all of the TMD 
systems, especially the upper-tier system, still face technical challenges. TMD 
flight tests are likely to demonstrate effectiveness against individual targets over 
time, but the greatest problem for the TMD systems is the prospect of being 
overwhelmed by large numbers of incoming missiles in a combat situation that 
could include simultaneous air and naval attacks.’153 In the cross-Strait context 
of armed conflict, it should be recalled that the Taiwan Strait is only 130 
kilometers long, so even with a TMD system in place it is difficult to respond 
quickly and make an effective intercept.154 Thus it is doubtful whether Taipei 
could have relied on TMD to successfully carry out a response to multi-wave 
and multi-directional saturation attack from China’s missiles. Second, a key 
question for a small state such as Taiwan is how limited military resources can 
be distributed most efficiently. Chen Pi-choa, Taiwan’s former Deputy Defence 
Minister, during the final year of Lee’s administration, stated, ‘Taiwan is 
defenceless against missile attacks and it is hard to find a cost-effective 
countermeasure. Deployment of a sea-based or land-based TMD is feasible, but 
that is the least cost-effective option. The estimated cost ratio of relying on 
Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) against a TMD system varies 
tremendously, ranging from 1: 20 to 1:90.’155 Whatever the actual ratio, it is 
simply not cost-effective at all for Taiwan to fight an exhaustive missile attrition 
war against China’s missiles. It is not surprising that Chiang Chung-ling, former 
Defence Minister and Lee Teng-hui’s most reliable military advisor, criticized 
TMD outright as a “money pit”.156 Consequently, if ‘war would be decided 
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more by attrition than by decisive battle’157, the low cost-effectiveness of TMD 
could easily waste Taiwan’s limited and precious resources in China’s favour. 
 
The merit of being able to draw on TMD thus can be understood in political and 
psychological terms rather than military. However, I believe that even the 
political and psychological merits of Lee’s construction of Taiwan’s missile 
defence system are significantly limited.  This is because the missile defence 
system may create a false sense of security, which is grounded in wishful 
thinking about the TMD’s capability to intercept incoming missiles and about 
possible American military involvement associated with the build-up of the 
TMD system.  ‘ [The] Chinese missile threat to Taiwan is much exaggerated, 
especially considering the very limited success of the far more massive and 
modern NATO missile strike on Serbia’, as Gerald Segal has well pointed out; 
yet, ‘if [the] Taiwanese have as much will to resist as did the Serbs, China will 
not be able to easily cow Taiwan.’158 In the event of war with the PRC, I believe 
that it is the resolute fighting will of Taiwan’s people, rather than the expensive 
and low cost-effectiveness of a missile defence shield, that will create “effective 
deterrence” against Beijing’s potential willingness to wage war. In addition, 
there are other ways of defence against a missile attack, such as hardening and 
building key underground facilities and also building redundancies into critical 
infrastructure and processes so that Taiwan could absorb and survive a first 
wave of missile strikes.159 Missiles are very costly and no country during a war 
cans relentlessly in its strategic bombing launch salvos of hundreds and 
thousands of missiles as if they were normal bombs . Even during the Vietnam 
War, the Viet Cong withstood America’s bombing, the most intensive of all 
time and won the war in the end. This may suggest some lessons to Taiwan’s 
defence planners in thinking how the country could survive under China’s 
missile bombardment.   
 
                                                
157 Brain Bond (1998) The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), p.5 
158 Gerald Segal (1999) ‘Does China Matter?’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 1999), p.29. 
159 William S. Murray (2008) ‘Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy’, Naval War College 
Review  (Summer, 2008), from https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ae650b06-a5e4-4b64-




Conclusion: Taiwan’s Grand Strategy under Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s 
 
 
This chapter has offered an analysis of the way in which the ROC on Taiwan’s 
grand strategy under Lee Teng-hui’s leadership in the 1990s was shaped by a 
dual struggle to improve the relationship with its Communist great-power rival 
across the Strait and at the same time to redefine the ROCOT’s own existing 
independent sovereign status. The most marked change in Taiwan’s grand 
strategy during this era was linked to the dramatic shift in Taipei’s strategic 
vision, whereby Taiwan changed from being a springboard for the unification of 
China into the pursuit of its own welfare and existence. The essence of Taipei’s 
grand strategy up to 2000 was premised on an ideational factor: that establishing 
the national consensus regarding Taiwan’s self-preservation, which emerged 
during the Lee years, would secure and consolidate the very sovereign existence 
of the ROC on Taiwan. The political will to ensure Taiwan’s self-preservation 
was encapsulated in Lee’s doctrine of “Taiwan’s existence and identity”, which 
became a guideline for his government in shaping Taiwan’s grand strategy. 
From the sovereignty perspective of Lee’s administration, Taiwan’s grand 
strategy had been distorted by the prolonged civil war between the ROC on 
Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland. To end this war, Taipei unilaterally took 
the initiative to renounce its former sovereign claim to the mainland, in the 
belief that by moving beyond the hard-line competition for Chinese sovereignty 
across the Strait it could provide a more favourable atmosphere, which would 
encourage the normalization of relations across the Strait and accordingly 
improve the ROCOT’s international status. The resulting normalization between 
Taipei and Beijing would also, in the belief of Lee’s administration at the time, 
maintain cross-Strait stability and thereby consolidate Taiwan’s de facto 
independent sovereign status by preserving the status quo of cross-Strait co-
existence.  In 1991, Taipei defined the cross-Strait status quo as “one China, 
two political entities” in the pursuit of pragmatic diplomacy in international 
society; it also proposed the “Guidelines for National Unification” with a view 
to possible future unification across the Strait. In this way, both components of 
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Lee’s strategy - that is, Taiwan’s existence and cross-Strait rapprochement - 
would serve as the means of achieving each other. 
 
The 1995-96 Strait crisis caught Taiwan by surprise and terminated the 
seemingly golden age of cross-Strait rapprochement associated with the early 
1990s. The origins of the 1995-96 Strait crisis occurred after Beijing perceived 
Lee’s government as pursuing “Taiwan independence” and became angry over 
Washington’s likely departure from the one-China policy. Beijing’s military 
coercion against Taipei in the 1995-96 crisis differed profoundly in its nature 
and consequences from earlier crises across the Strait and imposed new 
strategic challenges on Taiwan. This missile crisis not only put the spotlight 
once more on the influential factor of military power in the cross-Strait 
confrontation, but also exacerbated the competition for sovereignty between 
Taipei and Beijing, given its impact on Taiwan’s emerging national identity. 
The new experience of China’s threat in the Strait crisis endorsed the need to 
consolidate “Taiwan existence and identity”, which closely relates to the ROC 
on Taiwan’s sovereign status. In order to manage its strategic environment, 
Taipei, to balance China, has since focused above all on strengthening its 
defence cooperation with the US. Taipei has resisted the temptation to 
bandwagon with China across the Strait, which would cost its own sovereignty.  
Moreover, as the outcome of the crisis led to Beijing’s actively developing its 
missile capabilities, Taiwan’s homeland security again seemed as vulnerable to 
the PLA’s direct threats as it had been in 1949. As a result, Taipei adopted the 
strategic posture of “resolute defence, effective deterrence”, which was 
associated with the new deployment of a national missile defence system, in 
order to prevent or punish Beijing should the latter decide to invade.  
 
The distinctive characteristics of Taiwan’s grand strategy during the Lee Teng-
hui years built on the strategic choice of pursuing cross-Strait normalization, 
while articulating the theme of “Taiwan’s existence and identity”. This choice 
was derived from a combination of factors: the inspiration of what was called 
“Taiwan subjectivity”; the pursuit of the “New Taiwanese” identity; the desire 
for sovereign equality across the Strait; and the demand to end Taipei’s 
prolonged international isolation. The 1995-96 Strait crises demonstrated the 
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continuity of the sovereignty competition across the Strait, but located it in the 
post Cold War era, in the unique context of a democratic Taiwan with a divided 
national identity, Washington’s determination to see a “peaceful resolution” 
between Taiwan and China and the increasing economic interdependence across 
the Strait. 
 
The fundamental challenge for Lee Teng-hui’s administration was to develop a 
coherent national grand strategy based on his perspective of the ROC’s 
sovereign status as the ROC on Taiwan and his strategic choice to normalize the 
ROC-PRC relations by a better balance between ends and means. Lee initially 
continued Chiang Ching-kuo’s balancing of foreign and mainland policies while 
he could focus on domestic political reform for Taiwan’s democratization. For 
example, as with CCK’s flexible ‘total diplomacy’, Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy 
was designed to raise the ROC’s international status, which was inevitably 
involved addressing the sovereignty issue, for instance, as a dual recognition 
similar to the case of the two Germanys or two Koreas. But the main differences 
between Lee and his Chinese nationalist predecessor rested on Lee’s unique 
national identity with “Taiwanese subjectivity” and his reconciling attitude 
toward the PRC. These differences enabled Lee to take the initiative step to 
advance the first ever cross-Strait rapprochement in the early 1990s. This is a 
great achievement but one which has been ignored by many because of his later 
explicit and rhetorical stance on the sovereignty issue of the ROCOT. While 
Lee maintained the one-China principle across the Strait and intended to 
circumvent the sovereignty deadlock between the ROC and the PRC, Beijing 
constantly declined to accept Taipei as an equal political entity and completely 
blockaded the ROC’s attempts to fully re-enter international society. Beijing’s 
antagonism toward the sovereignty issue may explain why Lee’s mainland 
policy later evolved into a more radical way, as he needed to define more 
precisely what he understood by the sovereign status of the ROC on Taiwan. 
Moreover, following Taiwan’s democratization, the practice of popular 
sovereignty by the population of Taiwan also made Lee more unlikely to 
concede his claims of the sovereignty of ROCOT. To be sure, Lee’s sovereign 
perspective on the ROCOT still left open the possibility for future cross-Strait 
unification and was not intended to breach the one-China principle. Whatever 
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the case, there is little doubt that Lee successfully transformed Taiwan into a 
democratized society, which earned him the name of ‘Mr Democracy’. This 
achievement has had a great impact on Taiwan’s grand strategy. However, the 
failure to circumvent the cross-Strait sovereignty deadlock associated with his 
tough rhetorical stance on the sovereignty issue in the end not only deteriorated 
the cross-Strait relations but also alienated the ROC-US relations. All these 







More Cross-Strait Drama:   







In March 2000, to prevent Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the Democratic 
Progress Party (DPP), from winning the Taiwan presidential election, China’s 
premier Zhu Rongji declared in threatening tones that “Taiwan’s independence 
means war” at a press conference only a few days before election day.1 Zhu’s 
bluster indicated the possibility of a cross-Strait war if the DPP won the election, 
because Beijing had already in effect identified Chen as an advocate of the 
Taiwanese self-determination pro-independence movement. Nevertheless, Chen 
still won this election and he won again in 2004. No war broke out as a result, 
however, due to self-restraint on both sides and American mediation. The DPP’s 
self-restraint on Taiwan’s sovereign status and future can be best seen in its 
1999 ‘Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future’, which stated ‘Taiwan is a 
sovereign and independent country. …. Taiwan, although named the Republic 
of China under its current constitution, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
PRC. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all residents 
of Taiwan by means of a plebiscite.’2 Obviously, this new open-ended position 
under the principle of self-determination represented a significant reconciliation 
involving a climb-down from its 1991 Taiwan Independent Clause (taidu 
gangling), in which the DPP unambiguously declared its wish to pursue 
                                                
1  Zhu Ronggji (16 March, 2000) People’s Daily, 
http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/zgrdxw/lianghui/news/0316/031602.html (accessed on 16 June 
2010) 
2 Shelley Rigger (2001) From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party 
(Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publisher), pp. 131-132. The Resolution was passed by the 
DPP’s National Party Congress on 9 May 1999. A detailed discussion of the Chen Shui-bian 
administration’s perspective on the cross-Strait relations, see Wilson Tien (2003) ‘The DPP’s 
position on Cross-Strait Relations’, Donald Zagoria (ed.) (2003) Breaking the China-Taiwan 
Impasse (Westport: Praeger), pp. 67-73.  
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‘Taiwan’s independence’ and establish ‘the Republic of Taiwan’.3 Nevertheless, 
the DPP government, which still declined to accept the concept of “one China” 
as is endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang 
(KMT), was not only consistently subjected to military threats from Beijing but 
also was domestically handicapped from the first day it took office by the KMT 
majority in the Legislative Yuan. This was the origin of the national crisis which 
then ensued. 
 
It is with this context in mind that the chapter examines how the DPP 
government, the first ever non-KMT government of the ROC on Taiwan, 
re-evaluated and sought to rebuild Taiwan’s grand strategy, a question of some 
significance. Accordingly, it is important to establish whether Taiwan’s grand 
strategy was changed once it was in the hands of the DPP. Notably, this chapter 
finds that Taiwan’s grand strategy under the DPP principally focused on 
maintaining the sovereignty, security and prosperity of the territory of Taiwan 
and its people, in line with its perspective on the sovereignty of “the ROC as 
Taiwan”. Nevertheless, the government also advocated a national strategy which 
emphasized rapprochement with China to mitigate the tensions with Beijing in 
order to establish “peace and stability” in cross-Strait interactions. The strategy 
involved two proposals: 1) the “Five Noes” and 2) the vision of a “future one 
China”. Like the previous chapter, this chapter also finds that the formulation of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy by the DPP government was very much concentrated in 
the hands of the President, although its implementation was influenced by its 
inner-party politics and other constitutional bodies, such as the Executive Yuan 
and, in particular, the Legislative Yuan when the government lacked sufficient 
votes to pass bills for the required budgets.  
 
The chapter is organized in four sections. The first focuses on the nature of 
Chen’s thinking about Taiwan’s grand strategy, which was derived from a 
political centrist position of the so-called “New Middle Road”. And Chen’s 
centrist stance can be decoded by his beliefs in anti-radicalism, pacifism and 
                                                
3 Bush (2005) Untying the Knot, pp. 59-60. A discussion of the DPP’s constitution of the 
‘Republic of Taiwan’, see Wu, Hsin-hsing (1994) Bridging The Strait: Taiwan, China and the 
Prospects for Reunification (Oxford: Oxford University Pres), pp. 239-240.  
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progressivism. The second section explores Chen’s strategic choice to 
consolidate Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty through maintaining the “status quo” 
in cross-Strait relations. The third section examines how with a view to improve 
Taiwan’s strategic environment, Chen’s administration sought to embed 
Taipei’s grand strategy in the pursuit of internationalising the Taiwan issue in 
the context of relations with the United States, the influences of globalization, 
and the rise of China. The fourth section discusses the administration’s strategic 
posture which involved Taipei’s military doctrine of “effective deterrence, 
resolute defence” in the light of preventing war across the Strait.       
 
 
C.7.1 Ideational Inspiration of the “New Middle Road” 
 
The cross-Strait rapprochement strategy of Chen Shui-bian’s administration was 
inspired by the centrist perspective of the “New Middle Road”, which has found 
expression in President Chen’s views on anti-radicalism, pacifism and 
progressivism. The “New Middle Road” inspired Chen to formulate his 
cross-Strait doctrine of the “Five Noes” in which the government outlined its 
centrist stance in order to prevent any misunderstanding about the so-called 
Taiwan independence issue on the part of its domestic audience, as well as 
Beijing and international audiences, for the sake of peaceful and stable 





The failure to gain re-election as mayor of Taipei in 1998 had a profound impact 
on Chen Shui-bian’s overall perspective and way on winning support for his 
political ends. In the first volume of his autobiography, The Son of Taiwan, 
Chen describes the defeat as “unbelievable” and “cruel”, since he had previously 
enjoyed a consistently high approval rating and substantial support from citizens 
during his first term.4 According to his analysis of the election results, Chen 
                                                
4 Chen Shui-bian (2000) The Son of Taiwan: The Life of Chen Shui-bian and his Dreams for 
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concluded that, despite the general approval of Taiwan’s “Mainlanders” in 
relation to his social and economic achievements in Taipei, most of them still 
voted for Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT’s “Mainlander” candidate, reflecting perhaps 
continuing ethnic tensions between “Mainlanders” (waisheng ren) and “local 
Taiwanese” (bensheng ren).5 In fact, political parties, including the DPP itself, 
have always manipulated and taken advantage of the ethnic tensions during 
election campaigns in Taiwan. However, Chen’s bitter interpretation, which 
ascribed his electoral defeat to ethnic tensions compelled him, as well as the 
DPP, to find a way of dealing with the ethnic tensions so as to make the DPP 
electable as a ruling party and allow it to proceed to government. He concluded 
that the DPP had to discard its reputation for political radicalism, expressed in 
terms of a single-minded pursuit of Taiwan’s independence, in order to prevent 
the ethnic tensions in Taiwan from intensifying and escalating the crisis across 
the Strait with China.  
 
Defending his national vision against the charge of pro-independence political 
radicalism, Chen Shui-bian started to call for “The New Middle Road” in July 
1999. This concept, which lay at the heart of his 2000 presidential campaign, 
served as an important guideline for his grand strategy regarding cross-Strait 
relations. By endorsing “The New Middle Road” concept, Chen made clear that 
he wanted to be a “president of all the people [in Taiwan]”. The concept thus 
implied a preference for anti-radicalism, which suggested that moderate policies, 
which would speak neither to Taiwanese independence fundamentalists nor 
ardent Chinese unification advocates, would be pursued by his administration. 
Chen argued that there existed a middle path, which was ‘the largest common 
denominator among the populace’ in Taiwan. This middle path, he argued, 
should transcend ‘differences of historical background, ethnicity, party 
affiliation and opinions on whether Taiwan should unify with or remain 
independent from China.’6 In constructing the middle path against radicalism, 
                                                                                                                                       
Taiwan (tr. David J. Toman) (Taipei: Taiwan Publishing Co,. Ltd). Chapter One, pp.13-45.  
5 Ibid. The term “mainlanders” (waishengren) mainly refers to those who were part of the 
KMT’s retreat from China to Taiwan between 1947 and 1949, together with their descendants in 
Taiwan.  
6 Ibid, p.123. In his book, Chen Shui-bian said that his idea of “The New Middle Road” was 
inspired by Tony Blair’s ‘New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country’ and Anthony Giddens’s 
‘The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy’. 
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Chen first identified six national policy areas: ‘national security, financial and 
economic policy, public policy, cultural Taiwan, intellectual Taiwan and 
volunteer Taiwan’.7 Notably, Chen then prioritized the importance of “national 
security” because ‘“national security is the lingua franca of all the people [in 
Taiwan]” and the root of Taiwanese survival.’8 By focusing on these six areas, 
Chen proposed to establish common national values, which would be shared by 
almost everyone in Taiwan. These values were in no sense incompatible with 
the KMT’s political view, because their low political profile distanced them 
from a radical stance on Taiwanese independence. 
 
Fostering common national values was central to the incoming administration’s 
grand strategy. They were seen as necessary by the administration to create a 
sense of collective responsibility, which could prevail over divisions of interest 
and identity in Taiwan. Furthermore, Chen apparently hoped that the 
anti-radicalism of his approach would distinguish him from the fundamentalism 
of those striving for Taiwanese independence at all costs. Indeed, he expected 
that it might lead to a rapprochement strategy, which would create a new 
cross-strait relationship with China. One of his significant steps was the passing 
of ‘the Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future’ on 8 May 1999, in which the 
DPP replaced its radical independent stance by embracing the idea of an 
open-ended self-determination as the solution to the problem  Taiwan’s status 
and future. The 1999 Resolution represented a decisive turning point for the 
anti-one-China policy, as this self-determination doctrine was compatible with a 
full range of solutions for Taiwan’s future and status, either independence or 
unification, albeit under one fundamental principle: popular sovereignty. The 
self-determination principle was especially important in Taiwan’s electoral 
politics because it enabled the DPP to appeal to middle range voters, who were 
worried about the DPP’s radical outlook and played a decisive role in 
determining whether the DPP could take power. The party’s leaning towards 
Chen’s more centrist position could not be taken for granted. There was 
inter-party competition, associated with the ideologically oriented powerful 
New Tide Faction (xin chao liu) which still insisted on the party’s stance on 
                                                
7 Ibid, pp.125-6. 
8 Ibid. 
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Taiwanese independence.9 In the end, it was Chen’s determination and skillful 
political manoeuvre that unified the DPP and made possible the 1999 
Resolution.10 
 
Putting this anti-radicalism into practice at his inauguration on 20 May 2000, 
President Chen announced the famous “Four No’s, One Without” (sibu 
yimeiyou), or “Five Noes”. As he put it: ‘as long as the CCP regime has no 
intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in 
office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will 
not push for the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in the 
Constitution and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in 
regard to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, there is no 
question of abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification and the National 
Unification Council.’11 It is worth noting that Chen from the very beginning 
inserted a crucial temporal precondition at the very beginning of this ‘Five 
Noes” doctrine, which was to last ‘as long as the CCP regime has no intention to 
use military force against Taiwan.’ This precondition was a subtle and 
manipulative arrangement because, by then, there was no sign of any kind that 
Beijing would renounce the use of force in the Taiwan issue, let alone the fact 
that it was not easy to define a term such as “intention”. As a result, Chen was 
still able to retain the initiative to interpret, practise and even change his stance 
on the “Five Noes” doctrine. In fact, Chen did change later and suspended the 
National Unification Council [NUC] as well as the National Unification 
Guidelines [NUG] in early 2006. This was because, as he argued, Beijing had 
passed the Anti-Secession law and deployed missile forces against Taiwan, so 
the precondition was not being met.12 Nevertheless, it still could not be taken 
                                                
9 A discussion of the DDP’s inter-party politics, see for example Steven M. Goldstein and Julian 
Chang (eds.) (2008) Presidential Politics in Taiwan: The Administration of Chen Shui-bian 
(Norwalk, CT: EastBridge); Shelley Rigger (2001) From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s 
Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publisher) and Dafydd Fell (2005) 
Party Politics in Taiwan: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan, 1991-2004 
(London: Routledge).  
10 Denny Roy (2003) Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 228. 
11 “President Chen’s inaugural speech, ‘Taiwan Stand Up: Advancing to Uplifting Era’”, 
Government Information Office, 20 May 2000 (http://th.gio.gov.tw/pi2000/) (accessed 21 
September 2009) 
12 Gunter Schubert and Stefan Braig (2011) ‘How to Face Embracing China: the DPP’s Identity 
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for granted that the pro-independence president would commit himself to the 
“Five Noes” at the very beginning of his administration. In fact, if he had 
spelled out the “Five Noes” one by one as a sign of goodwill or as cards for the 
purposes of negotiation, Chen might have enjoyed a more flexible and better 
bargaining position. In the end, it was the Chen administration’s rapprochement 
strategy under which Taipei would endorse the immediate embrace of 
anti-radicalism, that was geared for consensus, reconciliation and cooperation in 
the interests of new and positive cross-strait relations. This anti-radicalism 
perspective may explain why the pro-independence administration committed 
itself to the “Five Noes”; its purpose was to prevent any misunderstanding with                                                                                                        





Once he had assumed office, President Chen explicitly opposed war, violence or 
any kind of coercion to settle the conflict across the Strait. This idea of pacifism 
was to underpin Taiwan’s national strategy, which was ultimately geared 
towards rapprochement. ‘War is a failure of humanity’, Chen argued, ‘Waged 
for whatever lofty purposes or high-sounding reasons, war is the greatest harm 
to freedom, democracy and human rights.’14 Applying Chen’s pacifism to 
Taiwan’s grand strategy drew on concepts of understanding, tolerance and 
peaceful coexistence. These concepts stood in marked contrast to Beijing’s dual 
strategy, which emphasized both peace and war as indispensable ways to resolve 
the cross-Strait issue.15  Indeed, Chen put forward a proposal to promote 
‘goodwill reconciliation, active cooperation and permanent peace’ as a method 
of achieving a mutually beneficial resolution to the cross-Strait confrontation. 
                                                                                                                                       
Politics and cross-Strait Relations during and after Chen Shui-bian’, Gunter Schubert and Jens 
Damm (ed.) (2011) Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-first Century: Domestic, Regional and 
Global Perspectives (London: Routledge), p. 76. 
13 Chen revealed that the content of his 2000 inaugural speech relating to cross-Strait relation 
issues was the subject of discussions with Washington, Singapore and even Beijing, in advance 
of the actual announcement. See Chen Shui-bian (2004) Believe Taiwan: President A-bian 
Reports to the People (Taipei: Eurasian Press), p.27.   
14 “President Chen’s inaugural speech, ‘Taiwan Stand Up: Advancing to Uplifting Era’” 
15 Chen’s pacifism is a kind of pessimistic pacifism, which still believes in the necessity of 
defence. For a detailed discussion of a spectrum of different views of pacifism, see Ceadel, 
Martin (1987) Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.135-165. 
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He argued that ‘war will lead to more hatred and enmity, without the least help 
to the development of mutual relations.’16  
 
To persuade Beijing to renounce the use of force, Chen connected his appeal for 
peace to the “Five Noes”. Acutely aware of Beijing’s hostility and its fear of 
‘Taiwan independence’, Chen’s strategy sought in the first place to relieve 
Beijing’s anxiety by reducing the anxiety that Taiwan’s new administration 
would opt for independence by committing itself to the “Five Noes”.  
Nevertheless, the administration did link its proposed commitment to one 
condition: ‘as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force.’ To 
put it another way, it was possible for Taipei to revise Chen’s “Five Noes” 
commitment if Beijing consistently refused to resolve the cross-Strait conflict by 
peaceful means. Unlike Beijing, which possessed suitable military means to 
impose its will, Chen’s administration felt that Taipei needed to rely on a 
political initiative, such as declaring the “Five Noes”. In the end, the “Five 
Noes” proved to be one of the few options by which the administration could 
generate the space and resources it needed to interact and negotiate in the 
context of cross-Strait rivalry. 
 
Building on the ideational aspirations proclaimed in pacifism, Chen’s 
administration invoked the latter to achieve two goals: one moral and one 
pragmatic. First, the administration deliberately opted for a political approach 
that would strike a favourable moral note and appeal to domestic unity, as well 
as reinforce the international condemnation that would follow any military 
attack by China. Second, Taipei’s dominant strategic perspective was to prevent 
rather than exploit war to secure Taiwan’s de facto independence, given Chen’s 
pragmatic calculations about the intolerable consequences of war across the 
Strait, such as wastefulness, ineffectiveness and unacceptability as a means of 
pursuing any political end. Furthermore, it was simply unrealistic for a small 
state such as Taiwan to mount a military challenge when it was so unlikely to 
win the upper hand against Beijing’s overwhelming material power. ‘To 
maintain peace and stability across the Strait’, the administration was convinced, 
                                                
16 “President Chen’s inaugural speech, ‘Taiwan Stand Up: Advancing to Uplifting Era’” 
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‘was the most important duty and sacred task for the president [Chen 
Shui-bian].’17 
 
President Chen’s primary measure in implementing his pacifist strategy and 
maintaining peace across the Strait was to establish a cross-Strait dialogue 
mechanism, a “peaceful and stable exchange framework”, which Chen regarded 
as a “decisive” step in resolving disputes.18 Nevertheless, when Chen proposed 
this mechanism he received no response whatsoever from Beijing. In 2006, 
Chen’s administration published Taiwan’s first ever National Security Report 
(NSR), setting out the island’s national grand strategy. In the Report, the 
pro-independence government defined as one of the two “strategic pillars” for 
Taiwan’s national security, namely “pursuing dialogue and seeking peace”, so 
as to reduce cross-strait tensions.19 Pledging peace first, Chen hoped that the 
new framework would overcome the bitter disputes over Taiwan’s sovereignty 
status, which had led to a hostile cold-peace relationship between the two sides. 
Adopting in the NSR the principle of ‘reconciliation without flinching and 
holding a firm stance while avoiding confrontation’, Taipei’s proposal for 
establishing the “peaceful and stable exchange framework” contained five 
components: ‘basic principles for managing bilateral relations, trade and 
economic exchanges, measures to prevent military conflict, consultation 
mechanisms and possibilities for the establishment of political relations.’20 
Derived from the desire to construct mutually favourable conditions for 
long-term peace and stability, Taipei’s proposal thus suggested that it was 
essential to initiate a process of dialogue in order to generate understandings and 
agreements. For Chen’s administration, cross-Strait dialogue could reduce 
miscalculations, tensions and the possibility of war at a time when the level of 
consensus on Taiwanese sovereignty issue remained very low on both sides. To 
promote the cross-Strait dialogue process, the DPP government even increased 
                                                
17 Chen Shui-bian (2004) Believe Taiwan: President A-bian Reports to the People (Taipei: 
Eurasian Press), p.16. 
18 Ibid, pp. 40-41. 
19 Another pillar was “a democratic Taiwan and sustainable development”; see “National 
Security Report”(2006), pp. iii-vi, National Security Council, Taiwan (2006) National Security 
Report, (Taipei, Taiwan: National Security Council, May 20, 2006), pp.137-147. Hereafter 
referred to in-text as “TNSR2006”. 
(http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/download/2006nsreport.pdf) (accessed in 16 June 2010).  
20 Ibid, pp.152-3. 
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Taiwan’s military transparency in an unprecedented attempt to ‘establish 
cross-Strait military confidence-building measures through security dialogue 
and exchange.’21   
   
Progressivism 
 
As the first president of the ROC without a KMT background, President Chen 
was eager to be a path-finder and ice-breaker, advocating the “New Middle 
Way” associated with the “Five Noes” doctrine in his leadership of the country 
in order to resolve the cross-Strait confrontation. He also wanted to win the 
confidence and support of moderate voters that his administration would not go 
radical on cross-Strait relations. That his “Five Noes” doctrine deliberately 
distanced the anti-one-China administration from the so-called Taiwan 
independence movements was evidence of the progress being made. Seeking to 
explore with Beijing his thinking on future cross-Strait unification, Chen 
Shui-bian also proposed alternative visions of unification, such as “cross-Strait 
integration” (liangan tonghe lun), in his New Year’s Day speech of 2001, and 
the “European Union experience” (oumeng jingyan), discussed in his 2004 
inaugural address, as possible models for changing his original position on 
Taiwan independence. The perspective of Chen’s administration on such change 
was bound up with further reformist thinking, namely, the concept of 
progressivism. To be progressive implied for Chen that one had a certain vision 
of the possibilities inherent in a process of change, which means, by and large, a 
willingness to eventually break away from a past position. The pursuit of change 
was indeed vital to President Chen’s vision of progress. This included a possible 
change of his position in regard to Taiwan’s status and future, as long as there 
was a consensus among Taiwan’s residents about the principle of 
self-determination. In the event, the DPP government put together the first ever 
referendum mechanism for the island, the Referendum Act, in 2004, though it 
must be admitted that the origins and practices of Taiwan’s Referendum Act 
were rather complex and controversial. 22  According to article 17 of the 
                                                
21 Ministry of National Defence (2004), “National Defence Report”, Chapter 5.VI. 
22 It is believed that Chen Shui-bian took advantage of the Referendum Act to manipulate 
domestic politics so as to resolve his political difficulties and help his 2004 presidential election. 
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Referendum Act, ‘when the country is under the threat of foreign force and the 
national sovereignty is likely to be changed, the President may, with the 
resolution of the meeting of the Executive Yuan, apply the matters regarding the 
national security to referendum.’23 As the Act contains a clear definition of 
“national security”24, the result of the referendum regarding changes to the 
island’s sovereignty in the context of cross-Strait relations would be open not 
only to independence but also to unification in practice. Significantly, while 
Chen’s cross-Strait policy was to maintain the status quo, his progressivist 
perspective on issues such as “cross-Strait integration”, or on the 
independence-unification issue, were long ignored by his political opponents, 
not least by Beijing, where Chen was regarded as a die-hard advocate of 
independence.  
 
By adopting an adjustable perspective on Taiwan’s sovereignty change with its 
referendum mechanism, Chen’s government, in fact, worked to move beyond 
the old “Chinese civil war” paradigm between the KMT and the CPP, which for 
decades had dominated the theme of Taiwan’s grand strategy.25 Chen expected 
that transcending the old paradigm would generate three favourable 
consequences. First, there would be a win-win situation across the Strait. The 
war would end with two de facto sovereign states, which in any case had 
coexisted across the Strait since 1949. This consideration was in fact not unlike 
that of his predecessor Lee Teng-hui. Second, by accepting the status quo and 
thus overcoming their competition over sovereignty as well as the attendant 
cross-Strait alienation, the two de facto governments would be in a position to 
start negotiating a possible political solution to cross-Strait relations, including 
                                                                                                                                       
Details of the origins, issues and practices of the Referendum Act, see Taiwan Foundation for 
Democracy (2005) Direct Democracy Practices in Taiwan: The Taiwan Referendum Act, 
Reports, and Analyses (Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy Publication); Olwen Bedford 
and Kwang-kuo Hwang (2006) Taiwanese Identity and Democracy: The Social Psychology of 
Taiwan’s 2004 Elections (New York: Palgrave), pp. 15-83; Chi Huang (2008) ‘Referendum and 
Democracy: The Experiences of Taiwan’, in Philip Paolino and James Meerink (eds.) (2008) 
Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in Transformation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate), pp. 
121-134.   
23 The Referendum Act, http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=D0020050 
(accessed in 17 June 2010) 
24 The term of “national security” refers to ‘the threat of foreign force and the national 
sovereignty is likely to be changed’. See Article 17 of The Referendum Act. 
25 Chen Shui-bian (2000) The Son of Taiwan, pp.133-4. 
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along the lines of Chen’s “cross-Strait integration” theory. Third, the end of 
confrontation across the Strait would eventually generate for both sides 
numerous mutual benefits, encapsulated in terms of progress, prosperity and 
stability. ‘The perspective on cross-Strait relations must be changed to respond 
to the domestic power transition between political parties [KMT and DPP],’ 
Chen argued, ‘From former President Lee’s “two-states theory” to my 
“cross-Strait integration theory”, I do not change my firm stance on Taiwan’s 
subjectivity [on sovereignty].’26 Chen continued that ‘however, in terms of 
implementing the principle of the “New Middle Road”, I am looking forward to 
a change soon, under the cross-Strait rapprochement.’27 In the other words, to 
implement his cross-Strait rapprochement and make changes accordingly, the 
President opted for an open end of the island’s future in term of the sovereignty 
issue as long as there was consensus within the island and across the Strait. 
 
President Chen’s embrace of a kind of rapprochement to advance cross-Strait 
relations did not imply any intention on his part to opt for appeasement or 
defeatism. Instead, rapprochement was a strategic perspective, which involved 
being prepared to make concessions in order to gain an advantage, or, as the 
Chinese world puts it, “one step backward two steps forward” (yi tui wei jin). In 
a constrained unfavourable context, this strategic perspective, so Chen believed, 
would bring about progress through relying on three successive steps: conflict, 
reconciliation and progress. From his experiences in dealing with the KMT 
authoritarian regime in the past, Chen drew conclusions about his ways to make 
changes and progress. As he argued, ‘it is impossible for vested interests to 
concede easily. We must confront them first to impose the perspective of change, 
then the majority will appreciate the merits and voice of the minority … and that 
will force them [the vested interests] eventually to give in.’28 From Chen’s 
perspective, confrontation was justified when it aimed at problem-solving, while 
reconciliation did not necessarily entail surrender as long as there was 
                                                
26 Chen Shui-bian (2001) The Maiden Voyage into the New Century: Meditation of Political 
Parties Rotation, Five Hundred Days After (Taipei: Eurasian Press), p.106, (my translation). 
Chen’s “cross-Strait integration theory” is analyzed in the next section. 
27 Ibid. 
28  Chen Shui-bian (1990) Conflict, Compromise and Progress (Taipei: Chen Shui-bian 
Parliament Office), p.36. (my translation) 
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progress.29 Chen’s perspective on pursuing progress on the back of a synthesis 
of confrontation and reconciliation was consistently applied to Taiwan’s grand 
strategy after he took power. The approach demonstrates three characteristics of 
his administration. First, Chen was never afraid of confrontation even when he 
did not have enough power; instead, he both intended and welcomed the 
application of confrontation when he wanted to alter unfavourable situations. 
Second, unlike radicals, Chen was always willing to make political 
compromises with Beijing as long as they brought some progress towards 
meeting his aims. Third, Chen’s dynamic perspective, hovering somewhere 
between conflict and compromise, on making what he saw as progress generated 
an image of him as capricious and insincere, which eventually undermined his 
credibility with Washington and was seriously criticised by his political 
opponents, e.g. the KMT and Beijing.30  
 
Chen Shui-bian’s synthetic perspective on conflict and compromise should be 
appreciated in order to understand Taiwan’s grand strategy under his 
administration. Chen’s progressivist perspective means not simply bringing 
about changes, but orchestrating such changes for what are presumed to be his 
political ends. It raises a vital question of its own: to what extent did Chen seek 
to propel Taiwan forward in the cross-Strait political-military conflict? In the 
2006 National Security Report, Taipei outlined for itself four principal values, 
namely “sovereignty”, “democracy”, “peace” and “parity” as a basis for 
engaging China.31 Although these values may be difficult and controversial 
when put into practice, Chen was convinced that these values, associated with 
the goodwill that accompanied the ideas underlying the “New Middle Road”, 
represented the bottom line and were not negotiable under his administration. In 
the context of cross-Strait conflict, ‘Chen … certainly left his mark, not all 
positive but certainly indelible,’ according to Ralph Cossa, president of CSIS,  
‘Chen kept Beijing on the defensive position.’ 32  As a result, in Cossa’s 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 For some representative critical views on Chen Shui-bian, see Su Chi (2003) Brinkmanship: 
From Two-State-Theory To One-Country-on-Each-Side (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing); 
Sheng Lijun (2002) China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian (London: 
Zed Books). 
31 National Security Council ROC, “2006 National Security Report”, p.vi. 
32 Reuters, 18 May 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTP13658920080518 (accessed in 
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observation, China was in effect forced to move from pushing for reunification 
to preventing independence.33 
 
 
C.7.2 Preserving Sovereignty through Upholding the “Status Quo” 
 
In the context of the cross-Strait confrontation under the DPP government, the 
core aim of Taiwan’s grand strategy was not only to preserve but also to 
manifest the island’s sovereign independence, by means of its perspective of 
‘the ROC is Taiwan’, which is associated with its endorsement of the 
self-determination formula and the declining to be bound by the one-China 
principle for Taiwan’s future. This was a distinctly different handling of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy from that of its domestic political counterpart, the KMT. 
In proposing “the New Middle Road” under the “Five Noes” doctrine to defuse 
the cross-Strait tension, Chen’s anti-one-China administration was extremely 
cautious about the prospect of China’s increasing challenge to the island’s 
sovereignty. This challenge at least temporarily culminated in Beijing’s 
Anti-Secession Law of 2005, which formalized China’s long-standing policy not 
to rule out the use of ‘non-peaceful means’ against the so-called ‘Taiwan 
independence movement’. To uphold Taiwan as an independent country, the 
national grand strategy of Chen’s administration emphasized national 
sovereignty by competing over the definition of the cross-Strait status quo. 
Furthermore, the pro-independence government proposed a the concept of a 
future “One China” as a way of reconciling the claims for independence and 
unification in order to establish a feasible framework of peaceful coexistence 





While states without universal diplomatic recognition but may still boast 
sovereign status, any nation values its sovereignty, even though it may have 
                                                                                                                                       
17 June 2010) 
33 Ibid. 
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different ways of interpreting, preserving and applying it in practice. 34 
Guarding against threats to sovereignty is universally regarded as one of the 
fundamental tasks of a national grand strategy. As has been argued, at the heart 
of the political-military confrontation between the ROC and the PRC since 1949 
stand competing claims to sovereignty in the context of a divided China. 
However, for the ROC, the nature of this sovereignty competition across the 
Strait has gradually evolved from competing for sovereignty over a united China 
to a demand to secure de facto sovereign independence on Taiwan. 
 
As the DPP declined to accept the one-China principle and instead advocated 
the idea of self-determination, China steadily put political-military pressure on 
Taiwan about this issue from the moment that the DPP President Chen 
Shui-bian took power in 2000. For instance, the timing of Beijing’s passing of 
the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005 was such that it came immediately 
before the anniversary of Chen’s 2004 controversial presidential victory. This 
was not a coincidence, but rather expressed the PRC’s intention to increase the 
difficulties for the DPP government and create a favourable situation to help the 
Chinese Nationalist KMT retake power in the future.35  According to the 
Anti-Secession Law, ‘the Taiwan question is one that is left over from China’s 
civil war of the late 1940s’; it also lays down that ‘the state [PRC] shall employ 
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.’36 The Chen administration perceived two 
major purposes behind this law. One was to justify all action against the ROC 
within China’s domestic political context. This involved Beijing’s ‘attempts to 
establish a legal basis for the invasion of Taiwan by authorizing China’s military 
and government to use non-peaceful means in solving cross-strait disputes.’37 
The second viewed as being about promoting the idea of legitimacy in relation 
                                                
34 For further discussion of Asian perspectives on sovereignty, see Chung-in Moon and 
Chaeaung Chun (2003) Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian Concept and Implications 
for Regional Security, in Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.) (2003) Asian Security Order – Instrumental 
and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
35 The DPP’s perception of the implied threat behind the Anti-secession Law, see also Chen 
Ming-tong and the Taiwan Security Research Group (2006) The China Threat Across the Strait: 
Challenges and Strategies for Taiwan’s National Strategy (Taipei: Dong Fong Color Printing), 
pp. 42-55. 
36For the full text of PRC Anti-Secession Law, at 
http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2005/CD-140305.htm (accessed on 17 June 2010) 
37 National Security Council ROC, “2006 National Security Report”, chapter 1, p.3. 
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to Beijing’s position. As it was formulated, ‘Beijing intends to use this law to 
play the role of a unilateral “arbitrator” in resolving cross-strait problems.’38 
Not surprisingly, Beijing unilaterally framed its threat to use force in domestic 
law and, since it assumed the cross-Strait confrontation to be part of an 
unfinished Chinese civil war. From Taipei’s perspective, the competition for 
sovereignty intensified, however. This is not surprising, considering that the 
stakes concern the very existence of the ROC’s survival as an independent state. 
 
To secure the perceived sovereign status of the ROC was always the first among 
of the strategic concerns of Taipei’s leaders and this was also true for the 
advocacy of self-determination by Chen’s administration. Indeed, Taipei’s 
National Security Report ranked “maintaining sovereignty and dignity” as the 
prime directive of Taiwan’s national security strategy. It also asserted that ‘the 
bottom line was to prevent encroachments upon the achievements that Taiwan’s 
people have made in democracy, freedom and economic development over the 
last half century.’39 Three justifications by the administration stand out. First, it 
was held that after Taiwan’s democratization, it was the people of Taiwan who 
are the repository of sovereignty, rather than Beijing or the people of Mainland 
China. At stake thus was the principle of popular sovereignty, which is held to 
be an essential attribute of statehood in a liberal democratic society. Second, as 
a so-called “settler society” from China, Taiwan was vulnerable to problems of 
“ethnic relations, national identity and confidence crisis” under a discourse of 
the “one China” concept, which undermines the people’s will to oppose 
Beijing’s threats.40 To deal with the vulnerability of Taiwan’s diversified 
national identity as presented here, it was thus vital for the government to unify 
the people of Taiwan by means of the principle of popular sovereignty. Third, 
the government believed that to safeguard popular sovereignty was necessary if 
the people were to pursue and legitimize their essential freedom of choice for 
the future of Taiwan, e.g. the status quo, independence, unification, etc.  
 
Chen’s strategy to consolidate Taiwan’s democracy and sovereign independence 
                                                
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, p.147. 
40 Ibid, pp.63-67. 
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was also designed to counter Beijing’s United Front strategy. In the 
post-authoritarian era, because of Taiwan’s historical experience and its 
unusually long-standing international isolation, the primary political cleavage 
has been and remains the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty status, often referred to 
as the “unification-independence” (tong du) issue. Given the deepening 
cross-Strait economic relations, Beijing’s United Front strategy was, by then, 
designed to make the most of its influential economic power, associating the 
phenomenon of Taiwan’s divided society, to advocate its one-China principle 
for cross-Strait unification. As Christopher Hughes puts it, the practice of the 
United Front is ‘to isolate pro-independence forces in Taiwan and to cultivate 
Chinese patriotism among interest groups in the island who wield significant 
economic resources, scientific knowledge and political standing.’41 Beijing’s 
United Front strategy culminated in the KMT Chairman Lien Chan’s historical 
visit to the mainland in May 2005and the establishment of a high-level dialogue 
and consultation between the anti-DPP pan-Blue and the CCP leadership.42 
Given Beijing’s refusal to contact Taipei, the CCP-KMT united front imposed 
tremendous domestic pressure on the DPP government precisely because this 
left Chen’s refusal to accept the One China principle looking ‘dangerously 
dogmatic’. 43  Accordingly, by proclaiming the importance of “maintaining 
[Taiwan’s] sovereignty and dignity”, Chen’s 2006 National Security Report 
emphasized consolidating the island’s democratic system and winning the 
loyalty of its citizens to Taiwan to counter the CCP-KMT united front.             
 
To be sure, while prioritizing the sovereignty issue on the national strategic 
agenda, Chen’s administration never ignored domestic economic development, 
in particular given the progressively deepening economic relations with 
mainland China. From the beginning of cross-Strait economic interactions in the 
early 1990s, it is estimated that ‘on a per capita basis, Taiwan has sent more 
                                                
41 Christopher R. Hughes (2001) ‘Living with “One Country, Two Systems”? The Future of 
Beijing’s Taiwan’s Policy’, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.14 (2) (April 
2001), p. 130. 
42 Christopher R. Hughes (2006) Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London: Routledge), p. 
129. 
43 Hughes (2001) ‘Living with “One Country, Two Systems”?, p. 131. 
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capital to China than any other country.’44 Accordingly, Chen’s administration 
was especially wary that the cross-Strait economic relations would jeopardize 
Taiwan’s economic development and national security. Finding a balance 
between Taiwan’s economic development and cross-Strait relations at this point 
became a serious question for Chen’s administration. To adjust Lee Teng-hui’s 
“no haste, be patient” (jieji yongren) policy, in 2001, Chen proposed his 
“Vigorous Liberalization and Effective Management” (jiji kaifang, youxiao 
guanli) formula. This was associated with the four principles of “Taiwan first”, 
“global setup”, “mutually beneficial” and “risk management” for cross-Strait 
economic interactions.45 In the 2006 National Security Report, Chen outlined 
his overall strategy for Taiwan’s economic development, focusing especially on 
the ‘promoting sustainable development and economic competitiveness’ by 
targeting five main missions – the ‘enhancement of industrial competitiveness’, 
the ‘reduction of the impact of China’s magnetic effect’, the ‘vigorous 
expansion of the scope of Taiwan’s economic and trade activities’, 
‘guaranteeing of energy resources and financial security’, and the ‘maintenance 
of the nation’s fiscal stability and health.’46 However, at the end of Chen’s 
regime, these economic strategies had not produced what the government 
expected Instead, Chen’s administration not only failed to reduce the deepening 
cross-Strait economic relations but also put Taiwan into its most serious 
economic decline.47 Chen’s sovereignty-centred perspective on the handling of 
national affairs may represent one of the major political causes of the 
government’s poor economic performance. For Chen, however, where Taiwan’s 
status was concerned, it was just clear that the sovereignty issue would trump 
the economic one.  
 
In short, Taipei’s grand strategy was clearly connected to the Chen 
                                                
44  T. J. Cheng (2005) ‘China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and 
Superconductive’, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed.) (2005) Dangerous Strait: The 
U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 93. 
45 Appendix 14, ‘Excerpt from Chen Shui-bian’s Address to the Economic Development 
Advisory Committee, August 26, 2001’, Zagoria, Donald (ed.) (2003) Breaking the 
China-Taiwan Impasse (Westport: Praeger). 
46 National Security Council ROC, “2006 National Security Report”, chapter 4, p.110. 
47 Yu-Shan Wu (2007) ‘Taiwan’s Development State: After the Economic and Political 
Turmoil’, Asian Survey, Vol.47, No.6 (November/December, 2007), p. 978. 
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administration’s security vision: that Taiwan’s sovereignty was under threat. As 
some have argued, given Chen’s sovereignty-centred perspective and his 
controversial ways of manipulating domestic politics to keep himself in power, 
‘Chen was more interested in ideological purity than economic pragmatism.’48 
As Taipei and Beijing have coexisted amid conflict across the Strait for decades, 
it should not surprise us that the emphasis on it by Chen’s administration, with 
its advocacy of self-determination, generated a vigorous attack on Beijing’s 
stance towards Taiwan. In fact, it is unlikely that political leaders in Taiwan, by 
then the current anti-independence KMT president, Ma Yin-jeou or a successor, 
will anytime soon concede the issue of the ROC sovereignty in response to 
Beijing’s demands, not least in view of Taiwan’s democratic system and public 
opinion.49 From Chen’s perspective, ‘the ROC is Taiwan’. Taipei’s firm stance 
on the ROC’s sovereignty and independence corresponded to the status quo 
across the Strait. 
 
Competition over Defining the “Status Quo” 
 
It was important for President Chen Shui-bian to endorse the strategy of 
upholding the cross-Strait status quo as a strategic choice in order to defend 
himself against the internal and external accusation that his anti-one-China 
government was beholden to the so-called “Taiwan independence movement”.50 
The purpose of endorsing the status quo was to prevent the Taiwan 
independence movement from escalating the clash of domestic identities as 
found in the competition between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism. Such a 
clash was seen as potentially raising a challenge to the prevailing regional order 
led by the US to stabilize cross-Strait relations.51 However, both Taipei and 
                                                
48 Rigger, Shelly (2005) ‘The Unfinished Business of Taiwan’s Democratization’, Tucker, 
Nancy Bernkopf (ed.) (2005) Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: 
Columbia University Press), p. 16. 
49 Robert A. Scalapino (2001) Taiwan- Opportunities and Challenges, in Tan, Alexander C., 
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(Aldershot: Ashgate), pp.14-5. 
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51 Nancy Bernkopf Tuckner (2005) ‘Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity’, in Tucker, Nancy 
Bernkopf (ed.) (2005) Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia 
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Beijing claimed to pursue a policy of maintaining the status quo across the Strait, 
for the sake of maintaining stability and peace. Chen Shui-bian’s administration 
grounded its status quo claim in the observation that two sovereign states had 
clearly co-existed across the Strait for decades. In contrast, Beijing justified its 
status quo policy with reference to the “one China” principle, which has not 
only been generally recognized by international society but also accepted by 
some of Taiwan’s political parties, e.g. the anti-independence KMT. 52 
Accordingly, the PRC insists upon the recovery of Taiwan which it asserts is a 
part of China’s sovereign territory. Thus, the two incompatible perspectives of 
the status quo were competing with each other across the Strait and the 
competition was in fact a continuation by other means of the pursuit of the 
sovereignty claim in each one’s favour. 
 
To contest Beijing’s notion of the status quo, Chen first defined his perception 
of the cross-Strait situation as “one side, one country” (yibian yiguo) on 3 
August 2002.53 Chen’s new initiative to define the cross-Strait relations can 
also be regarded as his counterattack on Beijing for its increasing pressure on 
him as Nauru switched recognition to Beijing, following Chen’s accession to the 
post of chairman of the DPP.54 According to this definition, Taiwan was 
already an independent sovereign state separated from Mainland China and 
called the “Republic of China”. Therefore, there was no need to formally declare 
Taiwan’s independence. This was what the administration later argued in the 
statement “the Republic of China is Taiwan”, which derived from the “Theory 
of the Four Stages of the Republic of China”.55 Within the fourth stage of the 
theory, “the ROC is Taiwan”, Chen argued, adding that, ‘on the basis of the fact 
                                                
52 KMT’s ‘one China’ policy is the so-called “92 Consensus” whereby both Mainland China 
and Taiwan belong to one China, with both sides having different interpretations over the 
meaning of ‘one China’. See Su Chi (2003) Brinkmanship, pp.16-21. 
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that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are under separate sovereignty and 
administration, this identity determines that all people living in Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Mazu should enjoy full national sovereignty and the right to decide 
their own future.’56  Chen’s definition of the status quo stemmed from a 
domestic perspective associated with the evolving historical experiences and 
national identity in Taiwan’s society. Furthermore, Chen’s intention of invoking 
identity to define Taiwan’s status quo as an independent sovereign state 
reflected the need to resolve the crisis of domestic unity, which involved ethnic 
alienation, the diversification of state identity and crises of confidence in 
Taiwanese society. Nevertheless, the main problem of this particular 
interpretation of the status quo, even though it may have been generally 
accepted in Taiwan, concerned the question of how Taipei could convince 
Beijing and the wider international audience, especially the US, to accept 
Taipei’s sovereignty stance- “one side, one country”.  
 
The main reason for this radical move on the sovereignty issue compared with 
his earlier centrist stance encapsulated in the ‘Five Nos’ doctrine can be 
understood as his frustration that Beijing would not negotiate with the 
government in any way without it accepting the one-China principle. 57 
Moreover, to understand how Chen dealt with this problem, we may also refer 
to his progressivist strategic perspective, which applies a synthesis of conflict 
and compromise to produce change. On the one hand, Chen’s administration 
challenged the notion that Taipei and Beijing did not coexist under Beijing’s 
“one China” norm. The way to do so was to discuss what the cross-Strait status 
quo was and should be in terms of sovereignty. Chen also adopted an offensive 
posture in response to Beijing’s unilateral implementation of the “one China” 
norm via the Anti-Secession Law. Chen’s administration argued that this law 
ignored the reality of Taipei as a sovereign state and was designed to undermine 
the cross-Strait status quo.58 On the other hand, Chen pledged that ‘Taiwan has 
no intention of [unilaterally] changing the status quo.’59 On occasion, Chen did 
                                                
56 Ibid. 
57 Shelley Rigger (2005) ‘Unfinished Business of Taiwan’s Democratization’, in Nancy Berkoft 
Tuckner (ed.) (2005) Dangerous Strait, pp. 18-20.  
58 National Security Council ROC, “2006 National Security Report”, pp.64-65. 
59 National Security Council ROC, “2006 National Security Report”, p.156. 
 279 
indeed demonstrate that the government preserved an open mind concerning 
future ties between Taiwan and China. This was apparent, for instance, with 
respect to the idea of a confederation with China across the Strait, in order to 
leave political space for Beijing’s decision-makers.60 As both sides had their 
bottom line in relation to the sovereignty issue, Chen’s administration suggested 
the adoption of four “basic principles”, namely, 1) the peaceful resolution of 
disputes, 2) the obligation to engage in consultations, 3) balance and parity and 
4) mutual respect, as a way of opening the cross-Strait negotiations.61 In the 
end, the pro-independence government’s embrace of the compromise suggestion 
that options to discuss Taiwan’s future with Beijing should be explored served 
the fundamental purpose of Chen’s grand strategy: to secure Beijing’s 
acceptance and recognition of the ROC’s existing sovereignty.  This was the 
progress that the administration felt it had earned by its compromise. 
 
 
Possibilities of a Future “One China” 
 
The perspective of a future “one China”, which Chen raised at his inauguration 
in 2000, was undoubtedly one of the most dramatic ideas by the 
pro-independence administration. Again, the origins of his future “one China” 
idea were to be found in the administration’s overall national strategy, 
rapprochement with Beijing by way of a more flexible sovereign stance under 
the 1999 self-determination formula. ‘I’m sure that nobody living in Taiwan 
wants to see tense cross-Strait relations’, Chen said; ‘with this in mind, the 
peaceful stability of the Taiwan Strait region requires the adjustment of relations 
with China, which demands an understanding of China’s policy toward 
Taiwan.’ 62  Seeing the unification principle as the unshakable element of 
Beijing’s Taiwan policy, the government’s rapprochement strategy thus sought 
to slacken the tensions in the cross-Strait relations which had intensified due to 
the sovereignty deadlock between Taipei and Beijing over Taiwan’s status. On 
                                                
60 Richard C. Bush (2005) Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, 
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61 National Security Council ROC, “2006 National Security Report”, p.153 
62 Chen Shui-bian (2000) The Son of Taiwan, p.129. 
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31 December 2000, Chen went further by launching a “cross-Strait integration” 
proposal to substantiate his notion of a future “one China”. Inspired by the 
European model of integration, Chen’s “cross-Strait integration” manifesto 
focused on three major interrelated themes: “one China”, sovereign dignity and 
integration.63    
 
On the issue of “one China”, Chen posited that, according to the ROC 
constitution, there might in fact not be a problem for Taipei over “one China”. 
However, as the “one China” definition was controversial and fundamentally 
different on each side of the Strait, he appealed to Beijing to understand why the 
people of Taiwan were worried and keen to find a way for the two sides to 
jointly reach a new consensus. On the second theme, sovereign dignity, Chen 
restated that the existence of the ROC on Taiwan had been a fact for decades 
and he was obligated, as the President of the people in Taiwan, to preserve its 
sovereign statehood. As both sides of the Strait shared a common heritage in 
terms of ethnic, cultural and historical relations, he urged that neither side 
should set out to hurt or eliminate the other. The government called on Beijing 
to respect Taipei’s “living space and international dignity” and to renounce the 
use of force to resolve disputes. With these two points in mind, the 
administration then proposed a way forward for cross-Strait integration. For one 
thing, Chen Shui-bian suggested that, despite their different stances on the 
sovereignty issue, cross-Strait integration could still be achieved if both sides 
began by cooperating in economic, trade and cultural affairs. After moving 
forward with integration, both sides could then work together to explore “the 
space of unlimited possibilities” from establishing a new framework of enduring 
peace and political integration.64  
 
Chen’s view that a future “one China” was possible was embedded in the 
“cross-Strait integration” manifesto, which was intended to fulfil Taipei’s desire 
to preserve its de facto sovereignty as well as to satisfy Beijing’s aim of 
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achieving national unification. The linkage between the security of the ROC’s 
sovereignty and the PRC’s aim of unification, encapsulated in the prospect of a 
possible future “one China”, represented the very core of the government’s 
national grand strategy of rapprochement as a way of handling cross-Strait 
relations. In terms of Taiwan’s status and future, according to the DPP’s 1999 
self-determination formula, Chen was open to a possible future “one China” 
across the Strait, but with precondition that any such change would have to be 
decided by the people of Taiwan. From Chen’s perspective, this flexibility 
would pave a middle way to overcome the competition between Taipei’s 
insistence on sovereignty and Beijing’s on unification. Without the notion of a 
possible future “one China”, each side would seek to unilaterally impose its 
position on sovereignty, which would produce exactly the kind of political 
antagonism that had undermined the cross-Strait status quo. The consequence of 
that in turn would be that both sides would escalate their confrontation to secure 
their fundamental national interest – sovereignty. In other words, the 
pro-independence government’s “cross-Strait integration” idea served to 
mediate Taipei’s claim of independence and Beijing’s claim of one-China across 
the Strait. For Chen’s administration, implementing the “cross-Strait 
integration” scheme was meant to lead to peaceful coexistence between Taipei 
and Beijing. However, this did not mean in the eyes of the Taiwanese 
government that conflict between the two sides had been resolved or that either 
side accepted the understanding of the status quo of the other. Indeed, from 
Taipei’s point of view the perspective on a future “one China” amounted only to 
a sign of good will and denoted the “New Middle Road” approach to addressing 
its political conception of sovereignty.  
 
In the event, Chen’s “cross-Strait integration” manifesto was immediately 
rejected and criticised by Beijing, which had consistently refused to talk with 
the President since the very first day of his administration.65 Beijing seemed to 
prefer to make a deal with the pro-one-China KMT and did not want to give any 
credit to the self-determination advocating DPP administration, nor any chance 
to resolve the cross-Strait confrontation. This was no surprise, given the two 
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sides’ apparently incompatible positions on the one- China issue, while Beijing 
seemed to have confidence in its power to direct the future development of 
cross-Strait relations. Nevertheless, Beijing may have missed a good 
opportunity at the time to bring the DPP to the negotiating table. As Chen 
Shui-bian asserted, ‘as long as Beijing still insists on its own “one China” 
principle and the doctrine of “one country, two systems”, no matter who is [and 
will be] the leader in Taiwan, it is impossible to achieve change or a 
breakthrough in the [deadlocked] cross-Strait relations.’66  
 
When moved into the domestic front, Chen’s reconciled proposal on the one 
China issue did not change the antagonism of the anti-independence KMT either. 
This was because there was still no consensus on the future of Taiwan 
associated with the one China issue, on the island also referred to as the 
“national identity” (guojia rentong) issue, which polarized Taiwan’s politics and 
society to an unprecedented degree in the post-nationalist era. The emergence of 
the pan-Green and pan-Blue coalitions by then demonstrated this polarization; 
clearly, the primary political cleavage between the two camps was derived from 
the national identity rather than socio-economic causes. 67  The severely 
contested identity politics in combination with Taiwan’s poor constitutional 
design, which does not offer proper mechanism for resolving stalemates 
between the legislative and executive branches, resulted in the DPP’s minority 
government nearly heading into a situation of ‘paralysis’.68 During the eight 
years of Chen’s presidency, the pan-Blue coalition led by the KMT firmly 
dominated the Legislative Yuan with such a comfortable majority that Chen 
could not forward on his agenda unless his minority government made 
concessions to the pan-Blue camp. Hence, for instance, the first session of the 
Legislative Yuan in 2005 passed the lowest number of bills in its history.69 In 
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vital issues such as the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, the Referendum Act and the 
arms procurement proposal, Chen’s administration had no chance to do what the 
government wanted. In the 22 December 2005 edition of A-Bian’ E-Newsletter, 
the President expressed his frustration: ‘In the past five years, the confrontation 
between the Blue and the Green camps has resulted in a political stalemate 
(zhengzhi jiangju) that has affected the function of the government and damaged 
the interests of all of the people of Taiwan.’70 Given the lack of institutional 
mechanisms to resolve the stalemate, the most effective strategy for the 
President therefore rested on a direct appeal to the Taiwanese people to support 
his political agenda. Chen was known as a talented political communicator, but 
the method of directly invoking the sensitive sovereignty issue inevitably made 
him look provocative and rhetorical. 
 
 
C.7.3 Internationalising the Cross-Strait Conflict 
 
The management of Taiwan’s strategic environment in Chen Shui-bian’s 
administration was dominated by Taipei’s perception of a “US-dominated 
uni-polar global system”.71 The pro-independence administration described ‘a 
global strategic landscape characterized by one superpower and many regional 
powers’ from which the United States, because of its unmatchable strength, had 
tried ‘to shape a new international order which it led’ in spite of the “multi-polar 
international system” which other regional powers, e.g. China, Russia, France, 
were intending to promote.72  Accordingly, the perception and practice of 
Chen’s administration of ways to manage Taiwan’s strategic environment was 
associated with a strategy to internationalise the cross-Strait conflict, which 
related to three interrelated factors (1) strengthening ties with the US, (2) the 
influence of globalization and (3) the rise of China.  
 
 
Strengthening Ties with Washington 
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A weak state whose internal strength is not sufficient to resist an external threat 
posed by a great power and which does not want to comply with its wishes, 
naturally looks to external sources of power to bring checks and balances to the 
threat.73 According to this classical insight into balance-of-power security 
strategy, it was natural for the DPP government to continually seek to strengthen 
its security ties with the United States. Seeking to involve Washington has 
always been one of the key constant components of Taiwan’s grand strategy, as 
previous chapters showed. Regarding the American political-military 
involvement as “decisive” to Taiwan, President Chen said: ‘Since the first day I 
took office, I have spent most of my time and efforts on building 
Taipei-Washington relations. Because I believe that if I can manage relations 
with Washington properly, cross-Strait relations will be stable.’74 To ensure 
good security ties with Washington, Chen revealed that in 2000 his 
administration even consulted Washington’s opinion in advance for views on 
the content of his first inaugural address.75 Chen’s decision to associate closely 
with Washington was based on the calculation that good relations with the 
United States would gain him international support for his cross-Strait 
rapprochement strategy, in particular if or when Beijing refused to make any 
deal with the government.  
 
US-Taiwan relations have been guided in part by the Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA) of 1979. They are also shaped by American national interests, which 
have been perceived and prioritized differently in response to particular 
challenges arising in a dynamic international context. With regard to US 
interests in addressing the cross-Strait confrontation, Washington does not seem 
to have favored any particular political outcome, i.e. unification or 
independence. But it has been concerned about a peaceful process of resolving 
the tension between Taipei and Beijing.76 According to the TRA and the US 
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experience of handling the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, Washington’s 
process-oriented approach relied on two operative codes for resolving the 
cross-Strait confrontation: (1) demanding that the antagonists commit 
themselves to peaceful means and (2) opposing unilateral actions. In the March 
2006 statement of its national security strategy, Washington made it clear that: 
‘China and Taiwan must also resolve their differences peacefully, without 
coercion and without unilateral action by either China or Taiwan.’77 Chen’s 
administration soon linked Washington’s statement with its strategy of 
rapprochement, calling for a “peace and stability framework for cross-strait 
interactions”. In its 2006 National Security Report (NSR), Taipei responded and 
made clear that ‘Taiwan has no intention of changing the status quo and strongly 
opposes any non-peaceful means to bring about change.’78 Nevertheless, the 
2006 NSR emphasis on no unilateral intention and action to make change can be 
better understood as Chen’s administration endeavouring to redeem its 
ignorance of Washington’s anger about Chen’s sovereignty movements, e.g., the 
‘one side, one country’ and Referendum initiatives, which were derived from his 
own political agenda; by then he not only surprised Washington but failed to 
consult the US altogether.79    
 
Washington’s opposition to the use of force and unilateral actions in changing 
the relations between the two parties indicates that American decision-makers 
have favoured the status quo of peaceful coexistence. In fact, the United States 
has for decades pursued an incongruous dual track policy of pursuing positive 
official relations with Beijing but simultaneously accepting Taiwan both as a de 
facto ally and a separate political entity. 80  During the period of Chen’s 
government, there were three identifiable components of Washington’s 
cross-Strait policy under its dual track policy: (1) the “one China” policy, (2) 
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opposition to unilateral change in the status quo across the Strait and (3) 
“non-support” for Taiwanese independence. However, while Washington had its 
own interpretation of these three policy components, both Taipei and Beijing 
also had their own perspective and interpretation of them. Deliberately or not, 
Washington merely had no clear and substantial definitions of the key terms in 
question.81 For instance, the United States still adopted an ambivalent stance on 
the sovereignty issue associated with the cross-Strait status quo,82 which was at 
the very core of the rivalry between Taipei and Beijing. In addition, the US had 
pointed out its security involvement to Taiwan under the TRA and admitted to 
having a “profound disagreement” with China over this commitment. 83 
Washington’s ambivalence on its security involvement and definition of the 
status quo reflected its insistence on the process-oriented peaceful approach to 
resolve the cross-Strait disputations in the context of its ‘dual track’, accepting 
the coexistence between Taipei and Beijing. In the event, Washington’s 
ambivalence offered space for Taipei and Beijing in which to maneuver. 
 
Chen’s commitment to the “Five Noes” in his 2000 inaugural address satisfied 
Washington’s demands. In April 2001, President George W. Bush stated that the 
US commitment to Taiwan represented an obligation whereby Washington 
would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.”84 In the same 
month the President approved a substantial arms sale package for Taiwan, 
including Taipei’s long-desired diesel submarines. 85  This would not have 
happened without the efforts of Chen’s administration, but it was also believed 
that the Bush government did favour Taipei more than any US administration 
had done since diplomatic relations had ended between Taipei and Washington 
in 1979.86 That the Bush administration began with a bold and positive gesture 
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to redefine US policy toward Taiwan proved important in improving Taiwan’s 
strategic environment, while the DPP government faced extreme pressure and 
explicit hostility from Beijing. However, two factors emerged on the way which 
modified and obscured Washington’s positive gesture toward Taipei: the war on 
terrorism and Taiwan’s domestic politics.87 On the one hand, the 911 World 
Trade Center terrorist attack fundamentally refocused Washington’s global 
strategic focus toward the war on global terrorism that in turn elevated Beijing’s 
strategic role. On the other hand, Chen Shui-bian manipulated domestic politics 
and sensitive cross-Strait issues mainly for his own political benefit and 
arguably disregarded the negative implications of Washington’s changing 
attitudes. 
 
Accordingly, the improved relations between Taipei and Washington soon faced 
serious setbacks and turned into mutual mistrust in view of Chen’s “one side, 
one country” statement in 2002, the 2004 referendum, and the 2006 
constitutional reform, etc.88 To be sure, the discord also stemmed in part from 
the different perspectives of Washington and Taipei on the meaning of the 
“status quo” in relation to the cross-Strait situation. While Chen’s administration 
was unlikely to retreat from his “bottom line” on the Taiwan sovereignty issue, 
Taipei endeavoured to convince Washington that Taipei’s moves were meant to 
assure everyone that its notion of the cross-Strait status quo merely implied that 
“the ROC is Taiwan”. Considering the “decisive” role that America played in 
Taiwan’s grand strategy, Taipei could have been expected eventually to follow 
Washington’s cross-Strait policy. This was why the president had repeatedly 
pledged to Washington that he would honour his commitment to the “Five 
Noes” and stated in the 2006 NSR that Taipei did not intend to unilaterally 
change the status quo across the Strait. In view of Taiwan’s vulnerability 
vis-à-vis China, most of the diplomatic efforts of Chen’s government were 
devoted to the perceived requirement to retain very close ties with the United 
States, not least because Taipei believed that Washington had the will and 
                                                
87 Tuckner (2005) ‘Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity’, pp. 203-204; Hughes (2006) 
Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, p. 142. 
88 Problems between Bush-Chen administrations see in Dumbaugh (2006) Taiwan-U.S. Political 
Relations, pp. 6-15. 
 288 
capacity to impose a policy of peaceful coexistence between Taipei and Beijing 
and to provide Taipei with vital military equipment to enable it to better defend 
itself if the need arose. By pursuing close strategic ties with the US, the 
government believed that ‘all these countries [China and Japan, for instance] 
have no choice but to maintain a certain level of strategic cooperation with the 
United States’.89 In the end, the Taipei-Washington strategic ties were also 
expected to provide an indirect strategic linkage between Taiwan and other 
American security allies in Asia, Japan in particular, and enhance Taiwan’s 
strategic position accordingly. How successful Taiwan was in drawing in and 
involving the US in cross-Strait relations would thus depend on the nature of 
Taipei’s ties with Washington, in terms of Taipei’s compliance with 
Washington’s global and regional strategy. While Chen Shui-bian regarded the 
Taipei-Washington relations as among the most important factors in Taiwan’s 
national strategy, his management of Washington, Taiwan’s most important 
security provider, was rather controversial and inconsistent. 
 
The Influence of Globalization  
 
Globalization, a phenomenon of international society in 21st century, has been 
defined as ‘the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such 
that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on people and 
societies far away.’90 The impact of globalization on national grand strategy, in 
terms of strategic environment assessment and management, is associated with 
the consequence of processing multi-calculated interdependences, e.g. those 
pertaining to co-operative security and market economics, in a global 
community. In the era of globalization, Martin Shaw suggests that a growing 
consensus on norms and beliefs to establish ‘a new cosmopolitan global security 
order’ has had significant impacts by constraining states’ behaviors within 
international society.91 Accordingly, Taipei’s strategy of internationalizing the 
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Taiwan issue, or the cross-Strait confrontation, was designed to draw on the 
influence of globalization to improve Taiwan’s strategic environment. The way 
it was to do so would involve Taiwan relying on growing interdependence 
among societies and states to translate the nature of the cross-Strait 
confrontation from what Beijing referred to as a “domestic issue” into a global 
concern. Such a perspective would favour the diplomatically isolated Taiwan. 
And to characterize the cross-Strait issue from the perspective of the global 
community would enable President Chen to internationalize, if not globalize, his 
rapprochement national strategy – with the aim of pursuing peaceful coexistence 
across the Strait. Wanting to think and act in the context of globalization and the 
global community, Chen’s administration proposed an innovative approach to 
achieving its four “strategic diplomatic objectives”: 1) ‘establishing a new 
balance of power [in the Taiwan Strait] that supports democratic Taiwan and 
cross-Strait peace’; 2) ‘promoting a multi-track diplomatic strategy to seek 
international support and to establish alliances based on shared values’; 3) 
‘adopting flexible tactics and applying creativity to seek support and recognition 
from the international community’; and 4) ‘carrying out a reform of foreign 
affairs and developing a foreign policy community’.92 An overall idea behind 
these four strategic diplomatic objectives was to establish ‘a framework of the 
global village’, an idea of global civil society, in which nations share rights and 
duties, as well as risk and rewards, based on mutual trust and interdependence 
under a mechanism of global governance.93 As Chen’s administration reckoned, 
‘such moves will enable Taiwan to expand its overall diplomatic strength and 
meet the challenges of increasingly complex international situations.’94  
 
With these four strategic goals in mind, Taipei proposed to pursue four 
perceived prevailing values closely linked to the idea of globalization, namely 
“democracy”, “peace”, “humanitarianism” and “mutual benefit”, in order to 
promote what was called “flexible and multi-track diplomacy”.95 In other words, 
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Taipei tried to shape its national strategy by appealing to the influential role of 
norms and beliefs associated with the idea of the global community in the 
globalization era. From the perspective of the Chen administration, the 
aforementioned four perceived values provided a moral ground on which Taipei 
could justify its head-to-head resistance to the unilateral unification claim of 
Beijing, because the PRC is associated with an authoritarian regime against 
democratic values, the use of force against peace, the neglect of Taiwan 
people’s rights, and a disposition for avoiding mutual benefit in the cross-Strait 
confrontation. By emphasizing these differences the cross-Strait sovereignty 
competition was to be highlighted once more as a moral confrontation between 
Taipei and Beijing. While Taiwan constituted a liberal democratic state tuned 
into the prevailing values of globalization, the PRC remained a communist 
authoritarian regime that threatened the integrity and vitality of Taiwan’s liberal 
democratic society. Accordingly, in the interests of democratic societies in the 
global community, Taipei under Chen’s government appealed to the global 
community to defend democratic Taiwan, to promote democracy in  
undemocratic countries such as China and to establish a framework ensuring 
peace and stability for cross-Strait interaction.96  
 
Chen’s administration had a firm belief that the assumptions about the global 
spread of values and thoughts of interdependence would benefit Taipei’s 
rapprochement strategy. While China could and would apply its overwhelming 
comprehensive power against Taiwan, Taipei’s counter-strategy to enhance its 
national capabilities was to appeal in the name of the values of “democracy”, 
“peace”, “humanitarianism” and “mutual benefit” to be allowed to comply with 
the trend of globalization so as to attract international support in withstanding 
Beijing’s threats. As such, Taipei’s willingness to bring into play the 
attractiveness and persuasiveness of its culture, its political ideas and foreign 
policies constitute the use of so-called “soft power”.97  Positioning Taipei 
against Beijing and its reliance on hard power, President Chen himself used to 
quote the Chinese Taoist dictum, that “the pliant and weak will conquer the hard 
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and strong” (rouruo sheng gangqiang) as an inspiration behind his national 
grand strategy. Put differently, to use “soft power” was a strategy, which was 
more promising for a small state such as Taiwan in the face of China’s threats. 
As Chen said, ‘if the international society is convinced that we [Taiwan] have 
done our best in goodwill, we should not be regarded as a troublemaker. 
Accordingly, the international society will support our stance of peace, 
reconciliation and benevolence on cross-Strait relations.’98 Adopting a strategy 
that relied on balancing rather than a bandwagoning to manage its strategic 
environment in the face of China’s coercive zero-sum diplomatic blockade, the 
administration’s appeal to alliances based on the “shared values” of the global 
civil society to improve Taiwan’s strategic environment in the globalization era 
reflected the importance of ideational factors as a constant key aspect of 
Taiwan’s national grand strategy.  
 
The Challenge of the Rise of China 
 
Taipei’s emphasis on “shared values” in a globalizing world was closely related 
to the way in which it dealt with the daunting challenges associated with the rise 
of China.  It is believed that ‘the single most important development in the 
post-Cold War world’ is China’s rise as a great power.99 This rise was fuelled 
by China’s rapid economic growth and a dramatic increase in its comprehensive 
national power that likely enables China to possess the capability and 
confidence to direct in its favour development of cross-Strait unification. In the 
2006 National Security Report, Taipei asserted that ‘China’s rise and strategic 
expansion’ would produce ‘a profound effect on the future strategic situation in 
the East Asia region as well as the world’ and have ‘a great impact on Taiwan’s 
security environment’. 100 Taipei highlighted two ‘most noteworthy points’ 
concerning the impact of China’s rise on Taiwan: namely as regards (1) 
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‘China’s promotion of its maritime strategy’ and (2) ‘the role which it plays in 
East Asia’s regional integration process’.101 On the one hand, China’s maritime 
strategy is shifting from ‘coastal defence’ (jinghai fangyu) to ‘offshore defence’ 
(jingyan fangyu) as Beijing pursues comprehensive maritime power, which will 
be consonant with the demands of its domestic economic development and 
entail a future naval force that can perform in certain operational scenarios. This 
includes an ability of warding off challenges over sovereignty claims amid the 
maritime interests of Taiwan, Japan, the US, India and the Southeast Asian 
states.102 At the same time, the Chen administration believed that the rise of 
China, associated with its expansionist geo-strategy, meant that China would 
inevitably ‘challenge US and Japanese status in the region’ and eventually 
‘dominate East Asia without needing to engage in war’ by virtue of its growing 
economic and diplomatic influence.103 Taipei analysed the way in which China 
sought to increase its influence over its neighbours, which during the Chen 
government involved ‘establishing a free trade zone, holding strategic talks, 
carrying out security cooperation, building up multilateral mechanism and 
conducting “big power diplomacy”.’104 It was in this context that the Chen 
administration endeavoured to manage its strategic environment in response to 
the rise of China, which caused a gradual structural change in Beijing’s favour 
and brought serious strategic challenges to Taipei.         
 
One of Taipei’s most important methods to combat the perceived threat of 
China’s rise was to appeal to the international order105from the emerging global 
society for the pursuit of upholding the cross-Strait status quo. In the 2006 
National Security Report, the DPP government repeatedly invoked the globalist 
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perspective on international order that Taiwan favoured, among other, 
interdependence, the non-use of force, co-operative security, and liberal 
democratic values .106 The government then began to raise questions about the 
phenomenon of the rise of China and argued that ‘China’s threats against 
Taiwan are pervasive and the international community has misgivings over 
China’s “non-peaceful rise” and its strategic expansion, with some even seeing 
this rise as a global threat.’107 Vowing to balance the growing “China threat”, 
the Chen administration emphasized the importance and advantages of Taiwan’s 
geo-strategic position and pledged that Taiwan would be ‘the “steadying 
anchor” in maintaining a stable, peaceful and free East Asia and North 
Pacific.’108 According to Muthiah Alagappa, there are three prevailing primary 
goals of the regional security order in Asia: “national survival”, “national 
prosperity” and “regional peace and stability”.109 Because these three primary 
goals are shared by Taiwan, the national strategy of the Chen administration was 
to reinforce the existing security order by arguing that China was an 
expansionist power in the region, so as to improve the strategic environment of 
Taiwan and reduce the effects of its diplomatic isolation. If Beijing had used 
military coercion and invaded Taiwan for the purpose of cross-Strait unification, 
it would seriously have destabilized the regional order, because it would have 
been obvious that Beijing was not only making an example of Taiwan by using 
military means to resolve the question of its proclaimed territory but was also 
demonstrating its long-term geopolitical and strategic ambitions as a revisionist 
power in the region. President Chen characterized Beijing’s unilateral 
cross-Strait unification policy as a “Chinese Monroe Doctrine”, which was 
designed to preserve and promote China’s superiority not only across the 
Taiwan Strait but also across the whole of the Asia-Pacific region.110 The Chen 
administration’s expansive tactic of using the “China threat” was designed to 
internationalize the cross-Strait confrontation by linking the so-called “China 
                                                
106 National Security Council (2006) ‘Taiwan’s New Security Environment’, Chapter 2, pp. 
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109 Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) (2003), ‘Constructing Security Order in Asia’, in Muthiah Alagappa 
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threat”111 with China’s rise so as to draw in possible international involvement 
to Taipei’s advantage.   
 
Because Taiwan sought to involve external powers to better resist the perceived 
threat of the rise of China, it comes as no surprise that the Chen administration 
intended to benefit diplomatically from upholding the role of other powers in the 
existing regional order. From President Chen’s perspective, the core of Taiwan’s 
grand strategy, as he saw it, focused on improving its strategic environment by 
linking the fate of Taiwan with the existing security order of Pacific Asia, which 
was centred on the US-Japan alliance. Taiwan thus had to work within the 
American-led regional order.112 It is worth noting that the Chen administration 
highlighted ‘Japan’s pursuit of becoming a “normal country” side by side with 
‘the rise of China’ as the two influential dynamic changes in the East Asia 
security order.113 However, unlike its negative perspective on the rise of China, 
the anti-one-China administration explicitly welcomed Japan’s moves towards 
becoming more of a “normal country” and the recommendation that Japan 
should play a more active role in international society, e.g. by becoming a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, in accordance with its 
economic power. It also held that in order to maintain regional order Japan’s 
government should seek to revise Article 9 of Japan’s Peace Constitution, in 
which Japan committed itself to ‘[renouncing] war and [renouncing] the 
maintenance of armed forces’, so as to unleash the strength which it had gained 
from operating in the context of the US-Japan security alliance.114 Given 
                                                
111 The theory of the “China threat” mainly derives from the realist view of power and 
competition in an anarchic world. For further discussion of this, see, for example, Rex Li (2004) 
‘Security Challenge of an Ascendant China’, pp. 24-30.  
112 Chen Shui-bian (2001) The Maiden Voyage into the New Century, p.105, (my translation). 
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113 National Security Council (2006) ‘Taiwan’s New Security Environment’, Chapter 2, pp. 13. 
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“self-defence forces”- and should use them as most countries do, for instance, to participate in 
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Constitution, Article 9, states that Japan would ‘renounce war, and renounce the maintenance of 
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114 National Security Council (2006), “2006 National Security Report”, Chapter 2, pp. 16-20. 
For a discussion of Japan’s national security strategy, see for example Richard J. Samuels (2007) 
Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Cornell, Ithaca: Cornell 
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historical issues, geostrategic competition, territorial disputation and a resurgent 
nationalism in both countries, Taipei assumed that ‘contradictions between 
Japan and China are not a transient phenomenon, but an objective reality’.115 
Taipei’s realist perspective on Japan’s role in the East Asia security order 
reflected the significance accorded to a classical balance of power strategy to 
manage the effects of the rise of China.  
 
Accordingly, it is clear that Taipei’s method of handling the effects of the rise of 
China was to pursue regional peace and stability by upholding US hegemony in 
general and the balance of power arrangement between a rising China and the 
normalizing Japan. Chen’s pro-Japan policy is understandable under the 
conversational wisdom of the balance of power, but a major question remains: 
does Japan really have the will and capacity to check China, not least on 
Taiwan’s behalf? Unless this question is answered in Taiwan’s favour, this 
pro-Japan strategy could more likely have been counter-productive for Taipei, in 
particular when one takes into account the factor of nationalism associated with 
Sino-Japanese historical animosity. While the states of the region at times also 
worried whether Taiwan would become a revisionist power, in terms of 
pursuing so-called “Taiwanese independence”, which challenged the existing 
regional order, the pro-independence government repeatedly pledged to behave 
like a “responsible stakeholder” rather than a “trouble maker” in the region and 
promised that Taipei would not seek to change the status quo regarding 
cross-Strait relations.116 Indeed, the Chen administration clarified that unless 
China initiated military action to deny Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty, it was 
unlikely that Taipei would formally declare independence, in accordance with 
President Chen’s “Five Noes”. As a result, as long as there was competition for 
power between the US-Japan alliance and China, it would enable Taiwan, 
despite its diplomatic isolation, to link the cross-Strait confrontation with the 
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competition between the major powers in the name of maintaining the existing 
regional security order. As a result, Taipei would be able to internationalize the 
Taiwan issue to its own advantage. 
 
 
C.7.4 Taipei’s “Active Defensive” Posture: “Effective Deterrence, Resolute 
Defence” 
 
During Chen’s administration, Taiwan’s strategic posture was centred on the 
fundamental goal of preventing war across the Strait under the doctrine of 
“Effective Deterrence, Effective Defence”. This overall defensive posture for 
preventing war was the same as that of its predecessor under the KMT’s Lee 
Teng-hui. Nevertheless, Chen’s administration emphasised an ‘active defence’ 
posture which was different from Lee’s passive “resolute defence, effective 
deterrence” to Chen’s active equivalent: “effective deterrence, resolute 
defence” 117 . The Chen government’s focus on ‘active defence’ was 
characterized by its adoption of an offensive concept to a complex deterrent 
operation as a default approach to the objective of preventing war. 118 
Accordingly, with its “all-out defence” (quanmin guofang) policy, Taipei put 
into action a series of military reforms for the pursuit of ‘technological 
advancement, information and electronics superiority, joint interception and 
homeland defence’119 to integrate the military and civilian sectors and, in the 
interests of war prevention, to establish a strong defensive power with credible 





                                                
117 Ministry of National Defence (2006), “2006 National Defense Report”, (Taipei: Ministry of 
National Defence, ROC), pp.98-99. 
118 The practice of Taipei’s “active defence” involved in methods of developing ‘long-range, 
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and casualty. See “2006 National Defense Report”, p.99. 
119 Ibid. 
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Under President Chen’s leadership, Taiwan’s defence strategy identified three 
primary goals for its armed forces, listed in order of priority: (1) “preventing 
war”, (2) “defending the homeland” and (3) “countering terrorism and 
responding to contingencies”.120 For these purposes, Taipei’s military-related 
thinking and preparations were governed by the fundamental military doctrine 
of “effective deterrence, resolute defence” (youxiao hezu, fangwei gushou).121 
Compared with that of its KMT predecessors, perhaps one of the most distinct 
aspects of DPP military strategy for ‘preventing war’ was to prioritize 
‘deterrence’ (hezu), which focused on discouraging Beijing from making any 
pre-emptive military move, rather than focus on ‘defence’ (fangwei), with a 
view to reducing any possible damage resulting from military action on the part 
of Beijing.122 The emphasis on deterrence in the DPP’s military strategy well 
reflected the new priority in strategic posture, moving beyond the KMT’s 
“resolute defence, effective deterrence” to its “effective deterrence, resolute 
defence”.123 While emphasizing deterrence in its security strategy, the DPP’s 
commitment to deterrence remained purely conventional in practice, and did not 
involve a nuclear option. Accordingly, Taipei’s conventional deterrence, as John 
J. Mearsheimer put, was a function of the capability of denying an aggressor’s 
military objectives with conventional forces in the context of the battlefield.124    
 
The Ministry of National Defence (MND) defined the concept of “effective 
deterrence” as follows:  
 
‘By establishing effective deterrent counterstrike and defence capabilities 
and by deploying forces capable of effectively neutralizing or delaying 
enemy attacks, the enemy will be persuaded to give up any military 
                                                
120 Ministry of National Defence, “2004 National Defence Report”, (Taipei: Ministry of 
National Defence, ROC, 2004), Chapter 6.I 
121 Ibid. 
122 For a discussion of the content and differences between deterrence and defence, see Glenn H. 
Snyder (1961) Deterrence and Defence – Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press), pp.3-5. 
123 Ministry of National Defence (1998), “1998 National Defence Report”, (Taipei: Ministry of 
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ambition after rationally assessing the outcome.’125 
 
As this definition suggests, the strategy of “effective deterrence” was based on 
two interrelated components: the ability on the part of Taipei to launch a 
credible military counterattack, involving retaliation and denial; and Beijing’s 
rational analysis of potential costs, which would see risks that would outweigh 
possible gains achieved by the use of force. In practice, Taipei’s “effective 
deterrence” required, first, the credible capacity to launch a counterattack. It 
needed to be credible, not only to prevent the success of any surprise attack by 
protracting the conflict long enough to allow for possible international 
intervention by a third party, but also, more importantly, to retaliate against the 
invader at once as strongly as possible. In the view of the DPP government, it 
was time to rethink something which had been deliberately ignored since the 
1990s – the value of military retaliation in deterring China’s military actions – 
and to reconsider its purely passive defensive tactics. The second component of 
“effective deterrence” focused on forcing Beijing to make a rational calculation, 
in the sense of instrumentally adapting means to ends. It was assumed that, if 
Taipei’s capabilities for counterattack were actual and credible, they would 
increase Beijing’s concerns about the risk of defeat and the possible cost of any 
military options. Consequently, Beijing would be more likely to resolve the 
cross-Strait conflict by peaceful means rather than by resorting to the use of 
force.  
 
The core of the doctrine of “effective deterrence” then focused on the 
importance of having an active posture, strategic defence with offensive tactics, 
to strengthen Taiwan’s credibility in mounting its own defence. It suggested that 
after Beijing’s conventional first-strike, Taipei should still be able to wage war, 
drawing on its sea and air powers as well as missiles directed at mainland China 
to maximize the possible cost to the invader. It denied a free hand to Beijing to 
coerce or attack without any fear of punishment and was designed to check the 
invader’s military threats in time before it could launch any further destructive 
attack on Taiwan’s homeland. To implement this doctrine of active defence, 
                                                
125 Ministry of National Defence (2004), “2004 National Defence Report”, Chapter 6.I. 
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first proposed in June 2000, President Chen issued new guidelines for seeking  
“decisive battle outside the territory” (jue zhai jing wai).126 Considering the 
island terrain of Taiwan, the guidelines placed emphasis on the decisive role of 
naval and air forces and not on the army, with a view to engaging with the 
threats of the PLA in Chinese mainland for instance.127 Ballistic and cruise 
missiles were also crucial in the light of the new guidelines, which advocated 
that it was important to engage enemy threats outside the territory. In the 2006 
National Defence Report, the MND for the first time revealed the establishment 
of “special type missiles” (te zhong fei dan) as a counterattack measure.128 It is 
believed that at this stage Taiwan already possessed the Hsiung-Feng E-2 cruise 
missile with a range of over 600 km and was moving forward with an active 
programme of research focusing on the development of a tactical ballistic 
missile (Tien-Kung or Sky-Bow) with a maximum range of 1,000 km.129 Since 
this range encompassed China’s major cities and high-value targets, such as 
Shanghai and the Three Gorges Dam, these ballistic missiles and cruise missiles 
were intended to back up Taiwan’s “effective deterrence” doctrine, which aimed 
to counterattack any aggression from China with the hope of either deterring 
further hostile action or improving Taipei’s negotiation position. Although the 
credibility of Taiwan’s deterrence was problematic and largely rhetorical, given 
the limited arsenal of conventional missiles, the DPP government set out to do 
what was possible to augment Taiwan’s deterrent capability because it served an 
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Taiwan’s military doctrine of “resolute defence” (fangwei gushou) was designed 
for homeland defence, which would be conducted on the terrain of Taiwan, 
against an invasion by the PLA, which was assumed to be intent on gaining 
geographical possession of part or all of Taiwan’s territory. “Resolute defence” 
forms the second stage of Taipei’s war plan, which comes into play in the 
aftermath of the failure of “effective deterrence”. “Resolute defence” thus is a 
purely defensive posture, designed for the purpose of making it as difficult as 
possible for Beijing’s military invasion to conquer Taiwan and its people. MND 
defined “resolute defence” as follows: ‘Should deterrence fail and the enemy 
launches a military invasion against us, we will combine our comprehensive 
all-out defence capabilities and joint operation capabilities to firmly defend our 
homeland and stop, defeat and destroy the invading enemy.’130  
 
At the very heart of Taiwan’s “resolute defence” doctrine was the idea of 
“all-out defence”, which was to wage total war by mobilizing all the available 
national resources to defend the homeland. According to Article 3 of Taiwan’s 
National Defence Act, Taiwan’s national defence was ultimately based on 
“all-out defence”, which involves ‘affairs pertaining to military, civil defence 
and those in [the] political, economic, psychological and technological 
domains.’131 Taipei’s “All-out defence”, as had been claimed, had five key 
themes.132 First, the nature of “all-out defence” was total and comprehensive, 
because the theatre of defence involved the whole territory of Taiwan and the 
forms of defence referred to a comprehensive set of capabilities relating to its 
overall national power. The concept of ‘total and comprehensive’ in “all-out 
defence” was reflected in Taipei’s statement that ‘national security is everyone’s 
duty and everyone is responsible for national defence construction.’133 Second, 
with regard to the possibility of a massive attack by China, Taipei’s “all-out 
defence” demanded the active participation of the whole population in the 
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defence effort. In safeguarding the nation there could be no distinction between 
the general populace and the military. Not military forces alone but the total 
nation must conduct the defence. Thus, the effective execution of “all-out 
defence” demanded the adaptation of the military-civilian mobilisation system 
for the purpose of defence. Third, the doctrine argued that the participation of 
large masses in “all-out defence” made it crucial to devote special effort, by 
means of political warfare, to morale and generating consensus at home. In other 
words, Taipei in particular was concerned about the non-violent threats 
emanating from Beijing, for example, its application of “three-fold warfare”, 
which refers to “legal contention”, “propaganda contests” and “psychological 
assaults”. 134  From Taipei’s perspective, the success of “all-out defence” 
depended not only on material resources but also, more importantly, on drawing 
on ideational factors, e.g. determination and consensus, for resistance against the 
enemy’s invasion. Fourth, preparations for “all-out defence” must begin before 
the outbreak of any overt military clash. During peacetime, all preparatory 
measures concerning military, economic or psychological factors and 
technological infrastructure would influence substantially the readiness for 
combat in the event of an enemy attack. Fifth, in order to achieve an integrated 
and efficient defence effort during the war, “all-out defence” would be directed 
by one centralized administrative and operational authority, that of the 
commander-in-chief, the President.135  
 
“Resolute defence” referred to the homeland’s “all-out defence” which served as 
Taiwan’s last defensive line and relates to matters of life or death for the state. 
Although there were two types and stages within Taiwan’s military doctrine, the 
above-mentioned “effective deterrence and resolute defence”, the 
implementation of Taiwan’s overall military strategy was seriously deficient if 
either of them was missing. The concepts of “effective deterrence” and “resolute 
defence” were interrelated and each of them was always in play to a greater or 
lesser extent in a dynamic strategic context. This was a strategy of blending 
defence with the implementation of deterrence and grounding deterrence within 
the defence infrastructure. Nevertheless, despite all Taiwan’s military efforts in 
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relation to “resolute defence” and “effective deterrence”, the prevailing external 
assessment of Taiwan’s “homeland defence”, such as the RAND expert Michael 
D. Swaine, is that Taiwan is incapable of resisting an all-out and prolonged 
attack from the PRC without international assistance, namely, that of the United 
States.136 The Chen administration was also in agreement. In March 2005, 
Minister of Defence General Lee Jye publicly reached a similar but more 
pessimistic conclusion, namely that Taiwan’s military possessed ‘enough 
equipment and supplies to sustain a conflict with the Mainland for two weeks at 
most.’137 To the extent that the DPP government considered “resolute defence” 
doomed, it is clear why Taipei prioritised the “effective deterrence” option in 
the first place, associated with its “active defence” (ji-ji fang-wei) strategic 




The implementation of the military doctrine of “effective deterrence, resolute 
defence” was linked to Taiwan’s military reform, which here refers to a process 
of self-improvement to pursue the most efficient and excellent military 
performance. This raises the basic question: what should be the primary areas of 
Taiwan’s military self-improvement to match its proposed task? Although 
Taiwan’s military reforms were extremely wide-ranging in scope, there were 
three key areas that the DPP government identified in terms of military 
reform: 139 the reconstruction of Taiwan’s military organization and force 
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structure, the establishment of a joint operational capability and the acquisition 
of modern weapon systems. 
 
The first of the DPP’s military reforms concerned the reconstruction of 
Taiwan’s military organization and force structure. Under the new legislation, 
the National Defence Act (2003) and the Organization Act of the MND (2002), 
the DPP’s reconstruction of military organization was central to promoting the 
“nationalization” (quojia hua) of Taiwan’s armed forces. This refers to a 
reinforcement of the rule that civilian-led armed forces should maintain 
neutrality towards all political parties and strengthen the relations between 
themselves and democratic civil society. The organizational reconstruction also 
involved integrating the command system of the General Staff Headquarters 
(GSH) with the administrative system of the MND. In the new defence system, 
the civilian Defence Minister thus came to be in charge of both the military 
command and the administrative system, under the direct orders of the President. 
President Chen praised the reconstruction as ‘the most important change in our 
national defence system.’140 With regard to the reconstruction of Taiwan’s force 
structure, the DPP government passed the “ROC Armed Forces Refining 
Program”, which was designed to (1) simplify the command structure of the 
armed forces, (2) downsize the units of the Army, (3) integrate and eliminate 
units and organizations with similar functions and (4) achieve appropriate 
proportions of staffing in the various branches of the armed forces.141 Guided 
by “The Military Service Comprehensive Review and Steering Task Force”, the 
MND also introduced a new military service system for Taiwan’s armed forces 
to convert the existing enlistment-oriented system to a conscription-oriented 
system, so as to be able to rely on highly professional military personnel in an 
era of information and technological warfare. 142  All of these, military 
organization, force structure and military personnel reconstruction, related to a 
single theme: the establishment of greater military professionalism to serve the 
liberal democratic government.  
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The second area of the DPP’s military reforms focused on establishing a joint 
operational capability.143  Central to this objective was the pursuit of the 
so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA), which depended on the 
high-tech-based “system of systems”, a system that would ‘collect, process, fuse 
and communicate information and … apply military force.’ 144  The 
implementation of the joint capability reform includes the following steps: the 
construction of the C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems to provide crucial 
information for jointly engaging the enemy at the right time and right place; the 
integration of various weapons platforms to maximize their potential fighting 
capabilities; the improvement of the joint operational command mechanism to 
unify interdiction operations against the enemy; and the formulation of joint 
operational doctrines to improve joint force training and performance. Taipei’s 
focus on establishing joint operational capabilities served to ‘strengthen the 
effectiveness of joint forces and synchronize the efforts of forces from the army, 
navy and air force.’145  
 
The third area of Taipei’s military reform concerned the pursuit of task-oriented 
modern weapon systems, which was mainly suggested and supported by the 
United States.146 During the DPP regime, major items in the government’s 
procurement of advanced modern weapon systems included automatic command 
and control systems (Project Program C4IRS), KIDD class destroyers, 
long-range defensive radar programs, a ballistic missile defence system (the 
PAC-3 system), follow-up counter-sea forces (P3-C long-range anti-submarine 
aircraft), diesel-electric submarines and F16C/D jetfighters.147 To stop the 
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continued decline of Taiwan’s military spending after 1994, the Chen 
administration, to improve its military infrastructure, decided in 2006 to raise its 
national defence budget to 3 percent of its GDP per year until the end of his 
presidency.148 The buildup of modern weapons systems also related to the 
effect of the defence and industry integration policy in strengthening the 
research and development of defence technologies and weapons systems. These 
modern weapons systems would improve Taipei’s capabilities to counter a 
possible preemptive long-range precision strike by China and thus ensure the 
continuity of government and the protection of critical infrastructure. The 
primary purpose of acquiring a modern weapons system was to enhance 
Taiwan’s combat capabilities in order to compensate for its numerical 
disadvantages and help to maintain a fragile cross-Strait military balance.   
 
The DPP government embarked on the process of military reform in 2000. The 
reconstruction of Taiwan’s military organization and the structure of its forces 
was an impressive achievement, as regards the “nationalization” of Taiwan’s 
armed forces in particular. With American assistance, the DPP government also 
made some progress in constructing its C4ISR system to improve its joint 
operational capabilities. Nevertheless, due to the KMT’s opposition in the 
Legislative Yuan, the DPP government failed to procure major new weapons 
systems. Eventually, this failure led to concern in Washington over Taiwan’s 
will to defend itself.149 To prevent Taipei from adopting extraordinary measures 
against Beijing, Washington kept a close eye on the DPP’s military reform and 
discouraged the development of Taiwan’s offensive capabilities, e.g. ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  As a result, the 
achievements of the DPP’s military reform were undermined by the 
combination of domestic handicaps and foreign constraints, even though 
Taipei’s primary goal of military reform was associated with the idea of “active 
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148 National Security Council (2006), “2006 National Security Report”, p.88. 
149  American Institute in Taiwan (2006), Press Conference, October 2006, at 
(http://ait.org.tw/en/news/speeches/docs/20061026-dir.pdf) (accessed on 21 April 2010); 
Michael A. Needham and John J. Tkacik, Jr. (2006) Grim Future of Taiwan Defence, The 
Heritage Foundation, WebMemo #1243, 31 Oct 2006, at 
(http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1243.cfm) (accessed on 21 April 
2010). 
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defence” to enhance Taiwan’s deterrent capabilities against a military threat 
from China.  
 
 
C.7.5 Conclusions: Taiwan’s Grand Strategy under Chen Shui-bian from 
2000-2008  
 
Given the unacceptable consequences that any war across the Strait would have, 
Taiwan’s grand strategy under President Chen Shui-bian’s leadership rested on 
the primary strategic goal of “preventing war” associated with the “Five Noes” 
doctrine, under the self-determination formula proposed by the 1999 Resolution 
of Taiwan’s Future. The resolution accepted the element in the status quo across 
the Strait that the DPP government accepted the name of the ROC and would 
not declare Taiwan’s independence. While Chen proclaimed his government to 
be in favour of the status quo, the main difference between him and his 
predecessor Lee Teng-hui was Chen’s distinct perspective of ‘the ROC is 
Taiwan’ associated with endorsing the self-determination formula and the 
explicit objection to Beijing’s one-China principle. Chen adopted a 
comprehensive approach, giving particular emphasis to consolidating Taiwan’s 
domestic political consensus and enhancing its international connections to 
refocus its national grand strategy in the context of the cross-Strait sovereignty 
confrontation. This chapter has argued that the re-evaluation and refashioning of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy under President Chen Shui-bian’s distinct sovereignty 
perspective was pursued with respect to four interrelated themes, namely the 
centrism of “the New Middle Road”, the preservation of Taiwan’s sovereignty 
through the “status quo”, the pursuit of internationalizing the Taiwan issue, and 
the modified military doctrine of “effective deterrence, resolute defence”. First, 
while President Chen advocated the centrist idea of “the New Middle Road” to 
map out the national strategy focused in essence on rapprochement to reduce the 
tensions across the Strait, his administration clearly failed to persuade China to 
accept his proposed cross-Strait interaction framework for this purpose. China’s 
refusal to engage through dialogue with Chen’s administration well reflected 
Beijing’s hostility toward the government, but China’s negative perspective on 
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Chen’s administration also meant losing a valuable opportunity to directly 
discuss the unification issue with the DPP government.   
 
Second, while Chen’s government endeavoured to maintain Taiwan’s economic 
development and reduce the impact of the deepening cross-Strait economic 
relations, Chen’s administration placed the preservation of Taiwan’s sovereignty 
as the prime goal of its national grand strategy. To circumvent any accusation of 
conspiring to bring about Taiwanese independence, Chen’s strategy for 
preserving Taiwan’s statehood was to legitimize the existing separation between 
Taiwan and China with reference to the cross-Strait status quo, under which the 
ROC was Taiwan. Nevertheless, while insisting that Taiwan was an independent 
sovereign state, the government, in advocating self-determination surprisingly 
accepted that a future “one China” was possible under the precondition of a total 
consensus from the Taiwanese people. By doing so, the government hoped to 
resolve the dilemma of sovereign competition across the Strait. In the event, 
Chen’s reconciled stance on the “one China” issue was rejected by Beijing and 
the pan-Blue camp. As a result, Chen had little choice but to adhere to what he 
called the “bottom-line” of safeguarding Taiwan’s own sovereignty, not least by 
resisting Beijing’s claims of the one-China principle. Third, Chen’s 
administration emphasized the vital influence of external powers, principally the 
United States, the impact of globalization and the rise of China, which were all 
seen to matter in Taipei’s management of its strategic environment. Chen’s 
efforts to enlist international involvement and support was in fact monopolized 
by efforts to promote its strategic ties with the United States, given that 
Washington was by then the only country in the world which had the will, the 
power and the commitment to impose a peaceful resolution across the Strait. 
However, as the differences between Taipei and Washington gradually became 
visible due to the US global war on terrorism and the complexity of Taiwan’s 
domestic politics, the support from the Bush administration to Chen’s 
government was dynamic rather than consistent. While endorsing the US-led 
international order in East Asia, Chen also invoked a globalist perspective, 
highlighting “democracy”, “peace”, “humanitarianism” and “mutual benefit”. 
By appealing to these values, Taipei also hoped to be in a better position to 
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defend itself against Beijing’s pressure. Indeed, Chen’s administration built on 
the notion of “allies based on shared values” to reinforce the existing regional 
security order so as to counterbalance the increasing challenge of China’s rise . 
Finally, Chen’s defensive strategic posture of “effective deterrence, resolute 
defence” served the ultimate goal of preventing war. The DPP government paid 
particular attention to the value of military offensive options to deter war across 
the Strait and embarked on Taiwan’s military reforms to achieve greater 
efficiency and excellence in military performance in the context of 
implementing its “active defence” doctrine of “effective deterrence, resolute 
defence”. 
 
Chen’s administration highlighted two strategic pillars within its national grand 
strategy, namely consolidating “a democratic Taiwan committed to sustainable 
development” and “pursuing dialogue and seeking peace”, to advance the 
nation’s long-term development.150 The first strategic pillar involved promoting 
democratic values at home, as well as protecting the idea of popular sovereignty 
and sustaining the economic prosperity and social justice needed for domestic 
consolidation. This strategy of consolidation on the domestic front was also 
expected to deal with the increasing threat of Beijing’s United Front; the second 
then concerns cross-Strait relations and focused on “establishing a peace and 
stability framework for cross-Strait interactions”. Nevertheless, given its refusal 
to compromise on its sovereignty stance in exchange for Beijing’s “one-China” 
principle, the self-determination stance of Chen’s administration prevented any 
progress on cross-Strait relations. Furthermore, the achievements of Chen’s 
administration, in terms of national grand strategy, were seriously undermined 
by the KMT’s control of the Legislative Yuan. Notably, the KMT blocked the 
DPP’s proposed military budget to massively upgrade its major weapons 
systems more than 60 times.151  The credibility of Chen’s administration was 
also severely damaged by President Chen’s controversial leadership and 
problematic family issues, in that in his second term Chen and his wife were 
                                                
150 National Security Council (2006), “2006 National Security Report”, p. iv. 
151 Useful discussion about KMT’s opposition to Chen’s military budget see Chase (2008) 
Taiwan’s Security Policy, pp.87-105.  
 309 
charged with embezzlement.152 This was perhaps an ironic and tragic end for 
the first non-nationalist administration, which thereby not only lost a very rare 
chance to prove itself a capable government, but also disappointed its supporters, 
who had regarded the DPP as more efficient and less corruptible than the KMT. 
In other words, the Taiwanese independence movement suffered a significant 
setback because of mainly domestic issues rather than external developments. In 
the end, the DPP government’s failures led to the resumption of power by the 
KMT. In summary, constituted as the first non-KMT government in Taiwan 
since 1949, Chen’s administration left a legacy in relation to Taiwan’s grand 
strategy which is controversial rather than fruitful.    
 
 
                                                
152 ‘Taiwan President Pledges Response to Allegation’, Washington Post, 5 November 2006, at 
(http://www.taiwansecurity.org/WP/2006/WP-051106.htm) (accessed on 21 April 2010). For 
more details of Chen’s allegation see in the section ‘Chen Shui-bian and Embezzlement 





Chapter 8 Conclusions and Implications:  




A nation’s grand strategy centres on the way in which a nation perceives itself 
and the outside world in the context of applying all available resources to the 
pursuit of its proposed national interests. This thesis has argued that Taiwan’s 
grand strategy (TGS) over the past six decades has been driven by a prime 
factor: to secure the perspective of the ROC’s sovereign status as understood by 
Taipei’s leaders. This primary aim has constantly been threatened by the twin 
threats of Beijing’s resolute claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and its 
overwhelming comprehensive national power. The decision-making process in 
relation to formulating the TGS, as argued in this thesis, has been closely 
associated with the exercise of exclusive presidential power. This is true both 
for the authoritarian regime that ruled the island from 1949 to 1988 and the 
democratic era thereafter.1 The evolution of Taiwan’s grand strategy has quite 
evidently been conditioned by the cross-Strait confrontation, changes in the 
international context, the unique strategic perspective of the Presidents, 
domestic political developments and the Taiwan-China asymmetry of national 
power. This thesis has proceeded by examining of three key questions: what has 
been the core of TGS, in what ways has the TGS been consistently practised 
and how has the substance of TGS changed over time? To answer these 
questions, the thesis began by developing an analytical framework for exploring 
the concept of grand strategy, which set out to offer an understanding of the 
development of Taiwan’s grand strategy. 
 
As grand strategy, also referred to as national strategy in this dissertation, is a 
policy-relevant activity, this thesis has suggested that the conceptual framework 
for understanding strategy needs to take account of the strategic actor’s 
                                                
1  President Chen Shui-bian did not enjoy as much exclusive presidential power as his 
predecessors had, because of the poor design of Taiwan’s constitutional design and its polarized 
identity politics, as described in chapter 7. Given his initiatives in the reform of its defence 
reform, the national security outline and the sovereignty issue, for instance, Chen relatively is 
still Taiwan’s  most prominent leading figure in terms of building its grand strategy. 
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capabilities as well as ideational factors affecting choices, the environment in 
which that actor operates, as well as the overall approach or posture that is 
adopted to further or defend its proposed strategic choices.  First, strategic 
choice is about the question of why the state decides on, which has to strike a 
balance between desired ends and available means. Why strategic choices are 
made with respect to what is at stake as the expected outcome is the central 
concern of the ends-means reconciliation in the realm of grand strategy. Second, 
a state’s strategic capability concerns the question of what resources the state 
possesses. Significantly, while capabilities often tend to be associated with 
material resources, this thesis also highlights the importance of emphasising 
ideas and creativity as resources that decision-makers may possess.  Third, the 
strategic environment concerns the question of where the state is situated, 
which entails that strategic actors have to identify merits and restrictions about 
the strategic environment, which is mutual constructed by the strategic relations 
between structure and agency. Fourth, the strategic posture concerns the 
question of how the state responds, which must explore the synthesis of offence 
and defence as a way of ascertaining the success of the strategic choice.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that strategy is a self-referential practice, 
because it is in the context of the practice of strategy that these four questions 
matter in the analysis of strategy. In other words, strategic reasoning is a 
blending analytical activity which incorporates why they behave, what actors 
are capable of, in what contexts they operate and how they respond. Strategy 
thus can be understood as a process of convergent activity in which a cognitive 
actor takes actions to create and manipulate power, so as to attain its proposed 
choices in a perceived dynamic environment.   
 
The goals of this thesis have been twofold. First, in its specific intention, it has 
sought to provide an alternative approach to strategic analysis, by introducing 
the kind of convergent analysis described above and by doing so to enrich the 
existing approaches to strategic studies, which have generally been classified 
somewhere on the spectrum between war-centred and peace-centred 
perspectives of strategy. Second, in its overall intention, the central goal of this 
thesis has been to offer an account of the development of Taiwan’s grand 
strategy since 1949, from Chiang Kai-shek to Chen Shui-bian. To this end, it 
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has examined what are identified here as the six major crises across the Taiwan 
Strait. In this concluding chapter, the main tasks are to offer a brief summary of 
the conclusions, to discuss the implications of the main findings and to outline 




C.8.1 Summary of Chapters 
 
In Chapter 2, “An Analytical Framework of Grand Strategy”, this thesis 
outlined an on-going debate in the strategic studies literature between classical 
war-centred and neo-classical peace-centred strategic perspectives. Trying to 
bridge these different perspectives, the thesis opted for what was introduced as a 
convergent approach which would enable this study to take into account various 
levels of analysis and to fuse both the war and peace perspectives. This 
convergent approach emphasizes the duality of ideational and material factors, 
the reconciliation of ends and means, the interdependence of agents and 
structures as well as and the synthesis of defence and offence. It aims to provide 
for a convergent framework for strategic analysis than are offered by the war 
and the peace-centred approaches to strategy. The argument is that the analyst 
must identify the ideational and material factors that impinge on the decision-
making in relation to strategy and that it is necessary to take full account of both 
ends and means to understand why decision-makers opt for any particular 
choice. Also the framework is able to highlight how contexts shape decisions 
and how decisions create new contexts. The framework moreover puts the 
spotlight on whether decision-makers rely on defensive or offensive postures or 
how they combine both of these. As such, the convergent approach aims to 
overcome the narrowness, partiality and one-sidedness of any particular 
perspective, such as the military-oriented, diplomatic-oriented, material-
oriented, neo-realist or neo-liberalist strategic perspective, in the complex realm 
of analyzing strategy. The contribution of this thesis is then in part to have 
established an alternative and viable analytical framework to enrich, to some 
extent, the subject of strategic studies in general and to have applied this 
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framework to the analysis of the development of Taiwan’s grand strategy in 
particular.   
 
In Chapter 3, “The First and Second Military Crises in the Taiwan Strait, 1954-
5 and 1958”, I analysed Taiwan’s grand strategy under the Chinese Nationalist 
government, which withdrew to Taiwan after losing the Chinese civil war to the 
Chinese Communists in October 1949. Initially, the authoritarian regime of 
Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) pursued the survival and integrity of the ROC’s 
sovereignty by adopting an outward-looking strategic choice: planning to retake 
Mainland China and eradicate the PRC. Mindful of CKS’s ‘one-China’ 
principle, whereby ‘the ROC was China’, CKS’s outward-look choice was 
integral to the sovereignty claim over China as a whole and challenged the 
legitimacy of the PRC accordingly. Other options, such as to accept the status 
quo by allowing two Chinas to coexist across the Strait, were not contemplated 
although they might have constituted a favourable outcome for Washington, 
Taipei’s military ally.2 As regards military strategy, Taipei adopted a strategic-
offensive posture, being relentlessly bent on staging an attack to retake 
mainland China if the opportunity arose. 
 
At the time, Taiwan’s grand strategy built on two key assumptions: one related 
to the island’s strategic environment; the other to the importance given to ideas, 
broadly understood. From Taipei’s perspective, the ROC enjoyed a favourable 
strategic situation as a result of the US strategic focus of global containment to 
prevent the expansion of a hostile international Communism. During the 1954-5 
and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises, which were both initiated by PRC attacks on the 
offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu, Taipei’s sought to maintain control over 
these remote offshore islands. This decision was very much in keeping with its 
strategic-offensive posture and regarded as indispensable in the context of a 
possible counter-attack. The two Strait crises did not radically depart from the 
context of the Chinese civil war between the ROC and the PRC. Both sides 
regarded the use of military force as an inevitable and desirable instrument to 
break the deadlock across the Strait. Beijing sought to probe Washington’s 
                                                
2 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey (2007) Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principles to 
Pragmatism (London: Routledge), p. 10. 
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security commitment to Taiwan. Taipei’s strategic-offensive posture at the same 
time demonstrated a strong belief in the power of ideas and spirit, which was 
expected to overcome its asymmetrical material disadvantage vis-à-vis Beijing. 
The assumptions about the eventual triumph of ideational power were derived 
from Chiang Kai-shek’s revolutionist belief in a global trend to anti-
communism, the lessons learnt from his experiences during the Chinese civil 
war, his moral convictions, and the preparedness to allow for an imaginative 
leap to think the unthinkable in seeking to retake Mainland China. 
 
Taiwan’s methods of dealing with the Communist military threat to the offshore 
islands in the two Strait crises played an important role in testing, as well as 
formulating and adjusting the content of Taiwan’s grand strategy. Notably, the 
ROC did pass the security test it had been given by attaining the goal of keeping 
the offshore islands.  However, the chapter argued that in the two Strait crises 
Taipei failed to acknowledge its strategic vulnerabilities and to make the most 
of its precious opportunities during the crises, when Beijing was generally being 
regarded by international society as an invader, by accepting the status quo 
across the Strait through international settlement. By this time, the peaceful 
coexistence of two de facto sovereign Chinas across the Strait was generally 
welcomed by international society, promoted by the anti-communist side in 
particular, a large element of which built on the fear that any change in the 
cross-Strait status quo at the height of the Cold War might impel an unwanted 
military clash between the two superpowers. In the end, Taipei’s overall 
offensive outward-looking strategic choice, focusing on Mainland China instead 
of the homeland Taiwan and pursuing change in the cross-Strait status quo by 
military means, produced negative strategic consequences for the period of 
international isolation that was to come.  
 
Chapter 4 examined Taiwan’s grand strategy after the decisive change in the 
island’s strategic environment as a consequence of the “Nixon shock”. The 
Nixon Shock rocked the very foundation of the US-Taiwan alliance and 
triggered the beginning of the end of Taipei’s international recognition, which 
culminated in the ROC’s expulsion from the United Nations in October 1971. 
After the second Strait crisis in 1958, Taiwan’s grand strategy had remained 
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largely unaltered, at least in the sense of its outward-looking focus, which was 
underpinned by the adamant refusal to accept the status quo across the Strait. 
Taipei’s relevant military preparation had peaked again during the Cultural 
Revolution in the 1960s. At this time, it was the US that regularly restrained the 
ROC’s strategic ambitions. Significantly, however, Taipei’s outward-looking 
strategic orientation in conjunction with its offensive posture came under even 
greater pressure as the strategic environment changed in two fundamental ways: 
(1) international détente moved ahead; (2) the Sino-Soviet split turned violent. 
Consequently, when Nixon subordinated the Taiwan issue in favour of 
rapprochement with the PRC, Taipei was forced to revise its very assumptions 
on the overall strategic environment and whether Taiwan’s strategic role was 
still relevant to the free world and especially the US.  
 
In the face of  the unfavourable change in its strategic environment, CKS’s 
preconception of the ROC’s sovereign status remained, but he adjusted his 
strategic-offensive posture from military counter-attack to political counter-
attack. This modified strategy, which re-emphasized the importance of political 
warfare over military means, was encapsulated in the doctrine of “70 percent 
political work and 30 percent military effort”. This doctrine had already been 
introduced in 1958 when Taipei half-heartedly renounced the use of force 
across the Strait in the second Strait crisis under pressure from Washington. 
Despite the gradual change in the 1960s to a strategic environment in Beijing’s 
favour, Taipei had continued to aspire to its ultimate strategic goal of retaking 
Mainland China and contested any challenge to its claim to sovereignty in 
international society. That Taiwan was so relentlessly insistent on being the 
world’s one and only legitimate representative of China had always been 
regarded as an international joke. This attitude was reinforced as Washington 
opted for rapprochement with Beijing. Soon thereafter Taipei lost its seat at the 
most important international organization, the United Nations. In the end, 
Taipei’s strategic choice of pursuing a sovereignty competition against Beijing 
drew it into a dangerous strategic situation: that of a small state facing off a 
much stronger power in conditions of international isolation.  
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A major argument developed in this chapter was that, facing all these 
fundamental changes in its strategic environment, Taipei took its national 
sovereign status as read and ignored the consequences of international isolation 
on the sovereignty issue. Chiang Kai-shek’s administration initially misjudged 
the changes in the international environment and consequently failed to respond 
flexibly to the unfavourable conditions, finally losing the diplomatic battle to 
defend the sovereign status of the ROC in the international arena. The main 
reason for this was attributed to Chiang Kai-shek’s insistence on the “one-
China” principle and uncompromisingly fighting a sovereignty competition 
against the PRC.  This strategic choice served as the single most important 
characteristic of Taiwan’s grand strategy and informed the application of its 
strategic resources, the leaders’ interpretation of their strategic environment and 
the adoption of Taiwan’s strategic posture in the 1960s and early 1970s. The 
chapter also showed that, after the expulsion from the UN, Taipei squandered 
what was probably the last opportunity for it to have made use of the influence 
of international organizations against Beijing’s unilateral claim to sovereignty.  
 
Chapter 5, entitled “The Challenges of Taiwan’s Self-Defence: the Uncertainty 
of Washington’s Security Commitment”, highlighted the crisis which resulted 
from the termination of the US-ROC diplomatic relations and the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. This period is referred to here as the third phase of Taiwan’s 
grand strategy, during Chiang Ching-kuo’s regime in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
The difference between Chiang Ching-Kuo’s (CCK) and Chiang Kai-shek’s 
(CKS) national grand strategy, in terms of defending the ROC’s sovereign 
survival, is marked. Compared with CKS’s outward-looking strategic choice, 
which emphasized a zero-sum competition across the Strait, CCK adopted a 
more flexible and realistic perspective on the ‘one China’ competition between 
Taipei and Beijing. Indeed, CCK came to the conclusion that an inward-looking 
strategic choice would be preferable: that is, to secure the ROC’s de facto 
sovereignty by focusing on its domestic development.  
 
When Washington withdrew its diplomatic recognition of the ROC in 1979, it 
was the first time in three decades that the ROC could no longer take for 
granted its national security, especially in the sovereignty term. The central task 
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of Taiwan’s grand strategy shifted from cross-Strait unification to securing the 
ROC’s sovereignty against Beijing without having the advantage of 
Washington’s formal recognition as a sovereign state and an unambiguous 
security guarantee. Adhering to the notion of “domestic concerns come first”, 
Taiwan sought to react to the change of its strategic environment by adopting an 
inward-looking doctrine, the purpose of which was ‘to develop Taiwan into a 
San Min Chu I [The Three Principles of the People by Sun Yat-sen] model 
province of China’. The inward-looking doctrine was by then vital, for two 
main reasons. First, for its obvious message: the development of Taiwan was 
prioritized as the state’s key mission, a message which was closely associated 
with the Chinese nationalist perspective on Taiwan’s status, a province of China. 
Second, for its underlying message: it maintained the continuity of ideological 
difference and sovereign competition between the ROC and the PRC. From 
CCK’s perspective, the ROC represented the free China and the PRC was still 
an illegitimate regime. The inward-looking strategic focus was a realistic and 
logical decision for Taipei. First, it served in part the purpose of countering the 
much stronger Communist opponent. In other words, Taipei sought to enhance 
its own strategic capability, or national comprehensive power, by fostering 
domestic development. Second, the decision also acknowledged that Taipei 
would not have much control over the given external context involving 
Washington and Beijing. The response was therefore to concentrate on the 
domestic context to enhance its own defence. Despite Taipei’s very limited 
influence on the external strategic environment, Taipei thus continually tried to 
alleviate the impact of the termination of the bilateral defence alliance and US-
ROC diplomatic relations. 
 
Not surprisingly, Taiwan’s grand strategy in CCK’s aimed to secure the 
political-military linkage with the US by lobbying for the passing of the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA). With this legislation, Washington committed itself to 
providing Taiwan with weapons for Taipei’s self-defence. More importantly, 
Washington also legally committed itself to the ‘peaceful resolution’ of the 
conflict across the Strait. To respond to the changes in the strategic environment 
in the 1980s, Taipei outlined a new strategic posture: a defensive-oriented 
deterrent strategy. This chapter showed that the deterrence posture included four 
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interrelated features: the endorsement of a non-offensive defense posture, a 
strategic plan to wage war on Taiwan during which a decisive battle would be 
fought, a willingness to accelerate a self-sustained military modernization effort 
in preparation for war, and the development of a nuclear deterrent capability to 
prevent war.  This chapter also demonstrated that during Chiang Ching-kuo’s 
authoritarian regime Taipei for the first time since 1949 moved beyond its zero-
sum competition against Beijing and developed in its place an appreciation of 
the choice of peace as a desired means and ends to compete with Beijing across 
the Strait. Furthermore, this chapter argued that it was only when the security of 
Taiwan was actually under threat that the KMT authoritarian regime started to 
commit itself to political reform, so as to justify the Nationalist rule and 
consolidate the domestic front against external challenges. While trying to 
pursue the goal of “unifying China under San Min Chu I”, Taiwan’s grand 
strategy during CCK’s regime focused on defending the ROC’s sovereign status 
by way of peaceful competition across the Strait and enhancing its overall 
strategic capability on the back of substantial economic success. CCK’s legacy 
of elevating domestic development above the cross-Strait issue and the strategic 
posture of deterrent-oriented measures has since then profoundly and 
permanently influenced Taiwan’s grand strategy. 
 
Chapter 6, “The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1995-96”, examined the fourth 
phase of Taiwan’s grand strategy, which stretched from the start of Lee Teng-
hui’s presidency in 1988, through to the turmoil of the third cross-Strait military 
crisis in 1995-96, to his controversial proposal of ‘a special state-to-state 
relationship’ in 1999. The most marked change in Taiwan’s grand strategy 
during Lee’s period was the dramatic shift of the vision of Taiwan from being in 
effect a means of carrying out the unification mission to being an end in itself. 
Indeed, during the presidencies of CKS and CCK, the main strategic purpose of 
Taiwan had been the fulfillment of national unification, either by way of CKS’s 
“counter-attack” or by focusing on CCK’s “model province of China”. It was 
the first time in four decades that the strategic choice outlined in Taiwan’s 
grand strategy had disconnected Taiwan from the burdensome mission of 
pursuing Chinese unification by recognizing the PRC’s legitimacy. This change 
can be understood by Lee’s perception that the ROC’s sovereign status was ‘the 
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ROC on Taiwan’ (ROCOT), which was different from CKS’s ‘the ROC as 
China’ and CCK’s ‘the ROC as the free China’. Nevertheless, given the 
sensitive nature of the competition for sovereignty across the Strait, Lee’s 
strategy of ROCOT was also designed to separate the issue of the ROC’s 
sovereign status from the issue of Chinese-Taiwanese ethnic division in the 
context of the deconstruction of Chinese nationalism within Taiwan. If they 
could be separated, Lee could not only circumvent the one-China principle’s 
implications, acknowledging that the PRC claimed sovereignty over Taiwan, 
but also leave open the possibility for future cross-Strait unification. This was 
because being part of the Chinese community also represented an opportunity 
for the island. This strategy of keeping relations with China was clearly 
presented in the 1991 National Unification Guidelines. 
 
To be sure, Lee’s dramatic adjustment reflected the prime strategic aim of 
ensuring the very existence of the ROC on Taiwan as an independent state. 
Accordingly, the aspiration of “New Taiwanese” self-preservation was 
encapsulated in Lee’s pursuit of “Taiwan’s existence and identity”, which was 
defined in terms of establishing the people of Taiwan as the ROC on Taiwan by 
substantiating Taiwan’s popular sovereignty. According to this vision, ‘the 
people of Taiwan can fully express their free will and build their own future.’3 
From Lee’s perspective, Taiwan’s grand strategy had been distorted by the 
prolonged Chinese civil war between the ROC and the PRC. To end the civil 
war, Lee took the initiative in May 1991 to declare the end of the Period of 
Mobilization to suppress the Chinese Communist Rebellion. By doing so, in 
conjunction with the “sovereignty of the people” principle, the ROC conceded 
important ground in the sovereignty competition with the PRC but confirmed 
that the ROC’s claim to sovereignty would concern the Taiwan area only. In the 
end, Lee’s strategic choice to pursue “Taiwan’s existence and identity” by 
redefining the ROC’s sovereign status on Taiwan, not only marked the end of 
Taipei’s historical claim to the whole China and beyond, but also sparked a new 
and difficult phase of Sino-Taiwanese conflict across the Strait.  
 
                                                
3 Lee Teng-hui (1999) The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity (Tokyo: PHP 
Institute), pp. 51-2. 
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This new phase culminated in the 1995-1996 cross-Strait crisis. In the event, 
Beijing’s military coercion produced two profound counter-effects: Lee’s 
landslide triumph in the presidential election and the biggest demonstration of 
US naval forces in East Asia since the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, the 1995-6 
missile crisis also demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of Taiwan to the PLA 
threat, despite the physical obstacle of the Taiwan Strait. After the Strait crisis, 
Lee promoted the notion of “Taiwan’s existence and identity” more 
enthusiastically, since it was important for him not only to justify the ROC’s 
very existence, but also to consolidate the domestic front against the threat of 
annexation by Beijing. Lee’s determination to implement the idea of “Taiwan’s 
existence and identity” reached another climax when in July 1999 he went on to 
conceptualise the relations between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC as “a 
special state-to-state relationship” in order to highlight the fact that the 
population of Taiwan exercised sovereignty over Taiwan, which makes the 
ROCOT a state. The evolution of Lee’s cross-Strait policy from the 1991 
National Unification Guideline to the 1999 ‘special state-to-state’ perspective 
was derived from his frustration over the failure of the first ever cross-Strait 
rapprochement, as well as his determination to defend the ROCOT’s 
sovereignty, given the deadlock over the sovereignty competition associated 
with the ‘one China issue’ between two sides.  
 
The chapter then argued that, although Lee maintained CCK’s strategic posture 
of defensive-oriented deterrence, the distinctive characteristic of Taiwan’s 
grand strategy during Lee Teng-hui’s period could be identified by Taipei’s 
strategic choice to pursue “Taiwan’s existence and identity”, which was 
significantly different from CCK’s inward-looking strategic choice. The 
discourse of Lee’s “Taiwan’s existence and identity” built on the combined 
factors of Taipei’s goal of self-preservation, the “New Taiwanese” nationalism, 
the perception of sovereign equality across the Strait and the aspiration to end 
Taipei’s international isolation. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis thus reflected 
much continuity in the sovereignty competition across the Strait but occurred in 
a very different strategic setting which saw renewed debate and change in 
Taiwan’s discussions about national identity, determination in Washington to 
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implement a “peaceful resolution” of the cross-Strait conflict and increasing 
economic interdependence between Taiwan and China. 
 
Chapter 7, “The DPP’s Accession to Power and the Pursuit of Self-
determination”, focused on the fifth phase of Taiwan’s grand strategy, from 
2000 to 2008, a time during which the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) was in 
power after the successful ending of 50 years of rule by the Chinese Nationalist 
Party (KMT) in Taiwan. Once the KMT’s Lee Teng-hui had proposed adopting 
the controversial “special state-to-state” formula, it made easier the stance of 
opposing the idea of one China. President Chen Shui-bian proclaimed his 
party’s position on Taiwan’s sovereignty: that Taiwan was an independent 
sovereign state and any change in this independent status quo must be decided 
by all residents of Taiwan by means of a plebiscite. This self-determination 
formula was imposed in 1999 by the DPP’s ‘The Resolution Regarding 
Taiwan’s Future’, as a replacement for the party’s Taiwan Independent Clause. 
Nevertheless, aware of Beijing’s hostility and possibly believing that a cross-
Strait war was more likely with the accession to power of the DPP, the DPP 
administration which adopted Taiwan’s grand strategy had focused on one 
fundamental question: how such a war could be prevented while at the same 
time it promoted the idea of Taiwan’s self-determination.  
 
In mapping out this question, Chen’s administration proposed the doctrine of 
‘Four Noes, One Without’, or ‘Five Noes’ (sibu yimeyou)4. Under the terms of 
this doctrine, Taipei would not take definite steps toward formal independence 
on condition that Beijing would not use and would not intend to use military 
force against Taiwan. Chen’s government, advocating self-determination,  
initially renounced independence for three major purposes: to defuse Beijing’s 
hostility, to win Washington’s support and to ensure domestic consensus. In the 
end, the doctrine of “Five Noes” helped the Chen administration to handle the 
tension across the Strait. It also became the major instrument of Chen’s 
administration for dealing with the complex triangular relations between Taipei, 
Beijing and Washington. This chapter showed that the very strategic choice 
                                                
4 The list and discussion of the ‘Five Noes’, see Chapter 7.1 in this thesis. 
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encapsulated in the “Five Noes” doctrine focused on upholding the cross-Strait 
status quo and rejecting Beijing’s notion of one China. For such a government, 
as this chapter has argued, maintaining the status quo was not a setback for 
Taiwan’s independence movement, but instead a continuation by other means of 
the latter’s core objective. This chapter also demonstrated that Taiwan’s grand 
strategy under the DPP government embodied five interrelated moves: 
consolidating popular sovereignty in Taiwan, preserving Taiwan’s sovereignty 
vis-à-vis Beijing through a competing definition of the cross-Strait status quo, 
seeking dialogue and peace with the rising China, encouraging external interest 
in a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait conflict by appealing to the common 
values of liberal democracy and adopting a modified military posture of 
‘effective deterrence, resolute defense’ in preparation for war.  
 
 
C.8.2 Main Findings and Contributions 
 
In the context of the ROC-PRC antagonism, Taiwan’s grand strategy has at its 
core sought to balance changes in domestic politics against changes in the 
island’s external strategic environment and to incorporate one when addressing 
the other in such a way as to secure the ROC’s sovereign status, as Taipei 
perceived it. This thesis has sought to show that the development of Taiwan’s 
grand strategy has been generally incremental but punctuated by Taipei’s 
experiences of national security crises in conjunction with each president’s 
overall perspective on national grand strategy. The thesis makes contributions 
both to the broader literature on strategy and, above all, to the more specific 
literature on Taiwan’s grand strategy. Other researchers specializing in the 
Taiwan conflict often emphasise the military and diplomatic aspects of 
Taiwan’s national security policy, but do not explicitly or systematically engage 
with the literature on strategic studies. In contrast, this thesis has implications 
both for what Taiwan’s case can tell us about strategy and for what strategy can 
tell us about the Taiwan case. There are six main findings, as follows:  
 
First, by analysing in depth the various definitions of what constitutes the nature 
of grand strategy, this thesis has tried to present strategic analysis in a concise 
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yet fairly comprehensive and conceptual form. The concept of strategic analysis 
employed here is in some ways different from other strategic analyses, which 
are more instrument-informed in nature, because, according to John Garnett, 
‘strategy is fundamentally about means rather than ends’.5 That is to say, 
existing strategic analyses have been focused either on the classical war-
centered approach, specifically on the application of military power to achieve 
particular political objectives, or on the neo-classical peace-centered approach, 
where they have exclusively highlighted several dimensions, e.g. military, 
economic, political, social, technological, psychological, etc., in order to offer 
special advice on ways of sorting out strategic questions in a given context. 
Unlike them, this thesis has suggested that an analysis of strategy is not only 
concerned with explaining how these special dimensions have been applied to 
answer these questions, but also, equally important, is about understanding what 
these questions mean as regards the nature and origin of these questions. This is 
why André Beaufré emphasizes the importance that strategy is “a method of 
thought”.6 This thesis has sought to provide an alternative analytical framework 
- a “convergent strategic analysis” - which attempts to take account of the 
beliefs and actions of the strategic actor, i.e. the individual or institution, by 
means of incorporating and exploring ideas in relation to key questions, which 
necessarily relate to the proposed four conceptual aspects of strategy: namely 
strategic capability, strategic choice, strategic environment and strategic 
posture.  
 
In the case of Taiwan’s national strategy, this thesis has applied the convergent 
approach, demonstrating that it is important to understand the implicit 
assumptions and arguments embedded in Taiwan’s grand strategy and focus on 
the beliefs held and actions taken by the key strategic actor, namely the 
president and the administration in charge of governing the state on the former’s 
behalf. Furthermore, it has argued that the beliefs and actions of the president 
are themselves crucially mediated by the overall strategic context, which is 
                                                
5 Garnett John (1987) ‘Strategic Studies and Its Assumption’, in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John 
Garnett and Phil Williams (1987) Contemporary strategy I: Theories and Concept (London: 
Croom Helm), p.5. 
6 André Beaufré (1965) An Introduction to Strategy (tr. R.H. Barry) (London: Faber & Faber), 
pp.11-13. 
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constituted by Taiwan’s limited national capability, the constraints bearing 
down on political choice, the dynamic domestic-international environment and 
the proposed military posture. A full understanding of the development of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy cannot, it was argued, be obtained without taking 
account of the aforementioned four key aspects of strategy. In the end, this 
research into Taiwan’s grand strategy adds to the literature by offering more 
comprehensive answers to key questions. For example, how, why and to what 
extent can a small state like Taiwan survive in the context of significant external 
security threats from a much stronger foe? This thesis has argued that, in the 
complex realm of strategy, it is vital to examine the way in which the strategic 
actors make choices to apply such ideational and external power as they have. 
Notably, the way in which ideational and material power is applied explains 
why small states may sometimes win and why stronger states may sometimes 
lose in this asymmetric competition.  
 
Second, this thesis has argued that the president’s conceptualisation of the 
ROC’s sovereign status has been the prime force behind the evolution of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy, despite the changes in the leadership and the domestic-
international context. However, while the sovereignty issue is a natural and 
continuous security concern to which Taiwan’s grand strategy has had to 
respond, the meaning of the ROC’s sovereign survival has itself varied over 
time. This thesis has divided the development of Taipei’s sovereign identity into 
four different phases. In shorthand, these can be identified as follows: first, 
during Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, the ROC as China; second, during Chiang 
Ching-kuo’s period, the ROC as the free China; third, during Lee Teng-hui’s 
administration, the ROC on Taiwan; and fourth, in Chen Shui-bian’s 
government, the ROC as Taiwan. These different and changing state identities 
have represented the Taipei leaders’ respective sovereign perspective on the 
ROC, in response to dynamic international challenges and the democratic 
development at home. Accordingly, deciding in what way to secure the 
respective sovereign status of the ROC has constantly been the central 
aspiration of Taiwan’s grand strategy. Importantly, the different ways in which 
Taiwan’s leaders have thought about the ROC’s sovereign status and the 
political reality across the Strait have influenced decisions on how to apply 
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strategic capability, what substance to give to strategic choices, whether and 
how to respond to the changing strategic environment and how to shape 
Taiwan’s strategic posture. Hence, this thesis has argued that, given the ROC-
PRC failure to reach an agreement to settle the cross-Strait sovereignty issue, no 
administration in Taiwan has formulated and pursued its national grand strategy 
without first identifying the meaning of the ROC. This has involved responding 
to two fundamental and interrelated questions: what is the ROC and what is 
Taiwan? Clarifying the relationship between the ROC and Taiwan accordingly 
stands at the heart of shaping cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s grand strategy. 
For CKS and CCK, this was not an issue because Taiwan was just a province of 
the ROC and the PRC was an illegitimate regime.  For both Lee Teng-hui and 
Chen Shui-bian, having accepted the PRC’s sovereignty over mainland China, 
they had to redefine and defend the ROC’s sovereign status since there was no 
agreement on this between the two sides. The difference between them was 
Lee’s ‘the ROC on Taiwan’ and Chen’s ‘the ROC as Taiwan’. However, for 
Lee and Chen, it was more difficult, complex and delicate to put their 
sovereignty perspectives into practice than to arrive at such a perception itself. 
This was because both them, in Taiwan’s post-authoritarian era, also had to 
circumvent the sensitive one-China issue to prevent domestic, cross-Strait, and 
international pressures simultaneously. As a result, this thesis has argued that, 
despite the influential external structural factors, e.g. the US, PRC pressure and 
the constraints of the international system, the formulation and evolution of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy were driven by domestic factors, especially, Taipei 
leader’s respective shifting perspective on the ROC’s sovereign status on 
Taiwan.   
 
Third, this thesis has argued that Taiwan’s grand strategy has evolved in line 
with changing interpretations of the cross-Strait status quo during different 
presidencies. During the 1950s and 1960s, when it benefited from US 
recognition, Taipei’s view of the cross-Strait status quo was that there was only 
“one China”, the ROC, which extended across the Strait. After the signing of 
the Shanghai Communiqué and during Chiang Ching-kuo’s administration, 
Taipei’s perspective on the status quo shifted slightly. It began to involve an 
acknowledgement that there was still one China across the Strait but this one 
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China was divided temporarily, though it would surely be reunified once more. 
However, during the 1990s Lee Teng-hui’s administration revised the notion of 
“one China” across the Strait, when Taipei acknowledged that the cross-Strait 
status quo was a “special state-to-state” relationship between the ROC on 
Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland, which emphasised the fact that the two 
Chinas had coexisted across the Strait since 1949. For the Chen Shui-bian 
government, the equilibrium was explicitly defined as that of “one side, one 
state”, meaning that there was no so-called “one China” but two Chinas across 
the Strait. This thesis has argued that the dynamics of Taipei reconceptualising 
the cross-Strait status quo also relate to the president’s perspective of the ROC’s 
sovereign status, as become evident not least in the various crises experienced 
across the Strait. However, the process of Taipei defining and re-defining the 
cross-Strait status quo was also significantly shaped by the strategic 
environment, which was influenced not merely by Beijing’s stance but also, 
perhaps more importantly, by Washington’s policy towards the PRC and its 
preferences regarding the status quo across the Strait. 
 
Fourth, as regards the ways in which Taiwan’s grand strategy has been affected 
from Chiang Kai-shek to Chen Shui-bian, the thesis has pointed to at least five 
influences: (a) the island’s geographical location, (b) a strong belief in Taiwan’s 
geostrategic importance, (c) domestic political divisions within Taiwan, (d) 
sensitivity to Taiwan’s military vulnerability and (e) the political-military 
reliance on the US.  
 
(a) The geography of the Taiwan Strait has obviously been a persistent 
influence on Taipei’s strategic attitudes and behaviour. The influence has 
affected much strategic thinking and Taiwan’s psychological predisposition. 
The Taiwan Strait has not only made an invasion by Beijing more difficult but 
also required the formulation of Taiwan’s armed forces to fit into this 
geographical context. Psychologically, the natural maritime obstacle reinforced 
the political antagonism in this area and led to considerable estrangement and 
alienation from the PRC as Taiwan has grown more distant from Mainland 
China. This situation is in some ways and to some extent similar to that of Japan, 
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geographically a group of offshore islands off the continent of Asia, which has 
developed its unique strategic character.7 
 
(b) Due to its unique geographical location at the centre of the first chain of 
islands in East Asia8, Taiwan’s grand strategy has reflected a strong belief in its 
own geostrategic importance. This thesis has shown that Taiwan’s leaders have 
constantly seen themselves as playing an active role to support a US-led 
regional order, not least to deal with the so-called ‘China threat’. To be sure, 
there are also obvious political motives. The two main objectives behind Taipei 
openly pointing to its geostrategic importance are, first, to identify its function 
as a member of the international society; and, second, to find a way to draw 
international support in its favour to neutralise the threat posed by Beijing.  
 
(c) The third distinct influence on Taiwan’s grand strategy has been domestic 
politics. This thesis has drawn attention to the role of the president, not least the 
values and preferences regarding the ways of handling domestic issues in the 
context of the cross-Strait sovereignty competition. During Chiang Kai-shek’s 
dictatorship, Taipei focused on upholding domestic security involving the 
reconstruction of the KMT, political militarization, the military buildup and 
modernization and emphasis on social stability. After a series of international 
setbacks in the 1970s, Taipei under Chiang Ching-kuo’s presidency adopted an 
overall inward-looking strategy to consolidate the domestic front by his 
methods of pursuing economic development, striving for Taipei’s political 
survival, maintaining domestic order, implementing constitutional democracy 
and proposing the ‘Three Noes’ policy against Beijing’s United Front. During 
the KMT’s authoritarian regime, domestic political divisions had been limited, 
because there were no multi-party politics until the DPP was illegally formed in 
1986. The Presidents mainly focused on unifying domestic consensus and 
justifying the KMT’s dictatorship in Taiwan by advocating Chinese nationalism 
to safeguard the ROC against the PRC. By then, they enjoyed relative freedom 
                                                
7 Naoko Sajima (1999) ‘Japan: Strategic Culture at a Crossroads’, in Booth, Ken and Russell 
Trood (eds.) (1999) Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: Macmillan), pp.69-
71. 
8 Allan M. Wachman (2007) Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial 
Integrity (Stanford: Stanford University Press), Chapter 2. 
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from domestic constraints in building their national strategy. Nevertheless, in 
the post-authoritarian era associated with the phenomena of the deconstruction 
of Chinese nationalism, both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian had to deal 
simultaneously with increasing domestic political divisions and Bejing’s United 
Front strategy. In the analysis of Lee Teng-hui’s idea of ‘Taiwanese 
subjectivity’, this thesis argues that the innovation of ‘Taiwanese identity’ was 
designed to advocate popular sovereignty as a way of unifying the hearts and 
minds of Taiwan’s people and also of competing with the DPP to re-establish 
the KMT’s legitimacy and rule over the island. Analysing of Chen Shui-bian’s 
centrist perspective of the “New Middle Road”, this thesis has shown that the 
centrist movement enabled the DDP government’s advocacy of self-
determination to modify its original radical stance on Taiwan’s independence so 
as to compete with the KMT in elections and handle the sensitive cross-Strait 
relations. Nevertheless, given China’s rigid stance on sovereignty and its policy 
of isolation, the administration of Chen in its opposition to Beijing’s focus on 
the one-China principle put its emphasis on preserving Taiwan’s sovereignty 
through upholding the status quo. Chen Shui-bian called for the consolidation of 
the island’s democratic system and for the loyalty of its citizens to defend the 
country’s sovereignty and counterattack the united front of the CCP and KMT. 
Chen Shui-bian’s unique sovereign perspective of ‘the ROC is Taiwan’, 
associated with his endorsement of the self-determination formula and the 
explicit opposition to the one-China principle made him different from his 
predecessor Lee Teng-hui. As demonstrated, the primary political and social 
cleavage has been and remains the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty status, often 
referred to as the “unification-independence” (tong du) issue of state identity. 
Given the combined forces of the polarized identity politics and the highly 
contested electoral politics in Taiwan’s post-authoritarian era, the absence of a 
clear domestic consensus on state identity has not only been perceived by 
political leaders to exacerbate the threat posed by Beijing, but also led them to 
respond in their particular ways.   
 
(d) The fourth influence on Taiwan’s grand strategy has been the realization of 
Taipei’s military vulnerability. This thesis has argued that TGS has been an 
attempt to deal with Beijing’s overwhelming strategic capability, which has 
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increased decisively with China’s economic achievements since the 1990s. 
Sensitivity to the possibility of military defeat by Beijing was particularly 
apparent when Washington terminated its diplomatic relations and defence 
commitment to Taiwan in the late 1970s.  Indeed, by 2005 Taipei’s own 
assessment was that its capacity to defend itself and hold out against an all-out 
military invasion by Beijing had shrunk from one year, as presumed in the 
1980s, to a mere two weeks.9 The awareness of Taiwan’s vulnerability and 
related pessimistic calculations have yielded the crucial assessment that Taiwan 
alone cannot defend itself against China in military terms.  
 
(e) As a small state as Taiwan is, the development of Taipei’s national strategy 
has constantly taken account of the strategic environment which has primarily 
been affected by the dynamics of Sino-American relations. Put differently, 
Taiwan’s grand strategy has constantly been influenced by and to some extent 
subordinated to America’s global strategy. As such, governed by the strategy of 
others, the development of Taiwan’s grand strategy has shown that Taipei had 
little room to make its own strategic decisions; indeed, its national strategy has 
always been gauged in terms of the specific strategic environment in which it 
was operating. This explains, for example, why Taiwan, having secretly 
developed a nuclear weapon for several decades from the mid-1960s to enhance 
its limited strategic capability, nevertheless decided in 1988 to forgo this 
nuclear option so as to maintain its security relations with the US. Clearly, this 
was one of Taipei’s most important and controversial strategic decisions. It 
must, however, also be noted that the ROC’s leaders achieved a reasonable 
security link to America, even at the height of Sino-American strategic 
cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s, not least by identifying common interests 
with Washington and exploiting every opportunity arising from the conflicts 
and competition in US-China relations. 
 
Fifth, this thesis has argued that the evolution of TGS up to 2008 comprises five 
distinct stages: the first was its “installation period”, in which the KMT sought 
to install itself on Taiwan in an effort to manage its very survival following its 
                                                
9 Bernard D. Cole (2006) Taiwan’s Security - History and Prospects (London: Routledge), p. 
184. 
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defeat on mainland China before concluding the Sino-American Mutual 
Defence Treaty in 1954; the second was marked as the “outward-looking 
period”, during which Chiang Kai-shek’s government relentlessly prepared a 
military-political counter-attack on China against the backdrop of the Cold War 
from the mid-1950s to the end of the 1960s; the third was the “inward-looking 
period” from the 1970s to the end of the Chiang Ching-kuo administration in 
1988, during which the administration changed its strategic focus from cross-
Strait relations to domestic development after the onset of Taipei’s international 
isolation; the fourth, “the rapprochement period”, which involved the first 
efforts ever made towards  political reconciliation with Beijing, coincided with 
Lee Teng-hui’s government in the 1990s, which adopted rapprochement with 
Beijing by conceding the prolonged sovereignty competition on mainland China, 
albeit with the intention of winning consensus from Beijing for the pursuit of 
Taipei’s international legitimacy and recognition; and the fifth phase, which for 
present purposes will be considered the “consolidation period”. This was 
managed by the advocates of self-determination in Chen Shui-bian’s 
administration, keen to ensure Taiwan’s sovereign independence from the PRC 
by promoting popular sovereignty via the installation of the Referendum Act.  
 
Sixth, although most theorists of strategy, in particular those making up what is 
generally called the war-centred classical school, would focus on the way in 
which states pursue political ends by applying military means, this classic 
military-political formula of strategy does not capture the pursuit of national 
grand strategy by the ROC’s leaders. In empirical terms, after examining the 
development of Taiwan’s grand strategy since 1949, I have argued that there is 
simply no strong evidence to suggest that military means have played a decisive 
role in achieving Taipei’s political ends. On the contrary, the political ends to be 
gained by Taiwan’s grand strategy have instead been achieved by relying on 
non-military factors, such as the ability to appeal to other states, mainly 
Washington, for help and support. Moreover, during the “outward-looking 
period” of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, Taipei’s insistence on preparing for 
military counter-attack in the confrontation with China in the 1950s-60s not 
only ended in failure, but also gave way to events, which caused Taipei’s 
international isolation. Ever since the “inward-looking period” began in the 
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1970s, Taipei’s military construction has turned to a deterrent-oriented 
defensive posture to deal with Beijing’s possible invasion, but the credibility of 
this deterrent capability has always been doubtful, even in Taipei’s own 
assessment. Taipei’s problematic experiences in relation to reliance on military 
means have been reflected in two crucial aspects of TGS: Taiwan’s rather 
insufficient military capabilities in the face of the threat posed by Beijing and 
Taipei’s preference, following Sun Tzu, for traditional Chinese strategic 
thinking, with its focus on “winning without fighting”. Taipei’s negative 
perspective on the use of force has thus had two profound impacts on TGS. First, 
it has become fundamentally dependent on Washington’s willingness to assist in 
extending the cross-Strait status quo to secure Taiwan as a de facto state. 
Second, assuming certain military defeat in the event of war with Beijing, if 
Taipei fought on its own, and attempting accordingly to prevent such a war at 
all costs, the democratic government in Taiwan has opted for another strategic 
illusion. This amounts to a naïve pacifism indifferent both to danger as well as 
opportunity, which always also exists in the event of war. As a result, because 
of the remarkable period of relative peace across the Strait since the 1970s, this 
thesis has argued that Taipei has taken the peaceful situation across the Strait 
too much for granted. Accordingly, Taipei’s political leaders, such as President 
Ma Ying-jeou’s “No Unification, No Independence and No Use of Force ” 
doctrine, have not only become infatuated with a perceived growing ability to 
rely more and more on non-military means against Beijing’s military threat, but 
also have perceived this threat itself more skeptically.  Hence, according to 
many experts in Washington, ‘Taiwan simply does not take Chinese military 
threat as seriously as it should’.10 Given Taipei’s strategy of focusing on non-
military means, not least on Washington’s security commitment, the lack of 
credibility in its boasts of the power to defend itself will result not only in 
Beijing’s military advantage, but also will likely undermine Washington’s will 
to intervene in the event of war.   
 
 
C.8.3 Future Research Agenda  
                                                
10 Michael S. Chase (2008) Taiwan’s Security Policy: External Threats and Domestic Politics 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p.155. 
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The historical developments linked to the transformation of the ROC’s state 
identity have provided a dynamic context for the evolution of Taiwan’s grand 
strategy. The research undertaken in this thesis has examined and explored 
Taiwan’s grand strategy in the context of a series of crises across the Strait in 
conjunction with the perspectives and solutions of Taipei’s authorities in 
dealing with them, while attempting to unify the themes discussed in a 
chronological framework. Through studying and connecting the various themes 
in the formulation and re-evaluation of its national grand strategy, this thesis has 
sought a better understanding of the distinctive features in the evolution of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy explored here. However, because of different research 
focuses and space constraints, there remains a rich agenda for further research 
on Taiwan’s grand strategy. The following will offer a cursory sketch that 
should be followed up by more detailed research.   
 
First, the presidency-centred perspective of national grand strategy is a useful 
tool with which to deal with  the emergent historical and political context out of 
which national strategies are made. However, the president does not stand still 
and alone in making national grand strategy. On the contrary, national grand 
strategy is the product of the dynamic process with which the president 
purposively engages with his surroundings, the strategic environment. This 
point has been generally valid, but it raises a potential research agenda when the 
concept is associated with small state theory.11 Given the finding that a small 
state such as Taiwan has significantly been affected by the strategy of others, 
this combined theoretical perspective will provide an insight into the way to 
look at national grand strategy of a state’s leader more specifically, not least 
how to win in asymmetric competition.     
                                                
11 On the theory and practice of small states in foreign policies and war, see for example,  
Christine Ingerbitsen, Iver Neumann, Sieglinde Gstohl and Jessica Beyer (eds.) (2006) Small 
States in International Relations (Seattle: University of Washington Press); Ivan Arreguin-Toft 
(2005) How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press); Rod Thornton (2007) Asymmetric Warfare (Cambridge: Polity Press); Robert 
L. Rothstein (1968) Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press); T. V. 
Paul (1994) Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press); Handel, Michael I. (1990) Weak States in the International System (London: 
Frank Cass); Ronald P. Barston (ed.) (1973) The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies 
of Small States (London: George Allen & Unwin); Marshall R. Singer (1972) Weak States in 
World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships (New York: The Free Press). 
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Second, another potential research direction to enhance our understanding of 
Taiwan grand strategy is to develop a theory of strategic culture, which refers to 
‘a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, 
achievements and particular ways of adapting to environment and solving 
problems with respect to the threat and use of force.’12 Given the finding of the 
vital role of the prime strategic actor’s perspective in making Taiwan’s grand 
strategy, the idea of strategic culture would potentially provide an alternative 
approach to explaining how the ideational factor, e.g., perception and belief, can 
play in broader aspects of the external cultural setting in which Taiwan’s 
military strategy has been distinctively formulated and developed. Although the 
strategic culture has a special focus on the military dimension, analysis of the 
cultural-military setting will offer provide insights into the way to understand 
how Taiwan’s unique geo-strategic situation, resources, history, military 
experiences and political beliefs are involved in making national strategy.  
 
Third, while the thesis has demonstrated the importance of domestic factors, it 
has argued the role of the president’s perspective is decisive in initiating and 
shaping national grand strategy. While acknowledging that other domestic 
factors also matter, not least Taiwan’s party politics and poor constitutional 
design, this thesis has not explored them in the same detail. This became 
particularly clear when Chen Shui-bian’s administration suffered an 
unprecedented domestic political stalemate due to the polarization of the issue 
of state identity within the island’s party politics and the lack of an institutional 
mechanism to resolve the deadlock between the executive and legislative 
                                                
12 Alan Macmillan and Ken Booth (1999) ‘Strategic Culture - Framework of Analysis’, Booth, 
Ken and Russell Trood (eds.) (1999) Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: 
Macmillan), p. 363. Other classic discussions of strategic culture theory, see Jack Snyder (1977) 
The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation Report R-2154-AF); Ken Booth (1979) Strategy and Ethnocentrism 
(London: Croom Helm); Basil Liddell Hart (1935) The British Way in Warfare: Adaptability 
and Mobility (Harmondsworth: Penguin); Russell Weigley (1973) The American Way of War: A 
History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan); Colin Gray 
(1986) Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press); Alastair Iain 
Johnston (1998) Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); Elizabeth Kier (1997) Imaging War: French and 
British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); Alan 
Macmillan (1996) Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1945-1952 (Aberystwyth: 
University of Wales, Aberystwyth). 
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branches.13 As Randall L. Schweller observes, domestic constraints often lead 
statesmen to respond slowly, ineffectively, haphazardly, or halfheartedly to 
external security threats.14  This suggests us to undertake a further research on 
the relations between state leaders and domestic constrains in the context of 
making national security strategy. Indeed, from a theoretical standpoint, this 
also reminds us of the limits of structural realism, which exclusively focuses on 
the international system and its effects on foreign policy and pays insufficient 
attention to domestic factors, such as the influential force of ideational effects.  
 
Fourth, in addition to domestic politics, further research should also focus on 
examining more closely the impact on Taiwan’s grand strategy of the deepening 
cross-Strait economic relations.  The cross-strait economic exchanges were not 
a major aspect of Taipei’s relations with Beijing until Lee Teng-hui’s 
rapprochement in the early 1990s. This is because both CKS and CCK simply 
forbade it. Given CCK’s ‘Three Noes’ and his rejection of the ‘Three Links’ 
(san tong) (direct air transport, shipping and postal services), he was aware that 
the economic connection was part of Beijing’s United Front policy. As 
demonstrated, Lee Teng-hui’s and Chen Shu-bian were both cautious over 
Beijing’s true intention behind the promotion of cross-Strait economic relations, 
given Lee’s ‘no haste, be patient’ and Chen’s ‘reduction of the impact of 
China’s magnetic effect’. Nevertheless, soon after the KMT retook power, the 
‘Three Links’ were finally opened up on 15 December 2008, which was 
regarded as ‘a major turning point for Taiwan’s domestic politics and its 
relations with China’.15 Indeed, although cross-Strait economic integration is 
accelerating, according to Christopher Hughes, there is still a long way to go 
before economic integration will be transformed into a greater political 
                                                
13 For a discussion of identity issues and domestic politics in Taiwan see, for example, 
Christopher R. Hughes (1997) Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in 
International Society (London: Routledge); Fell (2005) Party Politics in Taiwan; Gunter 
Schubert and Jens Damm (ed.) (2011) Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-first Century: Domestic, 
Regional and Global Perspectives (London: Routledge). 
14 Randall L. Schweller (2004) ‘Unanswered Threats: A  Neoclassical Realist Theory of 
Underbalancing’, International Security, No.29, No.2 (Autumn, 2004). A empirical analysis of 
Taiwan’s domestic factors in building national security, see Chase (2008) Taiwan’s Security 
Policy, Chapter 8. A general discussion of domestic factors in national grand strategy, see 
Rosecrance, Richard and Arthur A. Stein (ed.) (1993) The Domestic Basis of Grand Strategy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
15 Christopher R. Hughes (2009) ‘New Trend in Taiwan’s China Policy’, The International 
Spectator, 44: 2, p. 59. 
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integration because democratic norms and sovereignty consensus are still 
lacking across the Strait. 16  As a result, given the insight of liberal 
internationalism, it is worth further analysis to determine how and how far 
economic factors can improve or jeopardize Taiwan’s security in the context of 
cross-Strait political deadlock .  
 
 
C.8.4 Further Policy Suggestions 
 
For further policy suggestions on this subject involves the question of how 
Taiwan’s grand strategy is likely to evolve in the near to medium term. With 
respect to the more immediate prospects of TGS as a platform to uphold the 
survival of the ROC on Taiwan as a sovereign state, one should expect no big 
change, because the DPP, with its advocacy of self-determination, and the pro-
one-China KMT cannot agree on the way in which the one-China principle is 
supposed to relate to Taiwan. On the one hand, since the former DPP 
government in 2000 proposed the doctrine of the ‘Five Noes’ to reconcile the 
dilemma between independence and unification, it is unlikely that the DPP will 
radically depart from this stance in the foreseeable future as long as China does 
not attempt any radical military intimidation to revise the status quo across the 
Strait. On the other hand, as popular sovereignty has been practised in the 
context of Taiwan’s democratization since the 1990s, it would also be a mistake 
to assume that the KMT is likely to renounce the ROC’s de facto sovereign 
independence in order to comply with Beijing’s “one China” principle. 
Although the two major parties both reject Beijing’s one-China principle, the 
strategic choice of the incumbent KMT government will focus on continuing to 
pursue peaceful coexistence across the Strait. This will imply proposing its own 
version of the “one China” principle to resume the dialogue with Beijing. Fresh 
evidence of the KMT’s stance on this can be examined by the KMT’s Ma Ying-
jeou administration, which took power in May 2008.  
 
                                                
16 Ibid, pp. 73-74. 
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In his inaugural address with the title “Taiwan’s Renaissance”, President Ma 
Ying-jeou pledged to ‘to achieve peace and co-prosperity’ across the Strait. He 
reiterated the so-called “1992 Consensus” whereby, with regard to the one-
China principle, the two sides should follow the consensus already attained in 
the form of “one China, respective interpretations” to let cross-Strait interaction 
proceed.17  While arguing in favour of ‘resolving cross-strait issues, what 
matters is not sovereignty but core values and the way of life’, Ma’s 
government proposed a new three Noes doctrine, “No Unification, No 
Independence and No Use of Force ” (bu du, bu tong, bu wu), to ‘maintain the 
status quo across the Strait’ in order to secure Taiwan’s core values and way of 
life.18 Ma justified the “Three Noes” doctrine with reference to two main factors: 
the need to represent “mainstream public opinion” in Taiwan and to act in 
accordance with the ROC’s Constitution.19 It is also worth noting that Ma 
emphasized the status of Taiwan as ‘a beacon of democracy to Asia and the 
world’, saying that ‘Taiwan is the sole ethnic Chinese society to complete a 
second democratic turnover of power. Ethnic Chinese communities around the 
world have laid their hopes on this crucial political environment.’20 By way of 
preventing an explicit confrontation with Beijing on the difference between 
their stances on sovereignty, Ma’s perspective on pursuing liberal democratic 
values and maintaining the cross-Strait status quo was well encapsulated in his 
“Three Noes” doctrine as the new underpinning for TGS in the context of the 
cross-Strait political-military confrontation. Accordingly, the new KMT 
government’s self-image of the ROC’s sovereign status can be regarded as a re-
statement of the ROC as Free China on Taiwan.21 To implement peaceful 
                                                
17  President Ma Ying-jeou’s inaugural speech (21 May 2008), English version in 
http://www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/document_content.php?id=1105499687&pr
e_id=1105499687&g_category_number=145&category_number_2=145 (accessed on 14 June 
2010) 
18 Ibid. Although Ma’s government has not explained whether there is any special preference 
ranking among the “Three Noes”, it is worth noting that the pro-unification government puts 
“No Unification” ahead of the “No Independence” in the doctrine. 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21 In an interview by Newsweek at 26 December 2005, Ma, as the then mayor of Taipei City, 
proclaimed a cross-Strait perspective of eventual reunification, but he has never mentioned it 
since he became president in 2008. Instead he proposed “No Unification” in his inaugural 
speech. In the 2005 interview, Ma said, ‘Actually, the mainland is not pushing unification any 
more. … For our party [the KMT], the eventual goal is reunification, but we don't have a 
timetable. At the moment, we don't believe that either side is prepared to have unification... The 
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coexistence associated with its version of the “one China” principle, the pro-
unification Ma government is likely to try to work towards a consensus with 
Beijing which will re-define and re-shape the status quo across the Strait. At the 
same time, Ma’s administration has continued to enhance Taiwan’s limited 
strategic capabilities by pursuing military innovation and economic growth, 
while also seeking to improve its strategic environment through keeping close 
relations with Washington and maintaining its deterrent-oriented defensive 
posture to prevent war. However, due to Taipei’s stance on its de facto 
sovereign independence, it is still unlikely that the sovereignty deadlock 
between Taipei and Beijing will be broken dramatically in the foreseeable 
future, despite the increasing economic interdependence and social interaction 
under the Ma government’s promotion of the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA) across the Strait.22 
 
With regard to the longer-term prospects, the unprecedented scale and speed of 
China’s economic growth and military buildup over the last two decades have 
raised serious challenges to Taiwan’s grand strategy. A number of questions 
will need answering: first, can Taiwan preserve its de facto independence 
forever in the face of China’s threat? And what can possibly influence Taipei’s 
choice about whether or not to preserve its de facto political independence? 
What direction might any change take? There is no simple and straightforward 
strategy while Taipei struggles to address these questions. For example, while 
acknowledging Beijing’s military force as an important factor affecting 
Taiwan’s grand strategy, it is still hard to find anything that will compensate, 
with regard to strategic capabilities, for Taipei’s material-rooted weakness. 
However, if the development to date of TGS teaches anything, it is that likely 
effective compensation can come from outside the structure of the Taiwan-
China asymmetric confrontation itself, namely, from the dynamics associated 
with the American factor. And the path and extent of America’s possible 
intervention in the cross-Strait issue will still depend on the complex Sino-
                                                                                                                                      
conditions are really not ripe yet.’ See http://www.newsweek.com/2005/12/25/conditions-aren-
t-ripe.html (accessed in 14 June 2010) 
22  For reports for the ECFA from Ma’s perspective, see 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2010/06/13/260544/Taiwan-
China.htm (accessed in 14 June 2010) A detailed analysis of Ma’s China policy, see Hughes 
(2009) ‘New Trends in Taiwan’s China Policy’, pp. 59-74. 
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American relationship, as part of Washington’s overall understanding of its role 
in the world, which is outside of Taiwan’s control. Furthermore, there is also 
considerable uncertainty as regards possible domestic changes in the vision of 
the cross-Strait status quo held in either Taipei or Beijing, which will remain 
connected to the enduring debate of the unification-independence issue 
associated with the controversy surrounding Taiwan’s sovereignty. For the 
present, there is still no consensus in the unification-independence debate in 
Taiwan, let alone between Taipei and Beijing.  
 
Nevertheless, the DPP, advocating elf-determination and the KMT, advocating 
one-China do have some common ground on the question of Taiwan’s national 
security: that is, to protect the cross-Strait status quo, with regard to Taiwan as a 
de facto independent sovereign entity not subject to the PRC’s control. 
Although both parties have their own political vision of Taiwan’s future status, 
Taipei’s vision of the status quo might also evolve further in the longer term as 
a function of the referendum mechanism, which was established by the Chen 
Shui-bian government. Should relevant situations arise, those in which 
Taiwan’s leaders and people either need to respond to a tempting proposal by 
China or are intimidated by China’s deliberate or accidental attack, the 
Taiwanese might dramatically revise their stance on the status quo which 
exhibits ambiguity on the issue of the longer-term desirability of either 
unification or independence. That Beijing’s diplomatic influence succeeded in 
depriving Taipei of its international recognition as a sovereign state and that 
China’s military threat has made it difficult for Taipei to consider the explicit 
declaration of Taiwan’s independence is beyond doubt. However, Beijing’s 
military-diplomatic coercion in challenging what the ROC has been for decades 
in Taiwan has produced significant insecurity and estrangement from China 
within Taiwan and hence has made it unlikely that any Taiwanese political party, 
even the KMT, will proceed with unification negotiations of any kind across the 
Strait in the foreseeable future. One of the obvious examples of this is that the 
KMT President Ma Ying-jeou publicly rejected cross-Strait reunification 
associated with the “Three Noes” doctrine under his administration; and it is 
even less likely that the anti-one-China DPP would endorse any cross-Strait 
unification proposal.   Accordingly, a possible change in Taipei’s current stance 
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on sovereignty, which would see the island move beyond the status quo, will 
rest on not only Taipei’s assessment of prevailing external pressures, but also its 
future experiences of cross-Strait interaction. Ever since CCK, the unification or 
independence issue has not been the prime asset in Taiwan’s grand strategy. 
However, given no solution on the sovereignty competition between the ROC 
on Taiwan and the PRC, the rigidity of Beijing’s stance on sovereignty over 
Taiwan and its heavy hand against the island’s having an international status 
have evidentially resulted in a clear threat to the survival of the ROCOT’s 
sovereignty. Beijing’s threat, accompanied with the absence of a clear domestic 
consensus in Taiwan on the one-China issue, have led to a situation where the 
issue of state identity (guojia rentong yiti) rather than socio-economic cleavage 
has set a unique context for Taiwan’s party politics.23 It is in this context that 
the president’s perspective of the ROC sovereign status has become crucial and 
relevant not only to the security strategy of the island but also the necessity of 
electoral politics. Given Beijing’s military threat to impose its sovereignty claim, 
to proclaim the status quo, often referred to as ‘no unification and no 
independence’ in Taiwan’s post-authoritarian era, it has become a salient 
strategy to secure the ROCOT’s de facto sovereign status as a means of 
circumventing a direct clash with Beijing. As a result, the core underpinning of 
Taiwan’s grand strategy will become the way in which Taipei’s authority 
addresses and redefines the cross-Strait status quo to deal with Beijing and 
Washington and this will affect its future development accordingly. 
 
This thesis also wants to point out that Taipei should give further thought to 
balancing the enthusiasm for pursuing non-military means with the continued 
inclination to strengthen the island’s capability and determination for self-
defence in the context of cross-Strait confrontation. Taiwan has to manage the 
threat posed by China’s overwhelming military capability despite its insufficient 
military resources and the limited credibility of its deterrent. Nevertheless, the 
limitations of Taipei’s military capabilities and the extended experience of 
securing relative peace by non-military means should not normally have blunted 
Taiwanese leaders’ sense of the potential merit of employing military means to 
                                                
23 A further discussion of identity issues and party politics, see Fell (2005) Party Politics in 
Taiwan, pp. 85-142. 
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resist the threat. Given the evidence of a decline in Taipei’s military expenditure, 
regardless of China’s substantial investment in its military buildup since the 
1990s, Taipei’s pacifism and obstinacy in applying non-military means in order 
to deal with Beijing’s military threat have become more obvious and 
increasingly look naïve. Michael S. Chase describes this phenomenon as ‘the 
puzzle of Taiwan’s security policy’.24 Indeed, Taipei’s apparent indulgence in 
pacifism might not only undermine Taiwan’s own fighting spirit, but also 
encourage China to resort to a coercive stance, including possible military 
action, and affect American attitudes to intervention. Taipei’s way of endorsing 
non-military means can be encapsulated in the increasingly desperate belief in 
avoiding war, as if unilaterally renouncing war could achieve peace and hence 
stand as the core of Taiwan’s grand strategy. The Ma administration’s doctrine 
of “No Unification, No Independence, No Use of Force” also represents this 
kind of pacifism. While facing China’s increasing military preparations for the 
event of war, Taipei has still chosen unilaterally to renounce the use of force in 
advance, reflecting Taiwan’s optimistic view that non-military options will 
resolve the cross-Strait confrontation. The problem with this unilateral good 
will, which to some extent smells of appeasement, might not yield the expected 
favourable result of preventing a future military clash. This thesis therefore 
suggests that, as long as Taipei’s principal strategic choice is concerned solely 
with avoiding war while Beijing continues to prepare for war if it fails to 
achieve its political objectives, the only possible settlement across the Strait will 
in the end be on terms dictated by Beijing. With Beijing sensing the advantage 
of exploiting and pursuing its military coercive posture, it is understandable that 
Chinese leaders have consistently declined to renounce the use of force in 
resolving the Taiwan issue. 
 
In conclusion, with regard to further policy suggestions about Taiwan’s grand 
strategy, this thesis has outlined certain general choices open to Taipei to stave 
off conflict with an increasingly strong China in which the latter possesses 
overwhelming material powers. These choices can be summarized in the 
following five ways. The first involves adopting an indirect approach, which 
                                                
24 Chase (2008) Taiwan’s Security Policy, pp.1-3. 
 341 
would lead Taipei to circumvent a head-to-head independence-unification 
contest and to exploit the common ground and areas of ambiguity between these 
alternatives by defending the status quo, so as to minimize a possible military 
showdown across the Strait. Because of the political and societal estrangement 
between Taiwan and China, Taipei may still endorse its status quo strategy but 
has to keep an open mind as regards the unification option, if its terms are 
satisfactory to Taiwan, to maintain China’s reasonable expectations on possible 
cross-Strait unification. All in all, the core of the indirect approach is designed 
in the first place, to deflect Beijing’s will to fight. Second, planning for the day 
when the cross-Strait war occurs, triggered either by China’s military coercion 
or invasion to impose unification, Taipei should opt for the classical realist self-
help approach in holding its own against Beijing, by constructing solid self-
defence capabilities involving every possible means, with a view to making 
Beijing fully conscious of the high costs of pursuing military options and to 
prolonging the military confrontation as long as possible until external 
assistance of any kind arrives or a favourable development emerges. Third, 
given the unique territorial advantage of the Taiwan Strait and the distribution 
of Taipei’s limited and precious military resources, Taipei may need to consider 
more of an asymmetrical than a conventional approach to structure its armed 
forces against Beijing’s overwhelming material power. As an extreme measure, 
Taipei should not totally exclude or discard its former nuclear programme in the 
interests of asymmetric warfare, as a desperate situation may demand desperate 
measures to deter war. In the event of conventional warfare, it is evident in the 
history of modern warfare that no amphibious invasion can be successfully 
implemented without command in the air. Accordingly, Taipei could focus its 
military efforts on the preparation for air warfare and supremacy in information 
warfare. The asymmetric approach, possibly involving a nuclear option or more 
conventional means, would serve to maximize Taipei’s intrinsic military 
potential in order to raise the risk of war for Beijing to the highest possible level. 
Fourth, Taipei has to secure the moral foundation against Beijing’s military 
actions with reference to the values of democracy, justice and peace. Taipei’s 
embrace of a convincing moral cause is not only essential to establish the 
necessary domestic consensus against Beijing’s military coercion but is also 
vital to sustain any prolonged or total war against Beijing in the event of a 
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military invasion. Fifth, though Taiwan may endeavour to defuse the cross-
Strait conflict as well as to defend its own existence as a first consideration, this 
does not mean that Taiwan can afford to neglect the chance to exploit the 
strength of others. In fact, from Taipei’s own past experience in relation to the 
cross-Strait confrontation, the TGS has always taken account of the 
international environment, in particular the American factor, though it has also 
been constrained by the same. Accordingly, Taipei needs a cocktail strategy, 
which builds on a combination of realist and liberalist insights, to further 
internationalise the Taiwan issue at all costs to increase the likelihood of 
international intervention in its favour in the event of war, so as to compensate 
for its own limited material power. In short, given the historical evidence that 
possessing superior material power does not necessarily lead to military-
political domination, the small state of Taiwan might still have a fair chance of 
finding a way to deal with China to preserve its de facto sovereign 
independence. As Chiang Ching-kuo once put it, well encapsulating Taiwan’s 
grand strategy, when facing unexpected and unmanaged changes in the dynamic 
strategic environment, ‘Small nations have to adjust to international geopolitical 
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